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
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D. J. McMAHON, D.D.

Imprimatur.

✠ MICHAEL AUGUSTINE,
ARCHBISHOP OF NEW YORK.

NEW YORK, Aug. 11, 1898.

ELEMENTARY COURSE

OF

CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY

BASED ON THE PRINCIPLES OF

THE BEST SCHOLASTIC AUTHORS

ADAPTED FROM THE FRENCH OF

BROTHER LOUIS OF POISSY

BY

THE BROTHERS OF THE CHRISTIAN SCHOOLS

NEW YORK

P. O'SHEA, 45 WARREN STREET

1893

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Walker fund

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BRIEF OF OUR HOLY FATHER, POPE PIUS IX.

*Dilecto Filio, Fr. Aloisio de Poissy,
Congregationis Fratrum Scho-
larum Christianarum, Biterras.*

PIUS PP. IX.

DILECTE FILI, SALUTEM ET
APOSTOLICAM BENEDICTIONEM.

Si sedulo cavendum est in qualibet arte aut scientia, ne quoquo modo principia deflectant a vero, id maxime profecto curandum est in philosophia earum duce, præsertim vero in tanta errorum coluvie, quæ ab ipsius nimirum corruptione manavit.

Gratulamur itaque te, Dilecte Fili, scientiæ hujus elementa traditurum, rejectis recentiorum commentis, Angelicum Doctorem et ceteros fuisse sequutum, qui, Ecclesia veritatis magistra prælucente, sapientia et operositate sua philosophiam mirifice illustra-

*To our Beloved Son, Brother Louis
of Poissy, of the Congregation of
the Brothers of the Christian
Schools, Beziers.*

PIUS IX., POPE.

BELoved SON, HEALTH AND
APOSTOLIC BENEDICTION.

If in any art or science whatever special care must be taken that principles may in no way conflict with truth, this is above all necessary in philosophy, the queen and moderatrix of the arts and sciences. But especially must we be on our guard in the great flood of errors, of which the corruption of philosophy has been the unfailing source.

We, therefore, congratulate you, Beloved Son, on the manner in which you have treated of the elements of this science. Setting aside the false systems of more recent writers, you have followed the Angelic Doctor and those who, guided by the light of the Church,

vi *BRIEF OF OUR HOLY FATHER, POPE PIUS IX.*

runt; et ex iis deprompsisse doctrinas, quibus mentes fingeres commissorum tibi adolescentium.

Gaudemus autem, *Elementarem* *Oursum Philosophiæ Christianæ*, a te editum, probatum fuisse egregio Episcopo tuo; et cum ipso tibi ominamur, ut illud in plurimorum utilitatem vergat.

Interim vero divini favoris auspiciem et paternæ Nostræ benevolentiae pignus Apostolicam Benedictionem tibi Dilecte Fili, peramanter impertimus.

Datum Romæ apud S. Petrum die 13 Martii, anno 1876, Pontificatus Nostri anno tricesimo.

PIUS PP. IX.

the Mistress of truth, have, by their wisdom and diligent labor, wonderfully illustrated philosophy. From their works you have drawn the doctrines by which to form the minds of the young men confided to your care.

We are glad that the *Elementary Course of Christian Philosophy*, which you have published, has received the approbation of a Bishop so distinguished as yours; and with him we earnestly wish that it may prove beneficial to many.

In the meantime, as a presage of the divine favor and a pledge of our paternal love, we very affectionately impart to you, Beloved Son, the Apostolic Benediction.

Given at Rome, at St. Peter's, March 13, 1876, in the thirtieth year of Our Pontificate.

PIUS IX., POPE.

APPROBATION OF THE BISHOP OF MONTPELLIER.

MONTPELLIER, Aug. 15, 1875.

IT is with pleasure that we authorize Brother Louis, Sub-Director of the Boarding-School of Beziers, to publish for the use of his pupils his *Course of Christian Philosophy based on the Principles of the best Scholastic Authors*, which by our order he submitted to a careful examination. The learned priest to whom we entrusted the revision of the work has returned it with a flattering testimonial of its merit. We shall, therefore, be glad to see it in the hands of the young men of our schools, and to learn that its principles have been made familiar even to the pupils of our first classes. For it is these old philosophical teachings which prepared our fathers to become such good theologians, and which rendered their faith so enlightened and their reasoning so sound.

✠ FR. M. ANATOLE,
Bp. of Montpellier.

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

THIS manual of philosophy has been translated into English, with a view to meet the needs of a growing class of youth of both sexes. On all sides they are beset with doubt and error concerning even the primary truths that are the foundation of both science and religion. Their critical position was clearly perceived by the eagle glance of Pope Leo XIII., when he penned his immortal encyclical "Aeterni Patris." The impatient exclamation uttered by a graduate of a noted American University: "I cannot endure philosophy; its professors are ever wrangling about principles," is re-echoed by all who are "carried about with every wind of doctrine." Upon all such the illustrious pontiff who to-day teaches the world from the chair of Peter, has urged the study of the "wisdom of St. Thomas," whose keen analysis of the fundamental principles of philosophy and the opposite errors are an inexhaustible mine for the students of all succeeding ages. In this translation it is hoped that our youth will find a sure vantage ground, whence, as far as time and talent will allow, they may make excursions into the grand and inspiring depths of philosophy.

Such changes have been introduced into the original text and such additions made as the experience of the class-room for some years past, and the phases of thought of the last decade, especially in this coun-

try, have rendered either necessary or advisable. With the earnest desire that in the pages of this book may be found a sure guide for the intellect and an ennobling incentive for the will, the work is placed as an offering of love at the feet of Mary Immaculate.

NEW YORK, *Feast of the Purification*, 1893.

PREFACE.

THE aim of this work is to present, in as brief an outline as possible, a complete course of philosophy. Besides questions of direct utility for examinations, we have endeavored to introduce, at least summarily, many others of real importance, and without which there can be no philosophy properly so called.

A few words will suffice to explain our mode of procedure and the use which may be made of this work. Each paragraph contains an abridged formula intended to be learned *verbatim*, and a short development which may serve as a basis for the explanation of the professor. The formulas will prove of great utility to the student who takes pains to memorize them: they classify in the mind distinctly and logically all that is indispensably required in philosophy; they render the preparation for an examination easy; and very often they are a brief, precise, and full answer to the questions proposed. The development usually gives in their essential outlines the principal proofs of the foregoing formula. Comparisons, multiplied examples, detailed comments, have been purposely retrenched. We have confined ourselves to simple summaries, which will enable the student to follow and remember the instructions of the professor. Experience has proved that this method, apparently somewhat abstract and barren, is, in reality, very advantageous, since it obliges the student to have re-

course to that direct and personal work without which there can be no true intellectual formation.

Some, doubtless, may think that this work introduces questions too difficult for beginners, such, for instance, as ideas, universals, matter and form, space, time, and others, which are attended with serious difficulties even in treatises which deal with them in detail. But, these questions being so important, it seems to us that they cannot be altogether omitted without leaving philosophy destitute of foundation and consistency. This remark applies especially to the treatise on General Metaphysics. In its present concise form, it will, perhaps, be found too abstruse; still we have thought it proper to retain it, though it should prove of no other use than to serve as a summary for those who wish to make a more profound study of the subject.

Another charge may be brought against this course, that of being based on the method and doctrine of the Schoolmen. For we have, in fact, everywhere endeavored faithfully to reproduce the principles of the Thomistic school, as interpreted by Goudin, Sanseverino, Liberatore, Kleutgen, Prisco, Gonzalez, Tapparelli, and others, whose text we have often merely summarized and sometimes embodied in full. But this reproach, were it really merited, would be assuredly in our eyes the best eulogy that could be bestowed on this modest work. The Scholastic philosophy, which was adopted during many centuries by all the universities of Europe, and the abandonment of which has been attended with such fatal results, has undeniably in its favor not only the prestige of time and the authority of the greatest geniuses, but that which to the Christian is of more value, the sanction of the Church. Following this philosophy

we are sure never to stray from Catholic teaching ; while away from it we find only discordant, unsubstantial doctrines, often evidently erroneous or proscribed.

But some may object that we must pay due deference to the necessities of the times, that therefore the wisest course nowadays is, indeed, to avoid manifest errors, but still not to return, at least openly, to these old doctrines, which would expose us to be regarded as not only not progressive but even retrogressive. To this we reply that to reject the false without affirming the true is to leave the mind in suspense, not knowing where to rest ; it is to take from it all energy and vitality by depriving it of its proper and necessary element ; it is, in fine, to deliver it over without power or defence to the seductions of error.

May this humble work be free from that vagueness, or, rather, absence of doctrine, too often met with in certain elementary works on philosophy ; and may it contribute, in its own modest way, to the diffusion of the beautiful and fruitful teachings of Scholastic Philosophy.

Shortly after the publication of the first edition of this work, a Latin translation of it was made at Rome by Mgr. Amoni, canon, at present secretary of the Apostolic Nunciature at Vienna.

We give below the preface of the learned translator :

“I will be brief, kind reader, but I wish that you should know the two principal motives which have led me to consider the publication of this ‘Elementary Course of Philosophy’ as eminently opportune. First, though distinguished by an admirable brevity, it omits nothing necessary to a full knowledge of the subject ; secondly, and this is much more important at

the present time, the method of teaching adopted by the French author is conformable to that of the old Schoolmen, and his doctrines agree on all points with those of St. Thomas of Aquin. Now, however little you consider with what earnestness the learned Roman Pontiff Leo XIII. recommends to all the faithful of Jesus Christ the philosophy of the holy Doctor, you will easily understand that, in our day especially, this work merits the preference over all others.

“In fact, if the love of truth should always and everywhere move the minds and hearts of men, and if every one should direct all his efforts to acquiring truth, since its possession constitutes man’s happiness, we must apply ourselves so much the more earnestly to the task, now that the war against truth has become more active, and we are exposed to greater danger of falling into error. Although charged during seventeen years with the duty of teaching philosophy to young men, I shall never regret having undertaken this translation, because, in my opinion, there can be found in no other work anything more methodical, more exact, or more useful.”

At the time of the publication at Rome of the Latin translation, the *Osservatore Romano* recommended the work in a lengthy article, from which we extract the following :

“He who desires to procure this work, either for his own use or that of others, must not expect to find therein anything new in matter or form. We assure him, however, that he will find in it as pecial advantage : it contains an abridged and lucid exposition of all the parts of a sound philosophy — principles, method, doctrine — all are conformable to, or rather borrowed from, the most accredited and safe sources, whether ancient or modern, of a sound philosophy.

In short, errors are briefly exposed and so successfully refuted as to make young men certain of the truth and competent to defend it against Rationalism and Naturalism, which, in our day more than in any other age, infect society.

"Students of philosophy should feel thankful to the author, as well as to the learned translator, who has favored Italy, and especially institutions of scientific education, with a book entirely safe on all points. It is also extremely useful on account of the principles which it contains and expounds, the matter for reflection which it offers to young men, and the opportunity of making a fuller exposition which it furnishes to professors of philosophy. We believe, in fact, that it is neither useful nor advisable to put into the hands of young students a book which fatigues by its copiousness and the unnecessary difficulties introduced, and which, moreover, renders the oral instruction of the teacher superfluous."

A Vienna journal, the *Vaterland*, in the issue of April 9, 1882, concludes in these words an article upon the same work, translated by Mgr. Amoni:

"This work, by reason of the richness of matter presented, must take its place among the best works on Christian Philosophy which have appeared in these latter times. We do not possess in German any manual of philosophy which, in 416 pages, contains such a large amount of matter so happily and perfectly elaborated."

WORKS TO CONSULT.

- GOUDIN**,—*Philosophie suivant les principes de Saint Thomas*. Paris, chez Poussielgue.
- KLEUTGEN**,—*La Philosophie scolastique, exposée et défendue*. Paris, chez Gaume.
- SANSEVERINO**,—*Philosophia christiana cum antiqua et nova comparata*. Paris, chez Lethiellieux.
- “ —*Manuel de la Philosophie chrétienne*. Idem.
- LIBERATORE**,—*Institutiones philosophicæ ad triennium accommodatæ*. Romæ, ufficio della Civiltà Catolica.
- “ —*Elementa ethicæ et juris naturæ*. Idem.
- “ —*Le composé humain*. Lyon, chez Briday.
- “ —*Théorie de la connaissance intellectuelle*. Paris, chez veuve Casterman.
- PRISCO**,—*Elementi di filosofias speculativa*. Paris, chez Lethiellieux.
- “ —*Metafisica della morale*. Idem.
- TAPARELLI**,—*Essai théorique de droit naturel*. Paris, chez veuve Casterman.
- GONZALEZ**,—*Estudios sobre la filosofia de S. Thomas*. Madrid, imprenta de Lopez.
- “ —*Filosofia elemental*. Idem.
- FREDAULT**,—*Traité d'anthropologie physiologique et philosophique*. Paris, chez G. Bailliére.
- ZIGLIARA**,—*Summa Philosophica*. Lyons, chez Briday.
- DE SALINIS ET DE SCORBIAC**,—*Précis de l'histoire de la philosophie*. Paris, chez Hachette.

All these works are worthy of high esteem; but we commend especially those of Liberatore, who was among the first to recall and restore Christian Philosophy, and of Cardinal Zigliara, who is eminently trained and skilled in the teachings of St. Thomas.

To these may be added the following excellent works in English :

- HARPER**,—*Metaphysics of the School*. London, Macmillan & Co.
- “ —*Manuals of Catholic Philosophy (Stonyhurst Series)*. New York, Cincinnati, and Chicago, Benziger Bros.

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INTRODUCTORY.

DEFINITION OF PHILOSOPHY.—ITS EXCELLENCE AND UTILITY.—ITS DIVISION.

1. *Philosophy is the science of things through their highest or ultimate causes, so far as it may be attained by the light of reason.*—Whatever exists may be known in two ways: the first is by a spontaneous, common knowledge of things, such as every man may acquire; the second is by a reflex knowledge, peculiar to minds desiring to account for things and to know them in their principles and ultimate causes: this latter is philosophic knowledge. But the principles of things are partly confined to special sciences, and partly underlie all human knowledge; the former constitute the philosophy of this or that science; the latter alone are the object of philosophy properly so called. These principles or ultimate causes are investigated by the light of reason; and so philosophy is divided off from Sacred Theology, which rests on divinely revealed principles.

2. *The excellence and utility of philosophy are manifest, whether it be considered in itself, or in its relations with the other sciences.*—Since philosophy treats of things in their highest causes, it is in itself the noblest object that can engage the mind of man; it teaches him the knowledge of truth and enables him to attain his greatest natural perfection. Relatively to the other sciences, it is evident that since philosophy lays

down their first principles, it is their foundation, and exercises the most direct influence over their development, as experience besides has shown.

3. *Philosophy may be divided into real, rational, and moral philosophy.*—Every science may be divided into as many parts as there are different aspects under which the object of which it treats may be viewed. But the object of philosophy in general is *being*, which may be considered under three aspects : as *real* and possessing attributes independent of our cognition ; as *ideal* and having attributes which result from our mental action ; or as *moral* when regarded as the term * of voluntary action. Philosophy, then, may treat of the ultimate principles of things either in the order of reality, or of cognition, or of morality ; its divisions are, therefore, called *physical*, *logical*, and *ethical* ; or, if we use the Latin equivalents, *natural* or *real*, *rational*, and *moral*. The ontological order, or order of existence would require us to begin with real philosophy or metaphysics ; we must, however, first study rational philosophy, because it points out the laws of the human mind in acquiring knowledge, and trains it to discern the true from the false, thus furnishing the means to study real being more easily and securely.

* “ *Term* in general is a boundary or limit. In Logic, it denotes the subject and predicate of a judgment ; the major, minor, and middle of a syllogism. In Metaphysics, it denotes the limit of a cause, more particularly of an efficient cause. In Ethics, the final cause is the term, because the limit of desire.”—HARPER, *Metaphysics of the School*, vol. i., p. 589. .

RATIONAL PHILOSOPHY.

ITS DIVISION.

Rational Philosophy is divided into Logic, Ideology, and Criteriology.—As rational philosophy considers entities in respect to the knowledge which we have of them, it ought (1) to investigate the laws which govern the intellect, the instrument by which we know; (2) to treat of ideas, the means by which we know; (3) to determine the value of the knowledge acquired by the intellect. Hence rational philosophy is divided into three principal parts: 1. *Logic*, or the science of the laws of thought; 2. *Ideology*, or the science of ideas; 3. *Criteriology*, or the science of the criteria of certitude.

LOGIC.

DEFINITION OF LOGIC.—ITS UTILITY.—ITS DIVISION.

1. *Logic is the science of the laws which the intellect must obey in order to acquire readily and surely the knowledge of truth.*—The human mind in its search after truth is subject to laws imposed on it by its very nature. The ascertainment of these laws constitutes *Logic*. *Logic* is a science rather than an art, because it considers the laws of the mind in their intrinsic

principles and general applications, and is not confined to an enumeration of practical rules.*

2. *Logic is of great utility for advancing in the cognition of truth, for guarding against error, and acquiring proficiency in any science whatever.*—As Logic habituates the intellect to classify and co-ordinate knowledge, it gives us great facility for progressing still further in the acquisition of truth; moreover, by familiarizing the mind with the nature and structure, as also the artifices, of reasoning, it enables us easily to discern the vices of a sophism and the false appearances by which error seeks to seduce the mind. Finally, it is evident that, as the sciences can advance only by means of reasoning, nothing is more conducive to their progress and easy acquisition than Logic, which is, in fact, the science of reasoning itself.

3. *Logic is divided into three principal parts: the first investigates the nature and laws of reasoning; the second expounds the general conditions of science; the third determines the general rules of method.*—The object of logic is reasoning; but in reasoning three things may be considered: the nature of reasoning, the end of reasoning, which is science, and, lastly, the process or method followed to reach this end more easily. Logic, therefore, is divided into three parts, corresponding to the three aspects under which reasoning may be considered.

* Considered as “an enumeration of practical rules” for the detection and refutation of error, logic is an art. Hence, while logic is chiefly and primarily a science, it is dependently and secondarily an art.—Aristotle defines art as “science employed in production.”

PART FIRST.

DIALECTICS.

REASONING AND ITS CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS.

4. *Dialectics, the first part of Logic, has reasoning for its object, and treats: 1. of Simple Apprehension; 2. of Judgment; 3. of Reasoning.*—Reasoning is a complex operation, whose elements are judgment and simple apprehension. Every reasoning supposes several judgments, and every judgment supposes the apprehension of two ideas. Hence, before considering reasoning in itself, we must treat of judgment and simple apprehension. † /

CHAPTER I.

SIMPLE APPREHENSION.

ART. I.—NATURE OF SIMPLE APPREHENSION.

5. *Simple Apprehension is that first operation of the intellect by which it seizes or perceives an object without any affirmation or negation concerning it.*—The first act of the mind is a simple view by which it apprehends objects presented to it, without affirming or denying anything of them. The result of this operation is ar

ideal reproduction of the object perceived; this reproduction is called a *mental term*, *concept*, *notion*, or *idea*. If the mental term is expressed orally, it is called an *oral term* or *word*.

ART. II.—IDEAS AND ORAL TERMS.

6. *An idea is a mere intellectual representation of an object, by which that object is known.*—The human intellect is not necessitated by its nature to know any one determinate object. Now, since it is indifferent in this respect, it must, when it actually knows an object, be determined to know by that object. But this object can determine the intellect to know only by being united to it in some way. The intellect, evidently, cannot go out of itself to effect this union, nor can the object in its physical reality enter the intellect. The union of object and intellect, therefore, must be effected by a species, form, or likeness of the object. It is this medium of union, and therefore of knowledge, that we call an idea.* It must be carefully distinguished from the sensible image or phantasm, which is proper to sense only, and is therefore material; whereas the idea is spiritual and proper to intellect, and represents not the sensible qualities of an individual object, but its nature as one of a class of objects.

7. *An oral term is a conventional word which expresses an idea.*—Unlike the idea or mental term, which from its very nature represents the object, the oral term has a meaning only in virtue of the usage and agree-

* When viewed as the product of the joint action of object and intellect, it is called a concept, and the action producing it is called conception.

ment of men. It directly expresses the idea, and through this the object itself; but habit leads us usually to unite the idea of the word with the idea of the thing.

ART. III.—DIVISION OF TERMS.

8. *Ideas are concrete or abstract, clear or obscure, distinct or confused, complete or incomplete.*—Considered with reference to the manner in which the object is presented to the intellect, an idea is *concrete* when the object is apprehended in its physical reality with all its belongings; as the idea of a “learned man” or a “marble statue.” It is *abstract* when the object is apprehended apart from its real existence or its physical connections; as the idea of “learning” or of “whiteness.”

In respect to the degree of perfection with which the object is apprehended, an idea is *clear* or *obscure* according as the object perceived through it can or cannot be distinguished from other objects. The idea we have of a “brother” or “sister,” or of “virtue,” *v. g.*, is clear.

An idea is *distinct* or *confused* according as it does or does not exhibit the marks by which the object is distinguished from other objects; the idea of “virtue,” *v. g.*, is distinct when by it we know not only that virtue is an acquired habit, but also that it inclines the will to act rightly.

An idea is *complete* and *adequate* or *incomplete* and *inadequate* according as all or only some of the constituent elements of the object are known; the idea of “man” as a rational animal is complete.

9. *An oral term is significant or insignificant, fixed or vague, univocal or equivocal, analogous by attribution or analogous by proportion.*—An oral term is significant if

it means something, as "man;" it is *insignificant* if it has no meaning, as "tervoc."

An oral term is *fixed* if it has a settled meaning, as "God;" it is *vague* if its meaning varies at the will of him who uses it, as "Nature," which sometimes means the visible universe, sometimes the essence of a thing, etc.

An oral term is *univocal* when it has but one meaning for the several objects to which it is applied, as "man," which signifies the same thing when applied to Peter and to Paul; it is *equivocal* when its meaning varies for each of several things, as "dog," when applied to a star and an animal. An oral term is *analogous*, if it signifies several things which are not of the same nature, but have some similitude, as "foot," which is applied to a part of the animal body and to the base of a mountain. A term is analogous by *analogy of attribution* when it denotes one thing primarily and intrinsically, and applies to others only on account of the relation which they have to the first, either *extrinsically*, as when "healthy" is predicated of food and of the animal organism; or *intrinsically*, as when "being" is predicated of God and creatures, of substance and accident. A term is analogous by *proportion* when it is applied to several things which differ in reality, but which bear a certain proportion to one another; as "principle," which has a proportionate resemblance when applied to source, heart, and point.

10. *Mental and oral terms are significant by themselves or with another term, positive or negative, concrete or abstract, real or logical, absolute or connotative, implex or complex, transcendental or predicamental, connexed or disparate, predicable or subjective, antecedent or consequent, collective or distributive, singular or universal.*

—A term, whether mental or oral, is *significant by itself* when by itself it has a meaning, and therefore may be the entire subject or attribute of a proposition, as “hero;” it is *significant with another* when by itself it has no meaning, and therefore cannot alone be subject or attribute of a proposition, as “some.”

A term is *positive* when it signifies some entity, as “light;” it is *negative* when it denotes the absence of some entity, as “blindness.”

A term is *concrete* when it denotes a thing with its belongings as it really exists, as “Peter;” it is *abstract* when it denotes a thing viewed apart from the subject to which it belongs, and from which it has no separate existence, as “whiteness.”

A term is *real* when it signifies something having existence outside the intellect, as “God;” it is *logical* when it signifies a thing which has no existence except what intellect gives it, as “species,” “genus.”

A term is *absolute* or *substantive* when it denotes a thing as existing in itself, whether the thing be really substance, as “man,” or accident, as “prudence;” it is *connotative* or *adjective* when it denotes something accessory to another, whether the thing be accident, as “good,” or substance, as “philosopher.”

A term is *incomplex* when it denotes one thing by a single sign, as “angel;” it is *complex* when it denotes several realities or consists of several words, as “poet,” which denotes the man and his art; “Julius Cæsar,” which consists of two words; the “Emperor Charlemagne,” which is complex in word and in reality, for it embraces two words and two realities.

A term is *transcendental* when it signifies something applicable to all things, as “being,” “something,” “one,” “true,” “good;” it is *predicamental* when it

signifies something which applies only to certain beings, as "brute."

Terms are *connexed* when one includes or excludes the other, as "man and animal," "white and black;" they are *disparate* when they have no relation of exclusion or subordination, as "white and learned."

A term is *predicable* when it can be affirmed of another; it is *subjective* when another can be affirmed of it; thus, in the proposition, "God is just," *God* is subject and *just* predicate.

An *antecedent* term is that which another follows, as "man" in respect to animal; a *consequent* term is that which follows another, as "animal" in respect to man. If terms are deduced from each other, they are called *reciprocal*, as "man and rational."

A term is *collective* when it denotes several things taken conjointly, as "people," "nation;" it is *distributive* when it denotes several things in such a manner that it may be applied to each in particular, as "man."

A term is *singular* when it signifies one thing determinately, as "Aristotle;" it is *universal* when it applies to several things univocally and distributively, as "animal." In treating of universal terms, we may consider: 1. Universal terms in themselves, and the five Species into which they are divided; 2. The division of universal terms into different Supreme Genera, called Categories.

ART. IV.—UNIVERSALS.

11. *Universals are terms which are applied univocally and distributively to many things.*—When the intellect perceives the essence of an object abstracted from the individual characteristics of that object, it may con-

sider the mental term representing the essence as applicable to every being which has the common essence ; the term is then called *universal*, as "man." Its opposite is the *singular* term, which is applicable to one determinate thing only, as "Socrates." A *particular* term is a universal affected by the sign of particularity, which limits it to a part of what the term denotes, as "some men."


12. *Universal terms have two properties : comprehension and extension, which are in inverse ratio to each other.*—The essence represented by a universal term is made up of one or of many elements ; thus, the essence of man consists of "animality and rationality ;" the *comprehension* or *intension* of a universal term is the sum of the elements which it contains. The essence represented by a universal term is found in a greater or less number of subjects ; thus, the essence of man is found in every man ; the *extension* of a universal term is the number of beings to which it applies. The greater the comprehension of a term, the less its extension, and vice versa.

13. *There are five modes according to which a universal term may be applied to individuals of like nature ; there are, therefore, five classes of universals, viz., genus, species, difference, property, and accident.* These universals are also called *predicables*.—A universal term expresses either the essence of a thing or something added to the essence. In the former case, it expresses either the whole essence or only a part of it. If it denotes the whole essence, it is a *species*, and the beings to which it is applied are called *individuals*, as "man."

If the universal denotes only a part of the essence, it denotes either the part common to other species, or the part by which the essence differs from them : in the first case it is called *genus*, and in the second *spe-*

cific difference ; thus, “ animal ” expresses what is common to both man and brute, and “ rational ” expresses the specific difference which distinguishes man from brute.

If the universal denotes what is added to the essence, either this attribute cannot be separated from the essence, but is a necessary attendant of it, so that it is always found in the whole species and in that species only, in which case it is a *property* ; or it can be separated without changing the essence, and then it is an *accident* ; thus, “ free will ” is a property, “ learning ” is an accident of man. Genus, species, and difference are divided into highest, intermediate, and lowest or proximate, as may be seen in the following diagram.



ART. V.—PREDICAMENTS OR CATEGORIES.

14. *Predicaments or categories are the highest genera in which all real entities are classified ; or, they are the highest genera of all things.*—When the intellect examines an object, it seeks what attributes or predicates it can

affirm or deny of that object. These *predicates* all have their place under the predicables. But all the different *objects* which the intellect can know, have been arranged in logic under certain supreme genera ; these genera are called *predicaments* or *categories*.

15. *There are ten predicaments or categories : substance, quantity, relation, quality, action, passion, time, place, posture, habiliment.*—Every being exists either in itself or in another. If it exists in itself, it is called *substance* ; if it exists in another as its subject, it is called *accident*. Accident is divided into nine genera ; for, if we wish to know the accidents of a substance, Pope Leo XIII., for instance, we may put the following questions : 1. How large a man is he ? the answer to which gives *quantity* ; 2. Whose father or son is he ? which implies *relation* ; 3. What are his qualifications ? *quality* ; 4. What does he do ? *action* ; 5. What does he suffer ? *passion* ; 6. In what age does he live ? *time* ; 7. Where is he ? *place* ; 8. Is he sitting or standing ? *posture* ; 9. How is he clad ? *habit* or *habiliment*.

16. *Comparing with one another the things arranged under the predicaments, we may consider their opposition, priority, simultaneity, motion, and mode of having ; these are called post-predicaments.*—*Opposition* is the repugnance of one thing to another. It may be in four ways : as *Contrary*, when the two things, falling under a common genus, are mutually incompatible in the same subject, as “heat and cold” under the genus temperature ; as *Relative*, when the repugnance arises from a mutual relation, as “father and son ;” as *Privative*, when the repugnance arises between a thing and its privation, as “sight and blindness ;” as *Contradictory*, when the repugnance is between being and not-being, as “man and not-man.”

Priority is that by which one thing precedes an-

other. It is of five kinds: 1. Priority of *duration*, as "an old man is prior in existence to a youth;" 2. Of *consequence*, as "man precedes rational;" 3. Of *order*, as in the study of language "grammar precedes literature;" 4. Of *dignity*, as "king and subjects;" 5. Of *nature*, as the "sun and its rays."—*Simultaneity* is opposed to priority, hence it is also of five kinds.

Motion is the passage from one state to another. It is of six kinds: 1. *Generation*, or the passage from non-being to substantial being; 2. *Corruption*, or the passage from being to non-being; 3. *Augmentation*, or the passage from a less to a greater quantity; 4. *Diminution*, which is the opposite of augmentation; 5. *Alteration*, or the passage from one quality to another; 6. *Locomotion*, or the passage from one place to another.—The *modes of having* are five: 1. *Inherence*, as "a man has knowledge;" 2. *Containing*, as "a decanter has wine;" 3. *Possession*, as "a man has a field;" 4. *Relation*, as "a father has a son;" 5. *Juxtaposition*, as "a man has a garment on."

ART. VI.—PROPERTIES OF TERMS IN A PROPOSITION.

17. *Terms have six properties: supposition, appellation, state, amplification, restriction, alienation.*—Supposition is the particular signification of a word in a given proposition, as, "Angel is a word." *Angel* here signifies merely the word, not the nature of which the word is the sign.

Appellation is the application of one term to another, as "God is good;" here *good* is applied to God.

State is the acceptance of a term for the time indicated by the verb, as, "Peter sings."

Amplification is the acceptance of a term for a wider

time than that indicated by the verb, as, "The dumb speak."

Restriction is the limitation of the signification of a term to a narrower sphere; as, "Eve is the mother of the living." Here the word *living* is restricted to men.

Alienation is the acceptance of a term in a metaphorical or figurative sense, as "Sun of Justice," used to designate the Saviour. "All nature smiles," is also an instance of the alienation of a term.

18. *Supposition is material or formal, real or logical, particular, collective, or distributive.*—The supposition of a term is *material* when the term signifies itself; as, "Man is a word." It is *formal* when it denotes an object, as, "Man is rational;" and then it is *real*, if it expresses an object as it exists in itself independently of any mental consideration; as, "Man is a living being;" or *logical*, if it denotes an object abstracted from its individual characteristics; as, "Man is a species." Real formal supposition is *particular* when the term signifies some only of the beings which it can represent; as, "Some men are deceitful." It is *collective* when it signifies all the beings which it can represent, taken conjointly; as, "The Apostles are twelve;" and *distributive* when it expresses all and each of the beings which it can represent; as, "Man is mortal."

19. *Supposition is subject to the following rules:* 1. A term affected by a universal sign has a distributive or collective supposition; as, "All the Evangelists are saints," "All the Evangelists are four." 2. A term affected by a particular sign has a particular supposition; as, "Some men are just." 3. When the subject of a proposition is not affected by any sign, it has a universal supposition in necessary matter; as, "Man is rational;" it has a particular supposition in con-

tingent matter ; as, "Men are wise." 4. In an affirmative proposition, the supposition of the predicate is always particular ; as, "Man is mortal ;" in a negative proposition, the supposition of the predicate is universal ; as, "Man is not a plant." 5. In every proposition, the supposition of the subject is according to the requirement of the predicate ; hence a numerical term requires a collective supposition ; as, "The Apostles are twelve ;" a necessary term requires a distributive supposition ; as, "Animals are sensitive ;" a contingent term requires a particular supposition ; as, "Men are wise."

20. *Appellation is material or formal.*—Appellation is *material* when the predicate is applied to the matter of the subject, without regard to the form which denominates the subject ; as, "The physician sings." It is *formal* when the predicate is applied to the form of the subject, *i.e.*, to the quality or form which denominates the subject ; as, "The physician cures."*

21. *Appellation is subject to the following rules :* 1. When the predicate is a concrete term, the appellation is material ; as, "Man is a living being." 2. When the subject is qualified, the predicate is affirmed of the subject only, and the appellation is material ; as, "St. Thomas of Aquin was a disciple of Albertus Magnus." 3. When the predicate is qualified, the predicate with its qualifier is affirmed of the subject, and the appellation is formal ; as, "Thomas of Aquin was a saintly disciple of Albertus Magnus."

* In the first example the predicate *sings* must be applied, not to the form or quality of physician, but to the subject *man*, which the form denominates. In the second example, *cures* naturally belongs to the physician as such, and therefore is applied to the form. Form, in general, is *any determination whatever by which a subject is affected.*

ART. VII.—MEANS TO INSURE PROPRIETY OF TERMS.—DEFINITION.

22. *Terms, to be perfect, must be clear and distinct. To obtain this result, we have recourse to definition and division.*—The aim of these two processes being to clear up what is obscure or confused, it is evident that they should not be employed upon what is already sufficiently clear and distinct.

23. *Definition is a brief explanation of the meaning of a term or the nature of a thing.*—Whence it follows that there are two kinds of definition, *nominal* and *real*; the first explains the meaning of the word, the second explains the nature of the thing signified by the word. It should be observed: 1. That the nominal definition ought to precede the real, when the nature of a thing is in question and the meaning of the word expressing it is not understood; 2. That the nominal definition, in reasoning, must never be considered tantamount to the real definition; 3. That the real definition only is scientific.

24. *There are three kinds of nominal definition:* 1. *According to etymology*; 2. *According to usage*; 3. *According to the meaning which the person using it wishes to attach to it.*—A real definition is either *causal* or *essential*.—A nominal definition may be given according to *etymology*; as, “Intelligence (from the Latin *intus legere*, to read within) signifies intimate knowledge.” We may also define a term according to *usage*; as, “By the word God, all understand the Infinite Being.” Finally, we may attach to a term *whatever meaning we choose*. In this case, however, care should be taken: 1. Not to be so arbitrary in our choice as to become

unintelligible to others; 2. Not to use the word in a different sense during the discourse.

A *causal* definition explains a thing by means of the principle which produces or generates it; as, "A sphere is a solid generated by the revolution of a semicircle about its diameter." An *essential* definition explains a thing by giving its essence; as, "Man is a rational animal." This is the most perfect kind of definition. A thing is sometimes explained by describing it; such a description is called a *descriptive* or *oratorical* definition.

25. *Definition should contain the proximate genus and specific difference.*—By definition the thing defined should be distinguished from every other thing, and should be known in its characteristics. But without the proximate genus the characteristics of the thing are not known; and without the specific difference the species to which the thing belongs is not known. In this definition, "Man is a rational animal," *animal* determines the proximate genus, and *rational* the specific difference. This rule includes that laid down by modern logicians, viz., Definition must apply to the whole of the thing defined and to nothing else.

Three rules are ordinarily given for a definition: 1. The definition should be clearer than the thing defined; 2. It should be convertible with the thing defined; 3. The thing defined should not enter into the definition.

ART. VII.—DIVISION.

26. *Division is the distribution of a whole into its parts. Division is actual* or potential.*—As division is the

* An actual whole is either *physical* or *metaphysical*; *physical* when composed of really distinct parts, as body and soul in man; *metaphysical* when composed of parts that are only logically distinct, as animality and rationality in man.

separation of a whole into its parts, there are as many kinds of division as there are different kinds of whole. But a whole may be *actual* or *potential* ; hence division may be actual or potential : *actual* when the whole is divided into parts which it really has ; as, " Man is composed of body and soul ; " *potential* or *logical* when the whole is divided into parts which it has in virtue of its extension ; as, " Substance is corporeal or incorporeal."

27. *Division should be adequate, it should be made through the more universal members, and the members should exclude one another.*—1. The division should be complete, and hence equal to the whole thing divided ; thus, we should not divide *triangles* into *isosceles* and *equilateral*. 2. It should proceed from the more general parts to those which are less general ; thus, the division of *living things* into *plants*, *animals*, and *men* would be defective ; they should first be divided into *sentient* and *non-sentient*. 3. The dividing members should in some way exclude one another ; that is, one should not contain another, much less all, so as to be equal to the whole divided ; thus *man* should not be divided into *soul*, *body*, and *arms*. To these three rules may be added a fourth : The division should be brief, that is, the members should be few in number.

CHAPTER II.

JUDGMENT.

ART. I.—NATURE OF JUDGMENT.

28. *Judgment is the second operation of the intellect, by which it predicates the agreement or disagreement of the attribute with the subject.**—By simple apprehension the intellect perceives the subject and attribute separately ; but after this operation it compares them, and affirms or denies their agreement, that is, it forms a judgment. The intellect, by this second operation, perfects the first, which is initial and imperfect.

The chief division of judgments is that based on their nature, and embraces the two classes of *a priori* and *a posteriori* judgments.

An *a priori* judgment is one in which the agreement or disagreement of the ideas compared is necessary, and either is manifest or can become so from their mere consideration ; as, “ God is infinite.”

An *a posteriori* judgment is one in which the agreement or disagreement of the ideas compared is not necessary, and can be known from experience alone ; as, “ Columbus discovered America.”

A priori judgments are also called *necessary, analytical, pure, metaphysical, absolute*. *A posteriori* judg-

* Or with St Thomas : That action of the intellect by which it compounds or divides by affirming or denying.

ments are styled *contingent, synthetical, empirical, physical, hypothetical*.

29. *The a priori synthetical judgment of Kant must be rejected.*—In his “Critique of Pure Reason,” Kant lays down this third kind of judgment, the *a priori synthetical*. He holds rightly that all *a priori* or analytical judgments must fulfil three conditions : 1. The attribute must be included in the subject ; 2. It must be necessary ; 3. It must be universal. But he further maintains that such judgments as, “Every effect must have a cause,” or “7 and 5 are 12,” are wanting in the first condition. Now, every judgment implies the perception by the mind of the identity or diversity of the ideas compared. This identity or diversity can be apprehended either from the consideration of the ideas, and in this case the judgment is *a priori* or analytical ; or from some extrinsic source, *i.e.*, experience, and then the judgment is *a posteriori* or synthetical. Between these there is, therefore, no middle. Moreover, if the second and third conditions are fulfilled, evidently the first must also be fulfilled, since from it the other two result.

ART. II.—THE PROPOSITION AND ITS ELEMENTS.*

30. *A proposition is the expression of a judgment in words spoken or written. The elements of a proposition may be reduced to two, noun and verb.*—A proposition, as being the expression of a judgment, must contain as many terms as the judgment. But the judgment

* As Logic has to do with mental operations and their signs only in so far as they contain or express truth or falsity, so of all the kinds of sentence of which the grammarian treats, it is concerned with the declarative alone. This kind of sentence is called in logic a proposition.

is composed of three elements: *subject*, *attribute*, and *copula*. To these three elements of the judgment correspond the three elements of the proposition: *two terms*, which express the subject and predicate or attribute, and the *copula*, which unites them. The subject is generally a *noun*, the attribute an *adjective*; the copula is a *verb*. The copula is called a verb, because the word (*verbum*) of our mind is not complete without a judgment, and judgment is formally constituted only by the copula. The verb "to be" is explicitly or implicitly the copula in every judgment and proposition, because by it identity of subject and attribute, or want of identity, is expressed, and every proposition predicates one or the other. The terms constitute the *matter* of the proposition; the copula, which gives being to the proposition, is its *form*.

The verb "to be," or the copula, is often contained in the predicate, as "I love God," which is equivalent to "I am loving God." *

Besides the noun and the verb, Grammar recognizes other parts of speech, as the pronoun, adverb, conjunction, etc.; but Logic is not concerned with these terms, because they do not constitute an essential element of the proposition, and because they serve only to represent, modify, or connect nouns or verbs.

* The use of the term *predicate* in Logic must be carefully distinguished from its use in Grammar. In logic the attribute never includes the copula. Moreover, the copula, as the formal element of the judgment, must be in the present tense, indicative mood. Hence such propositions as, "The Martyrs suffered for the Faith," must be resolved into the equivalent, "The Martyrs are persons who suffered for the Faith."

ART. III.—DIVISION OF PROPOSITIONS.

31. *The division of propositions is the same as that of judgments. Hence a proposition is simple or compound according to the nature of the judgment expressed. A simple proposition is either simple incomplex or simple complex.*—A proposition being regarded in logic simply as the expression of a judgment, there are as many kinds of propositions as of judgments. But a judgment is *simple* or *compound*: *simple* when the relation is established between only one subject and one attribute; *compound* when there are several subjects or several attributes. When a judgment is simple, the attribute or the subject may be *absolutely* simple, or *simple by reason of the connection between the parts which compose it*; in the first case, the judgment is *simple incomplex* or *categorical*; as, “God is good:” in the second, it is *simple complex*; as, “He who loves not his neighbor, whom he sees, does not love God, whom he does not see.” Propositions, then, considered logically, are *simple* or *compound*. Grammarians who consider in propositions chiefly the words of which they consist, divide them into simple, complex, and compound; but Logic is not concerned with these divisions, since it contemplates propositions solely in their relation with thought.

32. *A categorical proposition, considered in respect to its quantity, is universal, particular, or singular, definite or indefinite; in respect to its quality, it is affirmative, negative, or infinitating; in respect to the mode or manner in which it asserts that the predicate belongs to the subject, it is modal.*—A categorical proposition may be divided in the same manner as the judgment which it ex-

presses. Hence according to its quantity, that is, according to the extension of its subject, it is *universal* if the subject is universal; as, "All men are mortal:" *particular* if the subject is particular; as, "Some men are just;" *singular* if the subject expresses only one individual determinately; as, "Peter is just." A proposition may sometimes appear universal without in reality being so; as, "Men are deceptive." Propositions are called *indefinite** when the subject is not affected by a determinate sign; as, "The Americans are enterprising;" and *definite* when the subject is affected by a determinate sign; as, "Some men are deceptive."

According to its *quality*, that is, according to the affirmation or negation indicated by the copula, a proposition is *affirmative*; as, "God is good:" or *negative*; as, "The soul is not mortal." If the negation does not affect the copula, but the predicate, the proposition is then said to be *infinitating*; as, "The human soul is not-mortal."

A proposition is *absolute* when it merely affirms the agreement or disagreement of subject and attribute; as, "God is just:" it is *modal* when it expresses the mode or manner in which the attribute is predicated of the subject; as, "God is necessarily just." The attribute may be predicated of the subject according to four modes: *necessary*, *contingent*, *possible*, and *impossible*. There are, then, four kinds of modal proposition: as, "Man is necessarily rational;" "Man may be good;" "Man can be bad;" "Man cannot be an angel." The *truth* of a modal proposition depends

* A singular proposition is the most limited case of the particular proposition. An indefinite proposition is universal or particular according as it expresses a necessary or a contingent truth.

on the mode according to which the attribute is predicated of the subject ; thus the proposition, " Man is necessarily bad," is false.*

33. *A compound proposition is either explicit or implicit. An explicit compound proposition is copulative, causal, adversative, relative, or hypothetical. A hypothetical proposition is conditional, disjunctive, or conjunctive. An implicit or exponible compound proposition is exclusive, exceptive, comparative, or reduplicative.*—A compound proposition consists of several propositions expressing several judgments which make but one by virtue of some logical bond established between them ; as, " If you are good, you will be rewarded." The *truth* of a compound proposition depends not upon each of the judgments, but upon the connection between them ; as, " If the soul is material, it is not immortal." A compound proposition is *copulative* when it has several categorical propositions united by the conjunction *and* or the like, expressed or understood ; as, " Time and Truth are friends."

It is *causal* when it states the reason why the antecedent contains the consequent, by means of the particle *because* or a word of similar import ; as, " He is proud, because he is rich."

It is *adversative* when it expresses some opposition between its members, by means of the particles *but*, *nevertheless*, etc.; as, " Virtue is persecuted, but it will be rewarded."

It is *relative* when it expresses some similitude

* The mode always affects the copula in true modal propositions. They are always capable of being reduced to another proposition of which the word or words expressing the mode is the predicate. Thus, " Man can be bad " is equivalent to " That man be bad is possible."

between the propositions that compose it; as, "As life is, so death shall be."

It is *hypothetical* when it states something not absolutely, but with the proviso that something else be verified; as, "If you love me, you are my disciple."

A hypothetical proposition is *conditional* when, by means of the particle *if*, it unites two categorical propositions, one of which contains the reason or condition of the other; as, "If you will live piously, you will suffer persecution." The proposition that contains the reason is called the *antecedent*, the other is the *consequent*. When the several component members of a hypothetical proposition are united by the particles *either*—*or*, or by *or* only, the proposition is *disjunctive*; as, "It is either day or night." But when a hypothetical proposition denies that two or more predicates can be affirmed of the same subject at the same time, it is *conjunctive*; as, "No man can serve both God and Mammon."

Besides these compound propositions proper, there are others really compound, though apparently categorical, and called *exponible*s. They are of four kinds: *exclusive*, *exceptive*, *comparative*, and *reduplicative*. The first is affected by an exclusive particle, as *only*, *alone*, or the like; as, "Virtue alone is praiseworthy;" and is expounded by the compound proposition: "Virtue is praiseworthy; nothing else is praiseworthy." The second is affected by an exceptive particle, *besides*, *except*; as, "All is lost except honor;" which is expounded thus: "Honor is not lost; all else is lost." The third is affected by a comparative particle, expressed or implied; as, "Gentleness effects more than violence;" which is equivalent to: "Gentleness effects something; violence effects something; the effect of gentleness is greater than

that of violence." The fourth is a proposition whose subject is affected by a particle which repeats it, *inasmuch as, as such, etc.*; as, "Fire, *inasmuch as* it is fire, burns;" which is equivalent to this: "Fire burns, because such is its nature."

34. *The propositions forming a compound proposition may be all principal, or some principal and others incidental.*—A compound proposition contains several independent judgments which may be expressed in several propositions; as, "Patience and meekness are virtues;" "Charity is meek and patient." That a compound proposition be *true*, all the parts which compose it must be true; thus the proposition, "Men and angels are mortal," is false.

A compound proposition may be resolved into several grammatical propositions either *co-ordinate, i.e.*, simply in juxtaposition, as in the foregoing example, or into propositions some of which are *principal* and others *incidental* and *explicative*; as, "Sin, detested by God, sullies the soul;" which is equivalent to the two independent judgments, "Sin is detested by God," and "Sin sullies the soul." If the propositions joined to the principal one are restrictive, the whole proposition is not compound but simple.

ART. IV.—PROPERTIES OF PROPOSITIONS.

35. *There are three properties of propositions: opposition, conversion, and equipollence.*


36. *Opposition is the affirmation and negation of the same thing in the same respect.*

37. *Opposition is twofold, contradictory and contrary.*—*Contradictory* opposition is the repugnance between two propositions, one being universal and the other particular, or both being singular.

Contrary opposition is the repugnance between two universal propositions.

Some recognize what is called *Subcontrary* opposition, which holds between two opposite particular propositions; but this is not true opposition, since the subjects of the two propositions may express different things. Still less can we consider as opposition that which is called *Subaltern*, and which holds between two affirmative or two negative propositions, the one being universal and the other particular. In this case there is no opposition, since there is no affirmation and negation of one and the same thing in one and the same respect. Of the four propositions: "All men are wise," "No man is wise," "Some men are wise," "Some men are not wise," the first and second are *contraries*; the first and fourth, the second and third, *contradictories*; the third and fourth, *subcontraries*; the first and third, the second and fourth, *subalterns*.

Representing the universal affirmative proposition by A, the universal negative by E, the particular affirmative by I, and the particular negative by O, we have the following diagram:



38. *Neither contrary nor contradictory propositions can both be true, for one of the contraries or contradictories affirms what the other contrary or contradictory denies.*

Of two contradictories one must be true and the other false, since each affirms or denies just enough to make the other false.

Contraries can both be false in contingent matter, because one not only affirms what the other denies, but states its extreme opposite.

Subcontraries can both be true, but cannot both be false, for then their contradictories would be true, and thus two contrary propositions would be true.

Subalterns can both be true or both false in necessary matter ; as, "All men are mortal, Some men are mortal ;" "All bodies are infinite, Some bodies are infinite ;" or one may be true and the other false in contingent matter ; as, "All men are rich, Some men are rich."

39. *Equipollence is the reduction of a proposition to another equivalent in meaning.*—Two propositions, though apparently different, may have the same meaning ; as, "Every man is a rational animal ; No man is not a rational animal." These two propositions are said to be equipollent.

40. *A contradictory proposition when its subject is affected by a negation, becomes equivalent to its contradictory ; as, "All men are wise ; Not all (some) men are wise, and therefore, Some men are not wise."*

A contrary proposition when its predicate is affected by a negation, becomes equivalent to its contrary ; as, "All men are wise ; All men are not wise, or, No man is wise."

A subcontrary proposition when its predicate is affected by a negation, becomes equivalent to the other subcontrary ;

“Some men are wise; Some men are not-wise, or Some men are not wise.”

A subaltern proposition both subject and predicate of which are affected by a negation, becomes equivalent to the other subaltern; “All men are wise: Not-all men are not-wise, or Some men are wise.”—These rules result from what has been said concerning the nature and rules of opposite propositions.

41. *Conversion is that change in a proposition by which, without altering its truth, the predicate is made the subject, and the subject the predicate.—The proposition to be converted is called the convertend; the proposition resulting from conversion, the converse.*

42. *Conversion is simple, per accidens, or by contraposition.—The conversion is simple when, the predicate being made the subject, the proposition retains its quantity; as, “No man is a plant; No plant is man.”*

It is *per accidens*, when, the predicate being made the subject, the proposition changes its quantity; as, “The Americans are men; Some men are Americans.”

It is by *contraposition* when, the predicate being made the subject, finite terms are changed into infinitating; as, “All men are animals; All not-animals are not-men; Only animals are men.”

In effecting a conversion, the *quality* of the proposition must not be changed, otherwise there would be no conversion, but simply opposition.—The following are the *rules for conversion: Universal negative propositions and particular affirmatives are converted simply; as, “No man is an angel; No angel is a man.”*

Universal affirmative propositions and universal negatives are converted per accidens; as, “All men are mortal, Some mortals are men.”

Particular negative and universal affirmative propositions are converted by contraposition, that is, by obvert-

ing or infinitating the proposition, and then converting simply ; as, "Some men are not just ; Some unjust beings are not not-men ; Some unjust beings are men."*

* The rules of conversion are expressed in the mnemonic couplet :

Simpliciter fEcI convertitur, EvA per accid (ens),

Ast O per contrap (ositionem). Sic fit conversio tota.

The capital letters in the words fEcI and EvA of the first line and O of the second line stand for the different kinds of proposition to be converted, as explained on page 26.

CHAPTER III.

REASONING.

ART. I.—DEFINITION AND ELEMENTS OF REASONING.

43. *Reasoning is the third operation of the intellect, by which, from the relation existing between two judgments, it infers a third as the result of the other two.*—There are two kinds of judgments. Some are self-evident, and on that account are called *analytical* or *immediate*. Others are not self-evident, and are called *deductive* or *mediate*; the relation between the predicate and the subject cannot be perceived without comparing them with a third idea. The act by which we seek to determine the relation of two terms by comparing them with a third is *reasoning*. The verbal expression of a reasoning is called an *argument*, and is, therefore, defined as a discourse in which one proposition is inferred from another.

44. *The elements of reasoning are three ideas and three judgments, and the relation existing between these ideas and judgments.*—Every reasoning must contain three ideas, since its end is to establish the relation between subject and predicate by means of a third idea. Again, it must contain three judgments: two to show the relation of the subject and predicate with a middle term, a third to point out the relation of the predicate with the subject. The three ideas and the three judgments constitute the *matter* of reasoning, their connection constitutes its *form*.

45. *The truth of a reasoning may be considered in respect both to matter and form.*—That a reasoning may be *materially* true, it suffices that the premises and the conclusion be separately true; but that it be *formally* true, the connection between conclusion and premises must likewise be true; hence it is clear that a reasoning may be materially true and formally false, and vice versa. Thus the reasoning, “Every man is mortal; every man is an animal: therefore every animal is mortal,” is materially true, but formally false; while the reasoning, “All substances are spiritual; color is a substance: therefore color is spiritual,” is materially false, but formally true.

46. *All reasoning is based on one of these two axioms:*
 1. *Two things which agree with a third wholly or in part, agree with each other wholly or in part;* 2. *Two things, one of which agrees wholly or in part with a third, with which the other does not agree, do not agree with each other.*
 —The first axiom is the principle of *affirmative* reasoning; the second is the basis of *negative* reasoning.

ART. II.—DIVISION OF REASONING.

47. *Reasoning considered in respect to its form, is deductive or inductive; in respect to its matter, it is categorical or hypothetical.*—In every reasoning a predicate is affirmed or denied of a subject, because, after comparing each of them with a middle term, we know whether or not the middle term contains the other two. Now, as one thing may be in another as a part in the whole, or as the whole in the sum of its parts, reasoning is of two kinds, according as we proceed from the whole to its parts, or from the parts to the whole; that is, according as we proceed from genera to species and from species to individuals, or from individuals to species

and from species to genera. The first is *deductive* reasoning, the second is *inductive*. Reasoning is also *deductive* if it proceeds from effects to their cause, as from signs to the thing signified, and it is thus we attain to a knowledge of God.

Reasoning considered in respect to the judgments entering into it, is *categorical* or *hypothetical* according as the judgments are categorical or hypothetical. But whether reasoning be inductive or deductive, categorical or hypothetical, the truth of the conclusion is always mediate and deduced. Hence the regular form of all reasoning is deduction, or the *syllogism*.

ART. III.—CATEGORICAL SYLLOGISMS AND THEIR RULES.

48. *The syllogism is that form of argument in which the two extremes of a proposition are compared affirmatively or negatively with a third term in order to conclude their agreement or disagreement.*—It is easily seen from this definition that the syllogism must contain three terms and three propositions. The subject of the deduced proposition is called the *minor term* or *minor extreme*; the predicate is called the *major term* or *major extreme*, because the predicate, when not identical with the subject, has always a greater extension than the subject. The term with which the extremes are compared is called the *middle term*. The two propositions in which the two extremes are compared with the middle term are called *premises* or *antecedent*; that which contains the major term is called the *major premise*; that which contains the minor term is called the *minor premise*. The proposition which is deduced from the other two, and in which the minor term is compared with the major, is called the *conclusion* or *consequent*.

49. *Syllogisms are subject to the following eight rules :*

I. A syllogism should contain only three terms.

II. No term should have a greater extension in the conclusion than it has in the premises.

III. The middle term should be taken universally at least once in the premises.

IV. The conclusion should not contain the middle term.

V. Nothing can be concluded from two negative premises.

VI. Two affirmative premises cannot give a negative conclusion.

VII. The conclusion always follows the weaker part.

VIII. From two particular premises nothing can be concluded.

I. The first rule is derived from the very essence of the syllogism, which consists in establishing the relation between two terms by means of a third. This rule is commonly violated by using one of the terms in two different senses ; as, " Every spirit is endowed with intelligence ; but alcohol is a spirit ; therefore alcohol is endowed with intelligence."

II. The conclusion should not be more extended than the premises ; otherwise, we should have a consequent not contained in the antecedent, an effect which exceeds its cause ; as, " Eagles are animals ; but eagles fly in the air ; therefore all animals fly in the air."

III. The middle term must be taken at least once universally ; otherwise, being twice particular, it would be equivalent to two different terms, and we should have a syllogism containing four terms ; as, " Some animals are endowed with reason ; but a horse is an animal ; therefore a horse is endowed with reason."

IV. The middle term should not be found in the conclusion ; because, being used as a term of comparison, for the purpose of finding agreement or disagreement between the other two terms, its proper place is in the premises, where this relation is established. Its appearance in the conclusion either repeats what has already been expressed ; as, " All crimes are detestable ; treason is a crime ; therefore crime is detestable : " or sometimes introduces a fourth term into the syllogism ; as, " English Catholics were persecuted by Queen Elizabeth ; Shakespeare was an English Catholic ; therefore Shakespeare was an English Catholic persecuted by Queen Elizabeth."

V. Two negatives give no conclusion ; for in that case we simply see that the term chosen for the middle cannot serve to establish any relation between the extremes ; hence the antecedent is null, and no consequent can be drawn from it ; as, " Shepherds are not learned ; but Peter is not a shepherd." It cannot be concluded that Peter is or is not learned.

VI. A negative cannot be inferred from two affirmatives, for two things identical with a third cannot but be identical with each other.

VII. The conclusion always follows the weaker or worse part ; that is, if one of the premises is negative the conclusion must be negative ; if particular, the conclusion must be particular. In the first place, it is evident that, if one of two things is identical with a third, and the other is not, the two things cannot be identical with each other ; thus, in the syllogism, " No spiritual substance is mortal ; the human soul is a spiritual substance," we must conclude, " The human soul is not mortal." In the second place, if one of two premises is particular, the conclusion cannot be

universal, otherwise it will have a term more extended here than in the premises; as in the syllogism, "Some men are rational animals; some men are poets; therefore all rational animals are poets."

VIII. Two particulars afford no conclusion; because if both are affirmative, the middle term is necessarily twice particular; as, "Some students are industrious; some industrious persons are successful; therefore all students are successful." If one of the two is negative, the conclusion must contain a universal term, which is particular in the premises; as, "Some heroes are young men; some young men are not pious; therefore all heroes are not pious, or, No heroes are pious."

All these rules may be reduced to the following Rule of Modern Logicians: *The conclusion must be contained in one of the premises, and the other premise must show that it is contained therein.*

ART. IV.—MODES AND FIGURES OF THE SYLLOGISM.

50. *The mode of a syllogism is its form according to the quantity and quality of the three propositions which enter into it.*—Propositions considered in respect both to their quantity and quality, are of four kinds: 1. Universal affirmative; 2. Universal negative; 3. Particular affirmative; 4. Particular negative. Logicians have designated these four kinds of propositions by the letters A, E, I, O, respectively. It is evident that these four propositions, combined in threes, give sixty-four possible combinations; but applying to these the rules of the syllogism, there will be found only ten valid modes. These are: AAA, AAI, AEE, AII, AOO, EAE, EAO, EIO, IAI, OAO.

51. *The figure of a syllogism is its form according to*

the position of the middle term in the premises.—The middle term may be: 1. Subject of major and predicate of minor; 2. Predicate of both; 3. Subject of both; 4. Predicate of major and subject of minor. There are, then, four figures; but many logicians make no account of the fourth, or turn it into the first. Each figure is susceptible of the ten modes, if no regard is had to the rules of syllogism, because the propositions may preserve their quality and quantity without changing the place of the middle term.

52. *There are only nineteen conclusive modes; they are designated by the following lines:*

*Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferioque prioris;**

Cesare, Camestres, Festino, Baroco secundæ;

Tertia Darapti, Felapton, Disamis, Datisi, Bocardo,†

Ferison habet. Quarta insuper addit

Bramantip, Camenes, Dimaris, Fesapmo, Fresison.

Applying the rules of the syllogism to these modes, we see that the first figure, in which the middle term is subject of the major and predicate of the minor, excludes: 1. Modes whose minor is negative; 2. Modes whose major is particular; 3. AAI, EAO as useless. The second figure, in which the middle term is used twice as predicate, excludes: 1. Modes whose two premises are affirmative; 2. Those in which the major is particular; 3. EAO as useless. The third figure, in which the middle term occurs twice as subject, excludes: 1. Modes in which the minor is negative; 2. Modes in which the conclusion is universal. The fourth figure, in which the middle term is predicate of the major and subject of the minor, excludes: 1. Modes having an affirmative major with a particular minor; 2. Modes having an affirmative minor with a universal conclusion; 3. OAO as contrary to the second rule. There remain only the following nineteen valid modes:

1st Figure, AAA, EAE, AII, EIO. 2d Figure, EAE, AEE, EIO, AOO. 3d Figure, AAI, IAI, AII, EAO, OAO, EIO. 4th Figure, AAI, AEE, IAI, EAO, EIO.

* Or Fakofu.

† Or Dokamok.
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All these modes may be converted into the four modes of the first figure, which on that account are called perfect. They are summed up in the four lines already given, which, by a happy disposition of vowels and consonants, designate at once a particular mode, the perfect mode into which it may be reduced, and the divers operations by which the reduction is effected. The three vowels of each word indicate the mode ; the initial consonant shows to what mode of the first figure this mode may be reduced, to that, namely, which begins with the same consonant ; the consonants, S, P, C, M, denote the operation to be performed in order to effect the reduction. S indicates that the proposition designated by the vowel before it must be converted *simply* ; P, that it must be converted *per accidens* ; C, that the syllogism must be reduced *per impossibile* ; F, by *infinitation* or *obversion* ; M signifies that the order of the premises must be reversed ; P in *Bramantip*, that from the premises a universal conclusion may be drawn.*

Thus the syllogism, "No material being is simple ; some simple beings are human souls ; therefore some human souls are not material ;" is designated by *Fresison* of the fourth figure ; for the mode is seen from the three vowels E I O, and the figure is known by the position of the middle term. This mode may be reduced to that mode of the first figure that begins with F, viz., *Ferio*. The letter S following E and I in *Fresison* indicates that the premises represented by these two letters are to be converted simply. Hence the syllogism becomes : "No sim-

* These rules are contained in the couplet :

S vult simpliciter verti ; P vero per accid ;
M vult transponi ; C per impossibile duci.

ple being is material; some human souls are simple; therefore some human souls are not material."

Other modes are similarly reduced except *Baroco* and *Bocardo*, which must be reduced *per impossibile*.

ART V.—HYPOTHETICAL SYLLOGISMS AND THEIR RULES.

53. *A hypothetical syllogism is that in which the major premise is hypothetical.*—If the major premise is a disjunctive proposition, the syllogism is called *disjunctive*. If the major premise is a conjunctive proposition, the syllogism is *conjunctive*; if it is conditional, the syllogism is *conditional*. A syllogism of whatever kind, besides the rules peculiar to it, is subject to the eight rules of the categorical syllogism.

54. *A disjunctive syllogism is subject to the two following rules: 1. One of the incompatible predicates being affirmed in the minor, all the others must be denied in the conclusion; 2. One of the incompatible predicates being denied in the minor, all the others must be affirmed disjunctively in the conclusion.**—It is evident that, for the legitimacy of the conclusion of a disjunctive syllogism, the disjunctive premise must make a complete enumeration of all the predicates that can agree with the subject. Hence this syllogism is false: "The rich must either squander their money or hoard it; but they should not hoard it; therefore they should squander it." The disjunction is not complete; it has omitted a third member, which is "to expend money prudently."

* To this may be added a third rule: All the predicates but one being denied in the minor, that one must be affirmed in the conclusion.

55. *A conjunctive or copulative syllogism, from the affirmation of one of the members, infers the negation of all the others ; but not vice versa.*—It is clear that the conclusiveness of this syllogism requires that the members enumerated in the conjunctive proposition be opposed to one another in such a way that they cannot agree with the same subject at the same time ; as, “No one can serve God and Mammon ; but many serve Mammon ; therefore many do not serve God.” From this example it is clear that if the minor were negative, as, “But the spendthrift does not serve Mammon,” we could not infer the affirmative : “Therefore he serves God,”* unless the opposition be contradictory.

56. *A conditional syllogism concludes in two ways : 1. From the affirmation of the antecedent it infers the affirmation of the consequent ; 2. From the negation of the consequent it infers the negation of the antecedent ; but not vice versa.*—In fact, the antecedent contains the reason of the consequent ; therefore the affirmation of the first implies that of the second, as the negation of the second implies that of the first ; as, “If Christ arose from the dead, He is God ; but He did arise from the dead ; therefore He is God.” But since an effect may depend on several causes, the reverse of the rules laid down would not give a logical conclusion ; as, “If Peter is studious, he merits a reward ; but he is not studious ; therefore he does not merit a reward.” It is clear that a reward may be merited for some other reason than that of *being studious*. If the antecedent is always the sole reason of the consequent, then we may conclude from the affirmation or

*The minor of a conjunctive syllogism always affirms one of the two incompatibles expressed in the major.

negation of the consequent; as, "If he is a man, he is endowed with reason; but he is endowed with reason; therefore he is a man."

ART. VI.—ABRIDGED AND COMPOUND SYLLOGISMS, OR ENTHYMEME, PROSYLLOGISM, EPICHIREMA, SORITES, AND DILEMMA.

57. *An enthymeme is an abridged syllogism, one premise of which is understood*; as, "God is Just; therefore God will reward the good."

58. *A prosyllogism is a syllogism composed of two syllogisms, the conclusion of the first becoming the major of the second*; as, "Every act of virtue will be rewarded by God; but humility is a virtue; therefore every act of humility will be rewarded by God; but the bearing of injuries is an act of humility; therefore the bearing of injuries will be rewarded by God."

59. *An epichirema is a syllogism in which at least one of the premises is accompanied with proof*; as, "God should be adored; but Jesus Christ is God, as His life and miracles attest; therefore Jesus Christ should be adored."*

60. *A sorites is a form of reasoning composed of several propositions so connected that the predicate of the first becomes the subject of the second, and so on, until the predicate of the last is joined to the subject of the first.*—This form of reasoning may be separated into as

* In the days of Aristotle an enthymeme was a "*syllogism drawn from probabilities and signs of the conclusion*;" and an epichirema, a *dialectical syllogism* in which the conclusion is reached after a careful examination of objections and difficulties. See *Logic*, Stonyhurst Series, pp. 356, 359.

many syllogisms as there are propositions less two. It rests on the principle that whatever is said of the predicate may be said of the subject; as, "Sin offends God; whatever offends God separates us from Him; whatever separates us from God deprives us of the sovereign good; whatever deprives us of the sovereign good is the greatest of evils; therefore sin is the greatest of evils." To be conclusive: 1. There should be no negative premise with the affirmative premises; otherwise in the resolution of the sorites there would be a negative premise with an affirmative conclusion, or the conclusion would have a greater extension. The middle term may be negative, and hence one of the premises may be apparently negative; 2. The premise immediately preceding the conclusion can be negative, and then the conclusion will be negative; 3. All the premises except the first must be universal, otherwise one of the middle terms would be taken twice particularly. If the first premise is particular, the conclusion will be particular.

61. *A dilemma is a compound syllogism in which each member of a disjunctive major premise is taken in a minor consisting of several conditional propositions, and serves to conclude against the adversary.*—In this form of reasoning care must be taken: 1. That the disjunction of the major be complete; 2. That no member of the minor can be retorted in an opposite sense. Ex. "A general said to a soldier who had allowed the enemy to pass: 'Either you were at your post or you were not; if you were, you deserve death for neglecting to give notice of the enemy; if you were not, you deserve death for breach of discipline.'" A dilemma may also have for major a proposition with a disjunctive consequent, the minor denying each member of

the consequent, the conclusion, therefore, denying the antecedent.

62. *To these arguments may be added the Example, a species of reasoning in which one proposition is drawn from another to which it has a relation of resemblance, of opposition, or of superiority.*—This argument may be reduced to a syllogism whose major is confirmed by a particular fact bearing on the conclusion which we wish to infer. Ex. 1. "Our Lord pardoned St. Peter on account of his repentance; therefore He will pardon you, if, having imitated St. Peter in his fault, you likewise imitate him in his repentance."—2. "Louis XIV. and Napoleon I. caused great evils on account of their love of war; it is therefore desirable that a people have a sovereign who loves peace."—3. "Behold the fowls of the air, for they sow not, neither do they reap, nor gather into barns; yet your heavenly Father feedeth them. Are not you of much more value than they?" (St. Matt. vi. 26.) In the first example we conclude *a pari*; in the second, *a contrario* or *ab opposito*; in the third, *a fortiori*.

When the example is drawn from the words and actions of an adversary and is used against him, it is called *argumentum ad hominem*.

ART. VII.—INDUCTION.

63. *Induction is that process in which the mind, after affirming or denying an attribute of each part of a whole, pronounces the same judgment of the whole.*—As has been said already, the reasoning process is twofold: it proceeds either from the whole to the parts which compose it, or from the parts to the whole which they constitute. In the first case we have deduction, in the second induction. "The Gospel has penetrated

into Europe, Asia, Africa, America, and Oceanica ; but these five Grand Divisions make up the whole known world ; therefore the Gospel has penetrated into all the known world," is an example of induction ; whence it becomes manifest that the middle term in an inductive syllogism is simply the enumeration of the parts. These parts united are in reality identical with the whole, though logically distinct from it ; they can, consequently, perform the function of a middle term.

64. *The legitimacy of an inductive syllogism rests on the principle that, the sum of the parts being identical with the whole, whatever is affirmed or denied of all the parts may be affirmed or denied of the whole.*—Hence that the inductive syllogism may be rigorously conclusive, it is essential that the enumeration of the parts composing the whole be complete. But this enumeration may be actually or virtually complete : actually, when what has been predicated of the whole has been verified in each of its parts ; virtually, when the predicate has been verified only in a certain number of the parts, and we regard it as applicable to the others on the principle that *natural causes always produce the same effects*, since they operate necessarily, or on the principle that *the laws of nature are constant, universal, and uniform*. In virtue of this principle, the mind regards that which is constant in a certain number of beings as essential to their nature. Hence, knowing that whatever proceeds from the nature of a being is always verified in that being and in all others having the same physical nature, we conclude that a quality which has been verified in some beings must be found, under the same circumstances, in all beings having the same physical nature.

When induction is really incomplete and inade-

quate, it does not authorize a universal and absolute conclusion.* It gives only a greater or less degree of probability, in direct ratio to the number of parts in which the predicate has been verified.

ART. VIII.—PROBABLE OR DIALECTIC SYLLOGISM.

65. *A probable syllogism is that in which at least one of the premises is only probable, and which, therefore, gives only a probable conclusion.*—Apart from the sciences and in the affairs of life, we cannot ordinarily arrive at complete certitude; we must be satisfied with probability. The argument which is thus concerned with contingent matter and with things known only in part is called a *probable argument*, and its expression, a *probable syllogism*.

66. *Whilst we argue in probable matter, we must endeavor to attain the highest possible degree of probability.*—Hence: 1. We must be assured of the possibility of the thing; 2. We must, as far as we can, establish the certainty of all the circumstances; 3. We must ascertain that there are more and better reasons on one side than on the other. Used in this way, the probable syllogism often prepares the way to complete certi-

* "In spite of this, these methods [of incomplete induction] cannot be passed over in the present day. They are too important a factor in the present condition of human society to admit of our neglecting them. . . . Besides, we must understand and appreciate them in order to protest against their abuse. . . . Mill and his followers drag down all the *a priori* laws to the level of the *a posteriori*, or rather deny the existence of *a priori* laws at all. This is the fatal result of the neglect of scholastic methods, which began at the Reformation, and has been carried further day by day." *Logic*, Stonyhurst Series, p. 387.

tude and to science properly so called ; at all events, it gives solidity to the mind, prevents it from advancing anything rashly, and from judging before the fact be well ascertained.

ART. IX.—SOPHISTICAL SYLLOGISM.

67. *A sophism is a syllogism which leads into error, and yet has the appearance of truth.*—The better to enable us to arrive at truth by means of reasoning, logic not only lays down the rules to which a syllogism must conform to be conclusive, but, moreover, exposes the artifices by which our minds are liable to be led into error, and thus enables us the better to defend ourselves against them. These artifices are called *sophisms* when they suppose in him who makes use of them the desire to deceive ; they are called *paralogisms* when they are employed through inadvertence or through ignorance of the rules of reasoning ; in either case they may be called *fallacies*. Taken together, they constitute the art of sophistry, which was particularly taught and practised by Greek orators, in order that, by enabling them to support at pleasure all causes and parties, it might be to them a means of acquiring wealth and influence.

68. *Fallacies are divided into those in diction and those extra-diction, according as they lead into error by an abuse of words or by other captious arguments.*—*Fallacies in diction are six in number : (a) Equivocation, (b) Amphibology, (c) Fallacy of composition, (d) Fallacy of division, (e) Fallacy of accent, (f) Fallacy of figure of diction.*—*Fallacies extra-diction are seven in number : (a) Fallacy of accident, (b) Passing from the absolute to the relative and vice versa, (c) Pretended cause, (d) Evading the question, or Irrelevant conclusion, (e) Fal-*

lacy of consequent, (f) Begging the question and vicious circle, (g) Fallacy of many questions.

69. *The principal fallacies in diction are six :*

(a) *Equivocation*, which consists in using the same term with different meanings ; as, "The dog barks ; but the dog is a constellation ; therefore a constellation barks."

(b) *Amphibology*, which consists in making use of a phrase in a twofold sense ; as, "I say, Pyrrhus, you the Romans will conquer."—"And thus the son his aged sire addressed."

(c) The fallacy of *composition*, which arises when things which are separately true are taken as collectively true ; as, "The Gospel says the blind see ; but that the blind should see is a contradiction ; therefore the Gospel contains contradictions."

(d) The fallacy of *division*, which is the reverse of the preceding ; as, "According to the Scriptures, the impious shall not enter the kingdom of heaven ; therefore it is useless for the impious to repent."—"Five is one number ; two and three are five ; therefore two and three are one number."

(e) The fallacy of *accent*, which changes the meaning of a word by changing the accent ; as, "He conjured me not to betray my country ; therefore he practised the black art."*

(f) The fallacy of *figure of diction*, which passes from the identity of the thing to the identity of the quality ; as, "The man who was speaking with you yesterday has been buried ; but the man was alive ; therefore a man has been buried alive."

* The fallacy of *accent* also includes the mistaking of one word for another having the same pronunciation but a different spelling ; as if I should say that "there were small islands in the church, because it has many *aisles*."

The principal fallacies extra-diction are seven :

(a) The fallacy of *accident*, which occurs when what is only accidental is affirmed as necessary ; as, "Philosophers often deceive ; therefore philosophy is false." With this fallacy may be classed that which is called *imperfect enumeration*.

(b) The fallacy of passing from the *absolute* to the *relative*, and *vice versa*, which occurs when we argue from what is true absolutely to what is true only in some respect, and *vice versa* ; as, "We must obey our parents ; but my parents command me not to adore God ; therefore," etc. : or, "John is a good penman ; therefore he is good."

(c) The fallacy of *pretended cause*, which occurs when we assign as the cause of an effect what is not really such ; as, "Inebriety is bad ; but wine inebriates ; therefore wine is bad."

(d) *Evading the question*, or *irrelevant conclusion*, which occurs when we prove something which is not in question ; as would be the case if "a minister of state, being pressed to modify certain laws, should demonstrate the necessity of law."

(e) The fallacy of *consequent*, which occurs when in a conditional syllogism the consequent is not inferred from the antecedent, but the antecedent from the consequent ; as, "If that is a man, it is an animal ; but it is not a man ; therefore it is not an animal."

(f) *Begging the question*, which occurs when we assume, in fact or in principle, the thing in question, or that which requires to be proved ; as would be the case if we should undertake to prove that the earth revolves about the sun thus : "The sun is at rest ; therefore the earth revolves about it." When this fallacy proves two disputed propositions, each by the other, it is called a *vicious circle* ; as if "after rely-

ing on the veracity of a witness to prove a fact, I should rely on the truth of the fact to prove the veracity of the witness."

(g) The fallacy of *many questions*, or of *interrogation*, occurs when several questions requiring different answers are asked, and the answer given to one is assumed as applicable to the others; as, "Are virtue and vice good or evil?" Whether we answer *yes* or *no*, we fall into error.

We may also classify among fallacies all reasonings in which any one of the rules of the syllogism is violated.

ART. X.—UTILITY OF THE SYLLOGISM.

70. *The use of the syllogism gives clearness, strength, and flexibility to the mind.*—By the use of the syllogism the mind discerns more readily the value of a reasoning and detects more easily the vices of a fallacy. As gymnastics strengthens the body and makes it supple, so the use of the syllogistic art gives solidity, flexibility, and precision to the mind. For if the errors that are rife to-day be stripped of their wordy covering and reduced to this severe form of reasoning, they will appear as the rankest sophisms. It is evident, however, that, though the use of the syllogism presents these great advantages, its abuse may easily generate stiffness and subtlety, and impede the progress of intelligence instead of aiding it.

LOGIC.

PART SECOND.

TRUTH AND SCIENCE.

71. *The second part of logic, which has for its object the end of reasoning, that is, science in general, treats: 1. of the different states of the intellect in respect to truth; 2. of demonstration; 3. of science in general and of its divisions.*—Before treating of science in itself, and the way in which the sciences are divided and co-ordinated, it is well to examine: 1. What truth is, which is the object of science, and what are the different states of the intellect in respect to truth; 2. What produces science, viz., demonstration.

CHAPTER I.

TRUTH AND THE DIFFERENT STATES OF THE INTELLECT IN RESPECT TO IT.

ART. I.—TRUTH.

72. *Truth is the conformity between the intellect and the thing known by it.*—I judge that God is good; this judgment corresponds to what God is in reality; hence it is true. In the same way, every creature corresponds to the idea which God has of it; that is, every creature is true.

73. *Truth is metaphysical, logical, or moral.*—Truth is in the thing, in our cognition of the thing, or in our expression of a cognition. In the first case, it is the conformity of the thing to the divine intellect; this is *ontological* or *metaphysical* truth. In the second case, it is the conformity of our intellect to the thing known; this is *truth of cognition* or *logical* truth.

Logical truth, according to its object, is of the spiritual or corporeal order, general or particular, natural or supernatural. To metaphysical and logical truth is added *moral* truth or *veracity*, which is the conformity of speech or other external sign to the thought in one's mind. The opposite of moral truth is a *lie*. Moral truth depends on logical truth, as the latter depends on metaphysical truth.

74. *The opposite of logical truth is falsity; metaphysical truth has no opposite.*—Our intellect is not the cause of creatures, and the knowledge which it acquires of them may represent them differently from what they are. There may, therefore, exist in our intellect logical falsity or *error*. The divine intellect, on the contrary, being the cause of everything that is, every being is necessarily such as God knows it; every being, therefore, must necessarily be metaphysically true. Hence being and metaphysical truth are convertible and may be affirmed of each other; and it may be said that whatever is is true, and whatever is true is, and that God, the absolute Being, is also the absolute Truth.

ART. II.—IN WHAT OPERATION OF THE INTELLECT LOGICAL TRUTH IS FOUND.

75. *Logical truth is, properly speaking, found only in the act of judgment.*—Logical truth is a correspondence

between the intellect and the thing known by it; it can, therefore, strictly speaking, be found only in that operation of the intellect which perceives and expresses this correspondence, that is, in the act of judgment. Moreover, truth is the perfection of cognition, and therefore is not, strictly speaking, to be found in simple apprehension, which is imperfect and inchoate cognition.

76. *Truth is not properly in simple apprehension nor in sensation.*—Every cognitive faculty, put in presence of its object, must apprehend the object as it is. Hence by simple apprehension and by sensation, things are known as they are, and this knowledge is *materially* true or conformed to the thing. But as the intellect has no cognition of this conformity, since there is no judgment, it follows that there is not, in simple apprehension or sensation, *formal* truth or truth properly so called.

ART. III.—DIFFERENT STATES OF THE INTELLECT IN RESPECT TO TRUTH.

77. *There are three different states of the intellect in respect to truth: 1. Certitude, 2. Opinion or probability, 3. Doubt.*—*Certitude* is that state of the intellect in which it firmly adheres to a known truth without fear that the contrary may be true.

Opinion is that state of the intellect in which it adheres to something known, but with fear that the contrary may be true.

Doubt is that state of the intellect in which it is in suspense and adheres neither to the affirmative nor the negative of the thing proposed. Doubt is *negative* when the intellect perceives no motive to adhere either to the affirmative or the negative; doubt is

positive when the intellect has as strong motives for adhering to the affirmative as to the negative.

78. *Probability, whatever its degree, is specifically distinct from certitude.*—Probability holds a middle place between doubt and certitude; it is susceptible of increase and diminution and may have several degrees; but none of these degrees, however great, will constitute certitude. This latter, on the contrary, cannot admit of degrees; it is or it is not. The calculation of probabilities has its foundation in the ascertained relation existing between the probable thing and its contrary. This calculation confined within proper bounds may become a legitimate source of knowledge, on which are based certain social institutions, such as insurance companies.*

79. *The elements of certitude being, 1. the truth of the object, 2. the firmness of adherence, 3. the motive which*

* The following are the rules for the calculation of probabilities: "I. A single probability of any uncertain event is ascertained by dividing the number of chances favorable to the event by the total number of chances favorable and unfavorable. II. The probability of the independent recurrence of an event is found by multiplying together the fractions expressing the single probabilities. III. In order to calculate the probability that an event already observed will be repeated any given number of times, divide the number of times the event has been observed, increased by one, by the same number increased by one, and the number of times the event is to recur. IV. In case of mutually dependent probabilities, or probabilities of probabilities, the total probability is reached by multiplying together the several single probabilities. V. In case of independent probabilities the total probability is reached by subtracting each separate probability from unity (which gives the probability of the opposite event in each case or the probability of a probability), multiplying the separate results together (according to Rule 4th), and subtracting this product from unity (thus arriving at the probability of the original compound event)." — Gregory's *Practical Logic*, pp. 182, 183.

See also *Jevons' Principles of Science*, Bk. II., pp. 224-249.

produces this adherence, it may be divided according to the particular element in reference to which it is considered.—Relatively to the truth of the object, certitude is *common* or *philosophical*, *immediate* or *mediate*, according as it is without, or with explicit cognition of the motive of adherence, known by intuition or by means of reasoning.

In respect to the firmness of adherence, it is to be remarked that while this adherence always excludes doubt, it may be more or less perfect according to the perfection of the motive producing it; we have, therefore, *certainty of evidence*, which is produced by an intrinsic motive, and *certainty of faith*, which is produced by an extrinsic motive.

Certainty of evidence is *metaphysical*, *physical*, or *moral*; for the intrinsic motive which produces it is nothing more than the perception of the connection existing between a subject and its attribute. But this connection belongs either to the *metaphysical* order, that is, is absolutely necessary, as, "Every effect must have a cause;" or to the physical order, as, "Fire burns;" or to the moral order, as, "Mothers love their children." In other words, the agreement or disagreement of subject and attribute is necessary according to (1) the very nature of the things, or according to the laws (2) of the physical or (3) of the moral world, established by God.

Of these three kinds of certainty, the most excellent is metaphysical certainty, which being founded on the very nature of things, whose archetypes are the divine essence, allows of no exception. Physical certainty is not absolute, since it is based on the supposition that in this particular case God has not suspended the effect of the physical laws which He freely established. It, therefore, is perfectly consistent with

miracles. Moral certainty implies the condition that the moral laws have been fully observed by the subject; but as the subject is a free agent, moral certainty cannot of itself generate certitude as to the individual, but only as to the class or species. Certainty of faith is *divine* or *human*, according as it rests on divine authority, as the *Scriptural revelation*, or on human authority, as the *facts of history*.

ART. IV.—IGNORANCE, ERROR, AND THEIR CAUSES.

80. *Ignorance is the absence of truth from the intellect.*—Ignorance and error have not been reckoned among the states of the intellect in respect to truth, since, instead of being cognitions of truth, they are respectively its absence and its negation.

81. *The causes of ignorance are: 1. the limited nature of our intellect; 2. a want of intellectual culture.*—The first cause of ignorance arises from the very nature of man, who is essentially a finite being. To this cause may be referred the organic defects which, in certain men, impede the cognition of truth.

The second cause is the absence of intellectual culture. Truth is not infused into man; he must acquire it either by instruction from others or by his own efforts. If he has not been taught and does not himself labor to develop his intellectual faculties, he must remain in ignorance of many truths.

82. *Error is the adhesion of the intellect to a false judgment, or a want of conformity between intellect and object.*—Since error is an adhesion to a false judgment, it can be found neither in the senses nor in simple apprehension, but solely in the intellect in an act of

judgment. It would be wrong to regard error, with Cousin (1792-1867), as incomplete truth. What he calls incomplete truth is none the less a truth; whereas error is the opposite of truth.

83. *The principal causes of error are: 1. Precipitancy of judgment; 2. Liveliness of imagination; 3. Prejudice; 4. Passion.*—Precipitancy of judgment consists in judging of a thing not sufficiently considered. It is remedied by attention and reflection.

The imagination often obscures truth by presenting too lively images of sensible things. Its excesses are corrected by keeping it under a severe control of reason.

Prejudices are judgments adopted without examination. A prudent man will weigh his prejudices in the balance of reason; he will not rashly reject them, neither will he blindly follow them.

The passions are the most fruitful source of our errors; they obscure the intellect and present things to it in the borrowed light of a badly regulated will. The remedy for this evil is found in virtue alone.

To these internal causes may be added external ones, as education, the school, the vices of language; all of which are remedied by a prudent scrutiny and a sincere love of truth. Bacon (1561-1626) has divided our errors into four classes: 1. *Idols of the tribe*, errors arising from the weakness of our common nature; 2. *Idols of the den*, errors arising from our individual character; 3. *Idols of the market-place*, errors resulting from the vices of language; 4. *Idols of the theatre*, errors of the school. Evidently the causes assigned by Bacon for our errors may be reduced to those already indicated.*

* See *Metaphysics of the School*, vol. i., p. 461.

84. *Man in his present condition cannot invariably avoid all error.*—If man always made use of his faculties in conformity with the laws imposed on him, he would not err. But, owing to his natural weakness, he is incapable of always conforming to these laws, and, consequently, of avoiding all error.

CHAPTER II.

DEMONSTRATION.

85. *Demonstration is a syllogism which produces science, or it is a reasoning which, by the aid of premises evidently true, gives a certain and evident conclusion.*—The sophistical syllogism is a source of error; the probable syllogism gives only verisimilitude; the demonstrative syllogism alone produces science, that is, certain and evident knowledge of a truth.

86. *Demonstration is necessarily preceded by that species of doubt called methodical, and which is defined as Doubt which is supposed to attend a thesis before it is demonstrated.*—A truth to be demonstrated is first proposed in the form of a question, and the intellect is supposed to be in suspense between its affirmation and its negation; that is, it is supposed to doubt. This doubt, called *methodical*, bears only on the truth or truths to be demonstrated, and not on the indemonstrable principles. Unlike the systematic doubt of sceptics, or real doubt, methodical doubt is not actual, permanent, or universal; unlike the Cartesian doubt, it not only admits the veracity of consciousness, but also that of all the cognitive faculties, and does not touch self-evident truths.

Methodical doubt may bear on one of these four questions: 1. *Does the thing exist?* 2. *What is its essence?* 3. *What are its accidents?* 4. *Why does it exist?* The first question presupposes at least the

nominal definition of the thing; the question regarding its essence supposes that of its existence already answered; the third question presupposes at least the notion of attribute; and the question of the wherefore of a thing can find its answer only in the principles or reasons of the thing; hence it is this last question that properly comes under the head of science.

87. *All demonstration presupposes three notions: 1. that of the subject; 2. that of the predicate; 3. that of the middle term.*—All demonstration has for its end to show that a certain predicate agrees or disagrees with a certain subject by comparing both with a third term; hence it is clear that, prior to all reasoning, we must have the notion of these three terms.

88. *The middle term of demonstration must fulfil three conditions: 1. It must contain the reason of the thing; 2. It must be known as the reason; 3. This reason must be certain.*—Demonstration produces scientific knowledge by means of a middle term; but to know a thing scientifically, we must know the reason of it, know that it is the reason of it, and know it with certainty; hence the middle term must comply with these three conditions of science.

89. *Demonstration is divided into a priori and a posteriori; direct and indirect or ad absurdum.*—*A priori* demonstration is that which descends from cause to effect, as when “from the existence of Providence we infer the order of the universe;” *a posteriori* demonstration ascends from effects to their cause, as when “from the order of the universe we infer the existence of Providence.”

Direct demonstration proves not only that a thing is, but, moreover, why it is; as, “The soul is immortal, because it is a spirit.” Mathematics abounds in

examples. *Indirect* or *apagogic* demonstration simply shows that we must admit the thing on account of the absurdities which would flow from its denial; as, "If the soul is not immortal, there can be no mortal order." This kind of demonstration serves to prepare the way for science and to defend it, but it does not constitute science.

To indirect demonstration may be referred the argument called *ex datis*, so designated because from the concessions of an adversary we draw conclusions which are evidently against him; as, "You grant that the world could not make itself; then God must have created it." The demonstration called *circular* or *regressive* is at the same time *a priori* and *a posteriori*; *a posteriori*, since it ascends from effect to cause; *a priori*, since from the cause better known, it returns to the effect for a better knowledge of it; as, "The order we behold in the world proves the existence of Providence; and as there is a Providence, we are certain that even events unknown to us are ordained by it."

A demonstration is *pure* when the premises are analytical; as, "An infinitely perfect being is necessary being; but a necessary being is eternal; therefore an infinitely perfect being is eternal." It is *empirical* when the premises are experimental; as, "Water seeks its level; but this stream is water; therefore this stream seeks its level." It is *mixed* when one premise is analytical and the other synthetical; as, "There can be no effect without a cause; but this building is an effect; therefore it must have a cause."

CHAPTER III.

SCIENCE.—DIVISION OF SCIENCE.—CLASSIFICATION OF THE SCIENCES.

90. *Science considered subjectively, is a certain and evident cognition of truths deduced from certain principles by means of demonstration ; considered objectively, it is a complete system of demonstrated truths deduced from the same common principles.*—Science considered as existing in the intellect, that is, *subjectively*, must be *certain* cognition, otherwise it would not be perfect ; it must be *evident* cognition, otherwise it would not account to the mind for the subordinate truths deduced from the principles. Finally, it must be cognition of the *truths deduced from certain principles*, for the conclusions cannot be stronger than the premises. Science considered *objectively*, is a body of co-ordinated truths deduced from the same principles and constituting what is called a scientific system. It is in this latter sense that the word science is usually understood.

91. *A science must be both one and multiple ; one in respect to the same set of principles whence flow the truths embraced under the science ; multiple in respect to the deductions made from the principles.*—Those principles from which the mind deduces the truths contained therein, are, as it were, the foundations of the science and constitute its unity. This unity is formal and not material ; for, though a science treats of objects materially multiple, yet these objects are considered

under an aspect by which they are referred to one and the same set. of principles, and hence the science is one.

92. *Every science is specified by its object.*—The formal object of a science constitutes its unity and makes it this or that science; hence the sciences are distinguished from one another by the diversity of their formal objects. Thus, a science is *natural* or *supernatural* according as its object is natural or supernatural truth; it is *speculative* or *practical* according as its object is purely theoretical truth or a truth the knowledge of which may serve as a rule of action.

Two sciences are said to be *distinct* when the object of one has certain relations to that of the other, as, "Geometry and Astronomy." They are said to be *separate* when their objects have no relation to each other, as, "Algebra and Morals."

93. *Philosophy is the science that governs all the other sciences, which may, therefore, be divided and classified according to the divisions instituted in philosophy.*—Philosophy is the fundamental science and ranks next to Sacred Theology; for it treats of being in itself and in general. But as every other science treats of being under some particular aspect, it follows that each has its foundation in philosophy, and from it derives its first principles.

The division of philosophy furnishes the basis for the general division of the other sciences, whose dignity and classification should be established according to the greater or less degree of abstraction of their object from matter. Thus, to real philosophy or metaphysics the *physical* or *natural* sciences and *mathematics* are related; to rational philosophy the *philological* sciences; to moral philosophy, *jurisprudence*, *aesthetics*, and the *political* sciences.

But if philosophy may justly claim superiority over all other human sciences, it is itself surpassed by the divine science of *theology*, which is as far above philosophy as the divine intelligence is above human reason.

LOGIC.

PART THIRD.

METHODOLOGY.

94. *The third part of logic, which has for its object the several processes by which the human intellect arrives at knowledge by reasoning, treats : 1. of method in general and its laws ; 2. of the different kinds of method and their laws ; 3. of the processes peculiar to certain methods.*

CHAPTER I.

METHOD IN GENERAL AND ITS LAWS.

ART I.—METHOD.

95. *Method is the direction given to the cognitive faculties, according to their nature, to enable us easily and surely to arrive at knowledge.*—It does not suffice for the acquisition of knowledge that we know the laws governing the intellect, and what constitutes science itself ; we must also know the way by which science is acquired, the particular path by which we may easily and surely attain to this or that science. This way or path which leads to science is *method*.

96. *Both reason and experience prove the great importance of method.*—As we speedily and surely reach the

end of a journey when we know the road, in like manner we easily and surely arrive at the knowledge of a science when we know the process which the mind should pursue. Ignorance of method necessarily causes much loss of time and often leads into error, a truth which experience likewise confirms. To good method is due the rapid progress of the natural sciences in late years; to a faulty method followed in philosophy in our own day, we owe the false systems which retard its progress.

97. *Method should be neither artificial nor arbitrary, but should be founded on the nature of the mind and of the object which it studies.*—As method has for its aim the directing of the mind in the acquisition of knowledge, it must be based upon the very nature of the mind and of the object to be known. This is the fundamental law of all method. It gives rise to several others, which may be reduced to the two following: 1. *We must in every method proceed from the better known to the less known*; 2. *We must proceed with order from one cognition to another.*

ART II.—ANALYSIS AND SYNTHESIS.

98. *Two processes are common to all methods*; 1. *Analysis, which resolves a whole into its parts*; and 2. *Synthesis, which reconstructs the whole from the parts.*—The mind must perform two processes in order to arrive at knowledge. For either it seeks the nature of the whole by studying its parts, and thus proceeds from effect to cause, from the concrete to the abstract, from the multiple to the simple, as in abstraction and induction; or it studies the parts in the whole, proceeding from the cause to the effect, from the abstract to the concrete, from the simple to the multiple, as in

deduction. The first process is *analysis* ; the second, *synthesis*.

But a method can be neither purely analytical, as the Experimental and Sensualistic school pretends, nor purely synthetical, as the Idealistic school holds. It cannot be purely analytical, since, to constitute science, it does not suffice that we know by analysis the whole through its parts, or the cause through its effects ; we must, moreover, know by synthesis how the whole contains the parts, how the cause produces the effect.* On the other hand, method cannot be purely synthetical, since it belongs to the nature of the mind to know the whole in its parts and the cause in its effects. We must, therefore, conclude that all method, to be good, ought to be *analytico-synthetical*.

99. *The rules for analysis are : 1. It should be complete ; 2. It should be as extensive as possible.—The rules for synthesis are : 1. It should omit nothing in the consideration of the whole ; 2. It should add nothing.*—Analysis makes known the whole in the parts, the simple in the multiple, the cause in the effect, only in so far as it investigates each of the parts and each of the effects. If it neglect to consider any one, it is liable to overlook one of the essential elements of the whole.

In the second place, it must divide and subdivide the whole into a reasonable number of parts, since the less complex a thing is, the better the mind knows it. Synthesis should neither omit nor add anything : for in the former case it would give only a partial or incomplete view of the object ; in the latter, it would introduce foreign elements, and thus alter our notion of that object.

* Our knowledge in particular cases is, however, often limited to the mere fact that the cause produces the effect.

CHAPTER II.

DIFFERENT KINDS OF METHOD AND THEIR LAWS.

ART. I.—DIFFERENT KINDS OF METHOD.

100. *There are two kinds of method, the Inventive and the Didactic.*—The mind first endeavors to find the truth, and afterwards to demonstrate it or communicate it to others. There must, therefore, be two methods: (1) that of *invention*, which guides the mind in its search after truth; (2) that of *demonstration* or *doctrine*, which guides it in imparting to others the truth that has been found.

101. *The method of invention is of three kinds: 1. Rational or a priori; 2. Experimental or a posteriori; 3. Mixed.*—The *a priori* method seeks to discover truth by the sole light of reason, to the exclusion of experience; this is the method of German Idealism, which shapes facts to ideas and transforms the most absurd conceptions of the mind into realities.

The *a posteriori* method is the reverse of the foregoing; it is exclusively adopted by the Sensist school and ends in materialism.

The *mixed* method is a combination of the other two; it is the only sound philosophic method, as it brings to the aid of science all the means of acquiring knowledge. Although this is the only legitimate method, it is none the less true that the *a*

priori method ought to predominate in mathematics, and the *a posteriori* method in the natural sciences.*

102. *The method of demonstration or doctrine is of three kinds: 1. Deductive; 2. Inductive; 3. Mixed.*—The *deductive* method descends from axioms or principles to their consequences, from laws to phenomena. The *inductive* method is the reverse of the preceding and makes the mind of the learner pass through the same process as is followed in arriving at truth. The *mixed* method is a union of these two. The *deductive* method is the easiest, the *inductive* the most effectual; the *mixed* method, being adapted to the ordinary requirements of students, is the one most frequently followed.

ART. II.—SPECIAL LAWS OF EACH METHOD.

103. *The laws of the inventive method require: 1. A determination, at least vaguely, of the end in view; 2. An attentive examination of known truths; 3. A classification of these known truths; 4. A careful use of definitions and divisions; 5. Elimination of whatever is useless or foreign to the end in view; 6. An affirmation of things as certain or doubtful according as they are really certain or doubtful; 7. Care to avoid all rash induction; 8. Prudence to advance nothing resting on what is doubtful or on inconsistent hypotheses.*

104. *The laws of the didactic method require: 1. The*

* As to the founders of these schools and the tenets which they held, see Sensism, Transcendentalism, and the Scholastic Theory of the Origin of Ideas, *Ideology*, chap. ii.; also *History of Philosophy*, *passim*.

use of clear terms fully explained and defined ; 2. Care to take as a starting point only clear and evident principles ; 3. A gradual advancement from one conclusion to another ; 4. Care to avoid digressions which make us lose the concatenation of ideas.

CHAPTER III.

PROCESSES PROPER TO CERTAIN METHODS.

ART. I.—HYPOTHESIS.

105. *Hypothesis is a probable assumption which is intended to explain the cause and nature of a fact, but is not as yet verified by experience or demonstrated by reason.*—The mind often cannot ascertain with certainty the reason of facts; it then finds it necessary to adopt conditionally a principle that is probable. If experience and reason afterwards verify this principle, it ceases to be a supposition or hypothesis, and becomes a *thesis*.

106. *In all the sciences hypotheses within certain limits are useful; in all the natural sciences they are necessary.*—Some philosophers maintain, with Reid (1710–1796), that hypotheses must necessarily be detrimental to science. This is an assertion contradicted by good sense and experience. Others, like Condillac (1715–1780), admit the use of hypotheses in the mathematical sciences only. But it is evident that, with the greatest philosophers and naturalists, we ought to admit them, at least within certain limits, in all the sciences, since in them there are facts not yet explained and for the explanation of which we may very conveniently resort to hypotheses, which subsequent observation will often transform into certain and scientific principles. But hypotheses are useful only

in so far as they conform to certain laws ; otherwise they are hurtful, and, by originating false systems, are fruitful sources of error.

107. *Hypotheses are subject to two sorts of rules, one regarding the formation of the hypothesis, the other its verification.*—The rules to be observed in the formation of an hypothesis are three : 1. It must rest on the knowledge of a great number of facts ; 2. From among the circumstances which accompany a fact we should select one or more, and see if they do not suffice for the explanation of the fact ; 3. The circumstances selected ought to be such as to account for all the others.

There are four rules to be observed in verifying an hypothesis : 1. It should not be opposed to the fact which it is intended to explain ; 2. It should be such as to explain all the facts for which it has been made ; 3. An hypothesis supported by certain facts should be preferred to one not supported by any fact ; 4. From among the hypotheses presented we should choose the simplest. It is evident that if an hypothesis conflicts with a truth known as certain, it is, by the fact, proved false.

ART. II.—EXPERIMENTATION.

108. *Experimentation is the act or art of producing or modifying at will the phenomena of nature in order to study them.*—In all the sciences, and especially in the physical or natural sciences, it becomes necessary to make an attentive study of the phenomena of nature. The more easily to account for these phenomena, we modify or produce them at pleasure ; this process is called *experimentation*. If we confine ourselves to

studying a phenomenon as presented in nature, we simply make an *observation*.

109. *The conditions of good experimentation relate, some to what is produced in the phenomenon, others to the person who experiments.*—In regard to the phenomenon, it is necessary to keep an exact record of all the accompanying circumstances, however minute; and when it can be done, these circumstances should be noted by figures and exact quantities. The person who is experimenting should (1) vary the experiments; (2) extend them; (3) reverse them. Above all, he should guard in experimentation against the spirit of system, which would make him see not what is, but what he wishes should be.

110. *As experimentation is employed to determine the cause of a phenomenon, we must carefully look out for indications which may point to the cause.*—These indications are four in number: 1. When one event invariably precedes another, except when the latter is counteracted or prevented by some circumstance; 2. When, one event undergoing a modification, another undergoes a corresponding modification; 3. When, one fact being absent, another is also absent, unless the latter may also be produced by a different cause; 4. When, one fact disappearing, another also disappears, unless the latter can exist without the continued action of the former.*

* Compare these indications with the following experimental methods of John Stuart Mill (1806–1873):

(a) *Method of Agreement*.—"If two or more instances of the phenomenon under investigation have one circumstance in common, the circumstance in which alone all the instances agree is the cause (or effect) of the given phenomenon."

(b) *Method of Difference*.—"If an instance in which the phenomenon under investigation occurs and another in which it does not

111. *Experimentation of itself does not constitute science ; it only enables us to establish principles by induction.* — As experimentation does not go outside the order of facts, it cannot of itself constitute science ; but when well conducted, it enables us to establish *principles of experience*, as, “Water slakes thirst.” These principles, to be such, must fulfil two conditions: 1. The fact which we wish to transform into an experimental principle must have been found the same in many cases ; 2. This fact must not be accidental, but a natural effect.

112. *Having by experimentation discovered points of agreement among several objects, we are enabled by the principle of analogy to infer other points of agreement : experimentation thus abridges scientific investigations and even makes up for impossible investigations.*—When several objects are known to agree in certain points, the *principle of analogy* enables us to conclude other points of agreement. This conclusion may be based either upon the simple relation of *qualities*, or the relation of *means to an end*, or the relation of *cause to effect* or *effect to cause*. But it can be considered legitimate only inasmuch as it rests not upon fortuitous or accidental resemblances, but upon *important re-*

occur have every circumstance in common save one, that one occurring only in the former, the circumstance in which alone the instances differ is the effect, or the cause, or an indispensable part of the cause of the phenomenon.”

(c) *Method of Concomitant Variation.*—“Whatever phenomenon varies in any manner whenever another phenomenon varies in some particular manner, is either a cause or an effect of that phenomenon, or is connected with it through some fact of causation.”

(d) *Method of Residues.*—“Subduct from any phenomenon such part as is known by previous induction to be the effect of certain antecedents, and the residue of the phenomenon is the effect of the remaining antecedent.”—*Mill's Logic*.

semblances, or, in the absence of these, upon *many* resemblances.*

ART. III.—CLASSIFICATION.

113. *Classification is the distribution of entities into genera and species.*—In every science it is necessary to proceed with order both in the discovery and in the communication of truth ; in this sense, then, classification is requisite in every science. But the term is especially applied to the distribution into genera and species adopted in natural history.

114. *The advantages of this classification are : 1. It aids the memory and facilitates the knowledge of the objects classified ; 2. It in a way initiates us into the divine plan, by showing us the admirable order which reigns among all creatures.*—Classification, by the fact that it puts order into the objects which we study, enables us to know them better and to apprehend their relations ; but, above all, it elevates the mind, by enabling it to penetrate the admirable harmony of the divine plan. This last result can be obtained only in so far as the classification is based upon nature itself. An artificial classification serves only to put a certain order into our knowledge, and is not in itself of any scientific value.

115. *The laws of classification are : 1. It must be complete ; 2. It must be based on the law of the subordination of characteristics.*—Evidently the first condition requisite for a good classification is that it comprise all the objects for which it is made. But it is also necessary, if we desire a natural or scientific classification, to base it on *the law of the subordination of characteristics*. In virtue of this law objects in nature

* See *Logic*, § 64.

have each a primary characteristic, to which other secondary characteristics are subordinate; to these latter still others are subordinate, until we finally reach the least important characteristic. We classify according to this law when we establish the principal divisions according to the principal characteristics, then subdivide according to subordination of characteristics. It is easily seen that such a classification is nothing else than the science of the objects classified. Hence, if we know to what division an object belongs, we immediately know its nature and characteristics.*

The great progress made in the natural sciences since the Reformation by the application of the experimental or *a posteriori* method has led many of its advocates to bring the same method into the field of philosophy in its different divisions and of theology. But such a proceeding has invariably been followed by results not only most disastrous to all positive religion, but even suicidal to human thought. The Church is the "pillar and ground of truth," and has nothing to fear and much to gain from the daily advances of scientific research. "Grammar, philology, archæology, history, ethnography, erudition, topography, æsthetics, all that makes up the long line of rationalistic criticism, have in turn paid her a forced homage."† The well ascertained results of science, the well-founded hypotheses, are all in harmony with her teaching. But when any rash conclusion is foisted on the public, the divine guardian of the truth sounds the alarm.

* See *Metaphysics of the School*, vol. ii., pp. 508-514, 515, 534.

† *Apologie Scientifique de la Foi Chrétienne*, by Canon Duilhé de Saint-Projet, p. 105.

IDEOLOGY.

1. *Ideology is a science which treats of ideas.*—As rational philosophy treats of entities as known by intellect, it must treat also of that in which and by which they are known, viz., *ideas*. Ideas constitute the object of *Ideology*.

2. *Ideology may be divided into General and Special Ideology.*—Ideology may be concerned simply with the nature and origin of ideas in general; then it is *General Ideology*; or it may treat of the special nature of certain fundamental ideas and the manner in which our mind acquires them; then it is *Special Ideology*.

GENERAL IDEOLOGY.

CHAPTER I.

IDEAS IN GENERAL.

ART. I.—NATURE OF IDEAS.

3. *In every being we must distinguish the essence from the particular conditions which individuate the essence.*—God has given being to every creature according to an eternal type existing in his infinite mind, and according to which he can create an unlimited number

of similar beings.* But each being, in realizing by its existence the divine type, is thereby invested with individuating conditions which make it that being and not another. But that which reproduces the divine type in a being and constitutes it in a determinate species, that which makes it specifically *what it is*, is called the *essence* of the being. This essence cannot really exist without being individualized; but it is, nevertheless, distinguishable from the conditions which individualize it. These conditions are seven in number: *Form, figure, place, time, name, family, and country.*

4. *An idea is a mere intellectual representation of the essence of an object, by which that object is known.*—We not only know the concrete individual notes of sensible objects, but we may also know their essence. The intellect naturally perceives this essence abstracted from its particular conditions, and forms in itself an image or similitude which mentally reproduces the essence. This image formed *in and by* the intellect is called an *idea*.

5. *The idea is not that which the intellect immediately knows, but that by which it knows the object.*—As the image of an object formed in the eye is not that which the eye perceives, but that by which the visible object becomes known, so that which the intellect immediately knows by the idea is the objective essence. But as the intellect is capable of reflecting upon itself, it may, by a second act, perceive the idea or mental representation by which it knows the essence.

* See *Metaphysics of the School*, vol. ii., pp. 518, 519.

ART. II.—CHARACTERISTICS OF IDEAS.

6. *An idea is subjective inasmuch as it resides in the subject knowing.*—The formation of an idea is a vital and immanent act which not only proceeds from the intellect, but is accomplished and exists in the intellect itself. Now an idea considered as residing in the subject knowing, is said to be *subjective*.

7. *An idea is objective inasmuch as that which it immediately makes known to us is an object.*—That which an idea immediately manifests to the subject knowing, is not the idea itself, but the object perceived. Hence an idea considered as the representation of an object, a representation by which the object is immediately known, is said to be *objective*.

8. *The characteristics of an idea vary according as we consider it subjectively or objectively.*—An idea considered *subjectively* participates in the conditions of the intellect that has the idea. Thus, if the intellect is infinite and uncreated, the idea considered *subjectively* is infinite and uncreated ; it is finite and created, if the intellect is finite and created. In the same way, an idea, considered *subjectively*, is singular like the intellect itself ; but, considered *objectively*, it is universal like the essence which it represents.

CHAPTER II.

SYSTEMS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS.

ART. I.—PRINCIPAL SYSTEMS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN OF IDEAS.

9. *The principal systems concerning the origin of ideas are the following: 1. Sensism; 2. Criticism or Critique; 3. The System of Innate Ideas; 4. Ontologism; 5. The System of Impersonal Reason; 6. The Scholastic System.*—All other systems may easily be reduced to one or other of these six; because the formation of ideas is explained either by the senses or by the intellect. If explained by the intellect, only one of the following hypotheses can be made; either the soul produces ideas from itself; or God, in creating it, has engraven them on it; or God communicates them to it directly; or a substance intermediate between it and God communicates them to it; or, finally, God gives it the power to form them itself in giving it the faculty of abstracting the essence of sensible objects from the conditions which individualize it.

ART. II.—SENSISM.

10. *Sensism is a system which affirms sensation to be the only origin of ideas.*—According to this system, all knowledge is merely a modification or transformation of sensation.

11. *The principal sensists among ancient philosophers are Leucippus, Democritus, and Epicurus; among modern philosophers, Locke, Condillac, and Laromiguière, are most prominent.*—The ancient sensists taught that all bodies throw off subtle particles analogous to the exhalations of odoriferous bodies; these particles, scattered through space, faithfully represent the objects from which they have been detached; by means of the senses they find an entrance to the soul, and by their impressions produce sensation, memory, and thought. This system was taught by Leucippus (about B.C. 450.), Democritus (B.C. 470–361?), and Epicurus (B.C. 342–270). Modern Sensism holds sensation to be the only primitive act of the soul, an act which by successive transformation produces all the other acts of the soul and all its faculties, nay, the sensitive faculty itself. This system, taught in ancient times by Protagoras (B.C. 480–411?), was renewed in the seventeenth century by Locke (1632–1704), and received its last complement from Condillac.

Besides sensation, Locke admits reflection in the soul; but, according to him, reflection is simply observant of sensitive facts, and acts only on the internal operations which had for their object external material things.

Condillac (1715–1780) denies that reflection or attention is distinct from sensation, and regards it simply as a more lively sensation than the others. He considers memory as a twofold attention,—on the one hand, to a past sensation, on the other, to a present sensation. Finally, he asserts that judgment is nothing more than a comparison between two sensations.

Laromiguière (1756–1837) maintains the sense origin of ideas; but he considers as necessary for their formation an activity distinct from sensation.

Auguste Comte (1798–1857) is the founder of that form of Sensism which is styled Positivism. He teaches that the object of science is the positive and real, that only that is positive and real, which is experimental. Hence his system is the foundation of the varied forms of unbelief that to-day infect men's minds.*

12. *Sensism, under whatever form it is considered, is false, both because it destroys intellectual facts, and because it renders even the fact of sensation inexplicable.*—The operation and object of the intellect cannot be reduced to the operation and object of the senses; for the intellect reflects on its acts, judges, and reasons, which the senses cannot do. The object of the intellect is the immaterial, the universal; the object of the senses is the material, the particular. Now, Sensism, by identifying intellection with sensation, destroys the true notion of the intellect and of intellectual acts. It is to no purpose that Locke admits reflection in addition to sensation; for he limits reflection to the perceiving of sensations, and hence it does not essentially differ from sensation itself.

Sensism, moreover, renders the fact of sensation inexplicable, as is evident in the theory professed by the ancients. It is also manifest in the modern theory, which by asserting that sensation is the principle of the sensitive faculty, becomes essentially contradictory. Sensism is also sufficiently refuted by its consequences: experience shows that it leads directly to the negation of all science and all morality. As to Positivism, if no *a priori* principle is certain, no experiment is possible or scientific, since it must rest upon the certainty of some axioms, or *a priori* principles.

* Cf. *Liberatore*, vol. ii., p. 381.

ART. III.—CRITIQUE, OR TRANSCENDENTALISM.

13. *Transcendentalism asserts that ideas are the product of the activity of the thinking subject alone.*—In this system, which is the opposite of Sensism, thought does not require for its exercise an object outside the mind itself.

14. *Transcendentalism originated with Kant, whose principal disciples were Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.**—Kant (1724–1804) teaches that we have within us *a priori* necessary forms or concepts both of the supersensible and of the sensible order; all our cognitions result from the application of these forms to the objects of experience. But as, according to the German philosopher, the *a priori* forms are purely subjective, it follows that the object of knowledge, as it is in itself, remains unknown to us.

Fichte (1762–1814) allows only one principle of knowledge, the *pure Ego*, from which he evolves all things,—God, the world, and the human mind,—all which he considers as only conceptions of the *Ego*.

Schelling (1775–1854) maintains very nearly the same system; instead of the *pure Ego*, however, he substitutes an abstraction, the *absolute*, from which everything, both mind and matter, emanates ideally.

Finally, Hegel (1770–1831) regards as the principle

* In America, Transcendentalism, according to its founders and leaders, Dr. Channing, Alcott, and Emerson, is rather an emancipation and reaction from the teachings of Calvinism, that man's nature is totally depraved, and that he has no liberty. It received very little, if any influence from the German system, and is rather the outgrowth of the principle of the American Constitution, that man is capable of self-government.

of all things the *pure idea*, in which the subject thinking and the object thought, the ideal and the real, entity and non-entity, are identified, and from which all proceeds,—God, the world, and the human mind.

15. *Transcendentalism is absurd ; because, if ideas are purely subjective, it follows either that the objects known do not exist, or that we can affirm nothing concerning their reality.*—In fact, if ideas are pure modifications of the *Ego*, produced by the mind itself, we must hold either that nothing exists outside the *Ego*, which is Nihilism, or at least that we know nothing of what is without us, which is Scepticism. These consequences were vainly repudiated by Kant ; his disciples glory in them, and with Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, regard all existing things, even God himself, as a pure creation of the human mind, or of the idea.

ART. IV.—THE SYSTEM OF INNATE IDEAS.

16. *The system of Innate Ideas considers ideas as infused by God into the soul from the moment of its creation.*—This system, regarding thought as constituting the essence of the soul, supposes that the soul must always have been engaged in thought, even from the first instant of its creation ; and as the soul cannot think without ideas, it also holds that ideas are innate in the soul.

17. *The upholders of this system are Plato among the ancients ; Descartes, Leibnitz, and Rosmini, among modern philosophers.*—In Plato's system ideas are the eternal types according to which God has ordained all things ; they exist not only in the divine mind, but also in the human mind, in which they are innate. Some think that Plato held these prototype ideas to

be eternally existing apart from the divine mind and independent of it. The human intellect, Plato (B.C. 429–348) teaches, existed before the body, and recalls these ideas according as it perceives copies made in their likeness, that is, sensible things.

Descartes (1596–1650) holds that innate ideas are perfect in the soul; but besides these ideas he admits *factitious* ideas, or those formed by an effort of the imagination, as the idea of a “gold mountain;” and *adventitious* ideas, or those which come from without, as the idea of the “sun.”

Leibnitz (1646–1716) teaches that all these ideas are innate, but are in our intellect in their germs; and as, according to Descartes, innate ideas become present to the mind only through sensations, so, according to Leibnitz, these germs become perfect ideas only by occasion of sensation.

Rosmini (1797–1855), laying it down as a principle that we ought to suppose as innate in the soul only that which is requisite to explain the fact of cognition, believed that he had found this sufficient element in the idea of being; he admits, therefore, no other innate idea than that of *possible being*. In his system, all ideas represent nothing but being differently determined. Hence it follows that all our ideas are formed from the idea of being by the same means by which we are enabled to perceive the different determinations of which being is susceptible, that is, by sensation.

18. *The system of Innate Ideas, besides not accounting for the fact of cognition, is absurd in its principles, and leads to the same conclusions as the system of Transcendentalism.*—In this system the close dependence on the senses which is shown by experience to exist on the part of the intellect becomes inexplicable, and man

appears no longer to act, in the order of cognition, according to the laws of his nature, which is both spiritual and corporeal, but rather in accordance with the laws of angelic nature. Hence all those who advocate the doctrine of Innate Ideas err regarding the human soul and its relations with the body. Moreover, the principle of their theory is that the essence of the human soul consists in thought. But if thought constitutes the essence of the soul, the act of intellection is confounded with the essence of the human soul; but in God alone is essence identical with intellection. Hence there would be no need of adding to the essence of the soul the ideas infused by God. Finally, the system of Innate Ideas, in admitting fundamentally the same principle as Transcendentalism, viz., *a priori* subjective forms, leads to the same consequence; that is, it renders all knowledge purely subjective, and thus ends naturally in Idealism.

ART V.—ONTOLOGISM.

19. *Ontologism regards ideas as seen in God by direct and immediate intuition.*—This system loses sight of the subjective character of ideas; it considers them as the object of knowledge and as direct manifestations of God himself to our intellect.

20. *The chief defenders of Ontologism are Malebranche and Gioberti.**—According to Malebranche (1638–1715), man perceives all things by his ideas, which are only the divine idea viewed under different aspects. And

* Some of the writings of the illustrious O. A. Brownson (1803–1876) are unmistakably ontologistic. He accepted the primary principle of Gioberti, *Being creates existences*, and thence deduced his argument for the existence of God.

this idea we know only in so far as God directly manifests Himself to our mind. By our ideas we apprehend the contingent, the imperfect, the finite, which are conceived only as the privation of the necessary, the perfect, the infinite. Hence our soul sees all in God, even the material world. Gioberti (1801-1851) starts with the principle of Malebranche, that ideas, being universal and absolute, must be a direct, though partial, intuition of absolute being, that is, of God Himself; he regards ideas, not as the means, but as the very object of knowledge. He teaches that what we see are the divine ideas themselves, that we have a constant intuition of God, but that we are conscious of this intuition only by reflection, which he calls *ontological reflection*.

21. *Ontologism is false in its principles, contradicted by experience, and fatal in its consequences.*—1. Ontologists teach that the intellect has a direct intuition of God; but to see the being of God is to see His essence. We must then affirm that in perceiving ideas our intellect is in a state similar to that of the blessed, who see the divine essence directly, a conclusion which is absurd and contrary to faith. 2. Ontologism renders the operation of the intellect independent of that of the senses. Such a supposition is opposed to the nature of man, and is contradicted by experience, which sufficiently proves that the idea is formed in us and by us and is not derived from an intuition of God. 3. If we must admit that ideas are not the medium, but the objects of knowledge, it follows that the ideal order is not distinct from the real, and as the real order alone exists, we must conclude that knowledge is impossible. Again, if the intellect does not form ideas, but sees them in God, it is, by the very fact, deprived of all activity of its own.

Hence Ontologism leads directly to Fatalism and Pantheism.*

ART. VI.—INTERMEDIARISM.

22. *Intermediarism, or the system of Impersonal Reason, supposes between God and man an intermediate impersonal reason, by which our intellect acquires universal ideas.*—According to this system, ideas are not innate in the intellect, they are not acquired by the mind, they are not seen in God; but they are seen in an *impersonal* reason intermediate between God and man.

23. *The principal defender of Intermediarism is Cousin, who has done nothing more than renew an error of Averroës.*—The reason of man, says Cousin, is individual and variable, and therefore cannot acquire of itself universal and immutable ideas. Hence man can form his ideas only in so far as they are revealed to him by a reason which, not being personal to him, is called *impersonal*. This reason is revealed to him from the very beginning, and the knowledge which the mind then has is said to be spontaneous. In this state man knows, but does not know that he knows; when he begins to reflect on his spontaneous knowledge, he acquires reflex knowledge. The former knowledge is always true; not so the latter, for in it man may fix his attention exclusively on one part of

* Nor does the fact that God is eminently intelligible, and that we are intimately connected with Him, give support to Ontologists. For God is eminently intelligible in Himself, and the bond by which we are united to Him arises not from our knowledge of Him, but from our dependence on Him. Even though we see all things through God, forasmuch as the light by which we know is from Him, it is still not necessary to behold His essence, just as for perceiving any sensible object, it is unnecessary to see the substance of the sun.

the truth, and thus confound the part with the whole ; thence arises error, which, however, Cousin asserts to be only incomplete truth. An almost analogous system was taught by Averroës (1120-1198) in the middle ages.

24. *Intermediarism is false in its principle, in its nature, and in its consequences.*—This system starts with the principle that our intellect, as being individual, cannot form a universal idea ; but this is to lose sight of the twofold aspect, subjective and objective, under which we may consider the idea, viz., the idea itself and that which it represents. Again, if Impersonal Reason is anything, it must be individual, and hence it is incapable, according to Cousin himself, of forming a universal idea. Finally, this system easily generates Pantheism, since it destroys all activity proper to the intellect of man.

ART. VII.—TRADITIONALISM.

25. *Traditionalism teaches that our ideas are formed by means of speech.*—This system, devised to combat those philosophers who hold that human reason is sufficient for itself, exaggerates the impotency of reason and asserts its dependence on speech and tradition.

26. *The principal representatives of Traditionalism are De Bonald, Bonnetty, and Ventura.*—De Bonald (1754-1840) teaches the absolute necessity of speech for the existence of thought, so that without speech man can have no idea, no general notion, but only sensible perceptions.

Bonnetty (1798-) and Ventura (1792-1861) concede the power of forming ideas of sensible things without the help of speech, but maintain that, inde-

pendently of social teaching, man cannot acquire notions of the spiritual and moral order, as those of God, the soul, duty, etc. Other philosophers admit that man can think without speech, but they deny that without it he can form clear and distinct ideas and that he can reflect on his thoughts.

27. *It is false to assert that speech is absolutely necessary for the formation of ideas either of sensible or of spiritual things, or for reflecting on ideas already formed.*

—Speech, being simply a sign, can make known an object to the intellect only through the idea which the intellect already has of the object; therefore, before the intellect is fixed on the essence of a thing by the word, it has already the idea of it. The idea of sensible things being formed, we cannot, without contradiction, deny to reason the power to attain to ideas of spiritual things; for, granting that reason can form ideas of sensible things in virtue of the abstractive power natural to it, we cannot deny it the power to ascend from these ideas to those of spiritual things, since the power of deduction is not less natural to reason than that of abstraction. Yet it is true that, owing to the feebleness of man's reason and the difficulties that beset his actual condition, but few men could, without the aid of speech, attain to those truths which regard God and His attributes, and even then only after much time and labor, with an admixture of many errors and great uncertainty. Besides, it is certain that, without speech, man would never arrive at complete intellectual and moral development.

But, if the intellect has the power of forming its ideas without the aid of speech, evidently it may reflect on its ideas without speech, for the intellect is essentially a reflective faculty, and requires for the exercise of its power of reflection only the idea, the

object of reflection. It will not do to cite in proof of the necessity of speech for the formation of ideas instances of deaf-mutes and savages abandoned in forests. A more attentive examination has shown that these facts have been imperfectly observed or have never existed.

ART. VIII.—THE SCHOLASTIC SYSTEM.

28. *The Scholastic system explains the origin of ideas by the power which the intellect has of abstracting from sensible images or phantasmata.*—The Schoolmen teach that sensible objects first impress the external senses. The impression, passing from the external senses to the imagination, gives rise to an image of the object, which, though more perfect, is individual and material, and represents the object with the sensible and concrete conditions which make it that object and no other. As soon as this image is formed, the intellect adverts to it, and calling into exercise its abstractive power, which constitutes what is called the *active intellect*, it illumines this sensible image, strips it of its sensible and individual conditions, and manifests the essence of the thing without its material determinations. Thus the object becomes *actually* intelligible, or the *intelligible species* is formed. The *active intellect*, or abstractive power, having thus separated the intelligible, that is, the proper object of the intellect, the intellect proper, called the *possible intellect*, receives the intelligible species into itself and elicits the word of the mind (*verbum mentis*), or forms the idea. These operations, though distinct, are accomplished at the same time in virtue of the unity of the soul, and one cannot take place without the other. As we shall see later, this system of the origin

of ideas is very closely connected with the Scholastic system concerning the nature of the human soul, and follows from it as a consequence.

29. *The Scholastic system has recourse to fewer a priori principles than any other system.*—It is an axiom among philosophers that nature is as fruitful in effects as she is sparing in causes; hence the simplicity of a system is a strong argument in its favor. But while the other systems concerning ideas assume gratuitously one or many *a priori* elements which may easily be dispensed with, the Scholastic system requires for the formation of the idea only that which is absolutely indispensable, viz., the abstractive power, or the active intellect. This abstractive power cannot be dispensed with, and it alone suffices for the solution of the problem.

30. *The Scholastic system is true, because it is in perfect harmony with the essential laws of human nature.*—Since the formation of ideas is an effect whose cause is the nature of our soul, a system concerning the formation of ideas is true, if it is in perfect harmony with the nature of the soul, if it refers the effect to its proper and adequate cause. But while the other systems do not take into account the nature of the human soul, which is both sensitive and intellectual, the Scholastic system explains the concurrence of sensible images in the formation of ideas.

It is also in accord with experience, which shows that we do not possess innate ideas, that we do not intuit ideas in God, but that we form the idea of a thing from its sensible perception. Thus the Scholastic system follows as a simple consequence from the true theory of the nature of man. According to that theory, man is neither a mere animal nor an angel, but stands, so to say, midway between them; for if, on the

one hand, his intellect, like that of the angel, does not intrinsically depend on an organ, on the other hand, being the faculty of a soul substantially united to a body, it can form the idea only after the senses have presented the matter for its operations. Hence the Scholastic system preserves the unity of man's being, and yet maintains a distinction between the soul and body; the other systems, on the contrary, either make the soul and body two distinct beings, or destroy one of these two elements of man.

31. *The Scholastic system rests on the authority of the greatest philosophers.*—This system, first taught, though with a mixture of error, by Aristotle (B.C. 384–322), was held by all the great philosophers of the middle ages, and especially by St. Thomas, who brought it to its full perfection. Up to the seventeenth century, it alone was admitted by all the great Catholic universities, and after having been for two centuries almost universally rejected, to the great detriment of philosophy, it is now accepted by the most distinguished philosophers of the present day without restriction or modification.

32. *The Scholastic system gives a satisfactory solution to all the difficulties connected with the problem of the origin of ideas, and in no way contradicts the facts of common sense.*—The principal difficulty connected with the problem of the origin of ideas is the necessity of reconciling elements apparently contradictory and yet evidently attested by experience, in the formation of ideas. On the one hand, there is the sensible, particular, contingent element; on the other hand, the intelligible, universal, necessary element. These contradictory elements cannot be united. But, while other systems avoid the difficulty by denying one of the two elements, and thus disregard both the nature

of man and facts of experience, the Scholastic system shows how the two elements co-exist without being confounded ; how the sensible image furnishes the intellect with matter for its operation ; and how the idea, while excluding the sensible image, cannot be formed without its concurrence. This system, explaining what is immutable and necessary in the idea by the nature of the essence perceived and not by the nature of the perception itself, accounts for the divine prototype of the object of the idea without deifying the idea itself ; finally, by attributing to man the power of forming his own ideas, it makes them dependent on him both for their causality and their very existence. At the same time, it enables us to comprehend the grandeur of the intellect, by showing that its intelligible light, its abstractive power, is a sort of participation in the light of God Himself. Thus, everything finds its proper place in this system, and far from excluding a single fact of experience or of common sense, it admits them all, and explains their mutual relations.

33. *The Scholastic system entails none of the consequences with which its adversaries reproach it ; the objections raised against it rest on false explanations.*—By recognizing the reality of the essence perceived, the Scholastic system avoids Subjectivism and Idealism, and it avoids Pantheism by making the idea a contingent production of our intellect. Those who object that it borders on Sensism in admitting a sensible element in the formation of the idea, forget that this element does not make part of the idea, but is simply the matter on which the intellect operates in forming the idea. The reproach that this system is contradictory in making the universal proceed from the particular, can be uttered by those only who do not ob-

serve that particular beings have each a proper essence, which, abstracted by the active intellect, is capable of being considered, by another operation of the intellect, under the relation of universality.

CHAPTER III.

UNIVERSALS.

ART. I.—NATURE OF UNIVERSALS.

34. *A universal is that which is found in many or may be affirmed of many ; it is the essence of a being or the intelligible object perceived by the intellect.*

35. *The question of the nature of universals is closely connected with that of the origin and nature of ideas.—*Ideas are universal ; by them we apprehend the universal. The solution of the problem of ideas is, therefore, closely connected with that of the problem of universals, nor is the latter problem less important than the former. As universals are the proper object of our intellectual knowledge, we can easily understand the lively controversy to which the question of universals has given rise in the history of philosophy.

10 36. *To account for the true nature of universals, we must distinguish : 1. the direct universal, which is the essence considered merely in itself, by a direct act of the intellect ; 2. the reflex universal, which is the essence considered by a reflex act of the intellect, as common to many individuals.—*The essence of a material being abstracted from its individuating conditions is the proper object of the intellect. But the intellect may perceive the essence by a *direct* act, or it may return to consider the idea of this essence by a *reflex* act. In

the first case, the intellect merely perceives the essence with its intrinsic characteristics, without considering whether it is single or multiple, real or ideal. Thus the intellect, by a direct act, represents to itself the essence of man, conceives him as a rational animal, but does not consider whether this essence is found in a single individual or in many individuals, whether it exists really or ideally.

Evidently the direct universal is not, strictly speaking, a universal; it is said to be so as opposed to individuals, and also as being the basis of the reflex universal, which is the universal, strictly speaking. In order to form this universal, the intellect reflects upon the essence which it has apprehended directly; it views the idea as representing an essence common to many individuals. Thus, after the perception of the essence of man as a rational animal, the intellect reflects upon the idea of this essence, and recognizes that it expresses the human nature in which all men are alike. This distinction arms us with a ready answer to the objection that the universal cannot be drawn from the particular, since the greater cannot proceed from the less. If the reflex universal is meant, evidently it is not found in the particular; but if it be the direct universal, the answer is that this universal is actually in the particular, inasmuch as the essence of the particular may be considered in itself and abstractly. But, once the direct universal is apprehended, nothing prevents the intellect from adding to it the consideration of its relation to individuals, and thus arriving at the reflex universal.

37. *To perceive the direct universal, mere abstraction by the intellect is sufficient; to form the reflex universal, the intellect must regard the essence as common to all the individuals possessing it.*—The consideration of the

essence in itself involves no scrutiny as to whether it exists in one individual or in many individuals, whether it is real or ideal; for its perception, the intellect need only abstract it from the individual characteristics. But the reflex universal contains a relation to individuals, and hence supposes a comparison by the intellect as well as abstraction.

38. *The direct universal has a real existence in the thing perceived, but not in the manner in which it is perceived; the reflex universal as such has only an ideal existence.*—The essence apprehended by the intellect in the direct act exists really in the individuals, but not in the manner in which it is apprehended, that is, as abstracted from individual characteristics; evidently this abstraction is the work of the intellect. In the same way, the color of fruit is really in the fruit, but any consideration of it apart from the taste is due to the sight, which perceives color, and not taste. The reflex universal as such exists solely in the intellect, since it is universal only in virtue of the reflection of the intellect, and this mental operation can be exercised on the ideas of things, but not on the things themselves.

ART II.—DIFFERENT OPINIONS ON THE NATURE OF UNIVERSALS.

39. *The different opinions on the nature of universals may be reduced to three principal heads: Nominalism, Conceptualism, and Realism.*—It may be said that there have been as many different opinions on the nature of universals as there have been diverse systems on the origin and nature of ideas. All, however, may be reduced to the three opinions which gave rise to so much controversy in the middle ages.

The *Nominalists*, headed by Roscelin (d. 1122), and later by Ockham, the Invincible Doctor (d. 1347), maintained that universals were mere words; the *Conceptualists*, represented by Abélard (1079–1142), made universals merely conceptions; the *Realists*, however, gave to universals a real existence outside the mind. But of this last class some confined themselves to attributing reality to the essence perceived, in so far only as it is individual and concrete; these are the *Moderate Realists*, and have St. Thomas of Aquin (1225–1274) at their head. Others attributed reality to the essence as qualified by the very abstraction and universality under which it is regarded; these are the *Ultra-Realists*, such as William of Champeaux (d. 1121) and Joannes Scotus Erigena (d. 875). Thus, according to the *Moderate Realists*, the essence “man” really exists outside the mind in individual men, but not with that abstraction and universality under which the mind considers it; according to the *Ultra-Realists*, the essence “man” really exists in an abstract and universal manner.

Nominalism is manifestly the negation of all science and the fruitful parent of Scepticism; Conceptualism being nothing more than disguised Nominalism, leads to the same consequences; Ultra-Realism directly produces Pantheism. With Nominalism are connected the systems of Epicurus, Locke, Condillac, Hume (1711–1776), in a word, of Materialists, Sensists, and the Empiricists of the Scotch school. With Conceptualism the systems of the Stoics of old, of Descartes, Berkeley (1684–1753), Kant, and all the Idealists, stand in close relation. Finally, to Ultra-Realism belong the systems of Plato, Averroës, Malebranche, Hegel, and Gioberti, that is, the systems of the Ontologists and Pantheists.

The chief exponents of Nominalism and Conceptualism in our day are respectively John S. Mill (1806-1873) and Sir W. Hamilton (1788-1856). The latter explains apprehension or the formation of ideas as a bundling together of attributes not the same, but called similar, because, though observed in different individuals of the same class, they produce in us the same effect as when first observed in a particular individual of that class. From this it follows in the teaching of Sir W. Hamilton: 1. That ideas convey not absolute but relative truth, relative, namely, to the object first perceived; hence certitude is impossible; 2. Ideas are merely subjective. Here the door is opened to Scepticism.

John Stuart Mill, following Dugald Stewart (1753-1828), holds that the ideas of individuals belonging to the same class have nothing in common but the name. When the mind perceives an object, in virtue of its power of abstraction, it fixes its attention on certain qualities to the exclusion of others, the qualities selected being those that are recalled to us whenever we perceive another object belonging to the same class. Hence it follows: 1. That the idea has no foundation in reality, and all positive belief in the most fundamental truths of religion is undermined; 2. That the common name is merely a convenience, and does not express any corresponding idea. Hence this system is even more radically sceptical than the other.

From these principles it is easy to gather the doctrines of Modern Conceptualists and Nominalists with regard to Universals.

SPECIAL IDEOLOGY.

CHAPTER I.

HOW HUMAN KNOWLEDGE IS ACQUIRED.

ART. I.—THE FIRST OPERATION OF THE INTELLECT AND THE PERCEPTION OF ESSENCES.

40. *In the first development of knowledge analysis precedes synthesis, that is, the first operation of the intellect is not judgment, but simple apprehension of essence.*—Some philosophers, as Reid, Kant, and Cousin, teach that the intellect first pronounces instinctive judgments, and afterwards arrives at ideas, by abstracting the elements contained in these judgments. But this is an error. For (1) any power which, by its nature, is only gradually developed, does not acquire its full perfection in its first act; but judgment is an act of perfect knowledge, whereas simple apprehension is merely an act of initial knowledge; therefore, simple apprehension precedes judgment. Moreover, (2) a judgment presupposes a knowledge of the agreement or disagreement of two terms; but, in order to perceive this relation, evidently we must first know the two terms. It is (3) also a mistake to assert that the intellect by one and the same act perceives the two terms and their agreement or disagreement; for, in order to perceive the agreement or disagreement of two things,

we must first have ideas of them, and then compare these ideas by a reflex act. Hence one and the same act would be both direct and reflex, which is contradictory. We must, therefore, conclude that the mind begins by *analysis*, and that it first apprehends the essence, separating it by abstraction from the conditions by which it is affected in nature; then follows *synthesis*, which it effects by judgment, when it establishes a union between the terms perceived.

11 41. *The proper object of the intellect in our present life is the essence of material things.*—As the intellect, in our present life, can form an idea only when the imagination has presented to it a sensible image, and as this image must have for its object something material, the proper object of the intellect, in our mortal life, must be the essence of material things.

42. *Among the essences of material things, some are immediately known, while others are known mediately, or by means of deduction.*—Certain essences, as those of “rest, motion,” etc., are self-evident; this must be the case, since otherwise human knowledge would be impossible. But, on the other hand, many essences, even of sensible things, are known to us only by means of reasoning; for example, the essence of “life.”

12 43. *In the cognition of material objects there are three degrees of abstraction employed by the human intellect; in the first degree, it abstracts from the individuality of the objects and considers them only as sensible; in the second, it abstracts also from their sensible and mutable qualities to regard only their quantity; in the third, it abstracts from matter altogether to contemplate the immaterial.*—The first objects of cognition in this life are individual, sensible, material things. The intellect abstracting from the individuality or *thisness* of the objects about

us in the visible world, such as "stones, plants, and animals," contemplates them merely as sensible.

It may further abstract from all the modifications that *qualify* sensible objects, to regard their quantity, and then it considers *continuous* quantity, as "lines, surfaces, solids," and *discrete* quantity, as "number."

Lastly, it may abstract altogether from matter, and regard only the immaterial. What is immaterial may be *negatively* so, as the nature of "being, substance, accident," etc., which though realized in sensible objects, may be abstracted from them; or it may be *positively* immaterial and exclude all matter from its nature, as the "human soul" and "God." Of these three degrees of abstraction, the first is the limit of the physical sciences, the second of mathematics, the third of metaphysics.

44. *In the immediate perception of essences, the intellect begins with the most universal concepts.*—Although adapted by nature to acquire knowledge, the intellect at first knows nothing. It proceeds gradually in the act of cognition, and does not, by its first effort, attain to perfect knowledge. Thus, before possessing a determinate and distinct cognition, it begins with a very universal notion. It is the same with the intellect as with the senses, which, in perceiving an animal, for example, first perceive it as a body, then as an animal, and afterwards as this or that animal. Experience also confirms this truth: for the less perfect the language of a people, the more is it wanting in precise and definite terms; the more perfect the language and the more civilized the people who speak it, the richer is it in exact and well-defined expressions.

45. *The first idea formed by the intellect is that of being.*—The intellect first perceives that which is most universal; but since the most universal idea is that of

being, the first thing perceived by the intellect is the essence of being ; other things are known only as some determination of being. It must not, however, be supposed that, when the intellect is once developed, it must begin by perceiving the idea of being before any other essence whatever, for this occurs only in the first development of intellect ; eventually, it first perceives some determinate essence, and afterwards attains to more universal ideas by an analysis of its reflections.

ART. II.—HOW THE INTELLECT KNOWS INDIVIDUAL BODIES.

46. *The intellect perceives particular bodies by perceiving its own act of abstraction of the intelligible object from the phantasm, which is always representative of an individual material entity.* — The intellect judges and reasons about particular bodies ; it must, therefore, know them. But, as the universal alone can be the proper object of the intellect, the knowledge which it has of the individual is not direct, but indirect (*per accidens*) ; that is, it does not know the individual as its proper object, but it knows it only through the act of a faculty which has the individual for its proper object. The intellect thus apprehends the act of an inferior power or faculty on account of the unity of the soul, in virtue of which one faculty cannot act without the next higher being apprised of its action. Hence particular bodies are known by the soul in two ways : directly, through the senses and the imagination ; indirectly, by the intellect, which perceives its own act of abstracting the intelligible species from the phantasms of the imagination. This manner of knowing is called *per accidens* by the Schoolmen, which they compare to that of knowing substance by sense. The

eye sees color *per se*, the colored object *per accidens*. The intellect knows the universal directly (*per se*), the individual indirectly (*per accidens*).

47. *The reflection of the intellect upon its act of simple apprehension is both consciousness of that act and the perception of the essence apprehended by the act.*—The intellect in reflecting on the act by which it has perceived the essence of a sensible object must know both the act and the object perceived by the act. Thus, when it has the idea of a “flower,” it may turn to this idea, and then know both that it has this idea and that the object from which it has abstracted the essence is a flower. This reflex act of the intellect receives the name of *psychological* consciousness when it is viewed as a modification of the intellect, but when it is considered as an expression of the object known, it is called *ontological* consciousness, or the intellectual perception of the material and individual.

48. *Man knows the material and individual through the senses ; but intellect adds something to the sensitive cognition, since it regards the individual not merely as a fact, but as the concrete realization of the essence which it has abstracted from the individual.*—When the intellect is directed to the consideration of the individual, it is already in possession of the idea which it has abstracted from it ; hence it cannot prevent the light of this idea from being reflected upon the individual object, nor the individual from being presented to the intellect as the concrete realization of the essence perceived through the idea.

The reason of this fact is not only subjective, inasmuch as the senses and imagination have their seat in the same soul as the intellect ; but also objective, since the individual perceived by the senses is truly

the same as that from which the intellect has abstracted the universal.

ART. III.—THE SOUL'S KNOWLEDGE OF ITSELF.

49. *The soul does not know itself immediately by its essence, but only by its operations.*—The soul has no innate idea; it does not, therefore, know itself from its very origin, through its essence. But since its essence is present to it, the soul is capable of perceiving its own existence easily without reasoning. And it attains to this perception as soon as it becomes conscious of any one of its operations.

50. *The soul does not know the nature of its essence immediately, but by reasoning.*—In order that the soul may perceive its own existence, it suffices that it be present to itself and perceive an act of which it is the principle. This is not the case with the knowledge which the soul acquires of its essence, for it attains this by means of deduction. For in perceiving another being, the soul perceives that the idea by which it apprehends the being is immaterial; thence it concludes that the principle whence the idea proceeds is also immaterial. From this property of immateriality the soul afterwards deduces the other properties which it possesses.

ART. IV.—HOW THE HUMAN SOUL KNOWS GOD.

51. *The soul does not know God immediately, but it rises from created things to a knowledge of His existence.*—The intellect perceives directly the essences abstracted from sensible things. From the perception of these essences follows immediately a cognition of the first principles of reason. By reflection on these

acts of the intellect, we at once perceive our own existence and by our senses that of corporeal individuals distinct from us. In this all other knowledge, including that of God, has its source, and is, consequently, only mediate knowledge.

52. *The first notion which we acquire of God is that of His existence, under the relation of first cause.*—Creatures present themselves to us as contingent beings, which, consequently, must have a cause; thus, by the principle of causality we are led to assign them a first uncreated cause.

53. *The knowledge of God as first cause of all created beings contains in germ all the other notions which we can acquire of Him.*—A cause must contain all the perfections which it produces in the effect and it must exclude those imperfections of the effect which are not due to its causality. But the First Cause, being independent and therefore infinite, extends His power to all possible beings, and immeasurably surpasses all the perfections of creatures. Now, there are three ways by which we may know the divine attributes: (1) by the relation of cause to effect, (2) by the exclusion of the imperfections of creatures, (3) by pre-eminent possession of every perfection. By the first, that of *causality*, we know that God is the efficient, final, and exemplar cause of all things, that He is their preserver and ordainer; by the second, that of *exclusion*, we deny of God whatever in creatures implies some defect, as “limitation, dependence, mutability;” by the third, that of *pre-eminence*, we attribute to God in an infinite degree all perfections, such as “goodness, wisdom, beauty.” The union of these two ways of pre-eminence and exclusion enables us to form the most exalted idea that we can have of God, by conceiving Him as absolutely pure Being, that is, as the Being

that simply is, without any augmentation or super-added determination to the simple and pure nature of being.

54. *The idea of the finite is formed by the union of the idea of being with that of privation.*—The finite is that which exists, but with limits, that is, it is affected by a privation of being. When the intellect “looks out upon an object external to itself,” it forms the idea of being. On instituting a comparison between this object and objects which it knows already, it observes what is wanting in each, and thus conceives the idea of privation. The union of these two ideas gives the concept of the finite. From this explanation we see the error of Descartes and Malebranche, who assert that the idea of the finite is deduced from that of the infinite.

55. *The idea of the infinite follows as a consequence from the idea of first cause.*—The intellect, having already the idea of the finite and the idea of God as first cause, easily perceives that the First Cause cannot be limited by itself or by any other cause, and thus conceives it without limits, that is, as infinite. Locke and Condillac, confounding the idea of the infinite with that of the indefinite, assert that the idea of the infinite is obtained by constantly adding to a given finite perfection yet another finite perfection. But this hypothesis is absurd; for the infinite, being essentially without limits, is not susceptible of increase or diminution; the finite, on the contrary, is essentially limited, and however much it may be increased ever remains limited and, therefore, finite, since its increment is, according to Locke, always finite.

56. *From the idea of the finite is derived that of the conditional or contingent, that is, of being which does not*

contain in itself the reason of its existence.—By the finite is meant limited being; but that which is ever tending to being and not to the absence of being cannot limit itself; it must, therefore, be limited by an external agent. But the external agent which gives it limits must also give it its existence, in which those limits are found. In other words, the being is contingent, since the contingency of a being consists precisely in this, that it receives existence from another, as from its cause. As the opposite of the finite is the infinite, so the opposite of the contingent is the necessary and absolute, or that which exists in virtue of its own essence, and in which all is pure act.

ART. V.—NECESSITY OF SENSIBLE IMAGES FOR INTEL-
LECTION IN OUR PRESENT LIFE.

57. *The human intellect in its present state of union with the body, can apprehend no object without the aid of a sensible representation in the imagination.*—Experience teaches us that when the imagination is disturbed or incapable of acting, as in sickness or lethargy, the intellect is likewise disturbed or powerless to produce any idea. It further shows that when we wish to think of anything, even if it be spiritual, we always form a sensible representation; and likewise, when we communicate our ideas to another, we make use of figures and sensible images. Besides this proof from experience, reason demonstrates *a priori* that, in our present life, we cannot, without the concurrence of sensible images, either form ideas or even make use of the ideas which we already possess. For *action follows being*, that is, the action is always conformed to the essence and mode of existence of the being that acts. But the essence of man is a soul substanti-

ally united to a body and the intellect's present mode of existence is in union with the sensitive faculties. In order, then, that man may act as man, he must do so with the concurrence of the two elements of which he is composed ; and the action of intellect naturally requires the co-operation of the senses. We thus see the admirable harmony existing between the subject that operates, the faculty by which he operates, and the object of the operation. The subject is a composite of soul and body ; the faculty is the intellect united to sensitive faculties ; the object is an essence realized in an individual and sensible body.

CHAPTER II.

KNOWLEDGE OF FIRST PRINCIPLES.

ART I.—NATURE OF PRINCIPLES OF KNOWLEDGE.

58. *A principle of knowledge is that by which something is known.*—A principle, in general, is that from which something proceeds. Principles are of three kinds: metaphysical principles, physical principles, and logical principles. The last named include all those principles which when known lead to the knowledge of something else. In a more restricted sense, first principles of knowledge, or simply first principles, are those propositions which are so clear and evident, that they do not require proof. Hence they are also called *axioms* or self-evident truths.

59. *After the perception of essences, the intellect immediately perceives first principles.*—The intellect proceeding gradually in the act of knowing, first perceives what is most elementary, viz., essences. This imperfect knowledge it immediately develops in observing the relations, properties, and accidents of essences, thus calling judgment and reason into action. Of the judgments which it pronounces, some are formed immediately and others mediately. The former are called *first principles*.

ART II.—THE PRINCIPLE OF CONTRADICTION.

60. *The first principle known by the intellect is: It is impossible for the same thing to be and not be at the same time. This is called the principle of contradiction.*—As in the simple perception of essences there exists a first universal idea, viz., the idea of being, which precedes all others and serves as their basis; so there must be a first principle, on which all reasoning rests, and to which the intellect must assent under penalty of being unable to accept any other truth whatever. This first truth is the principle of *contradiction*, and is formulated thus: “It is impossible for the same thing to be and not to be at the same time and in the same respect;” or, in a more didactic form, “Being is incompatible with non-being.” Evidently this is the first principle which the intellect knows. For, in perceiving being, it cannot but perceive the negation of being, or non-being. In comparing these two concepts, therefore, it compares its two primary concepts; and in discovering and affirming their absolute incompatibility, it affirms the principle which in the order of knowledge precedes all others. This principle is so evident that it is immediately known by every intellect, and cannot rationally be denied.*

61. *The principle of contradiction is implicitly contained in all other principles, even in those which are self-*

* Kant denies to the principle of contradiction all objective reality and puts forth his doctrine of Antinomies, or the principle that contradictories may exist side by side. The repugnance of the mind to assent to such a principle is due, he asserts, to the limited circle of our experience, within which contradictories exclude each other. But in the nature of things, he maintains, there is no reason why two and two should not make five.

evident ; it may be used to explain them or render them more evident, but can itself be proved by no other principle.

—Besides the principle of contradiction, there are many other self-evident principles ; but, though the mind arrives at these by the simple perception of essence, and is not obliged to recur to a higher principle, yet in formulating them it must adhere, at least implicitly, to the principle of contradiction. Thus it is with the principle of *identity*, “Every being has its own essence ;” with the principle of *excluded middle*, “A thing either is or is not ;” with the principle of *causality*, “There is no effect without a cause ;” with the principle of *sufficient reason*, “There is nothing without a sufficient reason.” So, too, is it with all the axioms ; as, “The whole is greater than any of its parts,” “Two things equal to a third are equal to each other,” etc. Although these principles do not require demonstration, still they are made more evident by means of the principle of contradiction. Thus, for example, we demonstrate that the whole is greater than any of its parts, from the fact that otherwise the whole would and would not be the whole.

ART. III.—THE PRINCIPLE OF CAUSALITY.

62. *The intellect forms the idea of cause in general when it ascends by abstraction from the knowledge of a particular effect and a particular cause to the idea of effect and cause in general.*—In the act of sensation, of intellection, or of volition, we necessarily distinguish two things : the sensitive, intellective, or volitive act, and the agent which produces the act ; this is nothing but the cognition of a particular effect produced by a particular cause. But from this particular cognition the intellect can by abstraction form the idea of effect and

of cause in general, that is, the idea, first, of something which exists only in virtue of the action of an agent, and the idea, secondly, of an agent by the action of which this thing is produced. Hence the idea of cause comprehends two elements: the perception of an agent as producing an effect by its action, and the perception of an effect as produced by this action.

63. *When the intellect has the idea of cause and effect, it immediately perceives the principle of causality, which is expressed in the formula: There is no effect without a cause.*—This principle expresses nothing more than the essential dependence of every effect on some cause. But this dependence is known from the very idea of effect; for an effect is something that begins to be, or that has a being that it had not. It must, then, have received its being from itself or from another. But it could not receive its being from itself, since in that supposition it would both *exist* in order to give being, and *not exist* in order to receive being. It must then have received its being from another, on which, therefore, it depends, and which is called a *cause*. The intellect, therefore, analyzing the idea of effect, immediately perceives its dependence on a cause; it expresses this dependence in the proposition: “There is no effect without a cause.”*

64. *To the principle of causality is referred the principle of sufficient reason, which may be thus formulated:*

* The word *cause* here means *efficient* cause, and is marked by two characteristics, “*immediate* influence and *active* influence.” Mr. Mill ignores these marks when he defines cause as an *invariable, unconditional* antecedent. When, too, he tries to establish, by means of the principle of causality, the *Uniformity of Nature* as the fundamental principle of his Experimental school, he implies the existence of this very uniformity, and thus falls into a vicious circle.

Whatever is, must have a sufficient reason why it is what it is.—This principle is only an extension of the principle of causality, but it has a more general application; while the principle of causality properly applies only to things which are effects or had a beginning, that of sufficient reason is applicable to the First Cause who had no beginning. The principle of sufficient reason has this limit, however, that with regard to free will, it is not true if taken *objectively* only; for not the object but the election made by the will is the reason why the will determines itself to the exercise of its act.

65. *The principle of causality is analytical, and not synthetical, as Kant maintains.*—A judgment is synthetical when the idea of the predicate is not contained in that of the subject; as, “This wood is green.” A judgment is analytical, when the analysis of the subject enables us to find the predicate in it. Hence the mere analysis of the idea of effect suffices to give the idea of dependence on a cause.

66. *The principle of causality has an objective value, notwithstanding the assertion to the contrary of many philosophers, among others Kant and Hume.*—Many philosophers, recognizing that to destroy the principle of causality is to destroy all science, accept the principle, but deny its objective or real value, and give it only a subjective or ideal value. It is evident, however, that the quality of dependence on a cause, which the effect possesses, results from its nature as effect, and, consequently, is as real as the effect itself.

CHAPTER III.

LANGUAGE IN RELATION TO THE ACQUISITION OF KNOWLEDGE.

ART. I.—UTILITY OF LANGUAGE IN DEVELOPING THE MIND.

67. *As men are composed of body and soul, they require an exterior sign to communicate their thoughts to one another ; the most perfect sign is that of language.*—Man is made to live in society ; but, since his intellect is joined to a body, he must make use of a sensible sign to communicate his thoughts. This sign may be of several kinds ; of these the easiest and most perfect is language ; by it he can communicate the greatest number of things with the greatest clearness.

68. *Language is not absolutely necessary either for the direct or the reflex action of the intellect.*—The intellect has in itself the power, by abstracting ideas from sensible images, of immediately perceiving first principles and of deducing the consequences of its first cognitions ; therefore, it is not absolutely necessary that these cognitions and their consequences should be communicated to the mind by language.*

69. *Language is very useful, and even morally necessary, for the development of the intellect and for the ac-*

* Speech or language may be defined as “the communication of our thoughts to others by means of words or articulate sounds used by consent as signs of our ideas.”

acquisition of the greater part of our knowledge, especially of that which relates to spiritual things and to moral truths.—

If we consider the intellect in itself, we see that it requires a sensible image for the formation of the idea. But, as experience proves, this image formed by the imagination may also be an obstacle in speculative operations. But speech performs the essential function of the sensible image without having its inconveniences ; for it furnishes a very simple sign not susceptible of being confounded with the idea, and easily concentrating the attention, since the words of a language are uniform and constant. Hence speech is very useful in the development of the intellect viewed in itself. But if we consider it in relation to other intellects, we must allow that speech is the principal means by which the greater part of knowledge is communicated in a prompt and easy manner, especially that knowledge which relates to spiritual things and to moral truths. Besides, every science requires the efforts and labors of many ages for its formation. How, then, could it be transmitted or enlarged, if language were not at the service of the savant to enable him to communicate to others the result of his labors ?

ART. II.—ORIGIN OF LANGUAGE.

70. *Speech is of divine origin.*—This is proved : (1) by Holy Scripture and the traditions of nations ; (2) by the silence of profane history about the invention of language and the time of its invention ; (3) by facts of philological science. The fact of the origin of language is settled, but several hypotheses are offered to explain how man received the gift of speech. Among these hypotheses, the simplest and most ra-

tional is, that man received from God the faculty of speech as he received reason and the organs of speech.

71. *The invention of language would not have been absolutely impossible to man.*—Rationalistic philosophers, especially of the Sensist school, maintain the possibility of the invention of language, but in the sense in which they explain it, it is an absurdity. Other philosophers, as J. J. Rousseau (1712–1778), De Bonald and Ventura, have maintained the absolute impossibility of the invention of language. But of the reasons which they give some are false, and others are not wholly conclusive.* Hence many eminent philosophers see no metaphysical impossibility in the human invention of language.

* These are grounds on which they base their theory: 1°. Language is absolutely necessary for thought, and therefore for the invention of language. But since language implies society, man cannot acquire ideas without society. 2°. Language is the efficient cause of ideas, or at least the occasion of perceiving innate ideas. 3°. Man cannot of himself acquire ideas and language; he needs a revelation.

But to this we reply that the invention of language is morally, perhaps even physically, impossible, since words have an arbitrary, not a natural meaning. Men should indeed unite to form a language, but language is an indispensable condition of their being united. Even if it be granted that one man may make himself understood by others who do not speak his tongue, it is yet true that this is effected by natural signs only. Since God has willed man to live in society, He must have given him the indispensable medium of intellectual communication, viz., language. This is the opinion of Humboldt and of Cardinal Wiseman.

CRITERIOLOGY ;

OR,

THE MOTIVES OF CERTITUDE.

1. *Criteriaology, or a treatise on the motives of certitude, investigates the value of our faculties as means of acquiring knowledge and determines the ultimate criterion of certitude.*—It would be of little use to the intellect to have ideas and sensible images if it were not certain that these corresponded to objective reality. Hence, after Ideology has determined how the intellect forms its ideas and acquires its cognitions, Criteriaology shows: 1. That the faculties by which we know afford us certain knowledge; 2. That there is an ultimate principle, which constitutes a solid foundation of the certitude of our knowledge.

CHAPTER I.

THE MENTAL FACULTIES AS MEANS OF ATTAINING TRUTH.

ART I.—THE COGNITIVE FACULTIES.

2. *The cognitive faculties are: 1. the senses; 2. the intellect, including consciousness and reason.*—We know two kinds of objects, viz., sensible and intelligible. The *senses* perceive the sensible; the *intellect*, the

intelligible. When the intellect is considered as having for its object the soul and its affections, or the internal facts of the soul, it is called *consciousness*; when it is considered as inferring one truth from another, it is called *reason*.

ART. II.—THE VERACITY OF THE SENSES.

3. *Sensation, considered as a modification of the sentient subject, is not an illusion but a reality.*—This is a primary fact which cannot reasonably be called in question. To say that the soul is in a state of illusion as to its own sensation is equivalent to asserting that it feels a sensation when there is no sensation, or that it feels when there is nothing to feel, which is a contradiction in terms. Sensation considered as representative of something else may be regarded as a mere representation of an object, or as participating in the nature of a judgment. Considered in the former way, sensation cannot deceive us as to the disposition of the sense, since it does not judge but only perceives; and perception, from its very nature, cannot disagree with the thing perceived, though it may occasion error in the intellect as to the disposition of objects. Considered in the second way, the senses are veracious, as will be established in the following paragraphs.

4. *The senses, when in their normal state and exercised upon their proper sensible object, cannot deceive us.*—No cognitive faculty can be deceived in regard to its proper object, when the conditions required for the exercise of the power are fulfilled; otherwise, it would be a power that could effect nothing, which implies a contradiction. These conditions are (1) that the faculty be in its normal state, (2) that the proper object be suitably disposed, (3) that the medium between the faculty

and the object be not modified. But if only one sense be exercised upon a common sensible, i. e., upon a quality that is perceived by several senses together, then error may arise, since an integral power is not directed to the object. An accidental sensible, i. e., the substance which supports the sensible qualities, demands, in addition to sense, the action of intellect.

5. *The errors arising from the senses are not properly attributable to the senses, but to the intellect.*—Error is found only in the judgment; but the senses do not judge; therefore, the senses, properly speaking, do not deceive us. When they are diseased, or when any cause modifies or impairs the sensation, the senses cannot but receive the sensation so modified or impaired, and transmit it as they receive it to the intellect. Hence the intellect should not be precipitate in judging, and should take into account any abnormal conditions under which the sensation may be produced.

6. *The Idealism of Berkeley is absurd; it admits no reality but that of spirits.*—The senses operating in their normal condition cannot deceive us; but the senses attest the existence of bodies; therefore, bodies really exist.

ART. III.—THE VERACITY OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

7. *The veracity of consciousness is a primary fact, which is affirmed even when it is doubted or denied.*—He who doubts or denies the veracity of consciousness either does not know that he doubts or denies it, and therefore cannot say that it deceives him; or else he does know that he doubts or denies the veracity of consciousness. But then, by what other faculty does he know this than by consciousness, the only

witness of the internal facts of the soul? Therefore, he makes use of consciousness to deny consciousness, and is guilty of evident contradiction.

8. *It is absurd to hold with Transcendental philosophers, that the testimony of consciousness is a mere illusion.*—The ancient Sceptics never questioned the veracity of consciousness; the German Transcendental philosophy alone has dared to do so, and it has thus arrived at absolute Scepticism. According to Fichte, "Reality all merges into a marvellous dream, without life to dream about or spirit to dream—a dream which is gathered up into a dream of itself." But if our life is a dream, if the existence of spirit is an illusion, there must be a subject which dreams or which is under illusion. And this subject must, by the very consciousness by which it knows that it dreams, know also a spirit, which pronounces as an illusion the knowledge of the spirit that dreams. Thus the contradiction of the system is evident. Moreover, since Fichte denies all reality but the *Ego*, he makes consciousness essentially impossible; for every cognition requires three realities, the knower, the known, and the relation between them.

ART. IV.—THE VERACITY OF INTELLECT AND REASON.

9. *The intellect cannot deceive us in immediate judgments which relate either to the rational or to the experimental order.*—The intellect cannot be deceived in regard to its proper object, when this object is presented to it in such a way as to necessitate assent; otherwise, it could not know anything with certainty, and thus it would be a faculty unable to effect anything. Hence the intellect cannot be deceived in the perception of essences; nor can it be deceived in the

cognition of first principles of either the rational or the experimental order. For these principles are self-evident: the former, because the attribute which is affirmed of the subject is found in the very idea of the subject; as, "The whole is equal to the sum of all its parts:" the latter, because they are only the expression of what this intellect sees distinctly in a sensible perception. Thus in the judgment, "The sky is blue," the intellect, by its abstractive power, separates blueness from the sky, and then predicates blue of the sky. Therefore, it is impossible for the intellect to be deceived in regard to first principles, whether rational or experimental.

10. *Reason cannot deceive us in regard to conclusions easily deduced from first principles.*—The whole art of reasoning consists in deducing from two given or known judgments a third judgment, which is found to be contained in them. Hence there is a necessary connection between the conclusion and the premises. But if the truth of the conclusion is based on its necessary connection with the truth of the premises, reasoning evidently cannot deceive us, since a truth cannot both be and not be necessarily connected with another truth. Hence arises the repugnance which the intellect experiences to dissent from the conclusions which follow from a principle; also that secret displeasure which we feel when an adversary, having accepted certain principles, is unwilling to allow the conclusions which are logically drawn from them. But, on the other hand, when the conclusions are derived from a first principle only by long and intricate argumentations, the reason may be deceived, not because the reasoning in this case deceives, but because the natural weakness of the mind is such that it easily allows the attention to

wander and thus overlooks some of the laws of reasoning.

11. *The objection raised against the veracity of reason on account of the errors of philosophers only proves their abuse of reason.*—From the fact that the abuse of reason gives rise to error, we must not infer that reason cannot in any case apprehend truth with certainty. This affirmation of La Mennais (1782–1854) is contrary to good sense and sound logic. Error should be ascribed to lack of attention, to the violation of the laws of reasoning, by interweaving some fallacy with this operation, and to the abuse of reason ; but not to the faculty itself, which by its natural act is never in fault.

CHAPTER II.

SCEPTICISM.

ART. I.—NATURE OF SCEPTICISM.—ITS DIFFERENT KINDS.

12. *Scepticism is a denial of the existence of truth or of the possibility of knowing it with certainty.*

13. *Scepticism is partial or complete, modified or absolute.*—Partial Scepticism rejects the truth or certitude of only a certain class of cognitions. Thus, Idealists, such as Berkeley, reject the truth of sensible cognitions, while Materialists or Empiricists, with Locke and Condillac, admit as certain only facts perceived by the senses. Rationalists, like Descartes, accept as certain only what appears evident to reason; the Sentimentalists, with Reid, consider as certain only what is not repugnant to instinct, to natural sentiment; the Traditionalists and Fideists, represented by La Mennais and Huet (1630–1721) respectively, regard as certain only traditional or revealed truths. Partial Scepticism, as experience shows, leads logically to complete Scepticism. Complete Scepticism rejects the truth or certitude of all knowledge, and is either absolute or modified. It is absolute when it denies the existence of objective or ontological truth, admits that contraries may co-exist, and regards all things as phenomena or illusions. This kind of Scepticism was taught in ancient times chiefly by Gorgias (B.C. 426) and Protagoras (B.C. 440); in

modern times it has been disseminated by Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. Scepticism is modified when it admits the existence of truth, but rejects the veracity of the means at our disposal to apprehend truth. The principal representatives of this phase of Scepticism in ancient times were Pyrrhus (B.C. 380) and Sextus Empiricus (B.C. 200); in modern times, Bayle and Hume (1647-1706) are the most noted.

ART. II.—REFUTATION OF SCEPTICISM.

14. *Scepticism is contradictory; it is logically and practically impossible.*—The consistent Sceptic ought not to reason nor even to think; for, in thinking of his doubt, he affirms his doubt, and consequently is no longer a Sceptic. Above all, a Sceptic should not attempt to propagate his Scepticism, for in doing so he simply uses reason against itself. The consistent Sceptic should no longer act, for all action proceeds from an affirmation of the mind, and thus involves the Sceptic in self-contradiction.

15. *Scepticism is absurd, since its consequence is the negation of all science and all virtue.*—Scepticism denies truth or the possibility of attaining truth with certitude, and thereby renders science impossible, for science is nothing more than the certain knowledge of truth. Scepticism subverts all morality, for it is a truth that every action is either good or bad; but if we must deny or doubt all truth, evidently it is a matter of indifference whether we do this or that act. History, moreover, shows that the ages of Scepticism have always been ages of intellectual and moral decay.

16. *Scepticism is contrary to the nature of man.*—Certitude is the life of the intellect, as air is the life of the body; thus, Scepticism is a state contrary to

nature, an abnormal, exceptional state, in which the mind can be placed only by an abuse of reason.

17. *The facts brought forward by Scepticism against certitude prove nothing.*—Sceptics bring forward in support of their system the great variety of human opinions and the errors into which our faculties lead us. But if men differ in opinion on certain truths, they all agree on fundamental truths, and our faculties do not deceive us when we apply them to their proper object and when they act under the requisite conditions.

CHAPTER III.

THE ULTIMATE CRITERION OF CERTITUDE.

ART. I.—WHAT IS MEANT BY THE ULTIMATE CRITERION OF CERTITUDE.

18. *The principle of certitude is the motive which produces the adhesion of the intellect to a known truth.*—Every cognitive faculty attains to a knowledge of the truth in regard to its proper object. But truth, properly speaking, resides solely in the intellect, which adheres firmly to a truth only by reason of some motive. This motive is called the principle or criterion of this certitude. That principle on which all the others depend is the *ultimate* criterion of certitude. It is with this principle only that the present chapter is concerned.

19. *The principle of certitude is twofold, intrinsic and extrinsic.*—The intellect adheres to a proposition either because the intrinsic truth of the proposition is in itself manifest, or because an extrinsic motive produces conviction, though the intellect does not perceive the truth of the proposition in itself. In the former case the principle of certitude is intrinsic; in the latter, it is extrinsic.

ART. II.—THE INTRINSIC PRINCIPLE OF CERTITUDE.

20. *The intrinsic principle of certitude is the objective evidence of the thing.*—That which causes the intellect

to know the truth of an entity is that the entity manifests itself to the intellect. But that which produces in us the knowledge of truth also produces certitude, since certitude is only the state of the intellect consequent on the possession of its proper object ; in other words, it is the repose of the intellect in the possession of truth to which it firmly adheres. The intrinsic principle of certitude, therefore, is the entity itself as manifesting itself to the intellect and determining its adhesion. This manifestation of the entity to the intellect is what is called *objective evidence*. This evidence is immediate, or evidence of intuition, when the thing becomes manifest to the intellect immediately and by its own light ; as, "The whole is greater than any one of its parts," "The sun is shining;" it is mediate, or evidence of deduction, when it becomes manifest only after some mental process, and by means of another truth.

21. *Huet bases all certitude on revelation ; La Mennais, on the authority of the common consent of mankind, or common sense ; Reid and the Sentimentalist school, on instinct and internal sentiment ; Descartes, on the clear and distinct idea of an object ; Leibnitz and Arnauld, on the principle of contradiction ; Cousin, on the impersonality of reason ; Galluppi, on the testimony of consciousness ; Kant, on practical reason ; Rosmini, on the idea of possible being ; Gioberti and the Ontologists, on the intuition of the divine essence, or on the intuition of the divine ideas. All these systems must be rejected as erroneous.*—If, with Huet (1630-1721), we doubt that which we know by the senses, by consciousness, or by the intellect, and of which we are certain only by the intrinsic evidence of the thing, it is manifest that we must also doubt that which is known to us by divine revelation itself, since we can know what divine revelation

teaches only by means of our senses and our intellect.

Our knowledge of the consent of mankind to a truth is obtained through the senses and the intellect; therefore, according to the very principles of La Mennais, we are necessitated to doubt our knowledge of this consent. Besides, mankind is made up of individuals; but, if certitude is impossible to the individual as such, the mere collection of the uncertain cognitions of individuals can never produce certain cognition.

The adhesion of the intellect, as being the state of a rational being, cannot be determined without a motive. But the instinct and internal sentiment of Reid are blind causes which do not make known the motive of adhesion; therefore, they cannot be the principle of human certitude. Instinct is peculiar to the animal and not to an intelligent human being; far from explaining anything, it requires explanation itself.

Descartes regards evidence as the foundation of certitude; but, according to him, evidence consists in the clear idea of the thing, and is purely subjective; that is, it is merely an act of the mind, and not the manifestation of the object to the mind. It is, consequently, variable and changing. But the certitude which puts us in possession of truth must proceed from an immutable and objective principle, like truth itself. The clear idea of Descartes, being a pure modification of the cognitive act, cannot be the principle of certitude.*

* Descartes held, when his faculties were developed, that as much of his knowledge had not been scientifically acquired, he should doubt of everything that was not evidently certain. Though doubting of the veracity of his faculties, he professed to be unable to doubt the principle, "I think, therefore I exist." From this he de-

We cannot, with Leibnitz and Arnauld (1612-1694), base certitude on the principle of contradiction ; for our assent to this principle must be determined by a motive, and this motive is its intrinsic evidence.

Besides the manifest absurdity that would result from admitting the Impersonal Reason of Cousin and his school, we must remark that this reason, even if supposed to be real, could not produce certitude, unless in virtue of some motive distinct from itself.

We cannot agree with Galluppi (1770-1846) in founding certitude on the testimony of consciousness. For consciousness testifies only to internal acts and states, and is a purely subjective witness ; hence it cannot produce certitude regarding objects outside the mind.

The practical reason of Kant must necessarily have speculative reason for its basis ; therefore, if the speculative order is uncertain, the practical order will share the same fate.

Rosmini errs in placing the principle of certitude in the idea of possible being ; for, aside from the falsity of the innateness of this idea, it cannot produce certitude regarding entities in the real order, since it is purely subjective.

According to Ontologism, the intellect does not form to itself a representation of the object known ; hence the ideal order is destroyed, and consequently, all knowledge also. Thus, direct vision of the divine es-

ceived his principle that the criterion of certitude is a clear and distinct idea. Thence he deduced the existence and veracity of God, and consequently the veracity of man's faculties. But his "methodical doubt" is contradictory, since he must rely upon intellect for his fundamental principle. Moreover, he falls into a vicious circle, for from the veracity of his intellect he proves God's existence, and from the existence and veracity of God, he infers the veracity of man's faculties.

sence or of the divine ideas, far from being the principle of certitude, is the negation of all knowledge and of all certitude.

ART. III.—THE EXTRINSIC PRINCIPLE OF CERTITUDE.

22. *The ultimate extrinsic principle of certitude is the authority of him who affirms the fact.*

23. *An extrinsic principle or criterion of certitude is either divine or human authority: the latter is mere human authority, if there be question of fact; or the authority of scientists, if there be question of scientific truths; or the authority of common sense, if there be question of the principal truths necessary for our intellectual or moral life.*

24. *Divine authority or revelation is a perfect criterion of certitude and superior to all others.*—God neither can deceive us nor can be deceived Himself. His infallibility and veracity give us the most perfect certitude regarding the truths which He has revealed to us.

25. *Human testimony produces certitude in us when we know that the witnesses cannot be deceived and do not wish to deceive.*—The knowledge and veracity of the witnesses are, therefore, the two essential conditions on which human authority is based.

26. *The absolute impossibility of the facts testified to, and in certain cases the improbability of the facts, argue against the validity of the testimony.*—If a fact is absolutely impossible, evidently the testimony borne to it is false. If the fact is improbable, the testimony requires more careful examination. But it is sometimes difficult to determine whether the fact is impossible; hence we should rely mainly on the positive indication of the knowledge and veracity of witnesses.

27. *We have a certain indication of the knowledge and veracity of witnesses, when they agree in reporting a fact*

in the same way.—The testimony of a single witness does not, of itself, afford a guarantee of truth ; but if the witnesses are numerous and if they agree in their testimony, we cannot call their testimony in question ; for then we must suppose either that all are deceived in the observation of the same fact, or that they all agree to deceive in reporting the fact. But, on the one hand, it cannot happen that many men should at the same time be subject to the same defect in their senses ; and on the other hand, many men cannot maintain the same error in the same way, since a lie is produced by the passions, and the passions vary with individuals.

But if the witnesses report facts humiliating to themselves ; if they are very numerous, of different ages and conditions ; if they endure torments and even death in support of their testimony ; if they report public facts of great importance, which are not contradicted, but rather confirmed by the very persons whom these facts condemn, then their testimony produces perfect certitude. Such is the testimony in support of the facts on which Christianity rests.

The certitude produced by human authority is often only *moral*, so that its opposite is not absolutely impossible but only against the laws by which the moral world is governed ; but cases occur in which it passes into *absolute* certitude, when the opposite is plainly contradictory ; as, for example, when there is question of a matter wherein it belongs to the providence of God to see that no error creep in. The certitude is also absolute when the witnesses are many and could not, if they would, deceive in relating a fact that is important and obvious to the senses of all.

ART. IV.—MEANS BY WHICH TESTIMONY IS TRANSMITTED.

28. *The three means by which human testimony is transmitted are : tradition, history, and monuments.*—*Tradition* is an oral account transmitted from mouth to mouth. *History* is a written record of past events. *Monuments* are all the works of men which may serve as signs of accomplished facts ; they comprise pillars, inscriptions, medals, charters, etc. Their testimony is indirect, if they afford knowledge which they were not intended to convey ; thus, the magnitude of the pyramids indirectly testifies to the power of the Egyptian kings. It is direct when they make known the fact which they were designed to transmit ; thus, the medal commemorative of a victory bears direct testimony to that event.

29. *When tradition is continuous, constant, and relates to a public and important fact, it is a source of certitude.*—Contemporaneous witnesses of an event give certain information of it to those who come after them. The latter may weigh the value of the testimony, but they will find deception and error impossible, if the witnesses to the fact are numerous. Hence, they can, in their turn, produce in those who succeed them a certitude equal to their own, and so the knowledge of the events may be carried down to the most remote ages. We thus see the falsity of the opinion of Locke, who holds that a tradition gradually loses its value by the lapse of time. It should be *constant* or uniform at least in substance and in leading circumstances, though it may vary in minor details. The fact should be *public* and *important*, attested by many witnesses and brought to the knowledge of many.

30. *It is absurd to object against the value of tradition*

the errors current during many ages among different nations.—These errors or fables have come down to us devoid of consistency and universality, and destitute of the essential notes of authority; and the fact that it has at all times been easy to show their falsity is a proof that they cannot be confounded with true tradition.

31. *Monuments are a source of certitude when we can establish their authenticity.*—A monument testifies that at the time when it is erected, the fact whose memory it is intended to perpetuate is certain and universally believed. It is impossible for a counterfeit fact to be generally believed by those who are its contemporaries. But if it is to make known the truth, evidently the monument must really belong to the epoch to which it is referred, or be erected by a people to whom a constant and well attested tradition of the fact has come down. Doubt as to the authenticity of a monument produces doubt concerning the fact which it attests.

32. *History is a source of certitude when it is authentic and entire.*—A historical narrative, when published, is equivalent to a public testimony of its contemporaries. If these receive such a work as truthful, and if it has undergone no alteration in the lapse of ages, it merits equal credence in all times, and is a criterion of certainty.

33. *We are certain that a writing is authentic: 1. When, by an unbroken tradition, it is recognized as such; 2. When it is in harmony with the manners and customs of the time to which it is referred, and with the character and the genius of the author to whom it is ascribed; 3. When by its nature it makes imposition impossible.*—If from the epoch to which it is referred a writing has always been recognized by the tradition of the common

people or of the learned as the production of a particular author, if the contents of the writing be in harmony with the known customs of the age, and with the life and genius as well as with the style of the author, its authenticity cannot be disputed. For this is especially guaranteed by the moral impossibility of publishing the writing without the immediate discovery of imposture.

34. *We are certain that a writing is entire: 1. When its component parts mutually agree both in matter and in form; 2. When the copies which have been made of it in different times and places are identical; 3. When, on account of its importance and the great number of persons interested in it, alteration becomes impossible.*—The intrinsic proof of the integrity of a writing is found in the perfect harmony of the different parts which compose it: the extrinsic proof consists in the identity of the extant copies of the writing, even though made at different times and in different places. Finally, if the writing interests a great number of persons, and if they have never protested against any alteration, the integrity of the work reaches its highest degree of certainty.

35. *The veracity of a history is established from the very nature of the writing and from the knowledge and veracity of the writer.*—The intrinsic indications of the veracity of a history are the notoriety of the facts recorded, their importance, and their relation to other facts which occurred at the same time. The knowledge and veracity of the writer are established in accordance with the rules of ordinary testimony. We should examine whether he is unbiassed by passion or prejudice, whether he could easily have ascertained the facts, and especially whether he agrees with other writers recording the same facts. To some extent,

these rules apply in examining the veracity of a monument.

36. *The objections of Scepticism against the value of historic testimony serve only to establish it more firmly.*—It is objected that many books, once received as authentic, have proved later to be forgeries. But if we have means of detecting the spuriousness of certain writings, evidently the authenticity of others, in which nothing of the kind can be detected, only remains the more firmly established. In like manner, it is true that many copies of ancient works have come down to us with alterations. But if the parts in which these copies do not agree prove that alteration has taken place, the other parts, in which they do agree, prove that the original text has been preserved intact.

ART. V.—AUTHORITY OF COMMON SENSE AND OF THE
LEARNED.

37. *By the testimony of common sense is meant the general and constant assent of mankind to some truth.*—To know this general assent, it is not necessary to question all men; it suffices to know the views of enlightened men and the opinion of nations in general.

38. *Common sense is a criterion of certitude in regard to the truths to which it bears testimony.*—That men in different times and in different places be unanimous in affirming a thing, it is necessary that this affirmation be founded in nature itself. But that which is the effect of nature cannot deceive; we must, therefore, admit the testimony of common sense.

39. *The truths affirmed by common sense are: 1. Principles which are easily known by the use of natural reason; 2. Those moral and religious truths the knowledge of*

which is necessary to the moral life of man.—There are both immediate and mediate principles the cognition of which is easy and requires only the natural development of reason: as, “The whole is greater than any of its parts.” These principles, therefore, are known by all men. The principal moral and religious truths, however, the knowledge of which is indispensable to man, are not so easily known. But few minds could have attained to them, and even then only after much time, with an intermixture of error, and in an uncertain manner. Consequently, if they are known and accepted by all men, it is in virtue of a primitive revelation made by God to the first man, and handed down to his descendants by unbroken tradition.

40. *It is vain to object against the authority of common sense the corruption of primitive traditions among nations in the course of time and the almost universal diffusion of certain errors.*—The alterations produced in primitive traditions are neither constant nor universal; they are then without value. Thus, polytheism was professed only during a certain period among different nations, and it was not universal; therefore it must be attributed to the corruption of men and not to their nature. While admitting the reality of certain errors, like that of the revolution of the sun around the earth, we must also observe that they are rather the result of ignorance; but ignorance should not be confounded with error. Besides, to determine the revolution of the heavenly bodies was beyond the sphere of the commonalty, and therefore beyond the common sense of mankind, of which exclusively is the present question.

41. *The authority of the learned in matters relating to their specialties demands our prudent assent.*—The authority of the savant in his peculiar domain, should

be respected by the unlearned, since he who by the culture of his mind is fitted to apprehend a truth may impose it on him who could not of himself attain to its knowledge. But as the learned themselves are competent to examine the particular truths in question, they should judge the authority of other scientists by their own reason. Hence we may formulate the following three rules: 1. The authority of scientists should be accepted so long as there is no reasonable ground to believe it false or to suspect it; it should be rejected, if it is known to be false; 2. Every scientist is a competent judge only in the science of which he is master; 3. One scientist may accept the affirmations of another, when he cannot himself ascertain their truth or demonstrate their falsity; * yet he may reject them if the opposite arguments are of equal weight.

ART. VI.—IMPORTANCE OF AUTHORITY AS A CRITERION OF CERTITUDE.

42. *Authority is necessary for the complete development of our mind and is the source of most of our knowledge.*—Without the aid of authority, man could, indeed, acquire the knowledge of some truths; but, if we except those which are sensible and elementary, they would be very limited and bound up with many errors. Authority develops his mind promptly and without fatigue, enriches it with a store of knowledge which it could never acquire by itself, either on account of its elevation or of the time required for their

* For a clear exposition of the harmony between the positive results of science and the truths of faith, consult *Apologie de la Foi Chrétienne*.

acquisition or of insurmountable material difficulties. It is because authority is necessary for the normal and complete development of the intellect, that the mind is naturally inclined to accept authority, especially during the early years of life. .

REAL PHILOSOPHY

OR

METAPHYSICS.

DEFINITION OF METAPHYSICS—ITS UTILITY AND DIVISION.

1. *Real Philosophy, or Metaphysics, is that part of Philosophy which treats of that which is immaterial and super-sensible in real being.*—Rational Philosophy treats of entities as they are in the order of cognition; Metaphysics studies them as they are in themselves.

2. *The excellence of Metaphysics is seen both from its own nature and from its relations to other sciences.*—The natural sciences, mathematics, and other sciences treat only of this or that being and under a particular aspect; they are, therefore, subordinate to metaphysics, which studies being in its highest or ultimate causes or reasons. Although, relatively to the end of man, moral philosophy excels all the other sciences, and rational philosophy claims pre-eminence as a necessary condition for advancing in any science whatever; yet, considered absolutely, metaphysics excels both, for it is their foundation.* Metaphysics yields in excellence to Sacred Theology alone.

*The inferior sciences neither prove their first principles nor defend them against attack; this they leave to a superior science, i.e., *metaphysics*. Cf. St. Thomas, *Sum. Th.* i, q. i, a. 8.

3. *Metaphysics is divided into General Metaphysics, or Ontology, and Special Metaphysics. Special Metaphysics is further divided into Cosmology, Psychology, and Natural Theology.*—Being, in its most general sense, when considered in itself as Being simply, is the object of General Metaphysics, or *Ontology*. When contemplated in its concrete reality, it is the object of Special Metaphysics. But Being is either created or uncreated. Cosmology treats of the created world in its most general principles, leaving to the subaltern sciences the study of particular things. Yet as man occupies a place apart in creation, the study of the human soul forms a separate branch of special metaphysics, and is called *Psychology*. Lastly, the study of God and His attributes is the object of *Natural Theology*.

GENERAL METAPHYSICS

OR

ONTOLOGY.

DEFINITION AND DIVISION OF GENERAL METAPHYSICS.

4. *General Metaphysics is a science which treats of being in general, and the common properties of being.*

5. *General Metaphysics treats : 1, of being and its common properties ; 2, of the principles of being ; 3, of the divisions of being.*

BEING AND ITS PROPERTIES.

CHAPTER I.

IDEA AND ANALOGY OF BEING.

ART. I.—IDEA OF BEING.

6. *Being, as the object of general metaphysics, is that which is, or at least can be.*—Being * as the object of

* The term Being may be used as a participle or as a noun. The former use implies existence, the latter need suppose only fitness to exist. In the text Being is used as a noun. As the term Being, therefore, means sometimes Essence only, sometimes Existence, so the term Nothing, the negation of Being may be used to signify Nothing of essence, i.e., absolute nothing, or to signify nothing of existence

general metaphysics, cannot properly be defined, for there is no more general idea than that of being. Whatever is, whatever can be conceived, comes under the name of being. Therefore every attempt to define being presupposes the knowledge of its meaning. Yet being may be described as *Whatever in any way is known in itself (per se) and positively, or, Whatever is in itself intelligible.*

7. *Being is an essential predicate of everything to which we attribute it.*—For that which we first perceive as belonging to the essence of any thing is that it is a being.

8. *Being is not one of the distinct formalities composing a thing, but it is inherent in all that goes to make up the thing.*—Man, for example, is composed of “animality and rationality ;” but being is inherent in these two formalities ; “animality” is being, “rationality” is being. There is nothing that may not be called being.

ART. II.—ANALOGY OF BEING.

9. *Being is predicated of God and of creatures not univocally but analogically.*—A term is predicated of several things *univocally*, when it has the same meaning with respect to each of them ; as, the word *animal* relatively to “dog and horse.” A term is predicated of several things *analogically* when these things have only a certain proportion to one another ; as, when *healthy* is predicated of “man,” of his “pulse,” and of the “food” which he eats. From this it is evident that *ens rationis*, or logical being, and real being are not

though the existence of the object be possible. Of a square triangle we must predicate nothing of essence, for it is an absolute impossibility ; of the men of the twenty first century, we predicate nothing of existence.

univocal ; since the one exists solely in the apprehension of the intellect, the other is independent of our cognition. It is also evident that created being and uncreated being are not univocal, for God is pure being, infinite and eternal, while the creature has only participated being, is finite and has a beginning of existence.

10. *Being is predicated analogically of substance and accident.*—Substance is being to which it belongs not to be in another in which it inheres ; accident, on the contrary, is being to which it belongs to be in another as subject.*

11. *Being is predicated analogically of the different things to which it is applied.*—Since the term *being* may be predicated, under a certain respect, of everything, of logical being and real being, of God and creatures, of substance and accident, the term is analogous.

* See § 111.

CHAPTER II.

THE TRANSCENDENTALS.

ART. I.—NUMBER OF TRANSCENDENTALS.

12. *We distinguish five transcendentals : Being or Entity, Unity, Truth, and Goodness.*—They are called transcendentals, because they may be affirmed of every thing.* The transcendental properties add nothing to being, but present it under a special aspect. Thus a *being* is called *one*, because it is undivided in itself ; *true*, because it is knowable ; *good*, because it is desirable. Though all these properties are essential to every being, yet three—*Unity, Truth, and Goodness*—are the most important, and are those of which metaphysics treats more particularly.

ART II.—UNITY.

13. *Unity is indivision of being. Whatever can be called one is a being undivided in itself.*—Every being is necessarily *one*, otherwise it would not be a being, but *several beings*. A being continues to exist so long as it retains its unity, but ceases to exist when its unity is lost. But unity adds nothing to being ; it merely

* In other words, they transcend or lie beyond all genera and species. But the term is by no means to be understood in the Kantian sense of exceeding the powers of man's mind.

indicates its entity's indivision, and denies division. Since unity is the indivision of entity, it means first and directly, the negation of division, secondarily and indirectly, positive entity.

14. *Unity is of three kinds: generic, specific, and numerical.*—Since unity is indivision of being, there are as many kinds of unity as there are kinds of division. But things are divided chiefly according to genus, or species, or individuals. There are then three kinds of unity: *generic* unity, which denies the division of genus; *specific* unity, which denies the division of species; and *individual* unity, which denies the division of number.

We may also classify unity as *metaphysical* or absolute, and *physical* or relative: the former not being really separable into parts, as the "human soul;" the latter being divisible though not yet actually divided into parts, as a "stone." But this second kind of unity is not properly unity; it should rather be called union or unity of imitation. To these may be added *artificial* unity, or that effected between things which, though not naturally ordained for this union, are now actually united, either *physically*, as are the "parts of a building," or *morally*, as in "society, domestic or civil."

15. *The merely individual or numerical unity and multiplicity of substances arise from matter.*—The principle of individuation, which must not be confounded with the seven individuating notes that serve to distinguish one individual from another, is that by virtue of which certain perfections belonging to the same species differ from one another and are multiplied numerically. But this principle of individuation can be nothing else than matter. For natural composites are constituted of matter and form. Now,

numerical multiplicity comes originally from that which renders a form numerically multipliable ; but that which renders a form numerically multipliable is proximately divisibility, a property of quantity ; but quantity is an accident of matter ; therefore, matter determined by quantity is the ultimate principle of the individuation of material substances. Hence it is evident that angels, being pure spirits, are not susceptible of individual multiplicity, and that each angel constitutes a distinct species.*

16. *Accidents derive their numerical unity and multiplicity from the subject as acted upon by some cause which produces the accident.*—With respect to accidental form, the subject holds the place of matter ; it must, therefore, individualize it, as explained in the preceding article. There are, for instance, as many impressions of the American eagle as there are pieces of bullion impressed by the die.

17. *The unity of a being brings with it a distinction from every other being then existing. Distinction is of three kinds, real, logical, and virtual.*—From the very fact that a being is *one*, it is necessarily incapable of being confounded with any other being ; hence it is *distinct* from it. Distinction is *real*, if it exists in beings independently of any mental consideration ; as the distinction between “Peter and Paul.” Distinction is *logical*, if the intellect separates into various concepts a thing which in itself is one ; as the distinction between “animality and ration-

* This opinion of the Thomistic school is rejected by the Scotists, who hold that in each individual there is a *hæcceity* or *thisness*, which renders the individual such apart from matter. Again, some Schoolmen consider the whole concrete nature of the thing, whether matter and form together, or form only, as the principle of individuation.

ality" in man, or between "man and rational animal."

Real distinction is subdivided into *major* or *entitative*, into *modal*, and *virtual*. *Real major* distinction is the "distinction of thing from thing," whether the things be substances, or substances and accidents, or accidents only. *Modal* distinction is the "distinction of a thing from the mode by which it is affected," as of a "line from its curvature." *Virtual* distinction is the distinction of the perfections of a thing by reason of its power to exercise many functions, so that while the thing is one it gives us a foundation for distinguishing in it several formalities according to its different functions." Such is the distinction of the "vegetative and sensitive functions" of the human soul from its "purely rational functions."

18. *Metaphysical degrees are distinguished not actually but only by a mental operation.*—By metaphysical degrees is meant that hierarchy of formalities* which can be observed in everything; for example, in General Sherman, the formalities of "rational being, of animal, of living being, of substance," etc. But before the operation of the intellect these realities are not distinguished actually but only virtually. For these metaphysical degrees constitute only one and the same reality, which is multiple not actually but virtually. The rational soul in man is not a triple soul composed of several souls in one; it is one and simple, and can only virtually be called multiple. But since one soul is equivalent in its operations to several inferior souls, the intellect represents it actually by several different concepts. Thus it distinguishes

* A formality is the manner in which a thing is conceived or constituted by an act of the intellect.

in the human soul three degrees—vegetative, sensitive, and rational.*

19. *Besides transcendental unity there is also quantitative or numerical unity. Several quantitative or numerical unities make a multitude or number properly so-called, which is defined as Multitude measured by unity.*—Numerical unity is transcendental unity with relation to number added. Unlike transcendental unity, which is not any thing really distinct from entity, numerical unity is an accident of things which are numbered. In other words, it is transcendental unity determined to the category of quantity, and bears to transcendental unity “the relation of contained to the containing, of the determined to the undetermined.” For though discrete quantity is divided in itself, it is not essential whether it be numbered or not; this unity then is accidental. Several quantitative unities form a multitude or number properly so-called.† Number

* This distinction is sometimes called virtual, sometimes conceptual, the foundation of which exists in the perfection of the subject. It is also known as distinction of the “mind motived” (*rationis ratiocinatae*) to mark it off from distinction of the “mind motivating” (*rationis ratiocinantis*), where the distinction exists in the mind only. See *Metaphysics of the School*, vol. i., p. 354.

† “If Transcendental Unity adds nothing to Being but actual Indivision, it is manifest that the Transcendental Unity of continuous Quantity will consist in undivided continuity within the one common limit. If that continuity be broken, Quantitative Unity is broken. . . . To take an illustration: There is a worm crawling before our feet. It is one Substance and one continuous Quantity, whose limit gives the animal its sensible configuration. Now cut it in two. There are two distinct living Substances; but there are also two distinct continuous Quantities under two limits, which give to the two animals respectively their external form. So separate are they now, that one may remain in England, and the other find its way to China. Thus, after the operation, the previous Substance (i.e. the worm) has lost its Transcendental Unity, and has become two Entities and two

must not necessarily be composed of unities of the same kind specifically. Hence it is not inaccurate, as some affirm, to speak of "two cardinal virtues," "two angels," etc., for one cardinal virtue and another cardinal virtue, one angel and another, etc., make two numerically as well as do one line and another line make two lines.

20. *From the unity of being is derived its identity, which is defined as The sameness of an entity with itself.*—Being considered as one and undivided without addition or diminution, must be regarded as the same with itself. This relation of a being with itself is called *identity*. When several beings numerically distinct have the same essence, they are said to be *specifically* identical, because there is among them an identity of essence. Identity is *physical* when the being remains really unchanged in itself; it is *moral* when the object is the same only in the estimation of men. The mineral kingdom abounds in examples of the first kind; living bodies afford instances of the second, for though, as physiology teaches, the constituent molecules are periodically changed, yet the plant or animal is reputed by man to be the same. To this identity of essence *diversity* stands opposed; thus, two beings of different species, as "a tree and a horse," are called diverse. If several beings agree in quantity, they are called *equal*; if they have the same quality, they are said to be *like*. To *equality* is opposed *inequality*, to *likeness* *unlikeness*.

Unities. The continuous Quantity which informed it has lost its Transcendental Unity, as well as Entity; and has become two Entities, two Unities. Consequently, the Unity which it conferred on the Substance of the worm has ceased, and is replaced by two Unities, extraneous and accidental to the substantial Essence of the two worms."—*Metaphysics of the School*, vol. i., p. 205.

ART III.—TRUTH.

21. *Truth is the conformity between the intellect and its object.*—The truth of a being is not an entity distinct from that being : by the very fact that a being is, it is true. Nevertheless, truth is the being viewed not precisely as such, but considered in its relation to intellect. For truth appertains properly and primarily to the intellect, as health belongs properly and primarily to the animal ; and just as nothing is styled healthy but with respect to the animal, so nothing is said to be true but relatively to the intellect. But the object of the intellect is being ; therefore every being can be called true, because there is none that is not placed in relation to the divine intellect. But an object is necessarily in relation to the intellect if it depends on it for its being ; it is accidentally in relation if it is simply known by the intellect. And since every thing depends for its being on the divine intellect, its truth is found chiefly in relation to this intellect. The conformity of being to the divine intellect is called *metaphysical truth*. The conformity of the human intellect to being is called *logical truth*. Hence truth is not mutable nor progressive, except in so far as man's knowledge is capable of increase. For all creatures realize their divine prototype, and our ideas represent the immutable essences of things.

22. *The truth of the intellect taken simply is prior to the truth of beings ; but the truth of the created intellect follows the truth of beings.*—A being is said to be true only in as far as it is conformed to the divine intellect ; therefore truth is found primarily in the divine intellect. On the contrary, the created intellect is said to be true, when it is conformed to the being

which is its object ; therefore the truth of being precedes the truth of the created intellect.

23. *Falsity is the non-conformity between an object and intellect.*—Since every being is necessarily conformed to the divine intellect, it is always true with respect to God. With respect to the human intellect, a being is said to be false when it is of such a nature as to appear what it is not, or under a character which it does not possess ; as for example, a “dream.”* But the object always remains true in itself. It is only relatively that it is said to be false. Properly speaking, falsity exists only in a judgment which is pronounced by the human intellect, and which is not conformed to the object.

ART. IV.—GOODNESS.

24. *Goodness is the conformity of a thing to the will, especially to the divine will. The good is defined as Being considered as appetible.*—Every being,† as such, has a

* “ Properly speaking, there can be no such thing as Ontological Falsity. For all being is *ipso facto* conformed to the Divine Intelligence, both practical and speculative. Neither can it properly be called, in a secondary sense, false, in regard of the human intellect. For there is no Being, as such, which is not apt to generate in our minds a just estimate and conform representation of itself. But it may be sometimes improperly called false, according to analogy of attribution of the first class, inasmuch as it allures the human mind to form a false Judgment. This arises from no defect in Being ; but partly, by reason of the similarity of the sensible accidents of an entity with those of other entities distinct from itself ; partly, by reason of the imperfection of the human intellect, which depends in great measure on sensible accidents for its cognition of Being.”—*Metaphysics of the School*, vol. i., pp. 467, 468.

† Real being includes both actually existent and possible being. Possible being is included under real being because it is not a mere mental creation ; moreover, it involves no intrinsic contradiction,

real existence, and is good and in some sense perfect, since the nature of any thing is so much perfection. But a thing is appetible by reason of its perfection, and whatever is desirable is referred to the will. But since the perfection of any thing depends on the nature of that thing, its goodness can have no other measure than its being, the *good* and *being* are one and the same thing, and differ only in that the good expresses a relation of conformity to the will, which being does not express. Every being is not only good in itself as having the perfections essential to its nature, but also good for others, since every creature bears some relation to some other creatures.

25. *A thing is good only in so far as it refers in some way to existence ; possible things, as such, are not good.*—Unlike the intellect which contains ideally in itself whatever it knows, and consequently prescind from their existence, the will is borne toward things and thus can properly seek them only when existing. Hence a merely possible thing can only be called good in a certain way, viz., as about to exist really, and as now existing ideally.

26. *Goodness belongs to a being in its relation to its final cause or end.*—As the truth of a being is its conformity with the idea which is its exemplar formal cause, the goodness of a being is its conformity with its end or final cause. Thus, a *house* is said to be *good*, not because it realizes the plan of the architect, but because it offers a secure and commodious shelter to those who live in it.

27. *Goodness is divided into transcendental and moral.*—The *transcendental* or metaphysical goodness of an

and there are now existing beings capable of giving it physical existence. (See note, § 6.)

entity is its capability of drawing the appetite toward itself. *Moral* goodness is the conformity of the thing willed to the rules of morality.

The good is also divided into *useful*, *honorable*, and *pleasurable*. For the objects sought by a rational nature are desired as a means to some end, and then are called *useful*; or for their own sake, in which case they are called *honorable*; or, finally, as giving repose to the appetite of him who possesses them, and then they are called *pleasurable*.

Good is also *true* or *apparent*, according as it suits the special tendency of the whole being, or some particular tendency not in harmony with the whole nature of the being.

28. *The highest degree of the good is the perfect.*—Goodness consists in the conformity of a being with its end; but because the end of a being can be attained more or less completely, there are degrees of goodness. A being is said to be perfect when it has attained its end in all its plenitude; i.e. when “none of the conditions requisite for its existence are wanting, when it possesses all the power necessary for the exercise of its proper operation, and is thus fitted to attain its proper end by its own operation.” (Jouin.)

29. *Evil, the opposite of goodness, is the privation of a good due to a being.*—Since every thing, inasmuch as it is, is good, it follows that evil is not being, but a privation of being or of good, and that it is real only so far as the privation of the good is real. Still, as every privation is necessarily referred to a being, for that which does not exist cannot be deprived of any thing, it is said that evil is in being as in its subject.

30. *Evil is divided into metaphysical or nominal, physical or natural, and moral evil. For voluntary agents, it is divided simply into the evil of sin and evil of punish-*

ment.—Created beings, from the very fact that they are created, are deprived of some perfections. But since this privation belongs to their very condition as creatures, it is not a true evil, but only a *nominal* evil. All the creatures in the world have not the same perfections; but this inequality by which some beings are deprived of perfections possessed by others, far from being an evil is a true good, since it is a condition of the admirable hierarchy of creatures and of the order of the universe. Moreover, it is part of the order of the universe that, besides incorruptible creatures, there should be others that may lose some of the perfections proper to their nature. This explains why God, though not the author of real evil, yet permits evil in the world in view of a greater good.

Physical or *natural* evil is the privation of a good required by the nature of a physical being, as “the want of wings in a bird.” * *Moral* evil consists in the privation of a moral good; it is a non-conformity to the rules of morality. This non-conformity to the rules of morality, which can happen only in creatures endowed with free will, is called the evil of *sin* or *sinful* evil. The evil in creatures which destroys the integrity of their being is the consequence of the evil of sin, and has the character of punishment; it is, therefore, called the evil of *punishment* or *penal* evil. And because this evil is found in a special manner in

* Even pain implies the existence of a natural good, for it warns the sufferer of the presence in his system of some obstacle to perfect health; besides, as a feeling it is a perfection, being an exercise of sensibility. In both these senses it exemplifies the axiom, “Good and being are convertible.” It is only as being a defect in the physical integrity of man or brute that it is an evil, an absence of due perfection.

creatures endowed with free will, and because the good of which evil is the privation is the absolute object of the will, it follows that, strictly speaking, there are but two kinds of evil, the evil of sin and the evil of punishment; the latter is a privation of integrity of being, the former of justice of action. It is further to be remarked that the evil of punishment is an evil only in its subject; in its cause it is a good; for from a moral standpoint the order of the universe is founded on justice, and justice requires the punishment of the evil of sin.

31. *Evil has no direct efficient cause, it has an accidental cause, which is the good.*—Evil necessarily has a cause. But there can be no cause without being, and every being, inasmuch as it is, is good; therefore the good alone can be the cause of evil. But, although it be the cause of evil, it is not a direct efficient cause, but merely an accidental cause. For if the evil, as, for instance, a “boiler explosion,” is produced by a natural agent, it is owing to some defect in the agent, as “unskilfulness in an engineer,” or in that on which its power is exercised, as “the thin walls of the boiler of a steam-engine.” If the evil is moral, and therefore produced by a voluntary agent, it is owing to some defect in the will. Therefore it is not the good directly and as such that is the cause of evil, but the good accidentally and as susceptible of defects.

32. *Since God is the infinitely perfect Being, it is only by permitting evil that He can be said to be its cause.*—It is consonant with the order of the universe that there be certain beings which can be defective. Therefore God, in causing the good which agrees with the general order, causes, as it were, in certain beings, by permitting it, the defect of which evil is the consequence. Hence whatever of being and perfection

there is in created things should be referred to God as to its cause; but whatever is defective has not God for its cause; it is the result of the imperfection of second causes. God is, however, the author of the evil of punishment, by which sinners receive the chastisement which they merit. But this evil is a true good, for it helps to satisfy the justice demanded by the order that should reign in the universe.

33. *It is a gross error to maintain, with the Gnostics and Manicheans, the existence of two contrary supreme principles, the principle of good and the principle of evil.*—A supreme evil, the cause of all evil, is an absolute impossibility, for evil is nothing but a privation of being; if, then, any absolute evil existed, it would be a privation of all being, and hence would be absolutely nothing. The believers in two first principles have allowed themselves to be drawn into this error by the sight of two particular contrary effects, one good, the other evil, which they attributed to two particular contrary causes, but which they knew not how to refer to a common and universal cause.

ART V.—BEAUTY.—SUBLIMITY.—GRACEFULNESS.

34. *The beautiful is that which pleases when known.*—The good is that which satisfies when possessed, the beautiful is that which pleases when known. Hence the good is referred to the appetite, the beautiful to the cognitive faculties; but because an object when known pleases only in so far as it has harmony of proportion, it follows that the beautiful consists essentially in harmony of proportion, just as the ugly, its opposite, consists in the absence of this harmony.

35. *The means of discerning the beautiful are the cognitive faculties, viz., the senses and intellect.*—In treating

of the beautiful, the faculties that perceive it must first be noted; these are the intellect and the internal and external senses. Among the external senses sight and hearing are, strictly speaking, the only ones that perceive the beautiful. The other senses are, so to say, immersed too deeply in matter; they help to perceive the beautiful, not of themselves, but by transmitting their impressions to the internal senses. Of the internal senses only the common sense (*sensus communis*) and imagination perceive the beautiful, the former by receiving the image, the latter by preserving it. The union of these senses and the intellect forms what is known as the *æsthetic* faculty commonly called taste.

36. *The elements of the beautiful are truth, order, and life.*—Two conditions are necessary to a beautiful thing, *truth* and *proportion*; a third condition should be added to make the beauty perfect; viz., *life*. All beauty is founded on truth,* the natural object of the intellect; hence beauty is not arbitrary, but, like truth, immutable; for it has its eternal type in God, the supreme beauty as well as the substantial truth. But that a thing be beautiful, it must have not only truth, but also unity in variety, or order and harmony of proportion. Since splendor is the perfection of this order, Plato could say with justice that the beautiful is the splendor of the truth.† Lastly,

* "It is impossible that anything be beautiful in itself, if it be not also true and good, or if it be dishonorable; for, *Order must necessarily exist, inordinateness must cease to exist.* . . . But there is no being that is not true and good; . . . and what is dishonorable is morally defective, and therefore repugnant to the idea of beauty."—Zigliara, *Summa Philosophica*, O. 19, vii.

† "The three elements that constitute beauty are (1) *the completeness or perfection* of the object; for what is maimed and defective is

when life is joined to order * the beauty is perfect ; for the true, the foundation of the beautiful, is chiefly in the intelligible. But a thing is the more intelligible the higher its grade of being ; and the higher its grade of being, the higher the life that it possesses. Since life is the perfection of beauty, action, whether physical or spiritual, which is the manifestation of life, must be the source of beauty. And since life perfects beauty, the higher the life is, the more perfect the beauty. Now, there are five kinds of life: the vegetative, the sensitive, the intellectual, the life of grace, and the life of glory. The last constitutes the highest grade of created beauty, because it is the most perfect reflection of the divine life, the eternal type of all beauty. As beauty is capable of degrees of perfection, it follows that when beauty of an inferior order is opposed to that of a superior order, it is really only deformity, because the superior order prevails over the inferior.

37. *Beauty is either ideal or real, natural or artificial.*—The *ideal* beautiful is that which is conceived by the intellect as a model to realize. The *real* beautiful is that which is found in the object itself, and is *sensible* if it exists in material things, *spiritual* if it is in a spiritual thing. The latter kind of beauty is defined by Zigliara as “the order of virtual parts with due spiritual lustre,” and is *intellectual* or *moral* according as the virtual parts are referred to an intellectual or a moral standard. The *natural* beautiful

disagreeable or ugly ; (2) *due proportion, harmony, or order of parts*, for if the parts do not harmonize the object does not please but offends ; (3) *lustre*, by which the object manifests itself wholly to the mind.”—Zigliara, *Sum. Ph.*, O. 19, ii.

* “Order results from the subordination of particular ends to a common end.” See *Cosmology*, § 8.

is that which is presented by nature.* The *artificial* beautiful is that which is an effect of art. To produce the beautiful, art must imitate nature. Yet not every imitation of nature, merely because it is an imitation, is therefore beautiful, as realism pretends. The reality imitated by art must also be beautiful, or art must add to it the idea that will give it beauty.

38. *The sublime is that which exceeds the intuition of our faculties.*—A thing is called sublime subjectively because of the weakness of our faculties, and objectively because of the excellence of the thing itself. It is the excess of light in the object that produces obscurity in our weak mental vision. The foundation of the sublime is the infinite, which we can never seize in any other than a limited and imperfect manner. As the deformed or ugly is opposed to the beautiful, so is the mean or contemptible opposed to the sublime.

39. *The sublime is ontological, dynamical, or mathematical.*—The sublime is *ontological* when its excellence lies in the nature of the being known; thus the “angelic nature” may be styled sublime. The sublime is *dynamical* when its excellence is in the physical or moral virtue of the being known; thus the “falls of Niagara” are sublime, “certain acts of the saints” are sublime. The sublime is *mathematical* when it consists in the vastness of the object; thus the “immensity of space” is sublime. The sublime is found also in the productions of art when they

* “Natural beauty is found in *each species*; for since God is the author of created nature, it is impossible that there should be either absence of any constituent principle or of harmony among the principles. But if we regard the essences as *realized* in individuals by particular marks, they may be beautiful or ugly. For natural causes may be impeded by one another.”—*Sanseverino*.

surpass the ordinary conceptions of man and reveal something of the infinite.

40. *Gracefulness is that quality which renders its possessor pleasing.*—Gracefulness consists especially in the excellence of the sensible, as the sublime lies in the excellence of the intelligible. It is found in the object that pleases and attracts us, not in that which lies above and beyond our grasp; for the sublime is not graceful. Gracefulness is various and changeable, for it resides chiefly in the sensible, which is various and changeable. From this point of view, then, it is true to say that *there is no disputing about tastes*.

PRINCIPLES AND CAUSES OF BEING.

41. *A principle is that from which anything proceeds. It is also defined as That by which a thing is, is made, or is known.*—From the latter definition it is evident that there are three kinds of principles: principles of *composition*, those of which a thing is constituted; principles of *production*, those which concur in the making of things; principles of *cognition*, those by which we attain to a knowledge of things. The last mentioned are treated of in rational philosophy, and the others in metaphysics; ontology studies the principles of composition or metaphysical principles; cosmology investigates the principles of production or physical principles.

42. *Cause is defined as That on which another depends for its being.*—This definition applies both to dependence of reason or order; as, “One proposition depends on another” (but not to mere external connection, as in the proposition, “Day succeeds night”); and to dependence of nature; as, “The fruit depends on the tree.” The definition of cause is further explained by that of effect. An effect is that which is produced, or that which passes from non-existence into existence; but that which is not yet existing cannot receive existence except by the action of something else, and to this agent the name of cause is given. Hence two conditions constitute a cause properly so called: (1) its distinction from the effect, and (2) the dependence of the effect upon it; *distinction*,

because that which is ushered into existence cannot be the same as that which has given it existence ; *dependence*, because to be brought by something from non-existence into existence implies a dependence on that thing. Hence it is manifest that principle is more general than cause. For every cause is a principle, but not every principle is a cause: that which proceeds from the principle is very often not produced by it; that which begins with the cause is at the same time produced by it. Principle implies priority of origin only, or, as St. Thomas calls it, "order of origin;" cause implies also priority of time, or, at least, priority of nature, for priority of nature consists in this that one thing depends on the nature of another and proceeds from it.

CHAPTER I.

METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES OF BEING.

ART. I.—POTENTIALITY AND ACTUALITY, OR POWER AND ACT.*

43. *The first metaphysical principles of every created being, those by which it is constituted, are potentiality and actuality.*—Every created being was, before its existence, in the series of possible beings; it had only a possibility to exist; it was in *potentiality*. Afterward

* Although Potentiality and Act do not generally receive so full a treatment in text books as is given in the present manual, yet they are of prime importance in Scholastic philosophy, and without them essence and existence, matter and form, soul and body, and the origin of ideas, cannot be understood, while they underlie the principles of moral philosophy.

it existed; then it was in *actuality*.* The possibility to exist and the act of being are, therefore, the two constituent principles of every created being. God alone is not composed of potentiality and actuality. Having always existed, He is *pure act*.

44. *Act † is a perfection; a thing is said to be in act when it has its perfection.*—The actuality of a thing is that perfection by which it is not in potentiality but in reality, not in the ideal order but in the ontological order. Hence act gives a new being to the thing, realizes its possibility, fills up its capacity. Therefore, a thing is in act when it has its perfection.

45. *Act is pure or not pure according as it excludes all potentiality or is united with potentiality.*—Act may be joined to potentiality in two ways: (1) When it is the act of some potentiality; thus the “soul” by which the body exists is the act of the body; (2) When it is itself in potentiality relatively to an ulterior act; as an “angel,” whose nature was at first in potentiality relatively to existence. Act is called *pure* when it is not joined to potentiality in one of these two ways; otherwise it is *not-pure*. In the latter case it is called *formal act*, or *act of essence*, if it determines the essence to a species of being; as the “form of a plant,” which makes it such a species of plant; and *act of being* or of *existence* if it is the being or existence itself.

46. *Not-pure act is divided into first act and second act, and either excludes or supposes another previous act.*—*First act* is that which does not suppose any other before it, but which prepares the entity for subse-

* The term *actus* originally signified *operation*; then by extension it came to signify also the *principle of operation*.

† “Act is the reduction of a possibility to a reality, of a power active or passive to its complete reality.”—*Harper*.

quent acts; in this sense the soul is the first act of the body. *Second* act supposes a first; thus the "operation of a faculty or power" is a second act, because it supposes the existence of that faculty from the first act.

47. *First act is divided into subsistent and non-subsistent act according as it can or cannot subsist alone.*—*Subsistent* first act either subsists alone, as "angel," or can subsist alone, as the "soul of man." *Non-subsistent* act cannot subsist alone, as the "soul of a brute."

48. *Subsistent act is divided into complete and incomplete act according as it has its perfection in itself in such a manner that it cannot be received into any potentiality; or though it can subsist alone, is yet destitute of its perfection if it be without the potentiality in which it ought to exist.*—*Complete* subsistent act is of such a nature that it cannot be received into any potentiality; as an "angel." *Incomplete* subsistent act can exist alone, but to have its perfection it requires the potentiality in which it can and ought to exist; as the "human soul."

49. *Non-subsistent act is divided into substantial act, which gives being simply to its potentiality, and accidental act, which presupposes being in its potentiality.*—*Substantial* act gives being simply to its potentiality; such is the "brute soul." *Accidental* act supposes being already in the potentiality which it informs; as the "whiteness of paper," which supposes the existence of the paper before its whiteness.

50. *Potentiality* is the aptitude to receive actuality;*

* Potentiality is a capability; if *active*, a capability of "doing, acting, energizing, working. . . . Such are the forces of nature, bodily power, the faculties of intellect and will." If *passive*, it is a capacity of "receiving, of being perfected by another. . . . as the

to be in potentiality is to be apt to receive the act which does not yet exist.—*Potentiality*, a metaphysical principle of being, is that by virtue of which a thing, which as yet does not exist, can receive existence from an efficient cause. The word potentiality is here a synonym for the words *possibility*, *capability*.

51. *Potentiality is logical or real according as it means simply the absolute possibility of existing, or signifies that a being already existing in some way can exist in another way.*—*Logical* potentiality is only the exclusion of the impossibility of existing, and is so called because it is only in the mind of the cause that is to bring it into existence. Such was the state of all created things before the power of God drew them from nothingness. This possibility or potentiality is also called *intrinsic* or *metaphysical* or *absolute*, to distinguish it from the active power that makes it come into existence. In respect to this active power it is called *extrinsic* or *relative* possibility—*extrinsic*, because it is to be reduced to act by some one beyond and distinct from itself; *relative*, because it is referred to the cause that makes the possible entity actual or real. In respect to creatures this relative potentiality is either *physical* or *moral*, according as the power which it implies is considered according to the laws of the physical world or according to those to which moral agents are subject.—*Real* potentiality supposes the being already existing in a determinate manner; it is therefore the possibility of passing from one mode of existence to another.

Metaphysical potentiality, regarded as about to capacity of water for receiving the form of heat. ‘The Infinite, being most pure Act, has no potentiality; primordial matter being simply and exclusively a passive potentiality, has no act.’—*Metaphysics of the School*, vol. i., p. 585.

come into existence by the action of some efficient cause, is called *objective*. To this, *subjective* potentiality is opposed, which is nothing but real potentiality, and is so called because only a subject already existing can have it. Real or subjective potentiality is *pure* if it has no act; and of this "primary matter" (*materia prima*) is the sole example. It is *not-pure* if it has a beginning of act, but tends to an ulterior act; as a "substance" relatively to its accidents.

52. *Potentiality is divided also into proximate potentiality and remote potentiality; the former needs only the action of the agent to pass into act, the latter needs other active principles to render this action possible.*—A man with good eyesight is in *proximate* potentiality with regard to vision, for he needs only the light to see. A blind man is in *remote* potentiality with regard to vision, because before the light can act on his vision he must be cured of his blindness.

53. *An entity is absolutely and intrinsically possible because it implies no contradiction; it is relatively and extrinsically possible because God is omnipotent.*—A thing is not *absolutely* impossible because it cannot be done by God, but it cannot be done by God because it implies a contradiction or is absolutely impossible. Therefore the possible is so primarily because it implies no contradiction. But if an entity is absolutely possible because it implies no contradiction, it is *relatively* possible because it can proceed from its cause. And since God is the cause of all being, it is from Him that the relative possibility of every being is derived, and, furthermore, everything that is absolutely or intrinsically possible is also *relatively* or *extrinsically* so.

54. *From the definition of act and of potentiality this axiom follows: A thing is perfect so far as it is in act,*

it is imperfect so far as it is only in potentiality.—Since act is a perfection, *that which is in act is perfect, and that which is in potentiality is imperfect.* From this axiom is derived the consequent: *An act absolutely pure is also absolutely perfect.* From the definition of act and of potentiality the following axioms are derived: 1. *Being acts inasmuch as it is in act; on the other hand, it is acted upon inasmuch as it is in potentiality;* 2. *Potentiality cannot of itself reduce itself to act, but requires a being already in act;* 3. *Every changeable being is composed of act and potentiality.*—For it changes, that is, it begins to be what it was not, or ceases to be what it previously was, only because it had the possibility to be or not to be what it became or ceased to be.*

ART. II.—ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE.

55. *In every created being we should distinguish as constituent principles, which are conceived as actuality and potentiality respectively, essence and existence, or the act of existing and that which has this act.*—Every thing that is either is being itself or has being, that is, participates in being. In that which has only participated being we notice, when it is in act, two distinct things: (1) that it is, or the act of being; (2) that which it is, or that which has the being. The former is called *existence*,† the latter *essence*. Essence is also called

* There is also an *operative* power or faculty, such as intellect and will, which may be defined *a capacity and aptitude to elicit operations*. Power again is distinguished as *active* or *passive*. Thus the “vegetative powers” are active because capable of changing that on which they act. “Marble” has a passive power of receiving the form of a statue from an agent. See *Psychology*, § 3.

† According to Hume, “whatever we conceive, we conceive to be existent;” therefore our mere thinking gives it existence. He denies

nature, because it is the source of a being's properties and operations ; *reason of the thing*, because it is the reason why the thing is what it is ; *form*, because it determines the thing in its species. Yet there are essences which are not pure forms ; such are essences composed of matter and form, and in these the form is not the whole essence.

56. *In every finite and created being essence is really distinct from existence as a potentiality from its act.*—In God, who is Being by excellence, essence is not distinct from existence but is identical with it. But finite and created beings are composed of essence and existence, as of two principles of being. In fact, no creature has being simply, for this is peculiar to God. All created beings are composed necessarily of potentiality and act. For if essence were not distinct from existence in them, they could be said to exist by their essence. But this is false, for creatures having been drawn from nothing by the creative act of God, have their existence not necessarily and essentially, but accidentally and contingently.*

the reality of essence, as Locke had done before him. Müll, too, approves the teaching of Locke that essences are merely " the significations of their names." Kant, though aiming to refute the scepticism of Hume, strays even further from certitude, for he denies that we can know things in themselves. The effect of such doctrines on science, morals, and religion, can readily be inferred. See also § 96.

* See Zigliara, *Summa Philosophica*, O. 12, v.

CHAPTER II.

CAUSES OF BEING.

ART. I.—DIVISION OF CAUSES.

57. *There are in general four kinds of causes : the efficient, the final, the formal or exemplary, and the material.*—If any effect be considered in relation to its causes, we can distinguish the agent that has produced it, the end proposed by the agent, the form by which the being is constituted in a determined species, and the matter out of which the being is made. The agent that produces the effect is called the *efficient* cause; the end proposed is the *final* cause; the form by which the being is constituted in a determined species is the *formal* cause, which is also styled *specific* if it is considered as intrinsic in the effect, and *exemplar* if it is extrinsic to it and is considered as the idea to the likeness of which the effect is produced. Finally, the matter upon which the agent works to produce the effect is called the *material* cause. This cause is found in corporeal entities only in the various changes which they undergo after creation, not in creation itself; in pure spirits there is potentiality as a principle of being, but no material cause.

ART. II.—MATERIAL CAUSE AND SPECIFIC FORMAL CAUSE.

58. *The requisite conditions that matter and form be causes are : (1) the influence of an efficient cause applying the form to the matter, and (2) the dispositions of the matter both preparatory to the reception of the form, and concomitant with its reception to render the matter capable of retaining the form.*—Since the matter is the subject, and the form is the term of the agent's action, it is evident that they cannot act as causes without the agent. The dispositions also are manifestly necessary, because the matter being indifferent to all kinds of form, needs something to determine it and fit it for one form rather than for another, and this can be found only in the dispositions.*

59. *The proper effect of the matter and the form is the entire composite.*—This is evident since the matter and the form are the causes from whose union the being results.

ART. III.—EXEMPLAR OR IDEAL CAUSE.

60. *The exemplar cause is necessary. It is defined as That which the agent keeps in view in his work.*—An intelligent agent must possess in himself the idea, the reason of his work; otherwise he would act blindly, and this is contrary to his nature. This idea, this reason of his work, which the agent has in view in acting, is a cause, inasmuch as it is imitated by the agent in doing the work. The idea thus understood is no longer that by which an object is known, as is the "idea of a flower which I have when beholding a flower;" but it is that which the intellect by

* See *Cosmology*, § 26.

thought forms in itself to be imitated; as the "idea of a house, which the architect forms in his mind, and according to which he has the house built."

61. *The exemplar cause is properly reduced to the formal cause, but it may also, in some manner, be reduced to the efficient cause and to the final cause.*—The form is that which determines a thing to a special kind of being. Now the idea determines the intelligent agent from whom the thing represented proceeds; therefore it determines the work also, not indeed in an intrinsic manner, by composing it, but in its source or origin. The exemplar cause is also reduced to the efficient cause, inasmuch as it is by the idea that the agent, who is the efficient cause, is ultimately determined and directed in his work. Finally, the exemplar cause may also be reduced to the final cause, because the idea, like a model, is what the agent intends to execute, and what the work is to reproduce.

ART. IV.—EFFICIENT CAUSE.*

62. *An efficient cause is an extrinsic principle from which the production of a thing proceeds.*—The efficient cause is styled an extrinsic principle, to distinguish it from the matter and form, which are intrinsic principles. Unlike the final cause, it does not merely move to produce the thing, but is itself the agent that produces it.

63. *In respect to the effect the efficient cause is perfecting, disposing, helping, or counselling.*—The efficient cause is a *perfecting* cause when it completes the work; as, "when a sculptor gives the marble the artificial form of the statue." It is *disposing* when it prepares

* See *Special Ideology*, § 67.

the matter to receive the last perfective form ; as, "when a sculptor prepares the marble out of which he is to make a statue." It is said to be *helping* when it aids the principal cause ; as, "a student who helps the artist to execute his masterpiece." And under these three aspects the efficient cause is a *partial* cause. It is *counselling* when it points out to the agent the form and the end, and may then be called a *moral* cause.

64. *The efficient cause may be a cause in itself or by accident, principal or instrumental, first or second, universal or particular, univocal or equivocal, proximate or remote, free or necessary, total or partial, physical or moral, a cause which or a cause by which, cause in potentiality or cause in actuality.*—It is a cause *in itself* (*per se*) when by virtue of its own power it produces the effect ; as, "fire produces heat." It is a cause *by accident* (*per accidens*) when by its own nature it neither produces the effect, nor is connected with it ; thus, "if a sculptor is deformed, it is accidentally that a deformed man has carved a statue." With the cause by accident may be classed *occasion*, which is that on the presence of which the cause is induced to act, or acts with greater ease and perfection ; as, a "feast-day may be the occasion of granting an amnesty ;" "a bright sunny day is an occasion of having one's photograph taken." *

A *principal* cause acts by its own power ; thus "a tree is the principal cause of another tree." An *instrumental* cause acts by the power of its principle ; thus "the painter's brush produces the picture."

* A *condition* is that which disposes the power of the cause to act, or removes impediments to its action ; thus, "if a man wishes to write, it is a necessary condition that the ink flow freely from his pen."

The *first* cause is that which receives neither its power nor the exercise of its power from another; "God alone is first cause." A *second* cause receives both its power and the use of it from another, that is, from the first cause; "all creatures are second causes."

A *universal* cause is that whose virtue is extended to different species of effect; as, "the earth which produces different species of plants." A *particular* cause produces only one species of effect; thus "the oak produces an oak."

A *univocal* cause produces an effect specifically like itself; thus "a lion begets a lion." An *equivocal* cause produces an effect of a different species; thus "the painter produces a picture."

A *proximate* cause produces its effect immediately; thus "fire generates heat." A *remote* cause produces its effect by means of another cause; thus "the heart produces heat by means of the blood."

A *free* cause has dominion over its actions, as "man;" a *necessary* cause acts from natural impulse, as a "plant."

A *total* cause is that which by itself produces the effect; as, "when one horse draws a wagon." A *partial* cause is that which in conjunction with others of the same species produces the effect; as, "when several horses together draw a wagon."

A *physical* cause is that which by its own action directly produces the effect; thus "an assassin is a physical cause of homicide." A *moral* cause is that which produces the effect by persuasion, threats, or other moral means; as, "he who counsels or commands the assassination."

A cause *which* is that supposit which produces the effect; thus "a workman is the cause which of his work;" a cause *by which* is the power by which the

cause *which* acts ; as, "the skill of the workman," "the science of the teacher." *

A cause is *in potentiality* or is a cause *materially viewed*, when, although able to produce its effect, it does not produce it ; as, "when, though able to write, one does not do so." A cause is *in act*, or is a cause *formally viewed*, when it really produces its effect ; as, "when one writes."

65. *Substances, even corporeal, are really active and are true causes.*—Several ancient and some modern philosophers, and among them Descartes and Malebranche, have maintained that God alone is truly causative and active, that He is the author of all the effects which are commonly referred to created beings, but which are simply the occasions of producing the effect. Hence the name of *occasionalism* given to this system. The absurdity of this system is manifest. For every creature is produced by the Supreme Being, of whose perfections it is an imitation ; but it is the property of the First Being to be sovereignly active, because He is wholly in act ; therefore it is the property of

* The Schoolmen speak of the *radical cause*, cause in *remote first act*, in *proximate first act*, and in *second act*. "A cause is said to be in its *second act* when it actually produces its effect. It is said to be in its *proximate first act* if no one of the conditions necessary for the production of the effect is wanting. It is said to be in its *remote first act* if either all or some of the conditions are wanting. Thus, for example (to borrow the illustration of Taparelli), when a steam-engine is actually propelling the vessel over the waves, it is in its *second act*. When the steam is up—the cables on board—the anchor weighed—the helmsman at the wheel—the captain on the paddle-box—the plank removed, but the machine not yet set in motion, it is in its *proximate first act*. When the steam has been let off—the fires out—the vessel moored—the ship's company ashore—it is in its *remote first act*."—*Metaphysics of the School*, vol. ii., p. 155. The radical cause in the example cited is merely the steam-engine as such.

creatures to be active, each in its own way; in their own degree they are in proportion to their being as its property. We see that in material substance the power of acting is derived from the Creative Virtue of the cause, and the perfection of the effect determines the degree of the cause [as cause]; more perfect cause is only known by its effect. We see that the divine Goodness, which, being the cause of all things, has made all things to imitate so far as they can, acting in Him eminently, not only in their degree but also in their mode of acting. We see that the divine Liberality, which grants no less than it can, which would produce only useless things if it did not give them, together with existence, which is its complement. In a word, we see that God is not limited in His perfections, and that His power necessarily be admitted. For if God does not act in His creatures, it is easy to see that He alone exists in them, and consequently that the world and the world are fundamentally dependent on Him.

66. *The two kinds of action, the permanent and the transient, exist in corporeal substances. Permanent action is that whose effect remains permanent; transient action is that whose effect remains transient.*

* *Metaphysics of the School*, vol. iii, p. 2. The power of creating does not exhaust His creative power; the power manifested is determined by His freedom.

† The teachings of occasionalism have been flatly contradicted; for (1) we have, as is plain, some idea though generic, of efficient cause, which precontains in itself whatever perfection it produces. Experience proves that no finite cause can act on a subject unless it be mediately or immediately.

Summa Philosophica, p. 192.

the agent. Thus, "when the soul elicits an intellectual act, that action is called *immanent*," and "when the sculptor carves his statue, the action is called *transient*." Although immanent action is the property of spiritual substances, yet as a superior being of a secondary order should have some of the perfections of an inferior being of a higher order, immanent action is found, in a certain measure, in the higher living corporeal substances. Thus animals, besides external action, have also internal action, as in sensitive cognition and appetite.

67. *The substantial form is the first source of all action in corporeal substances.*—Action and being have the same source and origin; but the substantial form is the first source of being; therefore it is also the first source of action. Although some accidents are principles of action, yet they derive their efficiency from the substantial form, just as second acts proceed from the first act.

68. *Substantial form has only a radical and principal power for the production of another substantial form.*—A *substantial* form is that which, by itself, gives a being the power to produce a substantial effect. *Accidental* forms affect the substance only by participating in the substantial form. Therefore the substantial form alone can be called the principal power for the production of another substantial form. The accidents are only secondary powers.

69. *When an accidental form produces another similar form, the substantial form on which the former depends is the radical power, and the accidental form the principal power in this production.*—The accidental form fulfils the conditions of a principal power with regard to a similar accidental form, as "heat with respect to the heat which it produces." This is evident,

since, in this case, the accidental form is the reason of the production of the effect and contains the effect.

70. *The faculties capable of producing immanent actions may be regarded as principal powers in their production.*—A faculty is defined as *the proximate principle of the operation to which it is naturally ordained*. It is a proximate principle, since the substance qualified by the faculty is a remote principle from which the faculty itself derives its efficacy. It is the principle of the operation only *to which it is naturally ordained*, for not all faculties are capable of producing the same operations. Immanent actions are effects which do not pass outside the faculties from which they proceed; therefore they may simply be attributed to their proper faculties as to principal powers, and to the substantial form as to their radical principle. Thus the “act of understanding is attributed to the intellect as to its principal power.”

71. *No created substance is immediately operative; but in every creature the operative power is an accident distinct from the substance.*—In God alone operative power is not distinct from substance. In the creature, these two elements are really distinct, the substantial form being the principle of operation, not because it operates immediately, but because it is the source of the operative forces which proceed from it as properties. Thus the soul which is the principle of the acts of the intellect, does not elicit them immediately, but only by the means of the intellective faculty. Now, the act of the faculty or power is an accident; this power, therefore, being ordained to its operation, will be itself an accident; but if it is an accident, it is distinct from the substance in which it inheres. Therefore this substance will operate not immediately by itself, but by a virtue distinct from it.

self. This truth is also proved by experience. We see, indeed, the virtue that has emanated from the plant and is in the seed, produce its effect, although the substance of the plant has disappeared. Therefore it is by virtue of properties communicated to them by the parent-plant that the accidents evolve the substantial form and generate the new plant.*

72. *Action is not exerted at a distance.*†—This truth, which is confirmed by experience, is also proved by reason. For action follows being;‡ but the being of

*“In all instances, without exception, of the generation of living things,—whether they be plants or animals,—accidents (that is to say, things that are accidental relatively to the principal agent) are the proximate and direct causes of the eduction of the form out of the potentiality of the matter.”—“Allowing . . . that the accidents, in instances [as in the pollination of plants] such as have been just detailed, effect the evolution of the substantial form and the generation of the new living body in a state of physical isolation and separation from the principal agent, how is it to be explained, that the accidents so circumstanced can of themselves operate an effect that is thoroughly disproportioned to their nature ? . . . It is to be borne in mind that in the generation of living bodies the instrumental cause (which in relation to the principal agent is justly denominated an accident, since it forms no part of the essence of the said agent) is in itself absolutely a substance with its own substantial form.” . . . This form, “though only provisional, . . . by virtue of its procession from the principal agent . . . is endowed with the properties which continue in their essential nature throughout the successive substantial changes up to the ultimate development, and gradually organize the matter for higher and higher forms of life. They have no sooner produced by their action a more perfect organism, than the matter grows impatient of the lower form ; and the form next in order is educed by the virtue originally impressed on the instrumental cause.”—*Metaphysics of the School*, vol. iii., Prop. cexlvi., cexlviii.

†See *Metaphysics of the School*, vol. iii., pp. 352–362.

‡That is, natural operation, or the second act of being, must as an effect be in accordance with the first act of being, which is “con-

a natural agent exists in a determinate place ; therefore the action of the agent ought to be in the same place, and it can act upon those things only which are locally united either with itself or with the medium which it modifies, and to which it communicates its action, in view of the things which it is to modify.

ART. V.—FINAL CAUSE.

73. *Final cause may be defined as That on account of which something is done.*—The final cause is that which moves the agent to act ; consequently it is that on account of which the agent acts.*

74. *The end is a true and real cause.*—The end really influences the effect, since it moves the agent to act, and since without it the effect would not take place ; it is, therefore, a true and real cause.

75. *The end may be objective or subjective, ultimate or intermediate, objective or formal, the end of the work or the end of the agent, principal or secondary, natural or supernatural.*—The *objective* end is the good which we desire ; and the *subjective* end is the person for whom we wish the good. “ When a father wroks to enrich

stituted existence.” “ Natural operation is the *whole* course of action by which a being tends towards the natural end of its existence ; and connotes *all* those faculties by means of which the said being is enabled to energize with this intent.”—*Metaphysics of the School*, vol. iii., p. 411.

* Some scientists of a materialistic tendency loudly declaim against the doctrine of final causes or teleology, on the ground that it is destructive of all the natural sciences. But against these views we argue that creatures, being the effect of a Supreme Intelligence, must have an end, and that the knowledge of this truth should stimulate man, the lord of creation, to search for the particular end of the various species.

his son, riches are the objective end, and his son the subjective end of his labor."

The *ultimate* end is that for which we wish all the rest, while we wish it only for itself; * the *intermediate* end is that which we do not seek for its own sake, but for something else to which it leads. "When a man prays to acquire virtue, God is the last end of his prayer; virtue is only an intermediate end."

The *objective* end, or *finis qui*, is the thing which we desire; the *formal* end, or *finis quo*, is the act by which we possess the thing desired. Thus "riches are the objective end, and the possession of riches the formal end of the miser."

The end of the *work* (*finis operis*), is that to which the work naturally tends; the end of the *agent* (*finis operantis*), is that which he determines according to his liking. Thus "the end of the work in almsgiving is the relief of the poor; the end of him who gives the alms is sometimes God, sometimes vain glory." The end of the work and the end of the agent may coincide, since it is manifest that the agent may intend that to which the work intrinsically tends.

The *principal* end is that which is intended primarily and directly by the agent; a *secondary* end is that which is intended as a consequence. Thus "the good education of children should be the principal end of a professor; the receiving of a fee may be a secondary end."

The *natural* end is that which surpasses natural powers; a *supernatural* end can be attained by the

* The *ultimate* end may be so *absolutely* or *relatively*. Thus the *relatively ultimate* end of a student undergoing examination is to "pass." The *absolutely ultimate* end is that which "the will seeks as the last complement of every desire and of all life," viz., supreme felicity.

aid of grace alone. Thus "health is the natural end of medicine; the beatific vision is the supernatural end of man."

76. *Only the good can have the character of end, never the evil apprehended as evil.*—There are two sorts of good, the true good, which is really such, and the apparent good, which though evil in itself yet seems to be good. Now, a thing can be desired as an end only in so far as it is regarded as good. For a thing has the character of end in so far only as it is desirable; but the good alone is desirable; therefore it alone has the character of end. Thus, "when a vindictive man revenges himself on his enemy, he wishes it, not because it is evil, but because it satisfies the craving of his passion."

77. *The goodness of the end has the character of causality; the apprehension of the goodness is only a requisite condition.*—In the final cause the character of causing consists in this, that the thing which is the end is agreeable to the agent; but this belongs to goodness and not to apprehension; therefore not the apprehension, but the goodness of the end has the character of cause.

78. *The end is truly a cause, not merely from the fact that it makes known its goodness, but because it moves to act by the desire or love which it excites.*—The end does not move the will by simply making its own goodness known; for knowledge appertains to the intellect, and we often omit what is good, although we both know and approve it. It is by the love which it excites that the end moves and inclines the will toward itself; therefore the love of the end is that by which it actually causes.

79. *Beings without intelligence, such as stones and plants, act passively and executively for an end.*—A being

acts for an end when, in its works, all the marks of a cause which acts for an end are discernible, and there appears no trace of chance or disorder ; but such is the mode of action observed in beings destitute of intelligence, as the contemplation of nature abundantly proves. But as these beings cannot know their end, they are ordained to it by Him who does know it. If in some rare cases nature seems not to act for an end, as in the production of monsters, this is not due to nature itself, but to an accidental defect in the subject by which it acts.

80. *Animals tend to their end by a certain knowledge which they have of it, when they perceive its goodness, and are moved to act by this perception ; but they do not act directly and electively for the end, for they do not know its connection with the means ; their knowledge and their appetites are ruled by instinct only.*—Descartes denies to animals all life and knowledge, and considers them machines set in motion by secret springs, like a clock. But this opinion is in manifest opposition to good sense. Indeed, experience clearly proves to us that animals tend to their end, not only because Providence directs them to it, but also because they have some apprehension of this end, representing it to themselves in their imagination, desiring to possess it if it be absent, and delighting in it if it be present.

But, though animals have a certain knowledge of their end, it would be false to assert with some philosophers, as Pythagoras (B.C. 580–500 ?), that they have reason, and differ from man only in bodily form. For animals do not perceive the relation of the means to the end. As they are incapable of abstracting, they do not know the end as such ; therefore they are guided in their acts by instinct, that is, by a natural judgment, which is determined to a single object, and

is not the result of reasoning, but is the gift of the Author of nature. It is the *vis æstimatoria*, or estimative faculty, of the Schoolmen.

81. *Man acts for an end not only executively and apprehensively but also directively and electively.*—Since man is endowed with reason, he knows the proportion of the means to the end; he chooses the means which seem good and rejects the others; therefore he acts for an end, not only executively, like a stone, nor apprehensively, like the brute, but also directively.

82. *Fortune and chance are accidentally efficient causes, that is, they produce an effect beyond the order and intention of the agent.*—These two terms differ only in this, that fortune, properly speaking, is specific, and predicated of free causes only, while chance is generic, and predicated also of natural causes. Fortune may even be affirmed of the angels, since some things may happen beyond their intention; but not of God. For God as universal cause directs all particular causes, and therefore no effect can transcend the order of His efficiency nor can any second cause prevent its exercise.

83. *Fate is a reality in the sense of a divine preordination or a certain disposition given to contingent things by which God executes the decrees of His Providence.*—The Stoics denied Providence, and therefore meant by fate a series of determinate causes which necessarily produce their effects. Other philosophers regarded fate as a necessity superior to all else, even to the gods, which it was impossible to modify. In these two senses fate is evidently an absurdity. But fate understood as a preordination of God, or as a certain disposition given to contingent beings, by which God executes the decrees of His Providence, is a reality. If the preordination be regarded as in God, it is not fate but providence.

DIVISION OF BEING.

84. *Being is divided, 1. into real and logical ; 2. into uncreated or infinite and created or finite ; 3. into substance and accident.*—Being exists either in the mere apprehension of the mind, or out of the intellect ; in the former case it is logical or *ens rationis* ; in the latter, it is real. Real being is either uncreated or created. Created being is either substance or accident.

CHAPTER I.

REAL BEING AND LOGICAL BEING.

85. *Real being is that which has existence outside of the intellect.*—Real being has a true existence independently of our thought ; it exists in its proper nature ; as a “ tree,” a “ stone.”

86. *Logical being is that which has no objective existence, which exists only in the intellect.**—This being

* A thing may be in intellect as *subject*, *effect*, or *object*. It exists in it as *subject* if it inheres in it as an accident in its subject ; it is in intellect as *effect* if it is produced as a vital action proceeding physically from it ; it is in intellect as *object* if it is merely apprehended by it. Of the first mode of existence, “ *intelligible species*, or *first intentions*,” and “ *intellectual habits* ” are examples ; of the second, “ *intellection* ” is an illustration. Both these modes are real.

neither has nor can have any existence in nature; it exists in the intellect only; as "darkness," "chimeras."

87. *Logical being is either founded in reality or not; in the former case it is a negation or a relation. Some negations are properly called privations.*—Logical being founded in reality is that which has a foundation in the very nature of real things; as, "when we judge the idea of animal to be more extensive than that of rational." Logical being *not founded in reality* combines arbitrarily things which really have no connection; as a "centaur." Logical being founded in reality is a *negation* when it apprehends through being the absence of being; as "death," "darkness." *Logical relations* are all those agreements which the reason conceives in things known; as "the agreement of subject and attribute." *Negation* is the absence in a subject of a quality which it is not required to possess; as "absence of sight in a stone." A *privation properly so called* is the absence in a subject of a perfection which it can and should possess; as "blindness in man."

88. *Only the intellect can produce logical being.*—Logical being is produced when we consider non-being after the manner of being; therefore it can be produced by that faculty only which apprehends the quality of being, that is, by the intellect. The imagination forms images, fictions, but not logical beings. Nor does the divine intellect form them, for their pro-

Of the last mode, "second intentions" are an example, and hence logical being (*ens rationis*) is said to constitute the formal object of Logic. "Darkness" is logical being because it has no existence except that which intellect gives it. "Light" is logical being if it be regarded as abstracted from the luminous body, for an abstraction has only an ideal existence.

duction would imply a knowledge of a thing other than it is in reality. But such cognition is imperfect, and cannot be predicated of God, since He is infinitely perfect.

CHAPTER II.

UNCREATED OR INFINITE BEING AND CREATED OR FINITE BEING.

FINITE BEING.

89. *Uncreated Being is that which exists of itself; created being, that which holds its being from another.*—

Uncreated Being is none else than God, who gives being to everything and receives it from none; He is Being by essence, whereas the others are being by participation. He is also called Necessary Being, because He cannot but exist, while creatures are called contingent beings, because their non-existence is possible.

90. *Uncreated Being is actually infinite, that is, it is bounded by no limit.*—The infinite is of two kinds: the *actual* infinite, which really and indeed is bounded by no limit, and the *potential* infinite or the indefinite, which is only the finite to which something can always be added. God alone is actually infinite. In creatures there is only potential infinity. For they cannot be actually infinite in perfection of being, since they have being only by participation; moreover, it is possible for them not to exist, and this implies a great imperfection in their essence. No creature can be actually infinite in magnitude, because no property of a finite substance can be infinite. Neither can there be an actually infinite number, because a

multitude that can ever be increased is not infinite; but however great the multitude be supposed, it can always be increased. Lastly, no creature can be infinite in the intensity of any of its qualities, because it is impossible for a finite subject to contain an infinitely perfect quality.

91. *There is a potential infinity in creatures.*—No quantity is so great that it cannot be further increased; no creature has all perfections, since it is essentially contingent.

92. *Material entities have a limit to their smallness, living beings have also a limit to their largeness.*—A natural form requires a certain quantity in the matter which it determines. A quantity may be so small that a smaller one would not suffice for the operations of any form whatever; therefore such a quantity cannot be informed, or determined by form. With regard to living beings, experience shows that they have certain limits as to maximum and minimum size.*

* See also *Metaphysics of the School*, vol. iii., pp. 307, 314–316.

CHAPTER III.

SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT.

ART. I.—NATURE OF SUBSTANCE AND ACCIDENT.

93. *Substance is being existing in itself; accident is being existing in another as its subject.*—Being is known either as something which subsists in itself without needing to be sustained by another, or as something which needs a subject in which and by which it may exist. In the former case, being is called *substance*; in the latter, it is called *accident*. Thus “Peter” is a substance, because he exists in himself; “white” is an accident, because it does not exist without a substance in which it inheres. Substance is also defined negatively as *that which is not in another as its subject*; or descriptively as *that which sustains accidents*. But from the fact that a substance exists in itself, we are not to infer that it excludes the idea of a cause which produces it, but only that of a subject in which it inheres. To define substance, with Descartes, as “that which exists in such a way as to need nothing else for its existence,” is to open the door to pantheism.

94. *The idea of substance is formed from a sensible concrete object by abstraction, by which the intellect perceives in the object that which exists in itself and not in another as its subject.*—When the intellect contemplates a sensible concrete object as existing, it has the power of abstracting from it existence in itself and not in

another as its subject. But this perception of existence in itself includes that of substance, viz., of that which is in itself, without requiring any thing else as its subject; and it is obtained by abstracting from all the characteristics which accompany the substance and cannot exist by themselves in the order of reality. For when the intellect has formed the idea of substance by abstraction from a sensible concrete object, it contemplates this idea as it is in itself, and perceives that it is applicable not only to corporeal beings, but also to spiritual beings that exist in themselves and not in another as their subject.

95. *When the intellect has the idea of substance and of accident, it immediately perceives the truth of the proposition: Every accident supposes a substance.*—With the idea of accident, the intellect possesses implicitly that of substance. The comparison of these two ideas results in the immediate perception that accident cannot naturally exist without substance, since that which does not exist in itself can exist only in another being which has existence in itself. Hence the proposition given above expresses an analytical judgment.

96. *The Phenomenalism of Hume, who denies the reality of substance, is absurd, because by denying substance he makes accident impossible.*—Locke, by admitting no other source of ideas than the senses, was led to deny the reality of substance and to hold that what is so called is in reality only a number of qualities held together by a common bond. But this is an absurd hypothesis; for, if the bond is not substance, it must be accident, and hence, in its turn, requires a substance to support it. The principle of Locke led Berkeley (1684–1753) to deny all corporeal substance, and Hume to deny all substance, corporeal

and spiritual, and to assert that only qualities exist and are known to us. The Phenomenalism of Hume, which rejects the very idea of substance, is absurd. For an accident exists either in itself, or in something else; it cannot exist in itself, for it would then be no longer an accident; therefore it exists in something else. But this latter cannot be itself an accident, for we should then have to proceed from one accident to another *ad infinitum*, thus postulating an infinite series of accidents, resting on nothing, which is absurd. Therefore every accident must be supported by something which is not accident, that is, by substance.

97. *Accidents are absolute or modal. Some absolute accidents can by divine power exist apart from their connatural substance.*—*Absolute* accidents are those that directly affect substance; *modal* accidents are the various ways in which the absolute accidents affect substance. The quantity or mass of matter of a bullet moving through the air is an absolute accident; the velocity of its motion is a modal accident. Actual inhesion in their connatural subject is essential to modal accidents, whereas most absolute accidents demand only aptitudinal inherence. Vital actions are an exception, however, not because of their generic nature as absolute accidents, but because of their specific nature requiring the actual influx of the life principle.*

Some absolute accidents of corporeal substance can by divine power exist apart from their substance; for an effect depends more on the first cause than on its second cause. God, who is the first cause of both substance and accident, can by His infinite power

* See *Metaphysics of the School*, vol. ii., pp. 248, 584.

preserve the accidents after He has withdrawn the substance by which, as by their proper cause, they were sustained. Even then the accidents do not cease to be accidents, since they retain their natural aptitude to inhere in substance.

ART. II.—DIFFERENT KINDS OF SUBSTANCE.

98. *Substance is complete or incomplete, first or second.*—A *complete* substance is one that is not destined to be united to another to form a substantial composite; as a “man,” a “tree.” An *incomplete* substance is one that must be united to another to form a substantial whole or specific nature; as the “body of man.” *First* substance is individual; as “John,” “James.” It is so called because it is that which first and by itself sustains the accidents, and because it is the first thing perceived by the intellect. *Second* substance comprises genera and species; as “man,” “animal.” It is so called because it subsists only in the individual with which it is identified, and because it is known by the intellect subsequently to the individual.

ART. III.—SUBSISTENCE, SUPPOSIT, AND PERSON.

99. *Subsistence is a perfection by which a nature is master of itself and incommunicable to another.*—Complete substance differs from accident and incomplete substance, because it belongs to itself, while accident and incomplete substance belong to another. Now, *subsistence* is that perfection which makes the substance complete, and by which the substance so belongs to itself as not to require union with another in order to be and to act.

100. *Supposit* is the concrete entity that answers to the abstract subsistence. *Person* adds the character of intelligent nature to the *supposit*.—When considered as having concrete existence in a complete substance, subsistence is called *supposit*, just as life considered in the concrete in a living thing is called a living being. Therefore *supposit* is subsistence itself considered as existing concretely in a particular individual. When the *supposit* is endowed with reason it is called *person*, which Boethius defines as “an individual substance of a rational [intelligent] nature.” A “stone” and a “horse” are *supposits*; “George” and “Joseph” are *persons*.* †

101. *Subsistence* is a positive entity really distinct from nature.—It is a great perfection for a nature to have no need of another as subject in which to inhere. Since subsistence means this perfection, it is something positive. The distinction of subsistence from nature is proved by the mystery of the Incarnation, in which the subsistence of the human nature is wanting to this nature.‡ Subsistence may also be said to differ from existence, since subsistence belongs

* An infinite being is necessarily personal because it has all perfections.

† Personality is not consciousness, as Locke asserted. For then personality would cease with the interruption of consciousness. But consciousness supposes personality.

‡ In the Incarnation Christ's human nature, being perfected by its hypostatic or substantial union with the divine nature, has no personality of its own. The divine nature of Christ, being infinite, must, according to the preceding note, be infinite, and therefore incapable of losing its personality. Hence in our Lord there are two natures, one human and the other divine, but there is only one person, and that is divine. Hence the purely human actions of Christ have an infinite merit as proceeding from an infinite person.

to complete substance only, while existence is common to both accident and substance.

ART. IV.—ACCIDENTS.—QUANTITY.

102. *The first accident of material substance or body is quantity, which consists in extension of parts beyond parts.*—When we perceive extension of parts in a substance, we perceive clearly that it has *quantity*, which is defined *an accident extensive of substance*. Occupation of a determinate place, divisibility into parts, and mensurability, are properties that belong to substance by reason of its quantity; but they do not constitute the essence of quantity, for a body must have parts before these parts occupy place, and are divisible and measurable.

103. *Quantity is really distinct from substance.*—Extension no more implies existence in itself than does heat or color. For just as we conceive a body as existing in itself before being hot or white, so also do we conceive that it should have existence in itself before having extension. And just as a body is not changed essentially when it is more or less heated, more or less white, so there is no essential change when by expansion it acquires a greater extension than it had before. Since, then, corporeal substance is shown by experience to be indifferent in its essence to that determinate quantity which it actually has at any given moment of its existence, quantity must be really distinct from substance. Descartes held the essence of material substance to consist in extension; but this is a great error. For that to which corporeal substance is manifestly indifferent is not really of the essence of such substance; but physicists establish the fact that the dimensions may and do vary with

changing external influences, and chemists prove that the substantial nature of bodies perseveres under these changes. Therefore the essence of material substance does not consist in extension.

104. *Quantity is permanent or successive; permanent quantity is either continuous or discrete.*—Permanent quantity is that whose parts can exist simultaneously, as a “line.” *Successive* quantity is that whose parts do not exist simultaneously, but follow one another in a continuous series; as “time,” “motion.” This kind of quantity is improperly so called; motion and time have no extension in themselves, but time has extension by reason of motion; and motion, by reason of the medium between the term *whence* (*terminus a quo*) and the term *whither* (*terminus ad quem*). *Continuous* quantity is that whose parts are contained within a common limit; as a “line,” a “surface,” a “solid.” *Discrete* quantity is that whose parts are not naturally united; as “numerical quantity, or number.”

105. *In the hypothesis that God preserves the accidents of a body after withdrawing the substance, the divine power will be the principle of individuation of the accidents; directly, of the mensurable quantity or extension, and through this, of all the other accidents.*—The substance is the principle of individuation for the accidents; when the substance is withdrawn, the divine power supports the accidents, and is therefore their individuating principle. It directly sustains the mensurable quantity which now just as when the substance is present, is the principle of individuation of the other accidents, because they are individuated only inasmuch as they are in a subject divided off from any other, and because division is referred to quantity.

ART. V.—RELATION.

106. *Relation in general is the respect that one entity has to another. Relation is real or logical. Real relation is created or uncreated. Created relation is either a relation of being or a relation of indication. — Real relation is the respect or order which exists among things themselves; thus “effect is referred to cause,” “a part to the whole.” Logical relation is the respect established between entities by our intellect; thus “an attribute is referred to its subject.” Uncreated relation is the respect which one divine Person has to another. There are four uncreated relations: *paternity*, *filiation*, *active spiration*, and *passive spiration*. Created relation is the respect which one created entity has to another created entity or to the Creator.* It is a relation of *being* when it is a pure respect to a term; as “paternity,” which indicates a pure order of one thing to another. Created relation is said to be of *indication* when it is something not merely relative, but absolutely containing a respect; as “the arm,” which indicates a respect to the whole body.*

107. *Relation considered as an accident or predicamental relation is a real created relation, which consists*

* Created relation is also called *transcendental*, and relation of being is known as *predicamental*. “A Prédicamental relation exercises no other office than that of simply looking to its term; while Transcendental relation besides and primarily exercises some other office in respect of its term; for instance, of producing, of depending, etc. Thus there is a relation between knowledge and the truth known *because* of the cognoscibility of the latter. As all finite being is in some such way dependent on some other, such relation runs through all the categories and beyond. Hence it is called Transcendental.”—*Metaphysics of the School*, vol. i., p. 587.

in a pure respect.—By this definition logical relations, uncreated relations, and relations of indication are excluded from relation considered as an accident.

108. *Predicamental relation requires a real subject, a real foundation, a real term, and a real distinction between the foundation and the term.*—The *subject* of a relation is the thing in which the relation is; the *foundation* is that which causes the relation; the *term* is that to which there is reference. Thus, in the relation of “possession,” the “man who possesses” is the subject, the “object possessed” is the term, and the “purchase that gives possession” is the foundation. Predicamental relation requires a real subject, else there would be no real accident, and a real foundation; a cause, namely, that produces the relation, because a real effect requires a real cause. There must be a real term, because relation consists in respect to a term, and it would not be real if the term were not real. Finally, there must be a real distinction between the foundation and the term, because there cannot be a relation of a thing to itself.

109. *The relation is really distinct from the foundation and from all that is absolutely in the thing.*—Two things are really distinct when their entities are not identical. But the entity of the foundation is not really identical with the entity of the relation, since the former is absolutely in the thing, while the latter is a mere respect; moreover, the entity of the foundation remains when the relation perishes. Relation, therefore, is really distinct from its foundation. It is also distinct from all that is absolutely in the thing.

110. *Relation is of three kinds, for it may be founded, (1) on measure and the measurable; (2) on action and passion; (3) on agreement and disagreement.*—Since the relation is caused by the foundation

there are as many kinds of relation as there are kinds of foundation. Now, there are as many foundations of relation as there are modes of referring one thing to another. These are three: (1) As to being, when one entity is considered the measure of another's perfection; thus "a copy is referred to the model;" (2) As to operation, when one is cause or effect of the other; thus "a father bears relation to his child;" (3) As to agreement or disagreement; and thus "one white surface is referred to another white surface." Hence there are three kinds of relation. And as the agreement or disagreement is especially remarked in three things, viz., substance, quantity, and quality, this kind of relation is subdivided into relations of *identity* or *diversity*, if the entities be substance; into relations of *equality* or *inequality*, if they be quantity; and into relations of *resemblance* or *difference*, if they be quality. Relation is also classified as *mutual* or *non-mutual* according as it implies reciprocity or not. Thus there is mutual relation between "father and son," and a non-mutual relation between "creature and Creator."* These various kinds of relation are further subdivided into several species. That which constitutes two relations in the same species is unity of foundation and of term; that which makes them of different species is diversity of foundation or of term.†

* "A mutual relation is that wherein there is a real foundation for the relation in each of the two terms; as, for instance, in the relation between '*father and son*,' or between '*king and subject*.' A non-mutual relation is that wherein the foundation is real in one term only, while it is purely logical in the other. Such is the relation between '*science*, subjectively understood, and its *object*;' or, again, between the '*Creator [as God] and His creature*.'"—*Metaphysics of the School*, vol. ii., pp. 157, 158.

† The properties of relations are, says Zigliara (Art. 40): 1°, to have

111. *It is impossible to know one correlative without the other.*—The knowledge of two correlatives is necessarily simultaneous; it is impossible, for instance, to know *a servant as servant* without knowing also *his master as master*.

ART. VI.—QUALITY.

112. *Quality is that accident which tells of what kind a substance is.*—Quality may be more exactly defined with St. Thomas as *That accident which modifies or determines a substance in itself*. The other accidents effect no modification of the substance in itself; even quantity extends the substance in parts, but does not modify them; quality, on the contrary, does modify them, and gives them this or that manner of being, this or that figure.

113. *There are four species of quality : 1. habit and disposition ; 2. power and impotence ; 3. passion and the passible quality ; 4. form and figure.*—There are four species of quality, because the substance can be modified or disposed in four ways. The substance can be disposed: (1) As to its state so as to be well or ill;* hence we have the species of *habit* and *disposition*; (2) As to its operation, hence the species of *power* and *impotence*; (3) As to the sensible alteration that constitutes it in a new mode; hence the species of *passion*

no contrary, but only to exclude identity of subject as subject and of term as term; 2°, not to be susceptible of more or less; 3°, to be mutually convertible, i.e., one correlative is explained only by reference to the other correlative; 4°, to be simultaneous in nature; 5°, to be simultaneous in cognition.

*That is, "well or ill," relatively to the end which by its nature it is destined to attain; thus man is well disposed by nature to attain everlasting happiness.

and *passible quality*; (4) As to its quantitative parts, and hence the species of *form* and *figure*.

114. *Habit is a quality inhering intimately in the subject and determining it to a good or evil state either in itself or its operation. When this quality inheres slightly in the subject, or is easily removed, it is called disposition.*—Ordinarily a substance is indifferent to a good or bad state either in itself or in its operation. Thus the body is indifferent to health or sickness, the hand to painting or not painting, the will to doing good or evil. Now, it is “health” that determines the body to a good state, and “sickness” to a bad state. It is the “ability to paint” that puts the hand in a good disposition with regard to the work, and the “inability” that maintains it in a bad state. It is “virtue” that disposes the will to do good, and “vice” that disposes it to do evil.*

115. *Power † is a quality that disposes the substance to action or resistance. When this quality is feeble, it is called powerlessness or impotence.*—When habit determines a faculty to a good or bad state, the faculty gives the substance that has it a *power*. Thus the “faculty of intellect” gives the soul the power of comprehending, and “science” disposes it toward truth.

116. *Passion is a quality which causes or follows a sensible alteration.‡ When permanent it receives the*

* See *Psychology*, § 77.

† Harper (*Metaphysics of the School*, vol. iii., p. 200,) renders the *potentia* of the Schoolmen by *natural power* or *faculty*; *passio* by *affection*, and *qualitas patibilis* by *affective quality*. He is calling attention to the fact that all the species of quality but the last may be efficient causes.

‡ “Material entities are subject to two intrinsic changes; in one of which all that is universally recognized as substantial remains, but certain accidental modifications, such as *size*, *colour*, *shape*, and the like are changed,—that is to say, these are not the same as they were

name of possible quality.—Passion, taken in this sense, comprises the whole series of sensible qualities. Thus “heat,” “taste,” and “smell” are passions.

117. *Form or figure is a quality which results from diverse dispositions of the parts of a quantity.*—It is that quality by which the parts of a quantity are disposed and determined in this or that way, for instance, as a “pyramid” or a “triangle.” *Form* is applied more particularly to artificial products; *figure* to natural objects.

ART. VII.—ACTION, PASSION, TIME, AND PLACE.

118. *Action is an accident by which a cause is constituted in the act of producing its effect. Passion is an accident by which a thing is constituted in the act of receiving an effect.*—In the production of an effect three things are to be noted: (1) its proceeding from the efficient cause; (2) its reception into a subject; (3) its production or its passage from the state of pure potentiality to that of act. The proceeding of an effect from its cause is the accident that is called *action*. The reception of the effect into a subject is the accident that is called *passion*, which must not be confounded with the quality that causes or follows a sensible alteration; the production of the effect is called *motion*, which, however, is not an accident, but is classified with that in which it terminates. Thus the “motion productive of heat” is reduced to the accident of heat.*

before. In the other, every thing is seen to change,—substance, nature, properties, as well as Accident; as in the instance of *sugar*, when submitted to the *chemical action of sulphuric acid*. The former species of change goes by the name of *alteration*; the latter is known as *generation*.”—*Metaphysics of the School*, vol. ii., p. 275.

* “That reality which is called *action* is included under three Categories. According to its formal signification, by which the effect in

119. *Action is transient or immanent ; immanent action is cognitive or appetitive ; transient action is artificial or natural. Passion is divided according to the various divisions of action.—Transient action produces something outside the agent ; as “ burning : ” immanent action produces an effect which remains wholly within the agent ; as, “ understanding, ” “ imagining. ” Immanent action is either cognitive, and then it is divided into sensitive and intellective, or appetitive, the subdivi-*

the subject denotes the Efficient Cause, by an extrinsic denomination, as that on which it depends ; it is in its own Category of Action. Considered as connoting a consequent relation between cause and effect, or Subject and effect ; it is included under the Category of Relation. Considered as an accidental perfection really inherent in agent as well as in Subject, it belongs to the Category of Quality. . . . ‘ Action, according to its formal meaning [says St. Thomas], does not express its being *in* the agent, but *from* the agent. ’ . . . Though action materially denotes motion, and passion materially denotes motion ; yet action formally connotes the Efficient Cause, while passion formally connotes the Subject. . . . But motion formally denotes the effect *in fieri* only ; materially, however, it connotes its two terms. . . . Motion, therefore, is an intermediate between agent and Subject, but formally including neither. By the medium of the motion, agent and Subject are united together ; because they meet in one and the same motion. The motion is truly affirmed to be *in* the agent as an accident, no less than *from* the agent as the *terminus a quo* ; because the accidental form, from which the action proceeds and by which it is initiated, is inherent in the agent. The *terminus a quo* of the transient action, as *transient*, is the body which is the Efficient Cause ; and the *terminus ad quem*, under the same respect, is the body that is Subject of the causal action. The *terminus a quo* of the transient action, as *action*, is the accidental form in the agent, as proximately disposed for producing the effect ; the *terminus ad quem* is the completed effect. The motion is the effect *in fieri*. In bodily motion there are two principal conditions, or rather, elements,—to wit, continuity and succession. The former is measured by place ; the latter, by time.”—*Metaphysics of the School*, vol. iii., pp. 277–279.

sions of which are *volition* and *sensitive appetite*. *Artificial* action is the result of art, and *natural* action the work of nature. For every action there is a corresponding passion.*

120. *When (quando) is an accident supervening on bodies, inasmuch as they are in a certain period of time.*† —A body is of itself indifferent to time; to be in one time rather than in another, it requires an accidental determination which is called *quando*, or the *when* of it. This accident in bodies results from the fact that they are dependent on time or are measured by time; as, to be “present,” “past,” or “future.”

121. *Ubication, or ubiety (ubi), is that accident of body by which it is determined to be in one place rather than in another.*‡ —A body is of itself indifferent to place; to be in one place rather than in another, it needs an accidental determination called *ubication*; as, to be “above” or “below,” to be “in Washington.”

Place is defined by Aristotle as “the superficies of the containing body considered as immovable and immediately contiguous to the body located.” The place, for instance, of a man standing in a stream is partly the river-bed on which he stands, partly the watery surface in immediate contact with his body, and the atmosphere about his head. This bounding surface is considered immovable, for though the contiguous particles of air and water are successively displaced, the circumscribed limits remain the same. The universe has no extrinsic place, since there is no body outside it; its intrinsic place is determined by its own superficies.

The category *when* is said to be *circumscriptive*, be-

* See *Psychology*, § 3, 6, 42, 70.

† See *Cosmology*, § 36-39.

‡ Ibid., § 33-35.

cause it so determines a thing that it is whole and entire in the whole place, and each of its parts is measured by a corresponding part of place. Hence this category is an accident of bodies only. A substance is in place *definitively* when it is whole and entire in the whole place and in each part of that place. This is proper to created spiritual beings, like human souls and the angels, but not to God, who is whole and entire in *each and every place* simultaneously.

122. *Posture, or situation (situs), is that accident of body resulting from the disposition of its parts in a place.*—The same body is susceptible of various dispositions in the same place; the accident that determines it to one disposition rather than another is called *posture*; as, “standing up,” “sitting down,” “kneeling.”

123. *Habiliment is that accident of bodies resulting from the manner in which they are covered.*—This accident is not the covering itself, but the disposition supervening on the body from the manner in which it is covered by the garment; as, “to have on a mitre or a stole,” “to wear slippers.”

SPECIAL METAPHYSICS.

1. *Special Metaphysics treats of the world, of man, and of God ; it is therefore divided into Cosmology, Psychology, and Natural Theology.*—While General Metaphysics studies being in its general characteristics, Special Metaphysics studies beings in particular. Now, on the one hand, there is the Uncreated Being, and, on the other, there are created beings, among whom man, as occupying a privileged place, claims also a special study. That part of philosophy which treats of created beings other than man is called Cosmology ; that which treats of man is called Psychology, or Anthropology, and lastly, that which treats of God is called Natural Theology.

COSMOLOGY.

2. *Cosmology is the science of the corporeal world in its first or ultimate principles.*—Cosmology is defined, according to its etymology, as a *discourse about the world*, and thus understood would embrace also a discourse about man. But because man occupies a place apart in creation, philosophers make him the object of a special science, and in Cosmology study only the first principles of the world, considered at first in general, and then in particular with reference to non-living and living beings, or to inorganic and organic beings.

CHAPTER I.

THE WORLD IN GENERAL.

ART I.—ORIGIN OF THE WORLD.

3. *It is a gross error to admit with Democritus, Epicurus, Lucretius, and the materialists of all times, that matter is eternal, and that the world was formed by the fortuitous concourse of atoms, i.e., of indivisible particles of matter, diverse in figure and size, and endowed with motion.*—The theory of atomism has at all times provoked the contempt of philosophers, and has always been rejected by common sense, for its absurdity is manifest. For, if the world has been produced by the fortuitous concourse of atoms, we must admit that it is the product of chance. But chance cannot be the cause of the admirable order that reigns throughout the universe among the various beings whose special ends are all co-ordinated and all made subordinate to one supreme and general end. Chance* is of itself blind and indifferent; it never works according to universal and constant laws. How then could the constancy and harmony of the universe spring from such a cause? Chance, moreover, is an empty word which we use to hide our ignorance; it is because of our limited knowledge, that not knowing their true cause, we refer certain things to chance.

* See *Ontology*, § 82.

But even supposing the production of the world possible by the fortuitous meeting of atoms, atomism would be none the less absurd, because it is impossible to admit the eternity and independence of matter. For such matter would necessarily be infinite. But that cannot be, because matter is composed of parts, each of which is finite, and no addition of finite to finite can make the infinite.

4. *It is absurd to admit, with Plato and Aristotle, an eternal and indeterminate matter out of which God produces the world when He clothes it with determinate forms.*—From the very fact that matter cannot be eternal and independent, the falsity of this system is manifest. But it appears equally so if we grant the possibility of eternity and independence in matter. For that which is independent in its being must be independent also in its operation, since operation follows being; therefore, if matter were independent of God in its being, it would still be so when, by its transformations, the world would be made; whence it would follow that God could not even have put order in the universe.

5. *God is the absolute and universal cause of the world.*—If matter is not eternal and independent, and if the world is not the result of the fortuitous concurrence of atoms, it is evident that it was made by the action of God alone. It will not do to say that the world made itself, for it must have being before it can give it. Much less, in order to dispense with God as its necessary cause, can it be asserted that the world, though it did not make itself, yet proceeded from an infinite series of contingent causes, i.e., from an infinite series of beings, each of which can exist only by the action of another being. Such a series is only a chain of effects without a cause, and is mani-

festly absurd.* Nor can it be asserted that the world was made out of some pre-existing subject; for this subject must have been either *uncreated matter* or the *divine substance, God Himself*. But the first hypothesis has been shown to be untenable and contradictory. The second is equally absurd, since the divine substance, as being infinitely perfect, is spiritual and therefore incapable of division. Since, then, the teaching of both materialists and pantheists as to the origin of the world, must be rejected, we must admit that the world was created by God, that is, that by His divine power He gave it its whole existence.

ART. II.—PERFECTION OF THE WORLD.

- 6. *The world is relatively perfect, i.e., it has all that is necessary to attain the end proposed by its Author.*—The perfection of a work is measured by the end which the agent proposes, and the manner in which the means answer to the end. In both these respects the world may be called perfect; it is perfect as to its end, which is none other than the glorification of God; and perfect as to the means of attaining its end, since the world, being the work of infinite wisdom and power, must have all that is suited to the integrity of its nature, in order to attain the end intended by its Author. Hence when the world is said to be perfect, there is no question of *absolute* perfection, but only of a perfection *relative* to its nature and end. This is true optimism, and has been embraced by the greatest philosophers, such as Plato, St. Augustine (354–430), St. Thomas, Bossuet (1627–1704), and Fénelon (1651–1715).

* On Creation and the End of Creation, see *Natural Theology*, § 27–29.

7. *It is false to maintain, with Malebranche and Leibnitz, that the present world is absolutely the best possible.*

—This form of optimism was held by the Stoics, by Abelard, and by Descartes. It is founded by Malebranche on the almost infinite perfection which has been imparted to the present world by the mystery of the Incarnation. It is based by Leibnitz on the principle that God, who does nothing without sufficient reason, could not have preferred the present world to the other possible worlds, if this were not the best possible, and therefore this is the most perfect possible. But both these forms of optimism are absurd. (1) For even though it is metaphysically impossible for God to raise a creature higher than He has raised the created human nature of Christ, or even as high as He has raised that nature, yet this world remains intrinsically finite, and therefore is not in every respect the most perfect possible. (2) It is true that God, who is sovereignly intelligent, wise, and free, does nothing without a sufficient reason; but this sufficient reason is to be found not in the object, the term of divine action, but in the agent, God himself; otherwise God would not be sovereignly free and independent.

8. *The world is not eternal.*—I. If the world were necessarily eternal, it would follow that, since it is created (§ 5), God was from all eternity necessitated to create it. But since God is infinitely perfect and therefore sovereignly free, as will be shown in *Natural Theology* (§ 21), this hypothesis must be rejected. II. The world is not contingently eternal, for the traditions of all peoples point to its beginning. Moreover, the generally accepted nebular hypothesis, the different strata of the earth's crust, and the fossil remains of the animal and the vegetable kingdom, all

imply *succession*, and therefore a beginning. The *exact* duration implied in the nebular hypothesis is, however, only matter of speculation; for it must be granted that the agencies then at work were much more powerful than those of the present time. The periods, also, assigned by geologists for the formation of the earth's strata, with their embedded fossils, are based in general upon the *assumption* that the forces employed were the same, and energized with no greater momentum and velocity than they do to-day. But it is possible, and even probable, that in the world's primeval age they were far greater in momentum and efficiency.

Although the *possibility* of an eternal creation of the universe is affirmed by St. Thomas, it is denied by St. Bonaventure (1221-1274) and Petau (1583-1651), Toletus (1532-1596) and Gerdil (1718-1802), on the ground that thereby creation is confounded with preservation, and that the succession of changes in the world necessitates a beginning. Both parties agree that the world is not actually eternal. As to the days of creation there are three leading schools: the Allegorical school of Alexandria, made illustrious by the names of Clement (150-220 ?), Origen (186-253), and St. Athanasius (296-373), taught that all creation was simultaneous, and that the succession of the Scriptural record is one of order only. The school of Cappadocia held that the elements only were created simultaneously, and that the successive transformations were real. This was the opinion of St. Basil (329-379), and in the Latin Church of SS. Ambrose (340-397), Hilary (300-367), Augustine (354-430), and Gregory the Great (542-604). Finally, there was another school, of which St. Ephraim of Edessa (d. 378), and St. John Chrysostom of Antioch (347-407), were

exponents, that interpreted literally the Mosaic record of creation.

As to the *age of man* no attested discoveries of geology have yet invalidated the authority of the Sacred Text, nor can they do so, since the genealogical tables of Scripture are not complete, generations being omitted here and there, the one purpose of the Inspired Writers being "to follow the direct line." *

ART III.—ORDER OF THE UNIVERSE.

9. *The order of the universe has its source in the subordination of the special ends of the various kinds of being to a common end, and in the manner in which each being constantly attains its own end, and thereby the common end.*—Experience proves that every being works for an end, and reason also tells us that God, who is infinite wisdom, must appoint an end for each of His creatures. But experience further shows us that the special ends of the various kinds of being tend to one universal end; and reason likewise shows that God, having created the world after one single prototype, must by the very fact have given it one single end. On the other hand, the subordination of ends presupposes a subordination of the agents that concur to these ends; for since the end is reached by the action of the agent, the ends that are subordinated must necessarily be attained by the action of agents subordinated one to another. All creatures are, therefore, bound together by this double subordination of end and action; and this bond constitutes the order and harmony of the universe.

10. *There is a natural gradation in created entities, so*

* See *Apologie de la Foi Chrétienne*, pp. 416-423.

that what is highest in an inferior order borders on what is lowest in a superior order, and all beings form as it were a ladder by which even from the lowest we ascend to God.—Since all creatures are subordinated to one another, it is evident that they must constitute a hierarchical order and a natural gradation. Thus man by his intellectual life is associated to the angels, and by his sensitive life to mere animals; brutes approach to man by sensitive life, and to plants by vegetative life; plants are allied to brutes by vegetative life, and to minerals by their purely chemical and physical properties. (See *Special Ideology*, § 51–55).

11. *The law of continuity, as set forth by Leibnitz, is false, viz., that to unite one species with another there must be a species which possesses the qualities of the other two.*—These intermediate species, destined to unite one class of beings with another, would have the qualities essential to both, and would necessarily be self-contradictory. Thus an animal-plant would be both sensitive and not sensitive; sensitive as an animal, and not sensitive as a plant; but such a being is impossible. Without doubt, among the species of the same genus there is such a gradation that the intermediate serve to join the lower with the higher species. So also the less perfect species of a higher genus help to connect it with a genus of a lower order. Yet in spite of these links there is always an essential difference between one species and another, between one genus and another; and this essential distinction of beings is not less necessary than their gradation, to constitute the admirable order of the universe.

12. *It is false to assert, with Geoffry Saint-Hilaire, that there is unity of composition among entities, so that, in spite of multitudinous individual differences, all are*

referred to one and the same prototype.—Since the system of unity of composition is only a consequence of the law of continuity, its falsity is demonstrated with that of the law on which it depends. Besides, the consequences of this law suffice to show its error. For the doctrine that there is no other than an accidental difference among beings, and that all substances are really identical, leads by logical sequence to pantheism. On the other hand, if there is but one prototype which exists in all beings, materialists are not in error when they regard life, nay, intelligence itself, as differing from brute matter only as the greater from the less.

CHAPTER II.

THE WORLD IN RELATION TO NON-LIVING OR INORGANIC BODIES.

ART. I.—PRIMITIVE ELEMENTS OF BODIES.

13. *All the theories relative to the primitive elements of bodies are necessarily reduced to three : Atomism, Dynamism, and the Scholastic system of Matter and Form.*

—Bodies manifest themselves to us as endowed with force and extension. But certain philosophers, regarding the first as the only essential property, admit only one principle in bodies, that of extension, and look upon force as an accident superadded to this principle. They are called *Atomists*. Others, called *Dynamists*, will have it that extension is produced by the active principle of bodies. Lastly, the *Schoolmen*, avoiding equally these two extremes, have admitted two distinct principles in bodies, *matter* and *form*. Whatever other opinions are held as to the principles of bodies may easily be reduced to one of these systems. For either the body is composed of extended atoms, or it is constituted of active forces, or it has within it both a principle of extension and a principle of activity.

14. *Atomism is false because it destroys the substantial difference between bodies.*—The atomic theory was taught in ancient times by Epicurus, Democritus,

and Leucippus, and more recently by Descartes, Gassendi (1592-1655), and Newton (1642-1727). It considers extended atoms, i.e., indivisible substances, to be the sole constituent elements of bodies. (1) Whether the supporters of this system hold that the atoms are homogeneous or that they are heterogeneous, whether they endow the atoms with such or such qualities, it is still evident that their theory makes force in bodies an impossibility, since it views them as purely passive entities without any energy of their own. This is equally opposed to reason and experience. (2) It is also manifest that in this theory there is no substantial difference among bodies. For, if all the atoms are of the same nature, bodies will differ from one another only by a greater or less degree of condensation or rarefaction. Water, for instance, will differ from fire only by a greater or less condensation of its constituent atoms. If the atoms are not of the same nature they will never constitute substantial units, and bodies will be only accidental aggregations of atoms, which are united by attraction or by chance. To illustrate, water will be only the reunion of two volumes of hydrogen and one of oxygen; it will have no substantial nature, no properties of its own, but will possess only the united substances and properties of hydrogen and oxygen.

15. *Dynamism is false because it makes extension an impossibility.*—The Dynamic theory, proposed ages ago by Pythagoras and adopted in modern times by Leibnitz (1646-1716), Boscovich (1711-1787), and Kant (1724-1804), maintains that the only elements of bodies are monads, i.e., simple inextended active substances. This theory is manifestly absurd. For by regarding monads as simple substances it suppresses a fundamental property of bodies, viz., extension. For in

extension there are two elements, viz., multiplicity and continuity of parts. But if it be maintained with Leibnitz that the monads are placed side by side, extension is impossible, because two indivisible elements cannot come in contact without penetrating each other. If, again, it be stated with Boscovich that the monads are endowed with the forces of attraction and repulsion, extension is equally impossible; for two inextended points can never produce extension, whatever be the relation in which they exist. Given two points at a determinate distance, we can never say that we have a line; nor can any number of separate points make a line.

16. *The Scholastic system of matter and form is demonstrated by the study of the very nature of bodies; and it alone explains the extension and force with which bodies are endowed.*—The system taught by Aristotle and Plato in ancient times, and in the Christian era by St. Augustine, St. Thomas, and generally by all the philosophers of the Schools, admits two distinct principles as the ultimate constituents of bodies: one called *matter*, or, as it is termed, *primordial* or *primary matter*, to distinguish it from that out of which something is made by art, and which is called *secondary matter*; the other called *form*, and more precisely, *substantial form*, to distinguish it from that which is added to the subject after it is already complete in its substantial entity, and which is known as *accidental form*. According to the Schoolmen, *matter* is nothing but a reality indeterminate as body, and incapable of existing by itself; because it is not a principle of unity and activity, but only the basis of extension. As by reason of its indetermination it presents only a pure aptitude to become by virtue of the form this or that body, it is defined as a *substantial potentiality*, i.e.,

such a principle as though not yet a corporeal substance, is still apt to become any corporeal substance whatever. The *form* is a simple principle and in itself inextended; it constitutes each body in its own species, and is the principle of unity and operation. It is defined as the *first act of matter*, because by it the matter which has already an aptitude to become this or that body, really becomes this or that body. An easy proof of the existence of *matter* and *form* is drawn from the substantial changes of bodies. For every body is subject to the law of change; but a body changes when it becomes what it was not before, and ceases to be what it was.* Hence in every change we observe: (1) The subject which changes, and which, not having at the beginning of the change that which it is found to have at the end, may be conceived as really distinct from the state that it acquires after the change; (2) The determination to be such a body before, and the determination to be such a body after the change, determinations which by their subtraction and addition produce the change. The subject that changes is the *matter* when the change is substantial, otherwise the subject of the change is the *substance*; the determination to be actually such a body is the substantial *form*. The truth of this system of *matter* and *form* is also proved by the fact that it alone reconciles what is true in the arguments put forth by the atomists and dynamists in favor of their theories, and is free from the absurd and contradictory consequences of their doctrines. For in it the *matter* accounts for the ex-

* Thus, to borrow the example of Father Harper, an atom of carbon may be traced from the air to the grass of the field, thence to the sheep, and later to the human body, from which it returns to the air.

tension of bodies ; and the *form* for their substantial unity and their active forces.*

ART. II.—PROPERTIES OF MATTER AND FORM.

17. *Primary matter has no existence of its own ; it is indifferent to all modes of corporeal being ; it individualizes the form from which it receives its perfection ; it is the same for all bodies ; it tends naturally to the form ; it is incapable of generation or corruption.*—Primary matter cannot have an existence of its own, because it has being in potentiality only ; whereas it is being in act that really exists. It is *indifferent to all modes of corporeal being*, for if it were determined to receive a particular form, the substantial changes that we see in nature would be impossible. The matter *individualizes the form* ; for as the matter, although susceptible of several forms, is yet limited by the form that it receives, so the form, which, considered in itself, may be applied to a multitude of beings, is determined by the matter. The matter is the same for all bodies, as experience shows, for we observe the same subject passing through all the varieties of corporeal being.† The matter *tends naturally to the form*, for, as a potentiality, it is naturally ordained to an act. Lastly, the matter is *incapable of generation or corruption* ; for as primary matter is the first subject of all substantial changes, it excludes by that very fact every previously existing material subject. It can proceed from nothing else, and is therefore *incapable of generation*, and must be produced by creation. And as the mat-

* See *Metaphysics of the School*, vol. ii., pp. 215–271, for a detailed account of these theories with the various arguments for and against.

† Only primary matter and informing form are meant in these two articles.

ter remains always the same from its origin, viz., by itself a mere potentiality, it suffers no alteration, it is *incorruptible*; and as it could begin only by creation, so it can end only by annihilation.

For a better understanding of the nature and properties of primary matter, we need only compare them with the nature and properties of secondary matter. Thus, when we see secondary matter, a mass of bronze, for example, disposed to take on all artistic forms, to become a statue, a table, or a basin, we can conceive how primary matter is disposed to assume all substantial forms, to become a stone, a plant, or an animal. When we observe that this mass of bronze cannot exist without some kind of form from which it is really distinct, we understand how primary matter can have no existence of its own apart from every substantial form, and how to the eyes of reason it is still distinct from all substantial forms. When we consider also that the bronze is indifferent to being round or square, we infer the indifference of primary matter to receive this or that substantial form. And as the mass of bronze makes concrete the round or square figure that terminates it, so we perceive how the primary matter individualizes the form by which it passes into act. Finally, the mass of bronze remains always the same during the various changes of form which it is made to undergo, and is always the subject of these changes; and so we conclude that the primary matter is the same for all bodies, and that it can neither be generated nor corrupted.*

18. *All forms, except those that are intellectual, are capa-*

* Compare *Metaphysics of the School*, vol. ii., pp. 187-215, and pp. 385-505.

ble of generation and corruption.—Substantial forms are of two kinds, *subsisting* and *informing*. The former exist alone without being united with matter, and of these are the “angels;” the latter have existence only when united with matter; as, the form of an “animal” or a “plant.” The “human soul” shares the nature of both these forms, because it can exist with the body or without the body. But it is evident that all other forms than the angels and the human soul are *capable of generation and corruption*. For since it is by virtue of its form that a body is this or that substance, it follows that in substantial changes what was one kind of substance becomes another kind, because the matter loses one form and receives another. Hence, in substantial changes, the old form is corrupted and the new one is generated; and as every form, except an intellective one, is subject to perish and give place to another form, every one, except an intellective form, must be capable of corruption and generation. *

To understand better the nature and properties of the substantial form, we have only to compare them with the nature and properties of the accidental form. Thus when we consider the figure or accidental form of a mass of bronze which, although it cannot exist without being united to the bronze, is still distinct from it, we understand how the informing substantial form, although it cannot exist without the matter, is still distinct from the matter. From perceiving how, by the form given to it, the bronze becomes a statue or a vase, we learn how the substantial form causes

* Intellective forms are incapable of eduction from the potentiality of the matter, because they are spiritual, and spiritual being cannot be the term of material action, since no effect can exceed the power of its cause.

the matter to be actually this or that substance. If, moreover, we observe that when a new form is given to the bronze the old one passes away, we understand something of how substantial forms are corrupted and generated.

19. *The corruptible forms of bodies are not created, but they are educed by the action of the agent from the potentiality of the matter.*—Corruptible forms are contained potentially in the matter; hence, when they are produced by the action of the agent, they cannot be said to be made out of nothing; but they are educed from the potentiality of the matter, just as the form which the sculptor gives to the marble is not said to be drawn from nothing, but from the potentiality of the marble to become a statue.* Of corruptible forms only the first that informed matter have been created; since matter cannot exist without form, these first forms cannot have been educed from the potentiality of the matter. Matter and the first forms of matter were concreated.†

* “No Form strictly speaking can be corrupted. It is the composite that is corrupted; and corruption is metonymically predicated of the Form. By the corruption of the substantial composite the Form ceases to be in act. But it is not annihilated, just as it was not created or made. It recedes then into the potentiality of the matter;—in other words, it is no longer actual, but virtually exists in the matter after such sort that, should the requisite dispositions recur, it can again be educed out of the matter.”—*Metaphysics of the School*, vol. ii., p. 486.

† “It is plain that the composite element was the primary and adequate term, the matter and Form partial and secondary terms, of the Divine act of creation.

“We say, then, with St. Thomas, that the two constituents were concreated and that the composite was created;—or, more accurately, that the constituents, Form and Matter, were concreated in the creation of the composite.”—See *Metaphysics of the School*, vol. ii., prop. 184, p. 495.

ART. III.—THE NATURAL COMPOSITE.

20. *Bodies in nature are called natural composites, because they are constituted by the natural union of matter and form.*—Neither the matter alone nor the form alone constitutes the complete being; but this consists in the whole resulting from their union, which is therefore called a *natural composite*. This composite, which is a product of nature, differs from an *artificial composite*, which is a work of art, for the parts of the natural composite form a unity of being and of substance, while the parts of the artificial composite preserve each its own being and substance. The “stones” in a building retain their own being and nature, and are natural composites; the “building” is artificial.

21. *The matter and form of the natural composite are united immediately by the action of the agent, without requiring any intermediate bond of connection.**—The matter and form of the natural composite are not united by means of a third object, as two stones are united in a building by means of the mortar; for potentiality united with act is potentiality in act. Since, therefore, the form is united to the matter as act to potentiality, nothing intervenes to unite them except the action of the agent by which the matter is constituted in act; just as no medium is necessary to unite the marble and the form of a statue given to it, the labor of the sculptor alone being sufficient.

22. *The natural composite is not a mere collection of two entities, matter and form; it is a third entity distinct from these.*—The matter and form separately cannot be called substances; the substance is the composite

* Compare *Metaphysics of the School*, vol. ii., pp. 616–627.

that results from their union. Therefore the composite is not a mere contact of the two entities, matter and form, as a dozen of pens would be a collection of twelve pens; but it is a new entity, distinct from the matter and form, and resulting from their union. Thus we understand how the agent truly produces something, although he makes neither the matter nor the form; for by the very fact that he unites the form to the matter, he produces that which before did not exist, the composite.

23. *The form of a compound body in nature, at least when the combination is perfect, is not a mere mechanical mixture of elements; it is a substantial reality or entity which is distinct from the elements.*—A compound (or mixed) body * is that which is formed by the union of several elements, as “water,” which is formed by uniting hydrogen and oxygen. When the union is perfect—that is, when the elements are so united as to form a substance specifically distinct, as in the case

* The phrase, *mixed bodies*, as employed by the Scholastic philosophers, “is specially applied to those compound bodies which are the result of chemical combination.—Avicenna, against whom the present Thesis is mainly directed, maintained that the substantial Forms of the elements, or simple bodies, remain actually in the compound substance, and that the mixture is accidental—that is to say, that these compounds are a mere combination of the qualities proper to the respective elements.” According to Averrhoes, “the greatest of the Arabian Peripatetics,—the forms of the elements are the most imperfect of all substantial Forms. Wherefore, they are half-way, as it were, between substantial and accidental Forms, so as to admit of increase and diminution. Accordingly, in the compound they become relaxed in energy by mutual reaction, and conspire toward the production of the substantial Form of the compound.”—*Metaphysics of the School*, vol. ii., p. 675; consult entire proposition.—The distinction of modern chemists between mechanical mixture and chemical combination is clearly gathered from the statement of Avicenna’s opinion and the thesis which it opposes.

of "water," the compound body does not consist in a simple combination of elements, but has a proper substantial form, since from the mixture there results a new substance, and every substance is constituted by its proper form.

24. *The substantial forms of the elements do not remain in compound bodies.*—Two substantial forms cannot exist together in the same matter, as may be seen from the very nature of substantial form, which, being the first act of matter, implies that all the supervening forms will only give the matter a second being after the first, and that, consequently, they will be only secondary forms. But a compound (or mixed) body has its own substantial form; hence the substantial forms of the elements cannot remain in the body. Yet, although the forms of the elements no longer exist *actually* in compound bodies, they remain *virtually*, and the properties of the elements survive the destruction of the forms which made the elements what they were.*

ART. IV.—SUBSTANTIAL CHANGES OF BODIES, OR GENERATION AND CORRUPTION.

25. *Generation and corruption are changes as to substantial forms; generation is the gaining of a new substantial form, which with matter makes a new substance; and corruption is the losing of a substantial form, and the consequent destruction of the substance.*—Whenever a substantial change takes place in a natural composite, a new form is produced or generated, and the old form passes away or is corrupted. Hence, in every substantial change, as matter cannot be with-

* See § 19, Note 1.

out form, the *corruption of one form is the generation of another*. More strictly speaking, generation takes place when the matter of an inferior form becomes invested with a superior form; and corruption takes place when the matter loses a superior form and assumes an inferior one.

26. *In substantial corruption the substantial form of the previous composite does not remain, the accidental forms also disappear.*—Since there is only one substantial form in the composite, when the new form supervenes, the form of the previous composite no longer remains. And because the subject which supports the accidents ceases to exist, the accidents also pass away.

27. *The accidents which precede a generated form dispose the matter for the reception of this form.*—The matter cannot naturally receive the form without certain accidents which dispose it for this form. Accidental forms are of two kinds: some are *preparatory* and precede the form; others are *concomitant* and accompany the form. Thus the “degree of heat which the wood reaches before bursting into flames, immediately precedes the form of fire, and the intensity of the heat is an accident which accompanies the form.” The preparatory dispositions cease at the moment of generation, and are immediately replaced by the others; and just as the former make way for the reception of the form, so the others tend to preserve its existence in the matter.*

ART. V.—PROPERTIES OF BODIES.

28. *There are two kinds of qualities in bodies: primary and secondary qualities.*—Experience makes known

* See *Metaphysics of the School*, vol. ii., prop. 146, p. 273.

to us two kinds of qualities in bodies: one constant, permanent, and common to all bodies; as, "extension, figure, divisibility, and motion;" the other varied in different bodies and in different states of the same body; as "color, sound, taste, smell, and resistance." The former are styled *primary*, because they are the basis and condition of the others. The latter are also called *secondary*, because they have their foundation in the primary qualities.

29. *The fundamental property of bodies is extension, which results from the multiplicity and continuity of the parts.*—Bodies are first manifested to us as composed of many and continuous parts. This multiplicity and this continuity of parts constitute the extension of bodies. It is the property that first flows from their essence. Yet although it is false to make it, with the Dynamists, something merely apparent, not real, it is none the less absurd to hold, with Descartes, that it is the very essence of bodies. For before extension can be had there must be the extended substance; hence extension, far from constituting the corporeal substance, rather presupposes it. Besides, with extension alone the substantial unity of bodies and their active principle cannot be explained.

30. *Bodies are naturally impenetrable, that is, two bodies cannot be in the same place at the same time, unless by the power of God.*—This is a truth attested by experience. Besides, impenetrability is a consequence of extension; for if a body in virtue of its extension occupies a particular space, it must for that reason prevent another body from occupying the same space.*

* Compare Russo's proposition, *Sum. Phil.*, pp. 245-252, that "reason cannot evidently demonstrate any intrinsic contradiction in the compenetration or the multi-location of bodies, so that not even by divine power would it be possible either for several bodies to be in

31. *It is essential to the extension of bodies to have parts that, mathematically considered, are always divisible.*—The indivisible is inextended; but the inextended added to the inextended will never produce the extended. Hence, metaphysically and mathematically considered, the parts that constitute the extension of a body are necessarily divisible *ad infinitum*. Still this is true mathematically, not physically; for a part may become so small as to be insufficient for the operations of any natural form (p. 188). It is also to be noted that this divisibility is infinite not actually, but potentially.

32. *Every body is subject to motion. Motion is the actual tendency of a movable entity to its term.*—Expe-

the same place at the same time, or the same body to be in several adequate places." The first part of the proposition the author proves from the fact that a body does not cease to be a body, though it be prevented by God from exerting its power of resistance, or from producing any effect by that power. This is important when applied to the miracle of Christ's resurrection and His entrance into the closed supper-room. The second part he establishes by showing that the unity and indivision of the body remain when the body is present in many places at the same time; that its quantity is not lost, nor increased, nor diminished, but its external relations are multiplied. A contrary view is that of St. Thomas, who reasoning from the fact that a body is in place circumscriptively, *i.e.*, so in place that it is bounded by the dimensions of that place, and that no part of it is outside the place, concludes that it is impossible even by miracle for a body to be locally in two places at once. [Sup. q. 85, art. 3, ad 3.] The question concerns certain facts in the lives of a few saints, St. Alphonsus Liguori, for instance, but does not touch the presence of Christ upon our altars. For in heaven the body of our Saviour exists locally or circumscriptively, *i.e.*, the parts of His body correspond to the parts of the place, since a body is in place by means of its extension; but in the Holy Eucharist His body, by the words of consecration, is present after the manner of substance, the nature of which is entire in the whole dimensions and in each part of the dimensions that contain it. [Sum. Th., iii., q. 86, art. 3, ad 6.]

rience proves that every body is subject to motion. This quality undoubtedly supposes an agent that gives an extrinsic impulse; but it also supposes in the body an intrinsic principle of passivity in virtue of which it receives and retains the force of the impulse given and continues to move. Motion is defined by Aristotle as "*the act of an entity existing in potentiality.*" It is an act relatively to the past and present, but in potentiality relatively to the "future." The meaning of this definition can be readily understood, if for the moment we limit it to locomotion, the principal species of motion. Let the movement of a body be represented by a line, between whose initial and final points is virtually contained "an indefinite number of potential points." The initial point will represent the term *whence* (*terminus a quo*), and the final point the term *whither* (*terminus ad quem*); the line itself will represent motion. At any one of the potential points "the body in motion is in act up to this imagined point, but is in potentiality to the remainder of the line." *

ART VI.—SPACE AND TIME.

33. *Real space is real extension of bodies with an added relation of container to contained.*—Every body is extended. Now, when abstracting from bodies, we conceive their extension, we form the idea of *space* in general, whence it is evident that real or positive space is not in itself distinct from the extension of bodies. And since the extension of a body is constituted by the relative distance of its parts, just as the extension between two bodies is constituted by

* See *Metaphysics of the School*, vol. iii., pp. 275–280 ; 310–313, 411. See *Logic*, § 16.

the relative distance of their surfaces, space cannot be conceived without extension. Yet it by no means follows that space is identical with extension; it supposes real extension, says Zigliara, "but it adds a certain relation to extension, not indeed a relation of existing corporeal things with one another and with possible bodies, as Leibnitz holds, but a relation or order of the parts of extension with one another. This relation is founded on extension, and immediately arises from the distance of the continuous parts," which space contains.

34. *It is erroneous to admit with Epicurus and Democritus that vacuous space is substance.*—Vacuous space is a mere negation; for we call that a vacuum which is occupied by no body. But a pure negation is nothing; vacuous space, therefore, cannot be anything really existing in nature. Besides, a vacuous space distinct from bodies would necessarily be extended. But whatever has extension needs space to contain it; and thus we should be forced to admit an infinite series of spaces contained one in another, which is absurd.

35. *It is an error to hold, with Newton and Clarke, that space is the immensity of God.*—Space cannot be conceived otherwise than as extended; therefore, were it an attribute of God, we would be forced to admit that God has extension. Besides, if space were an attribute of God, it would be God Himself, since the divine essence and attributes are really identical; therefore we would be obliged to conclude that the bodies that fill space occupy a part of the divine essence.*

36. *Time is the number or sum of motion with reference to before and after.*—Motion consists essentially in

* The source of this error is a confounding of vacuous or imaginary space with real space. But the latter is essentially *finite*; the former is not *infinite*, but *indefinite*.

a continuous succession of parts, one of which is before and the other after; that which numbers the extent of this succession is *time*. But time measures the succession in so far as it expresses the relation of the changes which constitute the succession, and this relation is nothing but the order of the succession. Hence time is defined as *the number of motion with reference to before and after*.

37. *Time is neither present nor existing in reference to before and after, but only in reference to the present instant.*—The present *instant*, the *now*, is the indivisible that connects the *before* and *after*, and with them constitutes the essentials of time; and all three are elements of motion, which is implied in time. Motion implies a substance that moves or is changed. The *now* (*nunc*) which always accompanies the moving entity as its accident, cannot be considered otherwise than as moving without destroying the very idea of time and going away from the truth. Mere succession is not time; it is the number of the motion causing succession, with reference to before and after, that constitutes time. Time resembles a sphere in constant motion; if in its motion we consider it as present in a place, disregarding the distance over which it has passed and that which it has yet to traverse, there is no motion, but an indivisible point of motion; if, on the other hand, we consider the constant motion of the sphere from one place to another, we see existing or rather passing motion. Hence the idea of time, as formed by the mind when it considers succession and abstracts from the successive things, is *objective* as to the indivisible present which alone is real; it is *subjective* in regard to the past, which no longer exists, and the future, which does not yet exist except in our mind.

38. *They err who, with Cicero and Gassendi, regard*

time as an incorporeal entity apart from successive things. —Time implies successive duration ; but duration independent of the things that endure is a mere abstraction, as is motion independent of the things that move.*

39. *Newton, Clarke, and the French Eclectic School err in regarding time as the eternity of God.*—Time implies succession, and succession implies change ; therefore if time is a divine attribute, God is subject to change.†

* Duration is of three kinds: *eternity*, which is, according to Boethius, the “simultaneous, complete, and entire possession of life that can never end” ; *aerum*, the everlasting existence of created spirits, i.e., of angels and human souls ; and *time*, which is proper to material entities.

† Immanuel Kant, styled by admiring disciples the “Aristotle of modern thought,” will have it that our ideas of space and time are not derived by abstraction from daily experience. In his own words: “Time is the formal condition *a priori* of all phenomena whatsoever. Space, as the pure form of external intuition, is limited as a condition *a priori* to external phenomena alone.” Kant’s principles, as given in his *Critique of Pure Reason*, imply the rejection of previously established habits and laws of thought, and the setting up in their stead of *forms of thought*, i.e., subjective conditions that are prior to all experience, and so modify all phenomena that we can never know essences [noumena] as they are in themselves, but only as affected by these subjective forms. “Kant undertook the task of constructing a foundation for scientific knowledge amid the chaotic heap of ruins which the scepticism of Hume had left.” “Yet he utterly fails to bridge over the chasm which Hume made between the subjective and the objective,—between thought and reality,—between human intelligence and that external world whose objective existence is assured to us by the general voice of mankind in all ages, by the safe instincts of common sense, and by that cogent argument of a practical necessity which scatters to the winds all mere dreams of the study, however geometrical in construction.” See Summary of Kant’s Doctrine in *Metaphysics of the School*, vol. ii., pp. 104–125.

CHAPTER III.

THE WORLD:—LIVING BEINGS.

ART. I.—LIFE IN GENERAL.

40. *A living being is one that produces or is capable of producing immanent action.*—Immanent action is action which proceeds from a principle intrinsic in the subject, and which does not go outside the subject. But life, considered as the principle of operation in a living being, manifests itself by immanent action; and considered as a substantial element of a living being, it produces, or is capable of producing, immanent action.

41. *The lowest degree of life is found in plants, a higher degree in animals, a still higher degree in rational beings, and the highest degree in God.*—Two things are necessary to constitute immanent action. First, the action must proceed from an intrinsic principle; secondly, it must not go out of the subject from which it proceeds. From these two points of view the life of plants is the least perfect. For in action we may consider (1) the execution; (2) the form which determines the agent; and (3) the end to which the operation tends. Now a plant is active in itself in regard to the first only of these three things; but it does not predetermine the end of its action, nor does it acquire by its own power the form which immediately influences it to act. It is God who has assigned its end, of which, however, the plant has no

knowledge ; and nature gives the form by which it is determined to act, although it cannot direct the influx of that form. If we regard immanence of action under the second aspect, the action of the plant, it is true, remains in the plant ; but not in the faculty that acts. The nutritive molecules absorbed through the roots and leaves do not remain in the roots and leaves, but feed the whole plant.—The life of animals is higher than that of plants. On the one hand, since brutes act in virtue of a knowledge acquired through the senses, they in some sort give themselves the form that immediately determines their action ; on the other hand, the act of sensation, which is proper to them, remains not only in the subject, but also in the faculty that produces it. Still, on account of the necessary concurrence of the material organ, this act does not remain in the vital principle only, but in the sense or organ, that is, in the composite, to which sensation properly belongs.—In rational and intellectual beings immanence of action is perfect. The end of the action is not imposed on them by nature as in the case of animals ; but they determine it and choose it themselves. Besides, the intellectual act not being exercised with the concurrence of a material organ, it belongs entirely to the intellectual faculty alone.—Nevertheless, it is only in God and not in created intelligences, that action attains the highest degree of immanence. For the action of a created intelligence proceeds from a substantial principle that holds its being from God. Besides, in created intelligences the action and the faculty are distinct from the essence of the agent. God alone is exempt from all these imperfections. He has no end proposed to Him by another ; but He is Himself the last end of all things. In Him action, the power of acting, and essence are

identified. He is not only living in the highest degree, He is life itself, the source and principle of all life.

ART. II.—THE SOUL OR LIFE-PRINCIPLE OF LIVING COMPOSITES.

42. *The principle of life in living composites is the soul. The soul is the first act of a physical organic body suitably disposed to receive life.*—The living composite can have life only through its substantial form. The animating form is called the *soul*. The soul is said to be the *first act* of a body, because it is the substantial form of the body, that which gives it first being and animates it. The term *physical* shows that the soul is proper only to natural bodies, and not to artificial and mathematical bodies. The soul is called the first act of an *organic* body, because the functions of the soul being different, and each of them requiring an organ of its own, every body united to a soul must necessarily have different organs. Finally, the words, *suitably disposed to receive life*, imply that the soul cannot be the form of every body in any condition whatever, but only of a body so disposed that it can have life and remain in the condition necessary to life. These words also convey the meaning that the property of the soul is to give life actually to the body which has only the potentiality of receiving it, and to render it capable of the operations of life, though not to constitute it always actually in operation.

43. *There are three kinds of soul : vegetative, sensitive, and rational.*—There are as many kinds of soul as there are kinds of life. But as life exceeds the ordinary powers of matter, there are as many kinds of life as

there are degrees in which vital operations surpass the powers of matter. These degrees are three in number. For there is (1) such action as exceeds the powers of matter in this, that it proceeds from a principle intrinsic in the subject in which it is manifested, although it is produced dependently on matter and its qualities; this is *vegetative* operation. For example, nutrition and the other actions related to it are produced not simply by means of corporeal organs, but also by means of the physical and chemical forces of nature. (2) There is also an operation which is exercised by means of a corporeal organ, but not in virtue of any quality proper to matter; this is *sensitive* operation. Thus, although moisture, heat, and other corporeal qualities are required for the operation of the senses, still the act of sensation is not produced by means of these qualities, which are requisite merely that the organ of sensation may be suitably disposed. Lastly, there is (3) an operation which surpasses corporeal nature in this, that it is not exercised in virtue of any quality proper to matter, like vegetation, nor through the concurrence of material organs, like sensation; this is the operation of the *rational* soul. As there are but three kinds of soul, so there are three modes of life—the vegetative, the sensitive, and the intellectual. Locomotion, it is true, is not, strictly speaking, common to all creatures having sensitive life. A distinction may, then, be made between those animals that have only the sense of touch, and perfect animals that are made aware by their senses not only of what is near them, but also of what is far removed, that direct themselves to these distant objects, and consequently have also progressive motion. Yet all animals have at least a power of contraction and dilatation, and therefore some form of

locomotion. Hence there is no need to classify locomotion as a special mode.

44. *In all living composites, even in those that possess several kinds of life, there is only one soul that performs all the functions of life.*—In every living being, as in every composite, there is only one substantial form.* But experience proves that it is the soul that in the case of living composites gives first being to the body, and is, consequently, its substantial form; therefore the soul must be one. In composites having several kinds of life, there is a superior soul which performs the operations of inferior souls, just as a greater number contains the smaller numbers, or as a superior active power contains in its unity the inferior active powers. But, although one in itself, the soul of the living composite is virtually multiple and informs all the parts of the body, enabling them to exercise the various functions of life, as the same blowing (blast) in the different pipes of an organ produces various sounds, according to the dispositions of the pipes.

45. *The soul is indivisible.*—The indivisibility of the soul is a truth attested by experience. For when a member of a living body is amputated, it ceases to be animated—that is, in dividing the body, the soul has not been divided, and as the soul cannot follow the amputated member, it ceases to inform that part of the body, which is thenceforth deprived of life. In a great number of plants, however, and in the imperfect animals, the soul is accidentally divisible,†

* What gives being to an entity also gives it unity; but the substantial form gives being to bodily substance; therefore, if the substantial form were not one, the body would not be one.

† In these plants and animals the specific functions are few and the organism is simple and diffused; “but with a complex and

like the form of minerals, which though not divisible in itself, is yet divisible accidentally—that is, in virtue of the matter in which by its imperfection it is too deeply immersed. Touching such a life principle and such a form, the same remarks may be made as of the affinity and the resistance of bodies, that although inextended in themselves, they nevertheless become extended and accidentally divisible by their entire dependence on bodies for their being.

46. *The soul does not act directly by itself, but through the medium of its faculties. They are distinct from its essence and may be defined as The proximate and immediate principles of the action to which they are naturally ordained.*—The essence of the soul does not operate immediately by itself, for then it would ever be actually producing all its vital actions, since essence is unchangeable. Therefore, the operations of the soul have not the essence of the soul for their immediate principle, but faculties distinct from the essence. In God alone the power, the operation, and the essence are the same.*

47. *Vital faculties are distinguished according to their proper acts and objects.*—Whatsoever entities are essentially related to other entities have distinctions corresponding to those found among the latter; but the vital faculties are essentially related to their proper acts, and through these acts to certain objects; therefore they are specified by these acts and

multifarious organism the case is very different. It takes but little to supply the acranial head and the tail of a worm, but it would require a far more elaborate process to develop the eyes, ears, nose, a vertebrate structure, heart, lungs, etc., out of the hoof of an ox.”—*Metaphysics of the School*, vol. ii., p. 654, and prop. 214.

* See *Metaphysics of the School*, vol. iii., pp. 205-219, and more particularly, pp. 214-217.

these objects. Thus the eyes are intended by nature for seeing; they are specified by the act of seeing, and more remotely by the objects to be seen.

48. *Although the powers of the soul are multiple, the soul itself is simple.*—The powers of the soul are necessarily multiple; for the soul produces operations which are not reducible one to the other, and which, consequently, require distinct faculties. But these faculties, although multiple, do not destroy the simplicity of the soul's essence, whence they proceed; for, since they are distinct from the essence, they do not enter into it as component parts; they are not parts of its essence, but diverse powers determining the activity of the soul's essence, which of itself is undetermined. Nevertheless, these faculties, though distinct, are not independent of one another; since the soul is one, its faculties must be subordinated one to another, that this unity may not be destroyed.*

49. *The powers of the soul are by their nature inclined to their proper operations.*—As each power has been given to the soul for the accomplishment of a special order of actions, it must naturally be inclined to perform these actions. This natural inclination of the power does not refer to this or that individual action, but to the whole species of actions which the power can produce. Since the action is the effect of the power inclined to produce it, it is evident that the more intense the inclination of the power the more perfect will the action be. But this peculiar intensity

* That there is a real distinction between the essence and the powers of the soul is manifest from our mode of speaking of them, from the very nature of the powers and their actions, and from the testimony of consciousness.

in the inclination of one power impairs the exercise of another power. For example, he who exercises his imagination to excess will do injury to his power of judgment. This is easily explained, because the activity of the faculties is a participation of the activity of the soul. But since the soul is one and indivisible and of limited power, the concentration of its activity with particular intensity on one faculty must be prejudicial to the other faculties.

50. *There are five different faculties in the soul : vegetative, sensitive, intellectual, appetitive, and locomotive.*—The faculties of the soul are divided according to their formal objects and actions. Now some powers have for their object only the body to which the soul is united ; these are vegetative powers. The soul of the plant, for instance, acts only on its material organism. Other powers have for objects not only the body to which the soul is united, but everything sensible. Finally, there are powers that have for object not only everything sensible, but all being whatsoever. When the soul has for the object of its operations other beings than its own body, it may attain to them in two ways : (1) in so far as the soul knows them and is united to them by their image or species ; (2) in so far as the soul is borne toward these objects. But the soul knows sensible objects through the medium of its sensitive faculties, and universal natures by its intellectual faculties.—There are two kinds of faculties by which the soul is united to the objects to which it tends : the sensitive appetite and the rational appetite, by which it is inclined to seek its connatural good. It has also a locomotive faculty, by which it moves the body which it informs to seek what is useful and to avoid what is hurtful.

ART. III.—THE BODIES OF LIVING COMPOSITES.

51. *Living bodies differ from others in organism, origin, development, duration, mode of conservation, and reproduction.*—Living bodies differ from non-living bodies : (1) In their *material constitution*, because they have organs of different conformation for the special functions to be performed, and, therefore, they receive the name of *organic bodies* ; while non-living bodies have a substance homogeneous in all its parts, and are therefore called *inorganic*. An organism is essential to the living composite, because diversity of vital functions calls for diverse organs. (2) In their *origin*, because living bodies proceed from constant causes, to which they are at first substantially united as germs ; while, on the contrary, non-living bodies are produced by the accidental intervention of causes entirely external. (3) In their *development*, because living bodies truly grow, developing in themselves their proper type ; while non-living bodies simply increase by external accretion or the addition of parts. (4) In their *duration*, because living bodies have an existence limited by their very nature ; while the existence of non-living bodies is indefinite, and can be destroyed only by an external cause. (5) In their *mode of conservation*, because living bodies repair their losses by the conversion of fresh nutriment into their own substance, and are thus renewed without losing their own individuality ; while non-living bodies do not repair their losses, but remain such as they were at first until they are resolved into other substances. (6) In *reproduction*, because living bodies are perpetuated in their species by their own virtue ;

while non-living bodies are multiplied only by the intervention of external causes.*

52. *The bodies of animals differ from those of plants, first, in having a more perfect vegetative organism; secondly, in having sensation; thirdly, in having a special organism adapted to the functions of sensitive life.*—Animals perform two functions, one, called vegetative, by which, like plants, they act upon their own bodies and grow, nourish, and perpetuate themselves; the other, called sensitive, by which they perceive the objects that produce a sensible impression upon them, and determine themselves to locomotion. For the functions of the first kind, they have organs generically like those of plants, but differing in this, that they produce effects more varied and above those to which the activity of plants can attain. For the functions of the second kind animals have special organs: the nervous system as the proper instrument of sensation, and the muscular system for spontaneous motion.

* Since living bodies differ essentially from non-living bodies, spontaneous generation in the sense of the production of life from no pre-existing germs and by the sole agency of physical and chemical forces is an utter impossibility. Traces of this theory are found in ancient Greek philosophy, and, in a modified form, in many of the Schoolmen, among whom are St. Bonaventure and apparently St. Thomas; but the latter merely believed that God the Creator had given to matter the power, on the presence of certain conditions, of producing the lowest and simplest forms of life, like infusoria. But the apparatus at the disposition of modern science and the persevering experiments of Flourens, Dumas, Quatrefages, and especially Pasteur, have proved that when air and water, in which the germs are disseminated, have been excluded no generation occurs. Of the result of Pasteur's experiment Tyndall says, "There is no conclusion in experimental science more certain than that." The obstinate persistency of Tiedemans, Brenser, Poncet, and Broca, in asserting the truth of spontaneous generation, has only served to bring out its falsity more clearly.

These organs are more or less perfect according to the species in which they are found. In man the animal organism attains a special perfection, because in him sensibility is the minister and aid of the intellect. This perfection is resplendent in the beauty of man's form, in the upright posture of his body, in the extreme delicacy of the nervous and muscular systems, and in the regularity and symmetry of all the parts of his body.

ART. IV.—VEGETATIVE LIFE, OR THE LIFE OF PLANTS.

53. *The principal functions of the vegetative life are reduced to three: Nutrition, growth, and reproduction.*—By means of its organs, a plant exercises several functions, such as absorption, circulation, secretion, florification, fructification, etc.; but all these operations are reduced to the three principal ones of nutrition, growth, and reproduction. These three operations are necessary to the plant and to every living body. The third is necessary that the body may be produced; the second, that it may attain its natural development; and the first, that it may preserve its being.

54. *It is an error to attribute the life of plants to a purely mechanical principle.*—This opinion, which reduces the vital principle to physical and chemical forces, easily leads to materialism. It is opposed to the judgment of the greatest naturalists, who prove that the vital principle is distinct from the forces of matter, whether from the impossibility of obtaining a living substance by mere chemical combinations, or from the diversity that exists between the laws governing organic bodies and those governing inorganic bodies.

55. *It is an error to attribute sensation to plants.*—This

error has been embraced by several philosophers, as Plato and Leibnitz, and by several naturalists, as Darwin (1809–1882) and Bichat (1771–1802). But it is evident that plants are destitute of sensation: (1) because they should then have organs of sensation, but of these we see they are deprived; and (2) because plants are rooted in the soil whence they spring, and therefore sensation would serve no purpose.

ART. V.—SENSITIVE LIFE, OR THE LIFE OF ANIMALS.

56. *Every animal has the faculty of sensation and of spontaneous locomotion.*—Besides vegetative life, every animal possesses sensation and motion. But this motion is not only a change of place, produced by an intrinsic principle, of which the plant is destitute, but it is spontaneous; it is not determined by nature, but proceeds from a previous perception, and is determined by an instinctive appetite of the subject that moves. Hence, unlike motion proceeding from nature only, spontaneous motion is varied, multiple, without fixed rule, and is modified according to the different perceptions and appetitions of the animal. Spontaneous motion is seen in every animal; in the imperfect animals it consists in contraction and dilatation; in perfect animals it is progressive and complete. But because the faculty of locomotion is only a consequence of sensation, it follows that sensibility alone suffices to specify the animal.

57. *The faculties of the animal are sensitive, appetitive, and locomotive. The sensitive faculties are external or internal. The external senses are five: Sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch. The internal senses are four: Common sense, imagination, the estimative faculty, and memory. Appetite is concupiscible or irascible.*—External

sensible bodies act on the animal. It is then necessary, first, that these bodies be united to it by the act of cognition, which takes place through the sensitive faculties both external and internal. For the animal at first knows sensible objects through one or more of the five external senses; the sensible species or representations are transmitted to the internal sense called common sense, and then to the imagination, which preserves them; the estimative faculty perceives what is useful or hurtful in the object, and its perceptions are retained by the sensitive memory. According to its knowledge of the object as useful or as hurtful, is the animal inclined by the concupiscible appetite to seek it or shun it. If difficulties arise in seeking or shunning it, the irascible appetite strives to overcome them. Incited by the appetite, the locomotive faculty enters into action, and, in one way or another, the animal moves. All these faculties are found in a state of perfection and completeness in perfect animals. In the imperfect animals, which have no external sense but that of touch, locomotion is very imperfect, because motion, being the consequence of sensation, is more or less developed according to the development of sensation itself. In man the sensitive faculties are found in admirable harmony and with a special perfection which they receive from the intellect. Hence it is in man that these faculties should be more particularly studied; and so much the more as they cannot be well known by him, but so far forth as he experiences them himself.

58. *The faculties of the brute animal are organic, that is, belonging to the composite and not to the soul only.*—Several modern philosophers, following in the footprints of Plato, consider sensation as an act of the soul only,

to which the body concurs only occasionally. But this error would liken the brute soul to that of man. For if sensation has no need of organs for its production, it is a spiritual act, and the sensitive soul is spiritual, which is absurd. Besides, the diversity of the organs answering to the diverse sensitive faculties, and the necessity of these organs and their modifications for their respective sensations, prove sufficiently that these faculties belong to the composite and not to the soul alone.

59. *The principle of sensitive life in the brute animal is identical with the principle of vegetative life.*—1. Although sensitive life and vegetative life really differ from each other, and though in the body of the animal there are parts that do not possess both kinds of life, yet it is one soul that causes the functions of both in the organism which it informs. For, although the animal grows and perceives through the senses, it constitutes but one living being. Hence the formal principle from which its being and its life proceed must be one and identical. It is true that this formal principle should have the power of communicating, according to difference of disposition and aptitude in the parts of the organism, either vegetative faculties alone or both vegetative and sensitive faculties; but if it were not one and identical, it could never constitute a subject one and identical. Now, nothing is more evident than the unity and identity of every animal. 2. This identity of the principle of the two kinds of life in the animal is confirmed by the fact of the cessation of vegetative life in an organism which has become incapable of sensitive life, and vice versa. It is further confirmed by the admirable harmony that exists between the vegetative and the sensitive organs, a harmony which makes of them but one or-

ganic system, although varied in its different parts according to the different functions that it exercises, and which explains the intimate correspondence of the two kinds of life and the reciprocal influence which they exert. 3. The identity of the sensitive and the vegetative principle in the animal is also proved by the elevation which the sensitive principle gives to the functions of the vegetative life. For, although they are of the same genus in the plant and the animal, they are more perfect in the animal.

60. *The brute soul, though simple and immaterial, is not immortal.*—The indivisibility and immateriality of the sensitive soul are proved (1) not only from experience, (2) but also by the unity of the brute's being, which can proceed only from a principle itself one; (3) from the nature of sensation, which perceives the whole object by a single act; (4) from the remembrance which the sentient subject keeps of the different and often contrary modifications which it has experienced, and which could not be explained if the principle were not immaterial. But the immateriality of the brute soul by no means implies its spirituality and immortality. For spirituality and immortality suppose a soul subsisting and operating by itself, independently of any material organ. But the being and operation of the animal are neither of the soul alone nor of the body alone, but of the whole composite. Therefore the soul of the animal does not operate without the body, and perishes with the body. But since it is simple, it does not perish by decomposition, nor does God annihilate it, for He annihilates none of His works. The soul of the animal perishes in some sort indirectly, forasmuch as the subject is wanting without which it cannot exist. Moreover, it is thus that all forms perish, that all

forces and all the modifications of inorganic bodies and of plants perish.

61. *Brutes are not automata, as Descartes maintained.*—This doctrine leads to materialism, for if a mechanism more or less perfectly constructed can produce in the animal the marvellous acts of sensation, a few additional degrees of perfection of mechanism could produce the marvellous acts of intelligence. It is in vain to urge in support of this doctrine that, if any immaterial soul be attributed to animals, we must thereby acknowledge in them a spiritual and immortal soul. The immateriality of a soul includes neither its spirituality nor its immortality. It is equally vain to invoke certain analogies with the motions of certain bodies like the magnet, or to have recourse to divine intervention to explain the operations of the animal. These motions of bodies bear no resemblance to the spontaneous motions of animals, and to have recourse to the intervention of God is to accept all the pantheistic consequences of the system of occasional causes.

62. *Epicurus and all other materialists err in ascribing reason and intelligence to brutes.*—This system, which makes a man of the brute only to make a brute of man, is contrary to experience and the unanimous belief of the human race. It puts forward two arguments in its favor: (1) that brutes perform their acts in a suitable manner, as man does; (2) that externally they resemble man both in their organs and in most of their actions. But these are pure sophisms. From the fact that brutes are like man in something, it does not follow that they are like him in all respects. If brutes know, they do not understand; if they form images, they do not attain to ideas; if they distinguish what is suitable to them from what is not

suitable, they are yet incapable of any moral notion. Finally, if they are guided by natural instinct with admirable rectitude, it is certain that they can neither invent nor perfect anything.*

* The question is not whether the acts of brutes could not proceed from a rational principle, but whether they cannot and should not be traced to a sensitive principle. The instances of wonderful industry and constructive skill to be found in the animal kingdom are not to be compared with similar habits and works of man, for the brute acts by instinct, and acquires no experience, properly so called, and shows no increased perfection in process of time. Father Harper cites three classes of facts to disprove the conclusion that the brute has the same faculties as man, "only under a rudimentary form:" "1, The judgment of brutes as to what is or is not conducive to their good is not free; for on the apprehension of what is useful or harmful their impulse is the result of natural operation; 2, Uniformity of operation observable in animals of the same species; 3, Brute animals at the beginning of their life receive a natural estimation in order to know that which is hurtful and that which is useful, because they cannot attain to this by their own investigation; but man is left to form his judgments gradually by the practical experience of life." — *Metaphysics of the School*, vol. ii., pp. 666-672.

Its importance to-day justifies the quotation of the following: "It is not possible to discover a link between man and the brute in any supposed order of men possessing a specific nature half-way between spirit and matter; for such a hypothesis is a contradiction in terms. A spirit cannot be more or less spirit after the manner that matter can be more or less organized. A form must be wholly spiritual or wholly unspiritual; though its faculties may be partly the one, partly the other. Neither is it possible, for the same reason, that there should be a common ancestry."—*Ibid.*, p. 551.

PSYCHOLOGY :
OR,
ANTHROPOLOGY.

1. *Psychology is a science which treats of the human soul, its faculties, its properties, and its relations with the body.*—Man is, as it were, a compendium of all creation ; for in him are found being, life, sense, reason, and corporeal nature united to spiritual nature. Therefore the study of man specially pertains to philosophy. That part of philosophy which treats of man is called *Psychology* or *Anthropology*. The name psychology more particularly signifies the *study of the soul* ; but because it is almost impossible to know the soul rightly without considering it in its relations with the body, it is necessary for psychology to study the whole man.

2. *The method to be followed in psychology is analytico-synthetical, a method that joins observation to reason.*—Some philosophers, as Bacon, Locke, Reid and his disciples, admit only the experimental method in psychology ; but this method can never give psychological science, because it regards only facts ; it cannot, therefore, solve problems concerning the essence, origin, and end of the soul. Other philosophers, as Schelling and Hegel, hold that the science of man should be constructed *a priori* ; but this method is also false, because by observation the operations of

the soul are known, and by reasoning, its nature. Hence it is by observation together with reasoning that the philosopher should construct the science of psychology.

CHAPTER I.

THE HUMAN SOUL AND ITS FACULTIES.

ART. I.—FACULTIES OF THE HUMAN SOUL.

3. *The human soul has vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual faculties. The sensitive and intellectual faculties are divided into cognitive and appetitive faculties.*—Since the human soul has vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual life, it must have the faculties of these three kinds of life. Cosmology treats of the faculties of vegetative life, but only in a general way, leaving to subordinate sciences the psychological investigation of these faculties. *Rational Psychology* treats of the sensitive and the intellectual faculties, but in the consideration of the former omits the physiological development of their organs, which belongs properly to *Empirical* or *Physiological Psychology*. Both the sensitive and the intellectual faculties are primarily *passive*, since they must first be acted upon before they operate; but they are also secondarily *active*, because they are vital powers. Strictly speaking, a power is *active* when it modifies, or, so to say, makes its object, and of this kind are the vegetative faculties; it is *passive* when it must be acted upon and moved by its object; and such are the senses and intellect. A faculty, whether sensitive or intellectual, is called *cognitive*, when it can know an object; it is *appetitive*, when it tends to union with the object known.

4. *In the cognitive faculties the object known shares in the perfection or imperfection of the subject knowing ; in the appetitive faculties the subject shares in the perfection or imperfection of the object to which the faculties are directed.*—The object of a cognitive faculty assumes the conditions of the subject knowing before its union with that subject. A stone in its physical reality is material; but when it becomes known by the senses, it has in them an immaterial existence; a circle is always united to matter in the real order, but when abstracted by the intellect, it has not only an immaterial, but a universal existence. But as objects inferior to the subject knowing receive a new perfection when by cognition they exist in the subject, so objects superior to it share in its imperfection in so far as they are objects known. It is far otherwise with the appetitive faculties: through these the subject acted upon tends to union with the object, and in a certain sense to be transformed into it; through these, therefore, the subject shares in the perfection or imperfection of the object. The soul, for instance, is elevated by union with the will of God, but is degraded by attaching itself to creatures.

ART. II.—THE COGNITIVE SENSITIVE FACULTIES.

—SENSIBILITY IN GENERAL.

5. *Cognition in general is an operation by which a living being perceives itself or some object present to it.*—By cognition in general a living being perceives and discerns itself, or some object present to it. Since cognition is wholly contained within the subject knowing, it follows that it becomes aware of external things in so far as they are in some way present with

in it. But external things cannot in their own nature enter the subject knowing, but solely through the medium of certain forms representing them and called *intentional species*.* It is, therefore, by these species that things are known.

6. *The senses are passive powers by which the sensitive being perceives sensible objects.*—The senses are *passive* powers, because they do not act until some sensible object has determined them to act, and principally because they do not form their object, but are informed by it. By them the sensitive being perceives all that is comprised under the name of sensible object. This perception is called *sensation*.

7. *The senses are classified as external and internal, according as they perceive external objects or the modifications produced in the sensitive subject.*—The action of the external object on the sentient subject produces a modification in the sense, and thus determines it to perceive its object. By the internal senses the subject perceives its external sensations.

8. *The senses, both external and internal, 1. reside in a corporeal organ ; 2. cannot reflect on their sensations ; 3. can have nothing but what is material for their object.*—1. The senses, as is attested by experience, are moved to act by corporeal objects. But what is corporeal cannot act on the senses, if they are not themselves corporeal yet vital, that is, organic. For bodies must act according to their nature and can produce only a material modification, since otherwise the effect would exceed the power of its cause ;

* They are named *species*, because they are likenesses or *forms* of the object ; they are called *intentional*, either because they intend, as it were, to represent the object, or because they tend from the object to the various faculties that receive the impressions.—See *Sum. Th.*, i., q. 78, a. 3.

but the senses could not receive this modification if they had not a material organ. No sense, therefore, can be without an organ fitted to receive the material impression which is produced by an object external to it, and which determines the sense to act. This material organ, because informed by the soul, can serve the soul in the act of sensation. 2. No sense can reflect on its own operation, because a faculty cannot reflect on its own action, unless it wholly and entirely return upon itself. But this is impossible to the senses, for they depend on material organs, one part of which might indeed return upon another part; but what is extended can never in its entirety return upon itself. 3. Since every sense consists of a material vital organ, it must necessarily have something material for its object. This is equally true of the internal senses, for they are put into exercise by sensations received through the external senses and accompanied by a material modification. Thus, although the object of internal sensibility is not absolutely material like that of external sensibility, yet it has in it something material that enables it to reduce the internal senses to action.

9. *The cause of sensation is not the mere activity of the soul, as was held by Leibnitz and Fichte.*—Leibnitz maintained that the soul is the only and necessary cause of sensation. But if the soul has sensations necessarily, evidently it must have them always, an assertion which is contradicted by experience. Besides, if the soul alone has sensations in virtue of its nature, how does this nature which is ever the same, become sensible of things which are contrary to one another or which have no bond of union? How, if it is sentient in itself alone, can it by sensation perceive bodies outside itself? Let it not be said that the pres-

ence of the external body is necessary as the condition or occasion of sensation ; for, either the body does not of itself really determine the soul to sensation, and then its presence is useless ; or it does of itself determine the soul to sensation, and then the soul is not the only cause of sensation.

Fichte, while admitting the soul to be by itself alone the cause of sensation, considered it not a necessary, but a free cause. But this is plainly contradicted by experience, which shows us that our sensations do not depend on our will ; that, on the contrary, we often experience sensations which we would wish not to have, and are deprived of others that we desire.

10. *The only cause of sensation is not, as Berkeley asserted, the action of God on the soul.* — Berkeley (1684–1753) taught that the soul, being immaterial, could not be affected by the action of a material object, but that since the representations of bodies in the faculties of the soul are an undoubted fact, they cannot otherwise be explained than by the action of God on the soul ; he added that only spiritual beings exist, and that bodies are but a simple succession of ideas formed in us by God. This theory is evidently erroneous, for, were it true, God would be constantly deceiving us by creating within us representations of bodies that do not exist. Should any one insist with Malebranche, that God by His omnipotence can produce in us the perceptions of bodies, although the bodies do not exist, then would the omnipotence of God be placed in contradiction to His veracity, and God Himself would be made contradictory. Besides, in this system it is absolutely impossible to account for the diversity of sensations among men in reference to the same object, as also to explain the connection

that exists between certain sensations; for example, between the sensations produced by an animalcule according as it is or is not seen under the microscope. Lastly, this system is based on the principle that "like can be known only by like." But this principle is manifestly false,* for in accordance with it materialists could deny the existence of spirits, since the perception of matter is incontestable; and idealists might question the existence of bodies, since the nature of the soul is immaterial.

11. *The only cause of sensation is not, as materialists maintain, the impression of the material object on the sentient subject.*—Broussais held that the impression constitutes the whole sensation, and regarded the brain as the sentient subject. Now, the brain is material, and what is material is composed of parts distinct one from another. If, therefore, what is material has sensations, we must conclude that each part has either the whole sensation or only a part of it. In the former case, there would be as many sensations as there are parts in the sentient subject; in the latter, the sensation would never be entire, for each part would have for itself only that part which it had received. Now, on the one hand, experience attests that sensation is one and indivisible, and, on the other hand, that in its indivisible unity it represents the entire sensible that is its object.

Cabanis (1757–1808), while agreeing with Broussais (1772–1838) that the impression constitutes the whole

* This principle must not be confounded with the principle of assimilation in the Scholastic theory of cognition: "Whatever is received is received according to the nature of the receiver." It follows from this principle that all objects known are in the act of cognition, which is an immanent act, assimilated to the subject knowing.

sensation, regarded the soul alone as the subject of sensation. But this cannot be, for the sensible object can produce an impression only on the organ; but sensation is something very different from this purely material impression. Sensation results from the action of the sense, whereas the impression is passive.

12. *Sensation is produced by two causes: the material object and the activity of the sense.*—There can be no sensation if the activity of the sense is not exercised; but, since the senses have a material object for their term, it must be this object that calls forth their action. Hence sensation is both active and passive; it is passive in so far as it presupposes the action of a sensible object; it is active so far as, given this action, sensation follows from the activity of the sentient subject.

13. *The sensible object is joined to the sentient subject by means of a certain representation of itself, which is called the sensible species.*—Sensation is an immanent action which is produced in the sentient subject, is proportioned to it, and remains wholly within it; but it does not take place without a material object which acts upon the sentient subject, and is perceived or cognized by it.

For the production of sensation, the material object must in some way be joined to the sentient subject. But evidently it cannot enter in its physical reality; it must, therefore, enter through something which represents it; and this is called the *sensible intentional species*. This sensible species produced by the object is not a simple excitation which is caused in the sensitive faculty by its contact with the object; but, since it makes known the object, it is necessarily a representation of it which renders it present to the

sensitive faculty. Thus the image formed on the retina of the eye by a body is not merely a motion, an excitation, which leads the sight to perceive the body, but it is a representation of it by which it is conjoined to the sense of sight.

14. *The sensible species is not the object of sensation, but the medium by which sensation is effected.*—The sensible species in the subject knowing is the immediate principle that determines the act of sensation; hence it could not be perceived by the sensitive faculty except by a reflex act, which sense cannot perform. Now, not only does reflex action suppose a previous act, but it cannot even be effected by the senses. Therefore the sensible species is not that which the sense perceives; it is the medium by which the sense cognizes its object. While it informs the sense, the object is perceived; if, then, for any cause it remains in the sense, though the object be absent, perception will be had just as if the object were present, as is the case with the insane.

15. *Between the sensible species and sensation there is a relation of causality.*—The sensible species is not sensation, but it determines the act of sensation, so that the senses do not act unless determined by the sensible species. When, however, this determination has been effected, the senses must act and thus perceive the object that impressed them. Hence a relation of causality exists between the sensible species *impressed* and the sensible species *expressed*, or sensation.*

*These vicarious species, considered as acting on the sense, were called *impressed* species; considered as actually received into the sense, as informing it, and producing a corresponding reaction which we call sensation, they were termed *expressed* species; "their intention being thus far realized."

ART. III.—EXTERNAL SENSIBILITY IN GENERAL.

16. *The object of the external senses is the external sensible which is present to sense and suitably disposed.*—The external senses are those to which the species of external objects are referred ; hence they have material external things for their object. But this object must be present ; for only the internal senses can preserve sensible species, and, consequently, they alone can apply themselves to absent things. Finally, the object should also be suitably disposed, otherwise it could not impress the sense, that is, form in it the sensible species.

17. *There are three kinds of sensible objects : the proper, the common, and the accidental.*—Of the qualities of bodies which we perceive, some are perceived by one sense only, as “color” by the sight, and these are called *proper* sensibles. Others are the object of several senses, as “figure,” which is perceived by both sight and touch, and these are *common* sensibles. Others, again, are not perceived directly, because they are implicitly contained in the sensible qualities, as “substance,” and these are *accidental* sensibles. There are five kinds of proper sensibles, the objects respectively of the *sight*, the *hearing*, the *smell*, the *taste*, and the *touch*. There are likewise five kinds of common sensibles: “motion, rest, number, figure, and dimension.” To these five common sensibles, “time, posture, unity, distance, and proximity,” are referred. The accidental sensible is whatever is implicitly contained in the sensible appearance, and as it were naturally connected with it: as “anger, love, hatred,” etc. The proper sensible impresses the species, the common sensible modifies

this ; thus each is represented by its own species, one unmodified, the other modified. The accidental sensible neither impresses nor modifies a species ; it is merely connected with the objects represented by the species, as with natural signs.

18. *Some senses need a medium through which they receive the species impressed.*—Sensitive knowledge is attained only by means of a species which represents the object in the sentient subject. In some of the senses the production of the species is not aided but hindered by contact of the object with the organ of sense. Thus, for instance, an image of the object is not formed on the retina when the object touches the eye.

19. *When the senses act in their normal condition, they do not deceive us as to their proper sensibles ; but they may become an occasion of error as to common or accidental sensibles.*—Nature has given us senses that they may each make known to us their proper sensibles ; hence they cannot deceive us as to these sensibles unless there is some defect in the organ, or the sensible is too distant, or the medium is accidentally modified. But as nature has not charged one sole external sense to cognize the common sensible and the accidental sensible, a single external sense may deceive us in regard to these sensibles. Thus, in perspective, the eye deceives us in regard to the common sensible, distance. That the common sensible may be known with certainty, it must be known through the concurrence of several senses.

20. *Proper sensibles actually perceived by the external senses, are only virtually in bodies ; they are actually in the sentient subject.*—Taste, smell, and the other proper sensibles are not actually in bodies as they are in the senses, otherwise the bodies would have sensations.

They exist actually in the sentient subject only. Thus the sweet or bitter is a modification of the organ of taste, in consequence of which it experiences the sensation of sweetness or bitterness. Yet, although these qualities which are called proper sensibles are not found actually in bodies, they exist in them virtually, since bodies really have qualities by which they are apt to produce corresponding sensations in the organs of sense. Thus bodies are not sonorous, savory, or odoriferous; but they are apt to produce in our senses the sensation of sound, of taste, or of smell.

21. *The object of external sensation consists primarily and immediately in sensible qualities, but mediately and secondarily in the subject in which the qualities exist. Hence the external senses perceive bodies through the medium of their proper sensibles which exist in the bodies.*

—Sensible qualities or sensibles are not, as some affirm, mere modifications of the organs of sense, but the object perceived by sense. But since the senses cannot perceive their own perceptions or sensations, being organic faculties, these must be perceived by the internal sense called *common sense* (*sensus communis*). As inhering in a substance, sensible qualities are perceived by the external senses. But as they cannot exist apart from the bodies of which they are qualities, the senses cannot apprehend them apart from their subject except by the process of abstraction; but of this act they are incapable, for they are organic faculties. Therefore they must apprehend the sensible qualities in the corporeal subject in which they exist; but this is equivalent to saying that they apprehend both the qualities and their subject, though not in the same way. The qualities are their proper object; the substance, their

object *per accidens*. From this two consequences follow. The first is that the external senses perceive bodies by perceiving their qualities. By the sense of sight we do not become cognizant of the impression made in the sense: this is known to be there by reason; while common sense, or sensitive consciousness, perceives the sensation; but by the sight we perceive color, and through it the colored body other than ourselves. The second consequence is that the perception of bodies is immediate, but not *per se*, but *per accidens*; because, the external senses requiring the qualities of bodies in order to perceive bodies themselves, this perception takes place indirectly.

22. *It is erroneous to hold with Condillac that sensations being mere modifications of the sentient subject, the soul has no perception of an object other than itself except through the medium of touch.*—The philosophers who have denied that the external senses perceive bodies immediately, have been compelled to seek by what means the soul perceives an object distinct from itself. Condillac, starting with the hypothesis of the “man-statue,” says that so long as this statue is endowed with only the senses of sight, hearing, taste, and smell, it perceives nothing more than that it is itself affected in this or that way; but when the statue moves and by active touch feels something that resists it, it then perceives an object distinct from itself, and is led to believe that the perceptions of the other four senses also relate to an object external to the sentient subject. Thus the touch would be a medium by which the soul would pass to something distinct from itself.

It is easy to see the absurdity of such a theory to explain the perception of bodies. Besides, it rests on an hypothesis essentially contradictory. For ac

cording to this theory bodies produce sensations, and the sensations produce the sensitive faculties. But on the one hand, sensation must be elicited by a sentient subject ; on the other hand, sensation, far from producing the sensitive faculty, supposes its existence.

23. *We cannot admit with Reid, that the soul cognizes bodies by means of certain instinctive judgments.*—Reid, like Condillac, holds that the senses do not perceive bodies, but merely the sensible qualities, and that moreover sensation is purely subjective ; for, he tells us, as soon as the senses have perceived the sensible qualities, the intellect pronounces this instinctive judgment: “There are no sensible qualities without an existing material subject.” But if this judgment is instinctive, it proceeds from the natural constitution of the soul, and consequently is purely subjective. But a purely subjective judgment applied to subjective sensations cannot manifest an objective reality.

24. *We cannot admit, with Fichte, that the soul perceives bodies, not as objective realities, but as representations which the soul forms at will within itself.*—Deducing the ultimate consequences of the subjectivism of Kant, Fichte holds that when the soul perceives bodies, it perceives nothing more than its own representations formed by an exercise of its will. This theory is essentially absurd and contradictory. For the will cannot be the cause of the representation of bodies ; it cannot will their representation unless they be already known. Besides, if the representation of bodies is purely the effect of the will, why is it that the soul cannot experience at will a sensation that it desires ?

25. *It is false to assert with Cousin that sensation is purely subjective, and that from it the soul infers with*

the aid of the principle of causality that bodies exist.—With these two premises, viz., sensation is an effect, and every effect must have a cause, we can draw no conclusion but that sensation must have a cause. But there is nothing to assure us that this cause is the body, or, as Berkeley maintained, God Himself.

ART IV.—THE EXTERNAL SENSES IN PARTICULAR.

26. *The external senses are five in number: Sight, hearing, smell, taste, and touch.*—A sensitive being must have as many senses as are required for the preservation of its existence. But for this five senses are necessary; for by means of *sight* it perceives the disposition of the surrounding objects; by means of *hearing*, the motion of those which it does not see; by means of *smell*, it perceives the character of the aliments that are not yet within its reach; by the *taste* it judges of them with more care before taking them as food; lastly, by the *touch* it oversees the state of its own body and its relation to external things. These five senses should be found in every perfect sensitive being.—Again, our senses are five, because there are five formally distinct material objects to be cognized, viz., the different qualities of bodies; and our senses are given to us for such cognition.

27. *Among the five senses, sight is the most intellectual, touch the most necessary.*—*Sight* is the most intellectual sense, that which plays the chief part in the cognition of bodies: for its exercise it requires only light, the most subtle of material things. *Hearing*, although in itself inferior to sight, yet possesses two advantages over it: the first is that it perceives sounds from every direction; the second is that it operates

even in the absence of light. Hearing is the sense most important to man, for it is especially through it that the intellect acquires the cognitions necessary to its natural development. And divine faith comes by hearing. *Smell* perceives even an absent body by means of the emanations which it sends forth, and thus it informs us where bodies are when sight and hearing fail. This sense is necessary to the animal to find food; it is useful to point out what food is suitable for it and what is not. *Taste* is a sense distinct from touch, its organ being the tongue in connection with the palate; for savor differs formally from the other tactile qualities; and their objects specify the faculties. *Touch* is a sense having its organ in the whole body, especially the ends of the fingers. Its purposes are manifold. This is the most material of all the senses; it is also the most necessary to animal life. To preserve life, the animal must by the medium of touch guard against what can harm its body, just as by the taste it must perceive what food is proper for the support of its body.

ART V.—INTERNAL SENSES.

28. *The internal senses are four in number: Common sense, imagination, the estimative faculty, and sensitive memory.*—A sensitive being not only perceives the sensible qualities of bodies, but it distinguishes them from one another by a single act, it perceives the acts of the senses and the sensitive state that accompanies them whether of pleasure or pain. But for this a sense is requisite to which the perceptions of all the external senses are referred as to their common centre, an internal sense which can thus cognize the acts of the senses. This internal sense is called

common sense. But the sensible being must apprehend the sensible object, not only when it is present, but also when it is absent. Hence it stands in need of a faculty which can preserve and reproduce the images already received. This faculty is *imagination*. The sensitive being might be able to seek or to shun not only those things that produce agreeable or disagreeable sensations in it, but also those that may be advantageous or hurtful to it in other respects. Hence it must be able to cognize their useful or harmful properties, to preserve and reproduce the perception of these properties, so that in the absence of useful objects they may direct themselves towards them. This it does by means of the *estimative faculty* which perceives these properties, and the *sensitive memory* which preserves this perception. Memory recalls all past sensations and their objects just as they occurred, in which it differs from imagination.

29. *It is an error to deny the common sense and say, with Rosmini, that the soul has through its essence the feeling of its sensations ; or, with Condillac, that each sense perceives its own sensations ; or, with other philosophers, that the sensations of each sense are perceived by the intellect.*—The opinion of Rosmini (1797–1855) is false, for the soul operates through its faculties and never directly through its essence. The opinion of Condillac is also false, because a simple sensation and the perception of the sensation are two things essentially distinct and cannot be referred to a single sense ; also because supposing each sense can perceive its own sensations, it can neither perceive the sensation of another sense nor its proper sensible. Now, the fact that the sensations of all the senses are perceived by a single faculty cannot be denied, for we compare our various sensations. Lastly, those philos-

ophers who say that man has no need of an internal sense, because his intellect can perceive the acts of the external senses, are also in error ; for sensation is a sensitive act ; the perception of the sensation, therefore, supposes a sensitive operation, and consequently a sensitive faculty. The existence of the internal sense called *sensus communis* is shown not merely by reason, but also to some extent by physiology ; for it testifies that the nerves of all the external senses diverge from a common source, where they unite as in their centre. This one point of reunion of the sensitive nerves may be regarded as the organ of common sense.

30. *Common sense* * has three functions : 1. *It perceives and distinguishes the perceptions of the different senses ;* 2. *It perceives the different states of the sentient being, whether of pleasure or pain, accompanying or following these perceptions ; i.e., it acts the part of sensitive consciousness ;* 3. *It perceives the proper and the common sensibles.*—1. The perceptions of all the senses are referred to common sense as to their proper faculty. Since, then, they must all be cognized by this central sense, it must evidently be capable of distinguishing them from one another, but it cannot know them as different. As each sense can perceive only its own proper sensible, it cannot distinguish it from the other sensibles ; for to distinguish two things, both must be known. 2. The second function of common sense is to perceive the act of the senses and the state that accompanies and follows the act. The object of each sense is one ; but the objects of the external senses are outside the sentient subject ; these senses,

* This faculty must be carefully distinguished from that intellectual habit, or "faculty of first principles," explained on p. 135.

moreover, cannot perceive their own sensations. For the *species impressa*, or form of the object impressed on sense and through which it perceives the object, is too close to sense to be seen by it or perceived. To perceive the sensation of each sense is proper to common sense, just as to perceive the objects that impress the senses is proper to the external senses.

3. Common sense has a third function, which is to perceive the common sensible. Since this sensible should be apprehended by several senses to be duly known, it is manifestly the proper object of common sense, since the latter perceives the sensations of all the particular senses. For instance, to know motion accurately, we must perceive both by touch and by sight: but these distinct perceptions can be perceived by common sense alone.

31. *Imagination or fancy is an internal sense which preserves the images or sensible species of objects already perceived by the external senses, and reproduces them in the absence of their objects.*—The existence of this faculty is attested by experience, which shows us the sensitive subject reproducing images of the sensible objects which it once perceived; but this it could not do if it had not preserved the images of these objects. By this faculty the soul retains the images of whatever was perceived by the external senses. They are like the glass of the camera obscura, which preserves the images only as long as the objects are present; imagination is like the photographic plate, which preserves the images indefinitely. As this faculty only preserves images of objects already perceived, it is evident that where a sense is wanting, the corresponding image in the imagination will also be wanting. Hence a man born blind can form no image of color.

Some philosophers, and among them Cousin, have

wrongly regarded imagination as an inventive faculty that can produce images of objects not previously perceived. Although imagination can, it is true, form images of objects not existing in nature, yet it can do so only by means of objects already perceived by the senses whose images it can divide or multiply, contract or distend, arrange or disturb, in various ways. But imagination not only preserves the sensible images, it can also reproduce them, and in these images it then contemplates the objects themselves, not in the state of immobility as on a photographic plate, but as they are in reality, moving, acting, and living, though not in the same exactitude with which they were first perceived ; for this belongs to memory. In the animal, the reproduction of the images corresponds exactly to the reality perceived before by the senses ; man can besides unite or separate the images in his imagination and combine them in diverse ways. Thus, from the image of gold and the image of a mountain, he forms the one image of a mountain of gold. In this way the artist becomes capable of producing masterpieces, the poet creates his fictions, the scientist conceives hypotheses by which he supplies the facts which nature hides from him. This special power of imagination man possesses, not as properly belonging to the sensitive life, but in consequence of the perfection which the sensitive life in him receives from the intellectual life, a redundancy flowing over, as it were, from the higher faculty to that which is immediately beneath it.

32. *Association of images is subject to laws which refer partly to the nature of the soul and partly to the nature of the images.*—Association of images, which modern philosophers improperly name *association of ideas*, depends partly on the nature of the soul. Thus

in virtue of the unity of the soul, just as the phantasm, through the action of intellect in man, influences his free will and necessarily determines the sensitive appetite in the animal, so does the will in man, and the sensitive appetite in the animal, call up the image or phantasm in the imagination.

Association of images depends also partly upon the nature of the images, which, according to the relations existing among them, are reduced to three categories: those of *similarity*, *contrast*, and *contiguity* whether of space or time. These relations are at times unperceived, but for all that they are real.

33. *The imagination in man should be regulated and prudently directed by the will, and this by intellect.*—The imagination plays a very important part in man, since it furnishes his intellect with material for its operations. Hence it is necessary so to regulate it that it may be of great service in the acquisition of truth. In the first place, since it is an organic faculty having a corporeal organ, it is evidently more or less perfect according to the physical organism of the individual and the external influences that modify that organism. Hence man should guard against all those influences which injure the orderly exercise of the imagination and from which he can withdraw himself. In the second place, since the will exercises a direct action on the imagination, man should guide his imagination by his will enlightened by reason, and constantly subject it to the control of the real; otherwise the imagination may by compounding and dividing images give a factitious existence to deceitful phantoms, and thus become the source of many errors for the intellect, and consequently of much wrongdoing for the will.

34. *The estimative faculty is an internal sense which*

perceives and distinguishes things not perceived by the other senses, such as the useful or hurtful.—The existence of this sense is attested by experience, for we see that animals seek what is useful to them and avoid what is hurtful. It is also proved by reason. In order to preserve its being the animal must perceive not only what is agreeable or disagreeable, but also what is useful or harmful. It is by this faculty that the sheep knows that the wolf is his enemy, that the bird chooses the straw required for its nest. To this faculty, also, must be ascribed the marvellous skill and sagacity shown by animals in self-preservation and self-defence.

Man possesses the estimative faculty as well as the brute; but in man it is more perfect because influenced by intelligence. The animal perceives the useful or the hurtful in a thing by natural instinct; man, as an effect of a sort of comparison. Thus the estimative faculty, which in the brute is analogous to reason, is in man called *particular reason*, the *cognitive faculty*, or *passive intellect*.

35. *Sensitive memory is an internal sense that preserves and reproduces the cognitions acquired through the senses, and reproduces the sensible images with the knowledge of their perception in past time.*—A sensitive being does more than perceive in sensible objects what is useful or hurtful, for it also preserves these perceptions. Thus a dog shuns the places where he was beaten. This faculty of preserving and reproducing the perceptions of the other sensitive faculties is called *sensitive memory*.* It differs from imagination, for it reproduces the cognitions of sensible objects with the condition of past time in which they took place, and

* Also, and more properly, *sensile*, memory.

also recognizes now as once perceived the perceptions recalled ; while the imagination reproduces images simply and neither with any determination of time nor in the order of their first appearance. For an act of memory, therefore, it does not suffice that the image perceived in time past be reproduced, but there must be also the knowledge that it was perceived in past time. This apprehension of time, though more noble than that of sensible qualities, is yet limited by two points * of a given time, and is determinate and particular. Hence it cannot be the object of intellect, which perceives only the universal as its proper object or object *per se*, the individual *per accidens*. Sensitive memory exists both in the brute and in man, as experience proves ; but in man, sensitive memory, besides recalling the past, may also deduce from what it recalls a series of connected events. And, as a child holding one end of the thread easily unwinds the spool, so man sees in his memory a long series of events and consequences which a first thought has recalled. This operation is called *remembrance*, and demands also the exercise of reason.

36. *The efficiency of memory depends partly on nature and partly on the mnemonic art. This art has four laws : 1. The representation by similitudes of the objects to be retained ; 2. A methodical classification of the objects ; 3. An effort to retain them ; 4. Continued reflection on the objects.*—Readiness of memory depends first of all on nature. Since memory is an organic faculty, it is evident that the more perfect the organ, the more perfect also will be the faculty. Hence in men the degrees of perfection of memory

* That is, by that moment in the past in which the object was perceived, and by the present moment in which it is recalled.

are as various as the organisms themselves, and these degrees vary even in the same individual according to diversity of age and of organic conditions. But man's memory may also be cultivated and helped by art. For, unlike the brute, which remembers only from natural means, and is determined by physical causes, man remembers not merely in consequence of physical causes, but also with the help of artificial means, which he uses at will.

The first of these means is the representation by similitudes of the objects to be retained. The use of these similitudes will be the more efficient in proportion to their more striking character. Thus in order to recall a great grief, it may be fixed in the memory under the image of a sword.—The second means is a methodical classification of the objects which we wish to recall. This means is based on the very nature of the mind, which passes from one remembrance to another in virtue of the numerous relations existing among things. Nothing in the universe is isolated; so also in the mind, all its cognitions are bound together, and form by their connection a sort of network, so that one thread cannot be touched without affecting all the others through their relation more or less direct with the part affected. Thus is explained the extreme ease with which the mind passes from one object to another without the bidding of the will, and even in spite of the will. But, if the association of images often takes place in an involuntary manner, it may also be regulated by reflection and directed by the will. This association is based either on purely accidental relations or on logical relations. The former are chiefly those of *similarity*, *contrast*, and *contiguity in space and time*. It is especially by these that children re-

tain, and hence they have a very superficial memory. The principal logical relations are those of *principle and consequence*, of *cause and effect*, of *means and end*, of *substance and accident*. By these relations the memory brings back within itself the real natural connections of things, it acquires consistency, strength, and unity, and the collection of its recollections is raised to the dignity of science. This, however, is the effect, not of sensitive but of intellectual memory.—The third mnemonic means is attention to the object and an effort to fix it in the mind. This effort impresses things deeply in the memory, and thus enables it to recall them with ease.—The fourth means is continued reflection on the object to be retained. We easily recall what we have well considered. Reflection makes our recollection clear and more distinct; it supplies in advanced years the force and intensity which the newness of the object gives to the recollections of the early years of life.

ART. VI.—THE APPETITIVE FACULTIES.

—SENSITIVE APPETITE.

37. *Sensitive appetite is a tendency to good perceived by the senses.*—The tendency of a being is proportioned to its nature. A sensitive being knows through the senses the sensible objects necessary for preserving its existence. Hence it has a natural tendency to seek sensible goods and be united with them. This tendency is called *sensitive appetite*.

38. *Sensitive appetite is divided into two distinct faculties: Concupiscible appetite and irascible appetite.*—*Concupiscible appetite* is a faculty by which the animal is led to seek what is useful to it, and to shun what is

harmful. *Irascible appetite* is a faculty by which the animal is roused to acquire a good that is difficult to attain, and to remove any evil that would destroy this good or prevent its attainment. By his concupiscible appetite, a dog seeks proper nourishment and avoids what is injurious; by his irascible appetite he is angered and attacks the animal that tries to deprive him of his food.

These are two distinct faculties, for it often happens that they are opposed to each other. Thus anger takes away the need of sleep, as, in turn, the want of rest lessens the heat of anger. At times the closest relations exist between the irascible appetite and the concupiscible; the former may even be regarded as the defender of the latter, since it combats whatever opposes the good sought by the concupiscible appetite, or whatever causes the evil that it shuns. Hence all the movements of the irascible appetite begin from those of the concupiscible, and are referred to the same.

39. *A sensitive being when urged on by its appetite transports its body from one place to another. The faculty by which it does this is called locomotive faculty.*—Descartes and his school denied this faculty. He attributed locomotion in the animal to the perfection of its bodily mechanism,* and in man to the action of the will. But reason and experience prove the existence of this faculty. For when an animal apprehends a useful or a hurtful object, it has need of a power to approach the one and withdraw from the other; and, in fact, we see that this does happen. It is evident

* The opinion that brutes are mere automata is refuted on p. 247. With this falls also the deduction that animals have no power of locomotion.

that this faculty is distinct both from the sensitive appetite and the will, for we often shun the sensible good which the appetite craves, and, again, are often unable to produce the motion which the will desires. Like all the other sensitive faculties, it is organic, that is, it resides in an organ and cannot operate without the organ.

ART. VII.—THE INTELLECTIVE FACULTIES.
—THE INTELLECT.

40. *The proper object of the intellect, the intelligible, is the immaterial, the essence of things.*—As the proper object of the intellect is such because of its relation to the intellect, it is rightly called the *intelligible*. It is the immaterial, the essence of things. For intellect, as the name indicates, is a faculty which penetrates the inner nature of things, that by which they are what they are, viz., their *essences*. It is without reason that certain philosophers have denied the possibility of knowing the essences of things, and by essences have consequently understood whatever is unknown to us in things. The essences of things are known to us, since we define things and specify them; for they can be defined and specified by their essences only. More than this, essence cannot be known merely in part, for it is indivisible; to know only a part of it, is to be ignorant of it.*

41. *The proper object of intellect is the immaterial and universal. Its adequate object is entity, whatever is or can be. Its proportionate object, in its actual condition, is the essence of sensible things.*—Every faculty is specified

* Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Mill, and Hegel have all either denied the objective reality of essence or at least wrongly defined essence.

by its actions and its object. Since the intellect performs operations that exceed the power of matter, since they attain to the immaterial and the spiritual, it must itself as the cause of these operations be spiritual. The adequate object of intellect is that which it can apprehend, if it be considered in its own nature. Now, since the intellect is a spiritual faculty and can have a mode of existence independent of matter, it can know every entity, that is, truth. But if the intellect be viewed as a faculty that requires a previous operation of the sensitive powers in order to act, its proportionate object is the essence of sensible things.

42. *The intellect is an inorganic faculty, and hence needs no organ for its action.*—Since the object of the intellect is the essence of things, and essence is always immaterial, we know the intellect must likewise be immaterial * and independent in its operation of any bodily organ.

43. *Since the intellect is an inorganic faculty, the system of phrenology must be considered absurd.*—Phrenologists, headed by Gall (1758–1828) and Spurzheim (1776–1832), regard all the faculties of the soul, sensitive, intellectual, and moral, as residing in bodily organs. They teach that protuberances exist on the surface of the brain and the skull, that each of these is the organ of one of the soul's faculties, and that in proportion as the protuberances are more or less developed, the faculty is also more or less developed. The number of these faculties varies with each phrenologist. Gall allows twenty-seven; Spurzheim,

* Essence is said to be *immaterial*, not that it is not sometimes joined to matter, but in that it is not necessarily joined to it, and is viewed apart from the individual conditions that determine it in any individual body.

thirty-seven. This theory, if consistent, must end in materialism and fatalism. It is, furthermore, contradicted by experience, which time and again has shown how slight is the relation between this or that protuberance and the corresponding faculty. It is contradicted by science, which proves that there is no constant relation between the protuberances of the skull and the surface of the brain.*

44. *An abstractive power must be allowed in the soul.*—Every being must have in its nature whatever is required for its proper operation. But the proper operation of the human intellect in its present condition has for its first and immediate object the essence of sensible things. Now, since this essence is individualized in the concrete conditions that environ it, it cannot be apprehended by the intellect, which is an inorganic faculty, unless it be stripped of its individuating conditions. Therefore, that the soul may apprehend the essence of sensible things, it must have a faculty capable of ideally separating the essence from its individuating notes. This faculty is called *active intellect* (*intellectus agens*).

45. *The abstraction of the essence from its individual conditions does not entail any error in cognition.*—A cog-

* “The fundamental error of the phrenological school lay in the idea that a science of mind can be founded in any shape or form upon the discoveries of anatomy. Their error lay in the notion that physiology can ever be the basis of psychology; and this is an error and a confusion of thought that survives phrenology.”—DUKE OF ARGYLL, quoted in *American Catholic Quarterly Review*, vol. ii., p. 124.

Yet the influence of body on soul cannot be denied any more than that of soul on body. The most that can be granted is that phrenology may point out certain tendencies in man. These tendencies may be due to heredity or to environment. It fails to appreciate the spirituality of man's soul and his freedom of will.

dition is false when we affirm of an object what does not belong to it, or deny of it what belongs to it. Thus the intellect, viewing the essence in itself abstracted from individual conditions, would err were it to affirm that the essence actually exists in the object separated from these individual conditions. But, since it is restricted to contemplating the essence by itself without any affirmation, and not considering it as *really* apart from its individuating notes, the abstraction which it makes no more implies error than does silence imply deceit.

46. *The abstraction of the essence is possible, whether we consider the abstracted essence in itself, or the condition of the intellect making the abstraction.*—Although the essence cannot exist physically without an individual determination, yet in itself it does not imply a necessary existence in this or that individual; otherwise it could never be found in any other than this individual, and consequently there could be but one individual in each species. But this is evidently false in regard to sensible objects. Therefore there is nothing in the essence to prevent its being abstracted from the individual in which it subsists, that is, its being considered apart. As to the intellect, if in the act of intellection it must be conformed to the object which it cognizes, it is by no means necessary that it be conformed to it as to the mode of cognizing. Thus, if the mode of existence of the essence is concrete in the real order, nothing prevents its being abstracted in the ideal order.

47. *The act of abstraction is prior in nature, but not in time, to that of intellection.*—When two forces concur to the production of one effect, their operation must be simultaneous; for every concurrence, while it does not exclude priority of nature, yet implies simulta-

neity of time. But the abstractive faculty and the faculty that perceives essence concur in the production of the single effect of intellective knowledge of the essence of material things: the first faculty abstracting the essence, and the second perceiving it. Therefore the act of abstraction is only in nature prior to the act of intellection.

48. *The power that abstracts the essence is distinct from that which perceives the essence.*—When two actions are exercised upon a single object in two ways specifically distinct, these two actions must be specifically distinct, and consequently not reducible to the same power; but to abstract the essence and to perceive it are two acts specifically distinct; therefore they demand two distinct powers. Besides, the essences of sensible things are not actually intelligible; but it is only actual being that can effect the passage of an entity from potentiality to act; hence the soul requires besides the faculty by which it comprehends the intelligible, and which is necessarily in potentiality with respect to all intelligibles, a faculty which when in act renders the essences of sensible things actually intelligible, by disengaging them from the material conditions in which they exist. The Schoolmen call this faculty the *active intellect* (*intellectus agens*); the other faculty, the *possible intellect* (*intellectus possibilis*).

49. *For the production of the act of intellection, intelligible species are required, or likenesses of the intelligible object, which inform the cognizing intellect.*—*Intelligible species* (*species intelligibilis*) is a likeness of the intelligible object, which informs the intellect, and by means of which it can cognize the object. It is without ground that modern philosophers have denied the existence of intelligible species. To acquire

knowledge, it is necessary that the object known enter in some way the subject knowing. But it cannot be said that the subject knowing contains already in itself the object known, and in the act of cognition does nothing but contemplate it: for this would identify the subject knowing and the object known. Hence it must be admitted that the object known is communicated to the subject knowing. But it cannot be communicated in its physical substantiality, because it exists outside the subject knowing. Hence it can be communicated to the subject knowing only by means of a representation of itself, and this is called the *intelligible species*. The intelligible species is named by the Scholastic philosophers the *impressed species* (*species impressa*), if it is considered as simply received by the intellect, and as the medium by which the object determines the intellect to the cognitive act. It is called the *expressed species* (*species expressa*), if it is considered as the effect in the intellect of the action of intellect after perceiving the *impressed species*, which action produces complete cognition.

50. *The intelligible species is not that which the intellect knows, but that by which it knows.*—If the intelligible species were the object known, it would necessarily constitute the term of the intellectual act; but since it is a form inhering in the intellect, it must be apprehended by a reflex act; therefore it is only in reflex cognition that it is the object known. In direct cognition it is the means by which the intellect knows.*

* "The main root of difference between adversaries and ourselves [as to the objective validity of ideas in general], is that they will insist contrary to us, in regarding knowledge as primarily not a knowledge of things but of ideas. They imagine that what we first of all know are always subjective affections as such—*signa ex quibus* and

51. *The act of intellection resulting after the impression of the intelligible object on the intellect by means of the impressed species, is always the proper act of intellect itself.*—The intellect is called passive or possible, because it is in itself indifferent to this or that act, and consequently requires some determination to be given to it by the object before it can act. Its act is called immanent because it remains in the acting subject and modifies it. It is easily seen (1) that the intellect is first *passive*, because it is in itself indifferent to knowing this or that object; and (2), because it knows an object only when determined to it by the object, that it is also *active*, because it is the intellect that knows. The intellective act must be elicited by an intrinsic vital principle. But a faculty is active when it elicits its own acts, and (3) that intellection is an immanent act, because it remains in the faculty, which it ennobles and perfects, and does not change or modify the object. It must be noted that the conditions that make the possible intellect passive are not found in the acting intellect. Hence that intellect is exclusively active.

52. *The term of the act of intellection is called the mental word.*—The intellect, after receiving the impressed species, the intelligible species that determines it to action, produces as its term the mental word. This does not really differ from the idea. Yet the word idea expresses the concept of the mind in

signa quibus. . . . The mind perceives through ideas, not in the sense that it looks at ideas first, and then passes on to infer things; but in the sense that the mind, at least under one aspect, begins as a *tabula rasa*, and only in proportion as it stores itself with ideas is it rendered by them cognizant of objects. . . . A world of misconception would be saved if the right view of the office of ideas were acquired."—*First Principles*, Stonyhurst Series, pp. 325, 326.

its relation with the object, while the mental word points out in addition the relation of the concept to the principle whence it proceeds, affirming to itself, as it were, the truth it knows. In its word the intellect perceives the object, just as in a mirror the eye beholds not the mirror, but the object reflected by the mirror. The term of the act of vision, considered as an action, is truly the mirror; but considered as cognition, it is the object. So too the term of the act of intellection considered as the effect of the intellect, is the mental word; but, under the aspect of cognition, it is the object of which the word is as it were the image.

ART. VIII.—CONSCIOUSNESS.

53. *Consciousness is the knowledge which the soul has of its present affections.*—Man not only has sensitive and intellective cognitions, but he also knows that he has them. The faculty by which the soul is cognizant of its sensations, is the common sense, sometimes called sensitive consciousness. But the knowledge which the soul has of its intellective affections and of itself is properly called *consciousness*. And because these affections may be viewed either in themselves or in their moral character of goodness or malice, a distinction must be made between *psychological* consciousness, which perceives the existence of the affections, and *moral* consciousness, which tells whether the acts are good or bad. This latter is generally called *conscience*. It is only with the former that psychology is concerned. The cognition afforded by consciousness, which is of a special kind, should not be confounded with intellective cognition in general. For by intellective cognition the in-

telleet apprehends an essence, or by judgment or reasoning affirms or denies something of an essence ; while consciousness has for its object this very act of apprehension, judgment, or reasoning, that is, the present affections of the thinking subject. Besides, the operation of consciousness depends entirely on the soul's activity. To confound it with cognition in general would therefore be to fall into the error of Fichte, who from the simple act of consciousness drew the creation of all intelligible objects, the *Ego*, the world, and even God.

54. *Consciousness is habitual or direct, actual or reflex.*—*Habitual* consciousness is the disposition of the soul to see its own affections by the mere fact of being present to itself. *Actual* consciousness is the knowledge which the soul here and now has of its affections. The former accompanies all the intellectual acts of the soul, because the soul is always present to itself ; the latter is consciousness now exercised upon its present affections. "*Direct* consciousness," says Balmes, "is the presence of a phenomenon to the mind, whether that phenomenon be a sensation or an idea, an act or an impression, in the intellectual or the moral order." *Reflex* consciousness, which alone is consciousness properly so called, is the act whereby the intellect explicitly adverts to the phenomenon present in it.

55. *Consciousness suffices to make us certain of the existence of the soul, but not to make known its nature.*—Many philosophers, and among them Hume and Kant, have attacked the testimony of consciousness. Others with Reid have admitted the value of consciousness, but have maintained that the existence of the soul cannot be known except by means of an instinctive judgment. Cousin pretended that the

existence of the soul can be perceived in no other way than by reasoning made by the intellect consequent on the testimony of consciousness. But, whatever philosophers may assert, it is evident that, as the soul is present to itself in its operations, it must by consciousness perceive itself operating. Again, consciousness in perceiving the acts of the soul, cannot but perceive them as in the soul; therefore in perceiving these acts it perceives the existing soul itself. Yet though consciousness is competent to perceive the existence of the soul, it is not competent to perceive its essence. For it is one thing to perceive the soul in action, and quite another thing to know that it has this or that nature. This latter knowledge is the result of reasoning, and is proper to the learned, while the former pertains to all men.

56. *Consciousness is not a faculty distinct from intellect.* — Several modern philosophers, with Descartes and Reid, make of consciousness a special and distinct faculty. But it is easy to prove that it is not distinct from the intellect. That two faculties be distinct, their acts or their objects must be not reducible one to the other. But the object of consciousness is reducible to that of intellect, for consciousness being an intellectual faculty can apprehend its object only under the form of its immateriality. In like manner, the act of consciousness is reducible to that of intellect; for consciousness properly so called is nothing else than the intellect knowing its own operations here and now.

ART. IX.—ATTENTION AND REFLECTION.

57. *Attention is an act by which the intellect is concentrated on a single object. Reflection is an act of con-*

centrating the intellect on itself and its own acts.—Several philosophers, following in the footsteps of Wolf (1679–1754), have distinguished between attention and reflection, saying that by the former the mind is fixed on a single object, while by the latter it passes successively from one object to another. But this distinction is false, for it is a necessary condition of every cognitive act that it can perceive but one object at a time, and that it can know several objects only successively. If a distinction be made between other cognitive acts and the acts of intellect, it must be made in accordance with the different modes in which they are accomplished. Hence we must say that *attention* is an act by which the intellect considers one object alone among many; and that *reflection* is an act by which the intellect concentrates its power on itself and its own acts, or reconsiders an object.

ART. X.—THE PRINCIPAL FUNCTIONS OF THE INTELLECT.
—JUDGMENT.

58. *Judgment is an act of the intellect by which it predicates the agreement or disagreement of two ideas; or by which it affirms or denies that something is.*—The intellect may perceive an object without affirming or denying anything of it, or it may proceed to affirm or deny something of that object. In the latter case it is said to *judge*. This act of judgment does not, as is evident, require a distinct faculty. It is an effect of the imperfection of our intellect, which, unlike the understanding of the angels, does not attain its perfection immediately in passing from potentiality to act, but acquires complete cognition only by compounding or dividing different ideas or concepts.

59. *Every judgment is necessarily comparative.* *Th*

instinctive judgments of Reid must be rejected.—Judgment is a complete cognition, since by it the intellect cognizes not only the essence, but also what does or does not belong to the essence. It must, therefore, be performed in the manner required by a complete cognition. But the perfection of intellectual cognition in a judgment requires not only that the attribute be affirmed or denied of the subject, but also that the reason of this affirmation or negation be likewise known. But this reason consists in the agreement or disagreement of the attribute with the subject, and hence they must be compared to find the reason. Therefore every judgment necessarily implies a comparison. The impulse which nature has given to intellect can be nothing else than a tendency to act, but not a tendency to perform an act of perfect and complete cognition like that of judgment.

60. *The comparison instituted preparatory to a judgment is between the idea of the attribute and that of the subject.*—The intellect cannot compare attribute and subject unless it knows them; consequently it must compare the idea of the attribute with that of the subject. Besides judgment is an immanent act which is accomplished in the soul that judges; but the soul cannot judge of things external to itself unless they are in some way present in it; this can happen only through their concepts. Therefore a judgment is formed by a comparison of the concepts of subject and attribute. This, however, does not deprive the judgment of objective validity, because the concepts of the subject and attribute are themselves objective, since they have for their immediate term the subject and attribute as they are in themselves.

ART. XI.—SPECULATIVE INTELLECT AND PRACTICAL INTELLECT.

61. *The speculative intellect is that which contemplates the true without any reference to its practical application. The practical intellect is that which regards the true as the rule of action.*—The human intellect may stop at the mere consideration of the true; but it may also apply the known truth to action, considering it as the directive rule of action. In the former case, it is called *speculative*; in the latter, *practical*.

62. *The speculative intellect and the practical intellect are not two distinct faculties, but only two functions of the same intellect.*—The object of the intellect is the true. But whether truth be speculative or practical, it is still truth, and does not constitute a specifically distinct object of intellect. The whole difference between the act of knowing speculative truth and that of knowing practical truth consists in this, that the consideration of practical truth is as it were an extension of the consideration of speculative truth.

ART XII.—REASON.

63. *Reason is that act of the intellect by which it deduces one truth from another.*—An angel perceives truth at once without any need of reasoning; but man comes to the knowledge of most truths step by step, passing from one truth to another. When the intellect compares the attribute with the subject and, perceiving their agreement or disagreement, predicates the same, it *judges*; when it perceives their agreement or disagreement by means of a third term, and concludes the same, it *reasons*.

64. *Reason is not a faculty distinct from intellect.*—Modern philosophers make reason a distinct faculty; but it is evidently only a function of intellect. For to deduce one truth from another, an act of reflection is sufficient, by which the intellect, considering attentively a cognition, perceives there a greater or less number of truths. But the intellect is an essentially inorganic faculty, and hence suffices to accomplish this act. Thus, in passing from one truth to another, reason is to intellect what motion is to rest; and since it is the same body that is in motion or at rest, so it is one and the same faculty that understands and reasons.

ART. XIII.—INTELLECTIVE MEMORY.

65. *Intellective memory is the power which the intellect has to preserve and reproduce intellective cognitions that have already been acquired.*—When the intellect has perceived its object, it ought to be able to preserve it in memory, and, if need be, reproduce it. This is necessary both for science and for practical life: for science, because no conclusions can be drawn from truths already known unless memory actually reproduces their cognition; for our daily life, because it is guided by the history of the past, and that history memory alone can preserve.

Three conditions are requisite for an act of intellective memory: (1) That the intellect be able to preserve an intellective cognition acquired in the past; (2) That the intellect be able to distinguish the time when the cognition was formed; (3) That the intellect be able to recognize the cognition that is now reproduced as having been acquired in the past. Now, it is evident that the intellect can preserve its intellectual acts, for they are immaterial and inherent

in an immaterial subject, and hence are not subject to corruption; secondly, the intellect, as being an inorganic power can apprehend not merely the intellectual acts, but also the time when they took place; thirdly, the intellect can recognize a particular cognition as had in past time, because, as it preserves a knowledge of its intellectual acts just as they were elicited, that is, in the past, and is endowed moreover with the power of comparison, it can in their reproduction recognize them as elicited in past time.

66. *Intellective memory is not a distinct faculty from the possible intellect.*—A power which by its nature is referred to a general object cannot be diversified by the particular differences of the object. Thus the faculty of sight, which is referred in general to color, is not different from the faculty that perceives green or orange. But the object of the intellect is the intelligible in general or the universal. Consequently, a power like memory which has for its object the intelligible perceived in the past, cannot be different from the intellect itself.

67. *Intellective memory differs essentially from sensitive memory.*—In the first place, sensitive memory reproduces sensitive perceptions; intellective memory reproduces intellectual cognitions. Secondly, sensitive memory reproduces the past as its proper and immediate object; intellective memory reproduces it only so far as, in perceiving the intellectual act, it perceives also the time when the act was elicited.

Several modern philosophers make no distinction between these two kinds of memory.* This is a

* With these may be reckoned Dr. Maudsley and Herbert Spencer. But all conceptualists and nominalists, all, in fact, who fail to divide off accurately the sensible image from the idea, must, if consistent, identify the sensitive memory with the intellectualive.

gross error, as even experience can show, because one man may often recall sensible things with ease, but intelligible objects with difficulty, while the contrary is true of another individual. The same phenomenon is manifest also in the same individual at different periods of his life under different conditions.

68. *The laws of the development and exercise of intellective memory are the same as those of the development and exercise of sensitive memory.*—The sole difference is that sensitive memory resides in an organ, and depends for its perfection on that of the organ; intellective memory is an inorganic faculty, and has only indirect dependence on the state of organism, in so far, namely, as the intellect requires the concurrence of the sensitive faculty to furnish matter for its operation.

ART. XIV.—THE INTELLECTIVE APPETITE, OR WILL.

69. *The will is an intellective appetite, or a tendency toward the good as apprehended by the intellect.*—When the intellect has apprehended the good, the soul seeks to be united with the good. The faculty by which it tends to the good is called the *will*. But whatever is may be apprehended as good; therefore whatever exists, the reprobate excepted, may become the object of the will. And as the will and its act are good, they too may become the object of the will. Thus we can love not only external creatures, but also our own will and the love to which it determines us.

70. *The will differs from the sensitive appetite in its object and its mode of action.*—The sensitive appetite depends on the senses, and has for its object the sensible and material; the will depends on the intellect and has for its object the universal good, and seeks

either material objects under their universal character of good, or immaterial objects. Secondly, the sensitive appetite acts like the will so far as it is the intrinsic principle of its own act, but it cannot propose to itself an end. That an agent may propose to itself an end, it is necessary that it be able to return upon itself and consider itself in relation to its end. Now the sensitive appetite depends on material organs, which are incapable of reflection ; but the intellect, as being intrinsically independent of organs, and, therefore, capable of complete return upon itself, can both present the good to the will, and cause it to consider the good as its end and perfection. Lastly, the sensitive appetite is incapable of choice and is necessarily determined to its act ; but the will can choose its own means to attain its end.

ART. XV.—FREEDOM.*

71. *Freedom is divided into freedom from coaction, freedom from necessity, and freedom from law. Freedom from necessity is divided into freedom of contradiction, freedom of contrariety, and freedom of specification.*—Freedom from *coaction* excludes all external constraint ; thus a prisoner in his cell is without this freedom, which is possessed by the beasts of the forest. Freedom from *necessity* excludes all internal constraint ; of this the insane man and the beast are destitute. Freedom from *law* excludes all dependence on a law

* “ *Freedom* is used where emphasis is laid upon large opportunity given for the exercise of one’s powers ; or where the previous or possible restriction has been or is legal or moral. . . . *Liberty* has more in mind protection from external constraint or from the aggressions of power ; hence, in civil affairs, *liberty* is *freedom* as outlined and protected by law.”—*Century Dictionary*.

imposed by a superior; God alone enjoys this freedom. Man naturally possesses freedom from coercion; but to constitute *free choice*, by which the will chooses the means to attain its end, freedom from necessity suffices. This is called freedom of *contradiction*, when one is free either to will something or not will it. It is called freedom of *contrariety*, when one is free to will either good, or evil under the appearance of good. It is called freedom of *specification*, when one is free to will this, that, or some other object or act. It is to be remarked that freedom of contrariety, far from being necessary to constitute free will, is rather an imperfection; and just as it is a defect in the reason to draw false conclusions from principles, so it is an imperfection in the free will not to choose the means proper to attain the end.

72. *Free choice belongs essentially to the will of man; it is the power of the will to choose the means by directing them to the end.*—The will is necessarily determined by its nature to universal good, and when the intellect points out to it this good, it cannot but love and seek it. But the same is not true of particular goods: the will may or may not seek any one of them as a means to attain its end, which is universal good; it is free to choose between them.* Some philosophers, with Locke, make this freedom consist in the physical power of the will to execute what it desires; but this is an accident of freedom which may be wanting, while freedom of the will properly so called still exists; as is the case with the paralytic who is unable to move his arm. Other philosophers, following Ockham, have maintained that the will may or may not

* Consult the valuable article by J. Gardair, *Le Libre Arbitre*, *Annales de la Philosophie Chrétienne*, April and June, 1889.

desire a thing without any necessity of its being apprehended as good. But this is tantamount to saying that the will is free because it is free. Moreover, such a doctrine contradicts the true nature of the will, which is a blind faculty, and cannot desire any object unless the intellect points it out as good. Others, again, assert that the apprehension of good, which is the motive of an act of the will, is a mere condition; that, given this condition, the will may still elicit an act or not, may desire one thing rather than another. According to these philosophers, freedom is the property of the will to act or not act, or to act in one way rather than in another, when the necessary conditions for acting are present. This view is correct.

To apprehend the nature of the will, one must keep well in mind that it is a blind faculty and can never act until the good, which is its object, has been shown to it by the intellect. But since the will is directed towards this or that particular good by the intellect, it follows that the free exercise of the will requires as a necessary condition a previous act of intellect. Now, reason and experience prove that the intellect is really indifferent to knowing this or that particular good, since every thing that is good for the will is also true for the intellect. When, therefore, the intellect has pronounced this or that to be a particular good, the will is free to choose whichever particular good pleases it. Hence freedom may not, as some affirm, be defined as the *free judgment of reason*; for it is a property, not of reason, but of the will; and the judgment of the intellect regarding a particular good imposes no necessity on the will of choosing that particular good rather than another.

73. *The existence of this freedom is proved from the very nature of the will, from the testimony both of con-*

sciousness and of conscience, from the common sense of mankind, and from the absurd consequences of its denial.

—1. The will has for its proper object the absolute good, and as to this good it is not free; thus man cannot but will to be happy. But as to the particular goods which are the means of attaining the absolute good, the will is necessarily free; because if the absolute good, as completely satisfying the tendencies of the will, inevitably determines it, particular goods, as lacking some perfections, may under this aspect be viewed as evil, and so be rejected by the will. Thus, while we necessarily will to be happy, we may yet, according to our liking, choose virtue or riches as a means to attain happiness. 2. Consciousness attests the existence of freedom. For we clearly distinguish in ourselves indeliberate movements from those that depend for their existence on our will and reason. In a multitude of cases we not only recognize a principle of activity which we can determine at will, but we also exercise it at pleasure; it is thus, for example, that I move my arm or my hand for the mere pleasure experienced in exercising my freedom. The reality of free will and its constant exercise are so evident, that we may say with Fénélon that no man in his senses can practically doubt it. 3. We have the irresistible conviction of being the responsible cause of certain actions which we regard as our own, and which we esteem worthy of praise or blame. Before performing these actions we examine whether we can do them; and we experience remorse if they are criminal. On the other hand, conscience reproaches us for moral evil, but never for physical evil. 4. The freedom of the will is a truth universally admitted by men, as is attested by all languages, by the civil and religious institutions of all peoples, and the

means employed in every age to instruct and educate man. 5. Finally, if the freedom of the will be denied, it must be admitted as a consequence that there is neither good nor evil, that remorse is a mere fiction, that laws are useless and absurd, that deliberation is nonsensical, and that God is the cause of all existing evil.

74. *It is absurd to urge against free will, as do fatalists, the action of God upon man, His foreknowledge of events, His goodness and power, and the influence of motives and temperament.*—In ancient times fatalism formed the basis of every religion and every philosophical system. It was continued in some of the heretical doctrines of the first ages of the Church, and Mahometism inoculated it into the manners of the Oriental peoples. In modern times it has been renewed as a doctrine by Protestantism, and later by Jansenism; it is an immediate consequence of the two chief errors that in our day divide non-Catholic philosophy, namely, materialism and pantheism.

The objection drawn from the action of God upon the will of man has no weight; for although God, as the first cause of all motion, moves man's will also, yet the will, as second cause, is a real cause of its own actions. Moreover, the action of God upon the will is so far from destroying its liberty that it rather protects it; for He always intervenes in the actions of all creatures in a manner conformable to their nature. Therefore He does not prevent their action, but preserves it to them together with its proper characteristics, that is, freedom in man's action. If the particular action of grace be cited, it is evident that, as grace is simply a help, it does not destroy our liberty; on the contrary, it perfects it, since it is an aid to avoid moral evil, which is an abuse of our liberty.

When grace proposes to the will the means it should choose to attain its end with certainty, it does for the freedom of the will what the skilled teacher does for the reason of his pupils when he enables them to draw true conclusions from given principles. To those who put forth the divine foreknowledge as an objection, the reply is that God is infallible, and hence the particular free act which He has foreseen will happen infallibly, not necessarily. To God the future is present, and His foreknowledge influences our acts no more than our vision changes the nature of the objects which we see. Nay, this foreknowledge rather confirms our liberty than destroys it, for if God foresees that such an act will be done freely, and His foreknowledge is infallible, the act will be done not otherwise than freely.

Some philosophers have pretended to see a contradiction between God's goodness and the existence of evil which results from free will; but it is evident that a world in which free creatures are subjected to trial, and personally merit happiness, cannot be opposed to the divine goodness. Besides, although God has permitted the evil, He has not willed it; He has set fixed limits to it, and in His wisdom He knows how to draw greater good from it.—The objection that the power of God in its government of the world would be restricted by the liberty of man, is refuted by answering that God, like a wise king, knows how to attain His ends by leaving to each man his liberty. He reserves to Himself certain extraordinary events to show forth His power; but He ordinarily conceals His action under the general laws by which He directs all things, and He makes the very exercise of liberty by intelligent creatures concur in the accomplishment of His will.

The philosopher Collins (1676–1729) pretended that motives necessitate the will, just as the weights placed in the scales of a balance bear down the side in which the heavier weight has been placed. Undoubtedly the will does not act without some motive proposed by the intellect, but the motive imposes no necessity on the will, as has been shown.—The influence exerted on the will by climate, temperature, the conformation of the brain, and other similar causes, cannot be contested, but it can be easily explained by the union of soul and body; besides, the will has power to resist their influence, and often acts contrary to it.

ART. XVI.—RELATIONS OF THE WILL TO THE OTHER FACULTIES OF THE SOUL.

75. *The will has a certain dominion over all the other faculties of the soul.*—The will has the universal good of the person for its object, while the other faculties have each its own particular good for theirs. Thus the good of the imagination is restricted to sensible images by which it is perfected; that of the intellect, to the true, which is its life and nutriment; the will has, on the contrary, for its object whatever is good for the whole being, for all the faculties, and hence it can wish the particular good of each faculty as contained in the universal good. Therefore, that the will may be enabled to seek the particular good proper to each faculty, it must exercise a certain control over that faculty, and consequently over all the faculties. This control is attested by experience. It is exerted, (1) over the external senses in either furnishing them with their object, or directing them to it; (2) over the internal senses in rousing them to action, and in taking complacency in their action; (3)

over the sensitive appetite, which, although it inclines the will to this or that action, may in its turn be ruled and repressed by the will; (4) over the motive faculty, which executes the motion ordered by the will.—If the intellect moves the will when it presents to it the good as its object, it is in turn moved by the will, inasmuch as the true, the object of the intellect, is a good, and the will excites the intellect to seek this good. Thus the intellect exerts on the will a determination of *specification* when it presents the object to it, and the will has over the intellect a dominion of *exercise* by applying it to its action.

76. *Considered absolutely, the intellect is more noble than the will; but relatively, the act of the will may be more noble than that of the intellect.*—1. The nobility of a faculty is in proportion to that of its object; but the object of intellect is the true. Now, the true is good, and the good is our end, and our end is happiness. Therefore, as the truth must be perceived before the will can tend to it as a good, so the perception of the supreme truth is the attainment of supreme happiness; and consequently that faculty by which we attain this is the noblest of all. But this faculty is the intellect. 2. It is more noble also, if considered as to the mode in which the two faculties are moved. For the intellect, it is true, is moved by the will to exercise; but it, on the other hand, determines the will as to its specification, it enlightens and directs it, so that the will depends for its act upon the intellect. 3. The intellect is more noble, because it brings its object in some way to itself and keeps it there, whereas the will tends outward toward its object, and moves the whole man to it. Still, as some things have a nobler mode of being in them-

selves than in our intellect, it is better to will them than to know them; thus in this life it is better to love God than merely to know Him.* Will is more noble than intellect also in that it has dominion over the other faculties, and moves them to act.

ART. XVII.—HABIT.

77. *Habit is a permanent quality inherent in the intellectual powers and inclining them to act well or ill.*—Habit is a kind of supplement added to a faculty, enabling it to accomplish acts of the same kind with ease. It must be permanent in the faculty, otherwise it would not incline it constantly to produce the same kind of acts. It can be found in the intellectual faculties only, for beings that by their nature are necessarily determined to their operation cannot modify or change it; therefore only such beings and faculties as are masters of their own acts are susceptible of habit. Still, as in man the sensitive nature is subject to the intellectual, and he can impress on the sensitive faculties a certain constant mode of acting; so, in virtue of his dominion over animals, he can by training form habits in them which may eventually become hereditary instincts. Lastly, habit has the effect of inclining the faculty to act well or ill according as it imparts a good or a bad quality. Thus virtue perfects the will, while vice degrades it.

78. *Every habit, whether good or bad, produces ease, constancy, and pleasure in acting.*—Constancy in producing the same kind of acts results from the fact that habit is a permanent quality. Yet it must be observed that this constancy never develops into

* See page 251.

necessity, because habit is but a quality superadded to the faculty, and hence has less extension than the faculty itself. Therefore the faculty can always perform an act to which the habit does not concur, and consequently can even act contrary to the habit. Facility and promptitude result from the fact that the habit inclines the power to action. Lastly, the pleasure experienced by the agent is owing to the fact that habit is a second nature, and the conformity of the action with the nature of the agent is the very cause of his pleasure.

79. *Habits are natural, infused, or acquired.*—A *natural* habit is one bestowed in the natural order by the Author of nature. Thus the disposition of the intellect to know first principles is a natural habit. This is sometimes called the “habit of first principles.” Others admit no natural habit, but call it *disposition*. An *infused* habit is one given by God in the supernatural order; thus “faith, hope, and charity” are supernatural and infused habits. An *acquired* habit is one formed by man’s activity; thus “science” is an acquired habit. The difference between these three kinds of habits is, that natural habits are simple dispositions; but, far from determining the faculty to the act, they must themselves be determined by some external principle. The other habits, on the contrary, of themselves dispose the faculty to act easily and promptly.

80. *Acquired habits are formed by repeated acts of the same kind; they are weakened and lost by the cessation of the acts that have formed the habit or by eliciting contrary acts.*—Experience affords sufficient proof that acquired habits are formed only by a repetition of the same acts. The destruction or weakening of habit is the result of a long cessation of the acts that

formed it, and of a repetition of acts proper to form a contrary habit. It may also be a consequence of obstacles to a natural disposition ; but, in the case of the intellective faculties, it is to be noted that the obstacle to their disposition must be indirect. Thus insanity puts a stop to the habit of knowledge, by affecting not the intellect, but the sensitive faculties, which supply the intellect with matter for its operations.

APPENDIX.

SLEEP AND INSANITY.

81. *Sleep is a repose of the senses intended for the health of animals.*—Sleep is a cessation of action in the senses ; but the mere inaction of one or several of the senses is not sleep, for this may be the effect of disease. Sleep is produced when the sensitive faculty called the *common sense* is impeded in its operation. Since the common sense (*sensus communis*) depends on the activity of the external senses for its object, when they are no longer active it too is at rest. Sleep is necessary for animals, because the sensitive faculties, being limited by their nature, cannot continue always active, but require rest at stated intervals.

82. *The cause of sleep is the exhaustion and fatigue of the sensitive nature by which communication through the nervous system is interrupted.*—After excessive or prolonged labor, and above all during the process of digestion, the senses must rest, that all the vital energy may be given to the digestive and recuperative action then going on ; from this results the repose of the senses, or sleep. First the sense of sight ceases to act, then that of taste, of smell, of hearing, and last of all, the sense of touch. The senses also awake successively, but in a reverse order.

83. *Somnambulism is an imperfect sleep in which all communication between the common sense and the exter-*

nal senses, is not interrupted. It happens in those persons in whom there is a superabundance of vital spirits.—In this state, in consequence of an abnormal condition of the system, if the individual has an abundance of vital spirits, the images produced in his imagination can act as in a waking state. But as he is in a state of sleep, he is not conscious of his acts, and though he may recall the images that troubled him, he will forget the consequent motions, because they have left no trace in him.

84. *Dreams and deliria have three causes : the activity of the imagination, the state of the body, and physical impressions received from without.*—Dreams and deliria are produced in the imagination, and hence the matter of dreams and deliria has always previously been in some way present to the external senses.

Dreams “are in some respects akin to states of *reverie* which occur during waking life. In dreaming the imagination assumes the part played in waking life by the external senses. During sleep the activity of these latter falls into abeyance ; volitional control over the course of thought ceases ; the power of reflexion and comparison is suspended ; and the fancy of the dreamer moves along automatically under the guidance of association.” The chief characteristics of the dream are “(a) its seeming reality, (b) its incoherence and extravagance, (c) its possession of a certain coherence amid this inconsistency, and (d) the exaggeration of actual impressions.”*

* “(a) The apparent reality of the dream is, in great part, a consequence of the cessation of the action of the external senses. In sleep the images of the fancy which may arise within us are not subject to the correction which the presentations of the senses are ever furnishing during waking life. . . . (b) The inconsistency of the dream seems to be due to its course being left entirely to the guid-

85. *Insanity and its different degrees, as hallucination, monomania, etc., are nothing but a derangement of the organ of imagination, in consequence of which it sees images that correspond to no reality.*—Insanity is a sort of waking dream. Its cause is to be sought either in the disorder of the brain functions, due to poisonous materials present in the blood, or in some organic disease of the brain.

86. *Insanity affects the intellect indirectly through the imagination.*—Insanity injures only the sensitive faculties; yet, as these faculties supply the intellect with matter for its operations, insanity reaches the intellect indirectly. But just as the sight is not injured when we look through a colored glass, although it is deceived as to the color of the objects, so in cognizing and in reasoning from a false image, the intellect, although deceived, suffers no injury in itself.

ance of the fortuitous associations modified by the interference of accidental sensations at the moment. The absence of control over our thoughts disables us from reflecting upon the ideas which arise spontaneously, and prevents us from comparing them with past experience or with each other. . . . (c) The coherence of the dream, in so far as it occasionally exists, probably results in part from an orderly succession of previously associated ideas, in part from a faint power of selection exerted by a dominant tone of consciousness at the time, which may be able to reject striking eccentricities.—(d) The exaggeration of occasional real impressions is accounted for by the fact that while the great majority of external sensations are excluded, those which do find entrance are thereby in a peculiarly favorable position. They are in novel isolation from their surroundings; their nature is vaguely apprehended; and they cannot be confronted with other experiences. . . . Another striking feature of dreams is the extraordinary rapidity with which trains of thought sometimes pass through the mind.”—(*Psychology*, Stonyhurst Series, pp. 176–179.)

CHAPTER II.

THE HUMAN SOUL CONSIDERED IN ITSELF.

ART. I.—ORIGIN OF THE HUMAN SOUL.

87. *The human soul comes immediately from God by creation.*—A produced substance is either drawn from nothing by *creation*, as in the case of the first man and of all substances at the beginning of the world ; or it comes from another substance by *substantial change*, as in non-living beings, when, for instance, wood is converted into ashes, then into clay ; or it comes from a like substance by *generation*, as in living beings, such as the plant, which comes from a like plant. Some both of the old and of the more recent philosophers, to explain more easily the transmission of original sin, taught that the human soul is produced by generation. But this by no means explains the transmission of original guilt, for, if this opinion were admitted, we would have to conclude that every man inherited likewise by transmission the sins of all his ancestors. Again, this opinion is evidently false ; for the soul being independent of matter, cannot come from the body, which is material. Nor can it come from another soul, because the soul is indivisible and therefore incapable of communicating a part of itself. It is evident, therefore, that the soul of each man comes from God immediately by creation.

ART. II.—SPIRITUALITY OF THE HUMAN SOUL.

88. *The soul of man is not only simple and indivisible, like that of plants and brutes, but it is also spiritual ; that is, it is in itself independent of matter and can subsist apart from the body.*—The spirituality of the soul, that is, its intrinsic independence of matter and its power of subsisting apart from the body, is demonstrated by its specific operations, which are intellection and volition. The operation of a being is according to the nature of the being itself. Now, a faculty that depends on a material organ for its exercise, can attain to that only which impresses this organ, and is, therefore, concrete and material. But intellect and will may attain to the abstract and immaterial ; therefore the soul itself must also be independent of matter. Another argument is furnished by experience. For the organs of the sensitive faculties are impaired by impressions that are too lively or too prolonged, and their alteration involves that of the corresponding faculties ; but the intellect and the will become more perfect as the truth is better known and the good more loved. In the second place, the very nature of intellectual acts proves their independence of all material organs. For our ideas and their corresponding appetitions are universal, and independent of time and place ; and the intellect and the will have a sort of infinity in virtue of which they are always capable of knowing and loving yet more ; but if the intellectual faculties were exercised in concurrence with organs, they would be limited and determined in their power

and their acts by the organs themselves, which by their nature are always limited.*

* According to the tenets of evolutionism, the spirituality of the human soul is an impossibility. "The real initiators of this system were Lamarck (1744-1829), who was the most profound, Goethe the boldest, and Darwin the most ingenious and popular." They teach that in the beginning there were but one or two types, "possessed of marvellous creative energies," and tending to develop into a higher state. In his *Philosophie Zoologique*, which appeared in 1809, just fifty years before Darwin's *Origin of Species*, Lamarck adopts three conditions as factors of evolution,—*adaptation*, *heredity*, and *time*. Darwin accepts the same principles, but gives them a more scientific form. Observing the variations attested in the history of cultivated plants and domestic animals, he compiled his *laws of adaptation*, correlation, growth, divergence of characteristics, etc. As a second element he places the *struggle for life*, which is most violent among the species most closely related, whereas the most opposite varieties have the best chance to live and tend to depart more and more from the common type. Holding that the vegetable and the animal kingdom increase in geometrical progression, while their means of subsistence increase in arithmetical progression, he concludes that only the best and strongest individuals survive and are perpetuated by *natural selection*, the marvellous results of which are preserved to future generations by *heredity*. Lastly, *time* is an essential condition.

But this theory is metaphysically impossible. For, says St. Thomas (*Sum. Th. i., q. 118, a. 2 ad 2*), "No substantial form receives either more or less, but the superaddition of a greater perfection constitutes another species, just as the addition of unity makes another species in number. But it is impossible that a form numerically one and the same should belong to diverse species." It is also contradictory in its process. External circumstances, says Lamarck, produce wants, wants create desires, desires generate corresponding faculties: and these in turn develop a suitable organism. Now, in the words of Cardinal Zigliara (*Psychologia*, 10, iv.), "That circumstances may produce wants, desires, etc., they must affect a subject capable in itself of such wants and desires, that is, a subject which either experiences all these things or is in potentiality to experience them; therefore our adversaries tacitly but necessarily suppose a vital subject in all these circumstances."

Although a general view of the earth's history seems to favor

89. *Materialism is refuted as absurd in its methods, its principles, and its consequences.*—The spirituality of the soul is an evident truth universally recognized. Many philosophers have, indeed, attempted to defend the cause of materialism, but it is only to the practical consequences that flow from it they have gained disciples. Leucippus, Democritus, Epicurus, and Lucretius were the principal supporters of materialism in ancient times. Bacon, Locke, and Condillac have favored it by their doctrines, and it has been professed with all its consequences by several philosophers, as Hobbes (1588–1679), d' Holbach (1723–1789),

Darwinism, yet an analytical and searching study of each epoch tends to remove this impression. Thus, in geology, the more perfect forms of animal organism, as the trilobite, are found among the primitive fauna, and are preceded by no transitional forms; among the secondary fauna appear the cephalopods. Again, the physiologist asks, Why is it that species of diverse structure exist in the same surroundings? "How could a fish sustain the struggle for life, or even live, during the slow and gradual transformation of branchial respiration into pulmonary, since at that time and for long generations it was neither aquatic, nor terrestrial, nor amphibious?" Again, the supporters of evolutionism "have practically ignored the formal and efficient causes by which, according to a different order of causality, each nature is essentially constituted, and have based their theories exclusively on the material cause." They seem "wedded to the strange hypothesis that the organism constitutes the Form (the species), rather than that the Form constitutes the organism. . . . They do not account for *life*. They begin with organism; but organism connotes life. . . . If matter evolves itself spontaneously into life without the aid of formal or efficient cause, why have not the metamorphic rocks through all these eons of time shaken off the incubus of their primitive passivity, and wakened up into protoplasm, and thus secured to themselves the privilege of self-motion, internal growth, reproduction?"—*Metaphysics of the School*, vol. ii., p. 747.

See also *Apologie Scientifique de la Foi Chrétienne*, by Canon F. Duilhé de Saint-Projet, pp. 264–308.

Helvetius (1715-1771), Lamettrie (1709-1751); by several physiologists, as Bichat (1771-1802), Cabanis (1757-1808), Broussais (1772-1838); and in our own day materialism finds many adepts in the schools of philosophy and medicine.

This error, already refuted indirectly by the arguments that prove the simplicity of the brute soul, and especially by the argument that demonstrates the spirituality of the human soul, is also refuted directly by showing the falsity of its method and its principles. For materialists pretend that experience alone is sufficient to build up the structure of science, and that nothing should be admitted that does not rest on observation. But, on the one hand, experience, as has been seen in Methodology,* is insufficient to constitute science; on the other hand, materialists contradict themselves when they assert *a priori* that man has only sensations. They know very well that if they observed the human soul faithfully, they would find acts that are by no means reducible to sensations.

The absurdity of materialism is further revealed by the falsity of its principles. They may be reduced to three: (1) That it is possible for matter to think; (2) that the development of thought corresponds to that of the organs; (3) that there is an analogy between the organism and the acts of man, and the organism and acts of the brute. The capability of matter to think, although admitted by Locke, cannot be sustained, because contrary properties cannot exist in the same subject. Thought, in its indivisible unity, embraces the whole object; but if thought were a property of matter, it would follow that the material thinking subject, because extended and composed of

* See page 66.

many parts, would with each part think either a portion of the object or the whole object. In the former case, there would no longer be any unity in the thought; in the latter case, there would be as many whole thoughts as there are parts in the matter, which is absurd. It is of no avail to urge with Locke that it is possible for God to endow matter with the faculty of thinking, although this faculty is distinct from the properties of matter; for, if God were to give matter the power of thinking without making this a property of matter, this faculty would then necessarily exist in an intelligent substance that is distinct from matter and independent of it.

The refutation of Locke's hypothesis avails also against the theory of those physiologists who pretend that all the intellective acts of man are nothing but a secretion of the brain. In support of this absurdity they appeal to the evidence of experience, which, it is true, attests how much the state and development of the organism affect also the development of the intellect. But they are greatly in error; for (1) Many facts prove that there is not a constant dependence between the state of the organism and that of the intellect; (2) Even if this dependence were admitted, we cannot conclude the identity of the organism and the intellect any more than we can infer an identity of the musician with the instrument on which he depends for his art; (3) The influence of the organism on the intellect is easily explained by the union of the soul and body, and by the need which the intellect has of sensible images for the matter of its operations.

The analogy between man and brute cannot furnish an argument to the materialist who denies even the simplicity of the soul, since, as has been shown, the

soul of the animal is also simple and indivisible. Besides, this analogy does not really exist. Physiologists agree in recognizing in the organism of man specific characters proper to him alone, and experience proves that the brute has not freedom, and if at times it acts in a marvellous way, it is still incapable of progress and of invention, which are properties of man's intellect.

Lastly, materialism is again refuted by its consequences ; for, if there be nothing but matter, there is no longer any God, any liberty, any moral law, any eternal life ; there remain only the fatal laws of matter. But such consequences are rejected by the good sense and moral conscience of all men, for in all times they have had a horror of materialism in its doctrines and its consequences.

ART. III.—IMMORTALITY OF THE HUMAN SOUL.

90. *The spirituality of the human soul implies also its immortality.*—1. The spirituality of the human soul requires that it subsist in itself independent of the body ; hence the dissolution of the body does not entail that of the soul, which is therefore extrinsically (*per accidens*) incorruptible. It is true that in this life the soul stands in need of the sensitive faculties, for they supply it with matter for its operations ; but when once the bond which unites it to the body has been broken, it possesses the existence proper to *separate forms* and operates with the intellect alone. 2. Nor is the soul of man intrinsically corruptible, for not being composed of parts, it is simple and contains in itself no germ of dissolution. It is idle to object to the incorruptibility of the soul the fact that God who has made it from nothing can also annih-

late it. This is merely an *absolute* possibility, which will never be reduced to act. God does not contradict Himself, and, as creator of all things, He does not deprive them of what their nature demands. It was possible for Him not to have created the soul; but having created it with an immortal and incorruptible nature, He cannot consistently with His infinite perfection annihilate it, and, so to say, by an act of His power destroy the work of His wisdom.

91. *The immortality of the soul is also proved* : (1) *By its inborn desire of happiness* ; (2) *by its desire of perpetuating its memory* ; (3) *by the idea which we have of vice and virtue* ; (4) *by the unanimous consent of all nations*.—The end of man is happiness, and happiness without limit ; hence his desire of happiness is inborn and necessary. Since this desire is natural to man, it has been given him by the Author of nature. But man cannot find here below the happiness that he desires ; we must therefore conclude that he will find this happiness in an immortal life, unless we wish to say that God deceives man, that He proposes to him an end impossible to attain, and that while all other creatures reach their end, man cannot arrive at his. Secondly, all men, not excepting those that reject the doctrine of immortality, wish to perpetuate their memory. But this desire would be inexplicable without a consciousness of our immortality ; for who would desire to live in the memory of others if he will himself be a mere nothing ? Thirdly, we are all persuaded that virtue merits a reward, and vice a punishment. But, in this life, the just man is often persecuted, while the wicked man triumphs ; there must, therefore, be another life where the moral order is reëstablished. Undoubtedly, peace of conscience is even now a reward of virtue, and remorse a

punishment of vice; but, besides the fact that the virtuous man is often troubled in soul, and the wicked man succeeds in stifling all remorse, it is certain that this peace and this remorse have no other foundation than faith in the immortality of the soul. Lastly, the unanimous belief of the human race at all times in the immortality of the soul confirms all the proofs that have been given. The traditions of all nations, and in particular the honor paid to their dead, manifest this belief, which, besides, has been held not only by the vulgar, but even by the greatest geniuses of mankind.*

92. *The two principal errors regarding the immortality of the soul are palingenesis and metempsychosis.*—Pantheistic philosophers, whether of ancient or modern times, regard the soul as a part of God's substance, and hold that it is immortal, because, on the dissolution of the body, it loses its personality and identifies its life with that of God. This error is called *palingenesis*. Other pantheistic philosophers, considering the soul as too imperfect to be identified immediately with God, have not hesitated to declare that after this life it passes through a series of transformations and probations, migrating from one body to another until it is sufficiently perfect to be identified with God.

* Still it must be granted that not all Catholics admit that the arguments of pure reason adduced to prove the soul's immortality are conclusive. They say that for this effect you must first establish the evidence of faith, which teaches that the soul is truly immortal; the other arguments they regard as merely confirmatory of the teaching of faith. With these men may be named the illustrious Alfonso Muzzarelli, the friend of Pius VII., and F. Casto Ansaldi, the eminent Dominican. Even Cajetan and Suarez will not pronounce the demonstration of St. Thomas to be rigorously conclusive.—See *Immortality of the Soul*, by Monsignor Corcoran, *American Catholic Quarterly Review*, vol. ii., p. 347.

This is the error of *metempsychosis*, taught of old by Pythagoras and in our own days by J. Reynaud.

93. *The absurdity of palingenesis appears from the two principles on which it is based, viz., that the human soul is part of the divine substance, and that to obtain immortality it must lose its personality.*—It is absurd to affirm that the substance of God and the substance of man are identical, because, in that case, the divine attributes also should pertain to man, thus identifying the absolute and necessary with the contingent. On the other hand, man is a person, and the immortality of his soul springs from his personality; otherwise we would accept the doctrine of palingenesis. If his personality is destroyed, his immortality is also destroyed.

94. *The doctrine of metempsychosis ignores the substantial union of soul and body; it renders expiation impossible; it cannot harmonize with the true idea of immortality.*—In the hypothesis of metempsychosis the soul is united to the body for the sole purpose of expiating the faults of a previous existence; therefore its union with the body is contrary to its nature. But this is refuted both by reason and experience. Again, this hypothesis pretends to explain the miseries of this life by representing the soul as united to the body solely to expiate the faults of a previous life. But to make atonement one must be conscious of the evil for which he is atoning; now it is evident that no one remembers having sinned in a previous life; under these conditions, therefore, no expiation is possible. Lastly, as this series of atonements must have an end, the soul will either survive or not survive its last body. In the latter case, it has no immortality; in the former, we ask why it could not have made atonement in its first body.

CHAPTER III.

THE HUMAN SOUL IN RELATION TO ITS BODY.

ART. I.—UNION OF SOUL AND BODY.

95. *Since the intellective soul is the substantial form of the body, it constitutes with it a substantial and personal union, so that from this union there results a single substance and person. Hence, as the soul without the body is not perfect in its operations, so the body without the soul has no subsistence of its own.*—In living composites the soul is the substantial form of the body; that is, the soul is so united to the body that through it the body receives and possesses subsistence and life, and that from the union of these two principles there results a single substance. So it is with man. From the union of his body and soul, from their intimate compenetration, there results a third substance which is neither body alone, nor soul alone, nor a simple contact or mixture of the two, as in a mixture of silver and gold. Still the soul in this union does not lose its own essence: although united to the body in unity of substance, it nevertheless remains distinct from the body; and since it performs certain acts independently of the body, it follows that it preserves its spiritual nature intact. The union of soul and body does not, then, mean a confusion of the two, but requires only that they complete each other. And as the single substance that results from the union of

soul and body constitutes an individual of a rational nature, we must conclude that the union constitutes not only a substantial unity, but also a personal unity. The person is, therefore, not the body alone, not the soul alone, but the soul united to the body, as is further witnessed by language, which permits us to say : *I hear, I understand, I desire, I run.*

96. *There are four striking errors regarding the union of soul and body : 1. The system of occasional causes ; 2. That of preëstablished harmony ; 3. That of plastic medium ; 4. That of physical influence.*—Several philosophers, and among them Plato of the ancient school, and Descartes of the modern, have denied the substantial unity of body and soul, and the reciprocal and immediate action of the soul on the body, and of the body on the soul. But as evidence shows the intimate relations existing between the soul and body, they have attempted to explain these relations. Now if, instead of regarding the soul and body as one clock, the hands and wheels of which are parts of one and the same mechanism, we regard them as two distinct clocks that go in accord, we may form four hypotheses analogous to those that would be formed for the two clocks. For either the clockmaker is always present to keep up the accord between these two clocks ; or he may wind them up once for all, so that thenceforth there is perfect agreement between them ; or this may be maintained by the aid of an intermediate mechanism ; or, lastly, it may be the result of a physical influence exerted by one clock over the other in virtue of some secret power. Thus four systems have tried to explain the relations between the soul and body : the system of *occasionalism*, of *preëstablished harmony*, of *plastic medium*, and of *physical influence*.

97. *It is false to hold with Malebranche that soul and body form two distinct substances ; that God takes occasion from the motions of the body to produce corresponding acts in the soul, and takes occasion from the acts of the soul to produce corresponding motions in the body. This system leads to pantheism, fatalism, idealism, and scepticism.*—The system of occasionalism, advocated by Malebranche, is a consequence of his false principle, that God alone is a true cause and that creatures of themselves produce no effect. It results also from the false notion which, after Descartes, he had formed of the human soul and body ; for he regarded them as two distinct substances forming only an accidental union. To hold with Malebranche that God alone establishes relations between soul and body, is to assign Him a ridiculous office, opposed equally to His holiness and His wisdom. For if God alone acts, we are destitute of all entity ; this is downright pantheism. Now, if man be not the principle of his actions, we must admit that his acts are not free, and this is fatalism. Lastly, if all our thoughts are but the play of God upon our intelligence, if they have no direct relation with external reality, the material world and our bodies are for us as though they did not exist, and this is idealism. And since in invincibly believing ourselves to be the principle of our acts we are in a constant illusion, we can no longer be certain of anything ; this is scepticism.

98. *We cannot admit with Leibnitz that God, at the moment of their union, secures the constant relations existing between body and soul, in virtue of a præestablished harmony.*—This system involves nearly the same consequences as occasionalism. Leibnitz has not denied to second causes an activity of their own, but, like Malebranche, he has failed to recognize a

true reciprocity of action between body and soul. According to him, before God united the soul to the body, He so constituted them that the motions of the body would be constantly in harmony with the actions of the soul. This system ascribes to God a less ridiculous office ; for it does not destroy all action on the part of the creature. But as it asserts that all acts, whether of soul or body, are invariably predetermined by an inevitable law, it is manifest that it leads directly to fatalism, idealism, and scepticism.

99. *It is absurd to admit with certain philosophers something intermediate between soul and body, called the plastic medium, by which the soul acts on the body and the body on the soul.*—This theory to explain the relations of soul and body, attributed to the English philosopher Cudworth (1617–1688), supposes that there exists as a bond of union between soul and body a substance that is at once material and immaterial, which holds communication with the body through its material part, and with the soul through its immaterial part. But, in the first place, such a substance is metaphysically impossible ; and, in the second place, the reciprocal action of matter on spirit and spirit on matter in this intermediate substance remains to be explained.

100. *The system of physical influence either is nothing but materialism or it explains nothing.*—The English school, in setting up this system of *physical influence*, considers the soul as extremely subtile matter, and from this infers that the action of the soul on the body is analogous to that of fire on wood. But this is evidently pure materialism. Those philosophers also who, while admitting physical influence, defend the spirituality of the soul, are likewise at fault ; for they regard the soul and body as two distinct beings.

Moreover, their system explains nothing, for it simply teaches that the soul exerts an influence on the body and the body on the soul.

ART. II.—UNITY OF THE HUMAN SOUL AS SUBSTANTIAL FORM OF THE BODY.

101. *There is but one human soul, which is the substantial form of the body. This soul is intellectual, and, besides intellectual life, possesses also sensitive life and vegetative life.*—By the very fact that in every natural composite it is the substantial form that gives being to the composite, this form must be *unique*; for, if there were a plurality of forms, there would also be a plurality of beings, and the composite would lose its substantial unity. Hence in the living composite, and more particularly in man, the rational soul must be the unique form of the body, since it is its substantial form. Without doubt, the difference between the acts performed by one and the same living being, would seem to necessitate the referring of them to distinct principles. But it is with forms as with numbers: just as any number includes the units of a lower number, and one or more units besides, so every form has, besides its own specific virtue, that of the inferior forms also. Thus it is with the human soul, which is at once vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual. This truth is confirmed by experience and common sense: by experience, which testifies that in each individual it is always the same person that wills, sees, and is nourished; by common sense, which as expressed in language does not point to distinct principles of action in man. But it must be observed that when the intellectual soul is called the form of the body, we thereby mean simply that the

three kinds of life—vegetative, sensitive, and intellectual—have in man a single principle; not that the soul communicates all its powers to the body. It communicates those only that require organs for their exercise, and reserves to itself the intellect and will, which are independent of the body. Hence the human soul is the form of the body inasmuch as it contains the virtue of the vegetative and the sensitive principle: not as being the rational principle in man.

102. *A plurality of souls, taught by several ancient philosophers, makes the unity of the human composite inexplicable.*—Several ancient philosophers, disregarding the substantial union of soul and body in man, were forced to attribute several souls to him. For if the soul is united to the body as the motor to the movable object, there is nothing to prevent the existence of many media between the motor and the object, even of many motors, especially if the movable object be impelled in different ways. By such reasoning was Plato drawn into distinguishing three souls in man—a vegetative, a sensitive, and an intellectual soul.

But this system is erroneous; for, as each soul has a distinct life and distinct operations, it should be independent of the other souls in its operations, and thus the unity of man would be destroyed. Besides, experience contradicts this doctrine; for it shows us that the acts of the vegetative and the sensitive life affect those also of the intellectual life, and vice versa.

It is useless to assert that the union of the three souls would be established by the body which would contain them in itself, as a bookcase holds many volumes. Since the body has its being only through the soul, it is the soul that contains the body, and not

the body that contains the soul. Nor can it be said that one soul is the substantial form of the body, and that the others are united to it accidentally. For this were tantamount to asserting that man is accidentally intelligent, or sentient, or vegetative, just as he is accidentally tall, learned, or courageous ; but this is absurd.*

103. *The modern theory of the "vital principle" is in substance only a reproduction of the error of a plurality of souls. The proofs and experiments on which it is based are valueless.*—The different systems by which it has been attempted in modern times to explain the life-principle in man refer to the question of the unity of the human soul. The three principal theories are, (1) the *Animism* of Stahl (1660–1734), according to whom the intellective soul through its inferior forms presides over the organic functions ; (2) *Organicism*, held by Descartes, who regarded the organs themselves as the cause, through their physical forces, of the vital acts ; (3) *Duodynamism*, formulated by Barthez (1734–1806), propagated by the school of Montpellier, and advocated in Germany by Günther (1785–1863) ; it is so called because it supposes two distinct principles in man, the soul to preside over intellectual functions, and the vital principle to regulate organic life.

In his system Stahl only reproduces, though with some errors, the doctrine of the substantial union of

* The doctrine of Photius that man has two souls, one rational, the other irrational, and that sin is the act of the latter, was condemned by the Fourth General Council of Constantinople (869). In the middle ages the error was revived by Ockham, and only thirty years ago by a German Catholic, Dr. Günther.—The General Council of Vienne condemned as erroneous and un-Catholic the denial that "the substance of the rational or intellectual soul is truly and in itself the form of the human body."

soul and body. The materialistic system of organicism is too much opposed to the data of physiology to claim disciples any longer.

The same is not true of the vitalism of Montpellier, which has seduced many by a specious appearance of elevated spiritualism. The duodynamists rest their arguments, first, upon the corruptibility of the sensitive life, which they claim cannot be referred to the intellective principle, for the intellective as such is incorruptible. This difficulty is removed by saying that nothing prevents an incorruptible substance from exercising corruptible functions; just as a king may for the nonce be soldier or judge. But if vital acts and intellectual operations must be ascribed to distinct principles, owing to the essential difference between them, we must still further multiply the number of souls in man; for the act of understanding differs essentially from that of willing, the act of perceiving from that of moving, and so of many other acts. The duodynamists also argue that, as the vital acts are accomplished without the knowledge of the intellective soul, therefore the intellective soul cannot be the principle of said acts. But though nature has willed that the vital functions be performed unconsciously, in order to their more secure fulfilment, it is none the less certain that the soul is made aware of these functions when they are attended with suffering. Lastly, the duodynamists invoke experience and bring forward certain phenomena, as, for example, the contractions sometimes observed in individuals immediately after death. But these phenomena are very rare, and may easily be explained by purely physical causes. Besides, if it were necessary to admit the conclusions drawn by these philosophers, we should eventually be compelled to allow that the body can

continue to live after its separation from the soul. Such an issue no duodynamist would dare to sustain.

ART. III.—SEAT OR LOCUS OF THE SOUL.

104. *The soul is in its essence entire in the whole body and in every part of the body ; but it does not exercise all its functions through corporeal organs, and it does not exercise the same functions in each corporeal organ.*—

Several modern philosophers, from denying the substantial union of soul and body, have been led to examine what part of the body is the seat of the soul. Some have asserted that it is the brain, others that it is the heart, and still others that it is this or that part of the brain. All these statements fall wide of the mark. For (1) the soul is the principle of life in the body ; now all the parts of the body are living ; therefore the soul is in every part of the body. (2) The same conclusion is drawn from the fact that the soul is the principle of sensation, and that it is sentient in each part of the body.

On the other hand, as the soul is indivisible, it must be entire wherever it is ; therefore the soul is entire in every part of the body. But, although the soul is in its essence entire in every part of the body, it does not exercise all its functions through bodily organs, because the functions that require the concurrence of an organ necessarily vary with the different nature of the organs themselves. The peculiar action of the soul experienced in the brain and in the heart is easily explained by the fact that these two parts of the body are the principal organs of sensibility and life, respectively.

Some philosophers object that if the soul be in every part of the body, it is extended, and therefore

material. This is readily answered. Bodies are in place circumscriptively, since they are circumscribed in their dimensions by the place which they occupy ; immaterial creatures are in place determinatively, since they are not measured by it but only so determined that they exercise their power in this place, and cannot be at the same time in another place. Thus the soul is in the body, not because the body contains it, measures it, or circumscribes it, but because the body is the subject of its operations, and because the soul contains it, so to say, by giving it being and unity.

ART. IV.—THE RESURRECTION OF THE BODY.

105. *Since the soul is made to be united with the body, it will again be united to it after having been separated from it for a time. This reunion is demanded not only by the very nature of man, but likewise by the moral order, according to which the body will share in the reward or punishment of the good or evil of which it shall have been the instrument.*—Man is neither soul alone nor body alone ; his being is complete only when his soul is substantially united to his body. Undoubtedly the human soul is subsistent in itself ; but God has placed it lowest in the order of intelligences, and on account of its weakness it requires the body for the perfection and integrity of its specific operations. Since, then, the body is an integral part of man's nature, it must be resuscitated ; otherwise we should be obliged to say that man, the work of divine predilection, would remain forever in a state contrary to nature. But this cannot be. God has allowed sin to subvert for a time the order of His Providence, but not to triumph forever over the laws that He has established.

To this reason, derived from man's nature, may be added another, drawn from the end for which the body was originally created immortal. When God made the soul subsistent in itself, in order to proportion the matter to the form He willed, by a special gift, to make the body share in the soul's immortality. But, if by the fall the body has become mortal, the soul is none the less immortal, and therefore the cause for which an immortal body had at first been given to it still exists.

Therefore, in order not to change the end for which He first made the body immortal, God in a manner owes it to Himself to restore to it for the soul's sake the primitive privilege of incorruptibility. Hence it is evident that the resurrection of the body is not something outside the laws of the natural order; but that it is, on the contrary, the restoration of the order originally established by God. If there is any miracle in the resurrection, it is only in view of the cause that will work it, which can be nothing but the power of God, and not in view of the natural exigency which we have just explained. These arguments for the resurrection of the body are confirmed by reasons drawn both from the moral order, which requires that the body, the instrument of the good or evil wrought by the soul, should share in its reward or punishment; and from the order of nature, where everything is unceasingly dying to resume a new life, and where man would be an exception without explanation, if he should die to live no more.

106. *It is absurd to object against the resurrection of the body that it is impossible for the scattered elements of the body to be reunited, or that it is impossible for the soul to resume its former body, which will have been transformed into an infinity of other substances: for in the*

former case, we put limits to God's power ; in the latter, we forget that identity of molecules is not necessary to constitute identity of body.—To assert with materialists that when the elements of the body have once been separated, it is impossible to unite them again to reconstitute the body, is to put limits to the power of God, who was able to draw the body out of nothingness, and who *a fortiori* can reform it with its primitive elements. But some philosophers raise the objection that since the body is transformed into an infinity of other substances, it can no longer be reconstituted with molecules numerically the same, and that, as God thus gives a new body to the soul, all the reasons alleged in support of the resurrection lose their value. The objection falls ; for, in the first place, it is not impossible for God to reconstitute the body with the same molecules that it had before ; and, in the second place, identity of molecules is by no means necessary to secure identity of body. For science has shown that the body, properly so called, is not constituted of the molecules that enter into it, since these molecules are renewed day by day and are all changed in the space of about seven years, while the body remains ever the same.

NATURAL THEOLOGY.

DEFINITION AND DIVISION.

1. *Natural Theology is that part of philosophy which treats of God and His attributes, as far as they can be known by the light of reason. It differs from Sacred Theology, in that this latter studies God and His attributes by the light of divine revelation.*

2. *Natural Theology is divided into three principal parts: the first treats of the existence and unity of God, the second treats of the attributes of God in Himself; the third treats of the attributes of God in relation to the world or to creatures.*

CHAPTER I.

EXISTENCE AND UNITY OF GOD.

ART. I.—PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.

3. *The existence of God is not immediately evident to us; but it can be demonstrated by the effects which He has produced.*—The existence of God is not immediately evident, because we do not behold the divine nature; but it can be proved by the effects which we know, for from any effect whatever we can prove the existence of a cause.

4. *The existence of God is first proved by a metaphysical argument, which consists in deducing the existence of*

a Necessary Being from the existence of contingent beings.

—The beings in the world are contingent, that is, they have not given themselves existence. For it is manifest by experience that the human soul, as well as the beings that compose the sensible world, have had a beginning. Now, that which begins to exist must owe its existence to its own action, or to the action of another, or to nothing. But it cannot owe its existence to its own action, because before acting it must first exist; it cannot owe its existence to nothing, because that which is without existence cannot give it; therefore it must receive existence from a being distinct from itself. But this being, in turn, either is or is not contingent. If it is contingent, it also must have received existence by the action of another being; and so on indefinitely, until we arrive at a being that holds its existence from itself. Among the contingent beings of the world is man, who is intelligent and free, as has been proved in Psychology. Therefore the self-existent Being from whom man holds his existence and perfections must also be intelligent and free. But such a being is not only necessary but personal; he is God; therefore the existence of the world proves the existence of God. It is to no purpose to urge the possibility of an infinite series of contingent beings which would produce one another without the existence of a necessary being as their cause. This hypothesis is absurd, because contingent being is an effect; but an infinite series of effects without a cause is a contradiction; by multiplying the number of effects we make the existence of the cause more necessary. Equally futile are the arguments of materialists, pantheists, and evolutionists against the personality of God. The spirituality of man's soul being once established, the Christian

dogma of a personal God is a necessary consequence of the application of the principle of causality to the existence of contingent intelligence.

5. *The existence of God is also proved by a physical argument, which consists in deducing from the order that exists in the world the existence of a supreme Ordaining Cause.*—Order reigns in the world, as is proved by the relations existing between objects the most diverse, and by the subordination of the special end of each being to one single and supreme end. Now, order is an effect which supposes an ordaining cause. This cause, it is evident, cannot be found in the series of ordered beings, because then it would be itself an orderly effect. Moreover, the inherent forces of matter are utterly inadequate not only to produce the phenomena of life, as has been proved in Psychology, but even to account for the order reigning in the inorganic world; for every material force requires a previous adaptation of the particles of matter in order to produce an orderly effect. But if it is outside this series it must have a different nature. Since, then, they are contingent, their ordaining cause must be necessary Being. By the argument given in § 4, this necessary Being is shown to be a personal God. The existence of evil is sometimes opposed to this physical argument. But, admitting for the moment that evil constitutes a disorder, it would be only accidental, and would not destroy the general order. Therefore the argument remains in all its force. When God has thus been proved existing as ordaining cause, reason then tells us that it is only because of our ignorance that any thing appears to constitute a real disorder.

6. *The third principal argument in favor of the existence of God is a moral argument, drawn from the assent*

given to this truth by all men in all times.—There is no truth in favor of which the unanimous consent of the human race is more explicit or striking than that of the existence of God. Civilized peoples as well as the most barbarous, modern as well as the most ancient, have all believed the existence of God, as is proved by the history, the traditions, and the monuments of all ages and of all countries. Now, this universal belief cannot be a fiction of men, nor an invention of priests or princes. If it were a creation of men, evidently we should know the time and the place in which it arose; but no one has been able to discover this. On the contrary, the oldest traditions of mankind represent the world as coming from the hands of God, and all accounts attest that the nearer we draw to Asia, the cradle of the human race, the more clearly is the existence of God professed. Neither can it be said that belief in the existence of God is an invention of princes or priests; for princes could not have given religious sanction to their laws if the people did not already believe in God; as to priests, the exercise of their functions evidently supposes this belief. Since, then, the unanimous assent to the existence of God is not of human origin, we must conclude that it is the result of a primitive tradition, and can have only God for its author. Even if some barbarous tribe should be discovered without religious ideas, which, however, has not as yet happened, it would no more invalidate the moral argument for God's existence than does the denial of atheists, materialists, pantheists, evolutionists, and the so-called progressive minds of to-day. The argument is based upon the fact that the belief has been professed by the great mass of mankind of all ages and nations.

ART. II.—ATHEISM. .

7. *Atheism is either positive or negative; positive atheism is either theoretical or practical.*—The doctrine which denies the existence of God is called *atheism*. Atheism is positive when it denies directly the reality of the supreme and divine Being; it is negative when it consists merely in ignorance of this divine Being.

Positive atheism is either theoretical or practical; the former teaches doctrinally either that God does not exist, or that we cannot know that He exists, and is therefore distinguished as *dogmatic* and *sceptical* atheism, or *agnosticism*; the latter is manifest in the conduct of those who live as if there were no God. Practical atheism is professed by a great number of men; but the same is not true of theoretical atheism and negative atheism. History and the accounts of travellers prove that there is no people, however ignorant and savage, that does not admit the existence of some divinity. It is manifest that those philosophers and writers who have gloried in teaching and professing atheism have not been sincere, and that they have proposed no other end than to favor the corruption of morals and to overthrow social order.

8. *Atheism is a most absurd doctrine, most degrading, and most fruitful in fatal consequences.*—The partisans of atheism are wont to call themselves *freethinkers* (*esprit forts*). Yet their doctrine is the very annihilation of intelligence, for the consistent atheist, not finding in his system the explanation of either his own existence or that of the sensible world, falls necessarily into the most complete scepticism; and

this is the negation of all thought. Moreover, if God does not exist, there is no longer either good or evil, man may follow at will his most perverse inclinations, society is without foundation, and the law of might alone prevails. History, besides, bears witness that all the epochs of atheism have been epochs of intellectual debasement, of moral corruption, and of great social upheavals. As for the agnostic who says, "God may or may not exist, I cannot know His existence with certainty," his position is shown to be untenable by the first, or metaphysical, argument for the existence of a Supreme Intelligence. The objection that any attributes of God that we may learn from the consideration of creatures are too imperfect to be possessed by Him, only serves to bring out in stronger relief the excellence of His perfections and personality. Moreover, the Christian theist is content to know of many of God's perfections that they are, without attempting to fathom them. As to the manner in which we rise from creatures to a knowledge of God, see pp. 104, 105.

ART. III.—UNITY OF GOD.

9. *The unity of God is clearly inferred from the very notion of God.*—The unity of God may be shown by three principal arguments. 1. God being a pure act,* His individuality is identical with His nature; but individuality is intrinsically incommunicable; therefore it is impossible that there be several gods. 2. God has all perfection; but if there were many gods, there would necessarily be some difference among them, and one would be deprived of what

* See page 163.

another would possess; but he who would be wanting in something would not have all perfection, and therefore would not be God. 3. All creatures are ordained for one another. As they differ one from another, they would not conspire to effect unity of order, if they were not governed by a being at least morally one: therefore the first Being who directs all to one and the same end must be absolutely one.

ART. IV.—DUALISM.

10. *Dualism is a useless hypothesis; it is absurd in itself, and it does not explain the fact for which it was assumed.*—The unity of God is a truth so evident that no philosopher dares to-day call it in question; it has been denied only in ancient times by polytheists and dualists, or Manichees.* Polytheism is so gross an error that it is superfluous to refute it. Dualism consists in admitting two principles, one good, the other evil, and is equally absurd. Yet it has led many minds astray, at different times, especially at the beginning of the Christian era and during the middle ages. But considered as a mere hypothesis, this system is destitute of all the characters that an hypothesis should have to be accepted. For an hypothesis should be necessary; it should not be absurd; it should explain the fact for which it was assumed. Now, (1) the hypothesis of dualism is useless, for its

* Mani or Manes (Babylon, third cent.) derived from the Persians the doctrine of two principles, and from the Gnostics that of the hatefulness of matter. His sect observed three seals: that of the mouth, for his followers were forbidden to eat meat or eggs, to drink wine or milk; of the hands, for they were forbidden to kill any animal or destroy any plant; that of the bosom, for they were forbidden to marry.

partisans formed it only because they thought the existence of evil irreconcilable with the goodness of God ; but it is easy to prove that the existence of evil is not repugnant to the idea of an infinitely good God. (2) This hypothesis is absurd, for evil inasmuch as it is a privation of good, is also a privation of being, since good and being are convertible ; therefore absolute evil would be absolute nothingness. (3) The hypothesis of dualism, far from explaining, on the contrary, destroys the fact for which it was assumed ; for the Manichees had recourse to a twofold principle to explain by one the existence of good, and by the other the existence of evil. But these two principles either possess equal power or they do not ; in the latter case, the possessor of the less power would not be God ; in the former, the two principles would destroy each other's work, and the result of their reciprocal action would be nothingness.

CHAPTER II.

ATTRIBUTES OF GOD IN GENERAL.

ABSOLUTE ATTRIBUTES.

ART. I.—ATTRIBUTES OF GOD IN GENERAL.

11. *There are two kinds of attributes in God, absolute and relative.*—Although human reason cannot comprehend God, it can, however, acquire a knowledge not only of His existence, but also of some of His attributes. These attributes are of two kinds: some belong to God considered in Himself, and these are *absolute* attributes; the others belong to Him as Creator of the world, and these are *relative* attributes.

12. *The divine attributes are not known by us directly, but we attain to a knowledge of them from the perfections which we discover in creatures.*—The cause must possess, if not in a superior degree, at least in an equal degree, all the perfections of the effect; otherwise the effect would excel its cause, which is absurd. Hence, as we infer the existence of the cause from the existence of the effect, so from the perfections of the effect we ascend to those of the cause. Therefore, since God is the absolute cause of all the perfections in creatures, it is from the knowledge of these perfections that we come to know those of God. Now, as creatures possess finite being, their perfections are also finite or limited; but as God, on the contrary, is

infinite in being, His perfections must likewise be infinite. It is, therefore, necessary, before attributing to God any one of the perfections of His creatures, to take from it all limit and to consider it then as found in God in an eminent manner, as absolutely infinite.

13. *As God is pure act, infinite Being, and perfectly simple, the divine attributes are identical with one another, and with the divine essence. If we distinguish them, it is because of the limitations of our mind.*—In creatures the attributes arise from the essence, but are not identified with it. Thus man's liberty, though having its principle in his essence, is really distinct from it. In like manner, in creatures one attribute is distinct from another; in man intellect is one thing, will is another. These distinctions are not found in God. For since God is perfectly simple, to admit any distinction whatever between His attributes and His essence would be to destroy His perfect simplicity, since all distinction supposes a certain composition in that in which it exists. Now, if the divine substance were composed of parts, either each of these parts would be infinite, and then there would be as many gods as there would be parts, which is contrary to the divine *unity* already proved; or the infinite would result from a collection of finite parts, the perfect from the imperfect, which is absurd. Moreover, if the divine perfections were really distinct, as are those of creatures, they would no longer exist in an infinitely perfect manner in God; for, that two things be distinct, it is necessary that one be without some quality that the other has, and consequently all distinction is necessarily a principle of limit and imperfection. From this, however, it would be wrong to conclude that as the plurality of divine

attributes depends on the mode in which our intellect knows God, these attributes do not really exist in Him. It is one thing to say that the perfections which we attribute to God do not exist in Him, and it is quite another thing to assert that in Him they are not distinct as our intellect conceives them. The perfections which we predicate of God are really in Him, but not with that distinction which our limited intellect establishes among them.

ART. II.—ABSOLUTE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.—ASEITY.

14. *Aseity is an attribute by which God is of Himself or from Himself. It is the primitive attribute from which we can deduce all the others.*—The divine attributes are manifold. But among them we can distinguish one to which all the others may, in our way of thinking, be reduced. This is *aseity*, that is, the perfection by which God is the absolute and independent Being who holds from Himself all that He has and all that He is. It is by this attribute that God defined Himself when He said, "I am who am." In this attribute philosophers have placed the metaphysical essence of God, because it is the principle and foundation of all the other perfections attributed to Him. For if we could conceive anything in God prior to aseity, we could conceive a self-existent being as dependent on another being. Since, then, God is independent in His being, and since He holds His essence from Himself alone, we very easily perceive that He possesses all possible perfections. Aseity, further, affords the primary reason for which God is distinct from every other being; for other beings have finite perfections, while God possesses infinite perfections. But it is evident that other beings than

God have finite perfections, for the very reason that they do not hold their being from themselves ; and that the perfections of God are infinite because He is the absolute Being who holds all from Himself and depends on none.

ART. III.—INFINITY, ETERNITY, IMMUTABILITY, SIMPLICITY,
AND IMMENSITY.

15. *God is infinite, that is, He has all possible perfections, and without limit.*—If God is of Himself, He must have all possible perfections, and there can no more be a limit in His being than in His perfections. All perfections are either *self-existent* or *contingent* ; that is, either uncaused or capable of being caused. The former God possesses *formally*, or in their own specific nature ; the latter He as First Cause must be able to produce, and therefore possesses *virtually* or *equivalently* with His creatures, and also *eminently* as being an infinitely perfect cause.

16. *God is eternal, that is, He had no beginning and will have no end ; He lives in a perpetual present.*—Since God is of Himself, He never began to be ; He is eternal, and eternity excludes not only beginning and end, but all succession as well ; for God possesses all perfections, and without limit. In God there is neither past nor future ; there is nothing that has been, nothing that will be ; all is in an indivisible and perpetual present. Moreover, since eternity implies existence which is *essentially* without beginning, it is proper to God alone ; for even could a creature have existence without beginning, such existence would be always contingent.

17. *God is immutable, that is, His perfections can neither be increased nor diminished ; He is subject to*

no alteration or change.—Since there is no succession in God, there can be no change in Him. Besides, if He changed, He would acquire or lose some quality, and this is contrary to His infinity.

18. *God is absolutely simple, that is, there cannot be in Him any kind of composition.*—God is absolutely simple, because all composition supposes an imperfection. Thus God is not merely exempt from all material composition, but His perfections are identified with one another and with His essence. If in God there were attributes distinct from one another, each of these attributes would necessarily be limited and therefore finite; but the finite added to the finite can never give the infinite.

19. *God is immense, that is, He is in His essence present to all things.*—Since God is infinite or without limits, He is everywhere infinitely—in Himself, in the world, and even outside the world—in that He can fill all possible space extended *ad infinitum*, without the least circumscription of His being.*

ART. IV.—THE DIVINE INTELLIGENCE.

20. *God knows Himself perfectly; He knows all things outside Himself, all future contingent and possible things.*—The intelligence of God is infinite like His being. God knows Himself and eternally affirms Himself. It is this eternal and unchangeable affirmation of Himself that constitutes truth in itself, absolute and essential truth, the prototype and supreme norm of all truth. God in knowing Himself perfectly, knows through His essence all other beings. He knows them in their eternal types, which are nothing but

* See page 203.

His knowledge of the various degrees in which His divine essence can be imitated and represented outside Himself, none of which, however, is adequate to the divine essence itself. God has a perfect knowledge of all real beings, because it is He who created them with their essences and perfections. Since God by His knowledge is the cause of all things, His knowledge and His power have the same extent ; and since He is the cause of all that exists in every individual, it follows that His knowledge embraces all beings also in their individuality. God knows all things possible, for, knowing His own power, He knows all its terms, both real and possible. He knows the good, and with it the evil that is its privation. As He knows all that can exist either by an effect of His power, or by the action of creatures, He knows all future contingencies, and this from all eternity and with certitude, because all things are eternally present to God. Lastly, as there is no succession in God, His knowledge is not discursive, but He comprehends all things simultaneously ; and since His knowledge is nothing else than His essence, it is absolutely immutable.*

* Since God's knowledge is infinite, He knows not only all actions of all creatures, but also all possible actions and all possible consequences of those actions. This knowledge does not, however, destroy man's freedom. It is because man will do an action that God, whose knowledge is infallible, foresees it. But since His knowledge is infinitely perfect, He must foresee not only the action, but also its nature, viz., *free* if proceeding from free agents, *necessary* if produced by a necessary cause. Otherwise God's knowledge would destroy what His creative act had effected, He would contradict Himself, be no longer immutable, and therefore no longer God.

ART. V.—THE DIVINE WILL.

21. *God has a perfect will; He loves Himself necessarily, all else He loves freely.*—Intelligence supposes will; therefore God has a perfect will, as He has an infinite intelligence. God primarily loves Himself absolutely as His own proper end; He loves His divine goodness absolutely and necessarily, just as we necessarily desire happiness; therefore God has no free will in this respect. As it enters into the perfection of the will to communicate the good which one possesses, so it is consonant with the divine goodness to be in some way diffusive of itself to others. But God does not will this absolutely and necessarily, because, being infinitely perfect, He needs nothing external to Himself; therefore as regards creatures He has free will. To say that God gives them existence by a necessity of His nature, would be equivalent to affirming that He is not self-sufficient, or that He created without intelligence and will; in a word, that He is not God. Yet, though God's decrees in regard to His creatures are free, they are *eternal*, since there is no sufficient reason for delay; and *irrevocable*, since God's knowledge is infinite, and therefore more perfect knowledge or "a fuller consideration of the matter and circumstances" as motives of repeal, is an utter impossibility.

22. *The divine will is immutable; yet it does not make contingent effects necessary.*—The divine will is immutable, as are the divine substance and intelligence; and it is always accomplished in all that it desires. But from this it does not follow that it renders necessary all that it wills. It renders necessary the effects that it has made dependent on necessary causes, and it

leaves contingent the effects that it has made dependent on contingent causes; for, as the divine will is sovereignly efficacious, whatever God wills is accomplished and in the way in which He wills. Hence God, in willing effects to be contingent, has subjected them to contingent causes which may or may not produce them. Among these contingent causes there are some that do moral evil, which consists in choosing a good which is forbidden in preference to another good that is enjoined by the moral law, and of which consequently one deprives himself. It is evident that God can in no way will moral evil, because it is opposed to His goodness, and because there is no other good that He can will more than His goodness. Yet it is not repugnant that God should sometimes will physical evil, which is an imperfection of nature or a punishment; this evil He wills indirectly, and only in view of the good to which it is attached.

23. *God loves Himself with a love equal to Himself, that is, infinite as He is; He loves all other beings in so far as they are good, and because they come from Him.*—Since God has a will, He loves, for love is the first act of the will, and without it the will cannot be even thought of. God loves Himself first with a love equal to Himself, a love which has absolute goodness and holiness as its object, the source and type of all goodness and holiness. Secondly, God loves all existing creatures, because they are good and come from Him; and He loves them the more the better they are, for they are better simply because God wills them to have more good. So while with us it is the goodness of things that determines us to love them, with God it is His love that is the cause of their existence and of the measure of goodness that He imparts to them.

ART. VI.—THE DIVINE POWER.

24. *God is omnipotent, that is, He can do every thing that does not imply a contradiction.*—The power of any being to operate has its principle in the essence of that being; consequently this power is always proportionate to the nature of the being. But God is infinite in essence; therefore He is infinite in power. Since He is omnipotent, He can do all that is intrinsically possible; for whatever is intrinsically possible can be, and divine power requires only this possibility in order to give existence to being. The disciples of Descartes hold that God by His omnipotence can also produce what involves a contradiction, as a “square circle.” This doctrine is essentially absurd, for a contradiction being the affirmation and negation of the same thing at the same time, is equivalent to nothing. As God cannot produce a contradiction, so He cannot do evil; for the possibility of doing evil is only the possibility of a defect in acting, and this is repugnant to omnipotence.

25. *God alone can work miracles.*—A miracle is a sensible, unusual, and supernatural work, exceeding the powers of created nature. It is evident that God, who freely established the order of nature, can derogate from it when He wishes, either by producing directly, without the concurrence of second causes, the effects proper to those causes, or by producing effects of which secondary causes are not capable. The angels of themselves cannot work true miracles; they can do extraordinary things, but only those that are preternatural, not supernatural. A miracle is defined a “sensible” work, because the change which it implies must be perceptible by the senses; an

"unusual" work, because it is opposed to the ordinary course of nature; a "supernatural" work, because although a divine work, it is not required to complete the natural existence of either man or any inferior creature. Thus in the raising to life of the widow of Nain's son, there is a sensible change from a dead body to a body in the vigor of health; an "unusual" work, in that the dead youth is restored to life; a "supernatural" work, since it was by no means due to the young man's natural existence; and it "exceeded the powers of created nature," since God alone could work it, though often God's servants are intercessors or instruments.

26. *Animal magnetism is the art of producing wonderful phenomena, especially in man, by either physical or moral means.*—This theory is called *mesmerism* from its author, Mesmer (1733-1815), and *magnetism* because he first used this influence to produce the phenomena, which, occurring chiefly in sentient beings, gave to this art the epithet *animal*. Its aim is to deny the existence of miracles, or at least to weaken their evidence.*

27. *Magnetism is common, transcendental, or hypnotic.*—The first species of magnetism makes use of sensible means, such as gestures, fixed gaze upon a bright object, stroking the limbs, etc. The second is also called spiritism. It provokes the intercourse of men with spirits, with angels, or departed souls, who are called up by determinate signs, or of their own accord present themselves to the magnetizer. The third species originated with Braid (1843), and differs from the first in this only, that the magnetic sleep or hypnotism is

* These four numbers have been abridged from Zigliara, *Sum. Phil.*, C. 24, 25.

produced by fixing the eyes intently upon some bright object.

28. *The phenomena of magnetism are mechanical, physiological, cognitive, and transcendental.*—The mechanical phenomena are rotations, attractions, elevations, and other motions of bodies. The physiological phenomena are: (1) *spasm* or tremor, and convulsion of the members in the subject operated on by the magnetizer; (2) *dilation* and *contraction* of the pupil and nerves; (3) *magnetic sleep* in which the subject holds exclusive communication with the operator and obeys him in all things; (4) *lucid somnambulism*, in which the subject has extraordinary powers, such as seeing with closed eyes, with his stomach, hands, or feet. The phenomena of cognition comprise the power of knowing the inner affections of the soul, of predicting future contingent free events, of examining the internal structure of the human body, of discovering remedies for disease, of treating of scientific matters, speaking all languages, etc. The transcendental phenomena include all those already mentioned, but they are effected by the conjuring of spirits, who speak to men through a person called a *medium*, and who is only a passive instrument of their operations. These phenomena include apparitions, voices, writings, scientific dissertations, etc.

29. *Four theories have been framed to explain these phenomena: the theory of material causes, of imagination, of animism, of spiritism, and spiritualism.*—The first theory ascribes the phenomena of mesmerism to a certain magnetic fluid which issues from the body of the operator and enters that of the subject. But such a cause is purely material, and is therefore incapable of producing spiritual phenomena. Nor can such phenomena be the effect of imagination, which is also

material, and is common to man and beast.—The theory of *animism* is a disguised materialism, whether we say that vibrations in the magnetizer's soul are communicated to external objects and thereby to the soul of the subject, or that a subtile matter, Od, is communicated to the soul of the subject, and thus produces the phenomena.—Of those who ascribe the effects to spirits, some are *spiritists* and hold the doctrine of metempsychosis, or transmigration of human souls. Their assumption is gratuitous, and has been refuted in Psychology (§ 94); moreover, they can assign no valid reason why departed souls should be subject to the will of man.—Lastly, *spiritualists* are they who attribute the phenomena, not to departed souls, but to angels. But manifestly these angels cannot be good spirits, since their answers often inflame the passions and attack revealed truths. They must, therefore, be evil spirits or demons.

CHAPTER III.

RELATIVE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD.

ART. I.—GOD THE CREATOR.

30. *God has created, that is, drawn from nothing, all that exists, whether spiritual or corporeal.*—God being infinitely perfect, is eminently sufficient for Himself. Yet it was fitting His goodness that others, viz., creatures, participate in His perfections; and therefore He created, that is, He drew out of nothing, all that exists.* When God is said to have made the universe out of nothing, the meaning is, that He caused the universe, which was not yet existing, to receive existence. Therefore it is by no means to be inferred, as some philosophers maintain, that nothing is the source out of which God brought all creatures; for then we could well apply the axiom: “From nothing nothing comes.” But although creatures did not always actually exist, yet they were from all eternity in the divine intellect, which knew them in their essence and their individuality. Therefore, when God wished to actualize these beings which He knew, the world, in virtue of the divine power, passed from the state of pure possibility to the state of actuality;

* “Creation is a production of a thing according to its whole substance, nothing being presupposed, whether created or increate” *Sum. Th.*, i., q. 65, a. 3. c.

it is precisely in this that creation consists. Hence by creation God does not, like man, bring about a mere modification of substances: by His infinite power He makes the substance itself. As to the time of creation, it would be vain to ask why God created the world so late; for time began with creation. In God there is no time, because there is no succession; there is no *early*, no *late*, no *when*, no *before*, no *after* in the divine eternity, which is a single and indivisible *now*. Moreover, God alone can create; for as St. Thomas argues (*Contra Gent.*, ii. 21): "Since the order of actions is according to the order of agents, because a nobler action is proper to a nobler agent, the primary action must be proper to the primary agent. But creation is the primary action, because it presupposes no other action, and all others presuppose it. Therefore creation is an action proper to God alone, for He is the primary agent."

Another proof may be drawn from God's absolute independence of all creatures. As He alone possesses an absolutely independent existence, to Him alone can that action be referred which requires no pre-existing subject on which to operate for the production of an effect. But such action is creation. Therefore creation is proper to God alone.

31. *The act of creation is an essentially free act of the divine will. As God is eminently sufficient for Himself, He is in this act bound by no necessity, whether external or internal.*—To hold that God made the world not by an act of His free will but from an irresistible impulse, is virtually to hold that God does not suffice for Himself, that He is not infinite, that He is not God. Moreover, this opinion would imply that every thing in the world is as necessary as the principle whence it emanated, and that, consequently, there is

no liberty either in man or in God. The objection that it is impossible to reconcile a free creation with the simplicity and immutability of God is idle, for the impossibility exists only in appearance. The act by which God wills creatures may be considered either in regard to Him or to creatures. In reference to Him, the act is eternal; therefore it does not affect His immutability; and since this act exists in God before He creates, He receives no new quality on the passage of creatures from non-existence into existence. Creatures alone acquire a new perfection by creation.

32. *The end which God proposes to Himself in creating the world is the manifestation of His perfections, or His own glory.*—God, being infinite wisdom, must have had an end in the act of creation, and this end must be the manifestation of Himself and His perfections, particularly His power, His wisdom, and His goodness. But since God is infinite, He can acquire nothing further for Himself, and the glory that accrues to Him from creation is purely accidental and extrinsic. It is fitting, therefore, that in the series of created beings there be some that can recognize this manifestation of God in the world. Such creatures must be intelligent. Undoubtedly irrational creatures operate for an end, which, however, they cannot know; nor can they raise themselves to Him who leads them to that end. Only intelligent creatures can propose to themselves an end in their acts, and only they can know the end which God proposed to Himself in creating. From this it is evident that intelligent creatures should hold the foremost rank among created beings, all other creatures having been made for them. Man is, therefore, the true king of the visible creation; everything in the visible world was made for him, since he alone can refer all to God.

ART. II.—PANTHEISM.

33. *Pantheism is the negation of creation ; it consists in recognizing no substance but God, and in identifying the world with Him.*—Those philosophers who, while rejecting the truth of creation, are yet unwilling to accept the absurd system of independent eternal matter, have been constrained to regard the world as an emanation from the very substance of God. This error, which is called *pantheism*, is as old as philosophy itself. It is the last term to which every philosophical and religious error necessarily and logically leads.

34. *There are two principal forms of pantheism, realistic pantheism and idealistic pantheism.*—In the most distant times pantheism was professed in India, where it infected not only the minds, but likewise the religion and morals of a whole nation. Later on pantheism was openly taught by several schools of Greek philosophy—by the Pythagorean, for example, and also by the Stoics, who declared that God was the soul of the world. In the first centuries of the Christian era it was propagated by many Neo-Platonic philosophers ; in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, by Arabian philosophers ; in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, by false mystics, and especially by Scotus Erigena (d. 875), and Giordano Bruno (d. 1600). In recent times it has been renewed and reduced to a system by Spinoza and the German philosophers, who have propagated it in Europe, where it infects a great number of minds. Although they teach oneness of substance in God and the world, yet pantheists, one and all, seek to reconcile their system with the variety of phenomena which nature presents, and

have fabricated divers modes in which the world has emanated from God. The multiplicity of these modes has given rise to the different forms of pantheism, which may, however, be reduced to two: *realistic* pantheism, invented chiefly by Spinoza, and *idealistic* pantheism, taught by Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.

The pantheism of Spinoza originated in a false definition of substance. Descartes had said that substance is that which has need of nothing else in order to exist. Adhering to this definition Spinoza easily demonstrated that there can be no other substance than the divine substance, because that alone needs no other being for its existence. Whatever we now consider as existing outside of God is, according to Spinoza (1632-1677), only a mode of the divine attributes. And as all that is in the world manifests itself to us as endowed either with thought or extension, thought and extension are, in Spinoza's system, the essential attributes of the infinite substance. This substance, it is said, acts necessarily. As a *thinking* substance it produces the different series of intellectual operations which constitute the minds of men; as an *extended* substance it produces bodies with all their various modifications. Therefore the aggregate of finite things is, he asserts, a necessary development of the attributes, thought and extension, which belong to the infinite substance.

Fichte (1772-1814), applying certain principles of Kant to the pantheism of Spinoza, endeavored to prove *a priori* how mind and matter, which he calls the *Ego* and the *non-Ego*, originate in the successive development of a single substance. To reach this he rises by abstraction to the *pure Ego*, that is, to thought, having no relation either to the thinking subject or the object thought of. This pure Ego is

the infinite, or God. But, says Fichte, the pure Ego is necessarily conscious of itself. In virtue of this necessity it thinks or posits itself, and in thinking or positing itself it distinguishes self as subject from self as object. As subject, it is the human mind; as object, it is matter. This development of the *Absolute* under the form of mind and matter is accomplished by an internal operation, and this is consciousness. Mind and matter are only the internal representation which the Absolute or the pure *Ego* makes of itself to itself.—Schelling (1775–1854) adopted the pantheism of Fichte, and considering God as the sole substance from whom mind and matter emanate ideally, he defined it as the *indifference of the differentiated*. Lastly, Hegel (1770–1831) set forth the whole system with scientific method and with all the appurtenances of a theory rigorously demonstrated. He substituted the *Idea* for the pure Ego of Fichte, and explained the origin of all creatures by the ideal motion of the Absolute.

As is evident, realistic pantheism teaches that the world exists by a necessary emanation from the divine substance, in much the same way as the web comes from the spider. Idealistic pantheism considers the world as emanating from God by an internal and immanent action. The former admits an Absolute in act, containing in itself all the various beings of the world, which it produces by necessary and external evolution of itself. In the latter system, the Absolute is in potentiality, and, in developing and completing itself by an internal and necessary motion, it manifests itself now under the form of matter, and again under that of mind, and so begets the series of existing things, which are not realities, but mere appearances, pure phenomena. But, whatever may be the

divergencies of the pantheistic systems, the essential characters may be reduced to two : (1) oneness of substance between God and the world ; (2) negation of all liberty in the act by which God creates the world.*

35. *Pantheism refutes itself, first, because the principle of a single substance is contradicted both by reason and experience ; secondly, because the denial of the liberty of the creative act is the destruction of the very notion of the Absolute ; and, lastly, because it leads to fatal consequences.*—The fundamental principle of pantheism is that there is but one substance, and that divine. Now, on the one hand, experience tells us that there are many substances ; on the other, reason finds in the idea of substance nothing requiring it to be unique. Without doubt, he who admits, with Spinoza, that substance is that which depends on no cause for its being, must hold that there is no other substance than the divine. But this is not implied in the true idea of substance, which should be defined : “That which does not require another as subject in which to inhere.” Thus the idea of substance does not imply independence of another subject, but excludes inherence in another as its subject.—It may also be shown that if only one substance, God, the Absolute, exists, this substance necessarily entails a contradiction. For if the Absolute contains many beings in itself, it lacks that unity which we conceive to be an essential quality of an infinitely perfect being ; if, on

* “The historical development of pantheism shows that it was the product of religious imagination in the Orient, that it was abstract with the Greeks, and physical with the Roman stoics, was couched in the mysticism of mediæval times, became ontological in Spinoza, ethical and subjective in Fichte, objective and ideal in Schelling, and attained its consummation in the dialectical processes of Hegelian metaphysics.”—*American Encyclopædia, sub. Pantheism.*

the other hand, it does not contain the collection of the various beings in the world, they could never have come forth from it.—Finally, if God and the world are but one substance, it follows that God is the world and the world is God; or, in other words, that the infinite is the finite and the finite is the infinite. The contradiction is even more manifest in the Absolute as understood by the German philosophers. For this Absolute, which, as Absolute, should actually possess all perfections, has them only potentially, and acquires them by successive developments. Moreover, the manifestation which the Absolute makes of itself in creatures is deceitful, and these creatures are only appearances or phenomena. But an Absolute which deceives and a potential Absolute are pure contradictions. Therefore contradiction is the term to which every system of pantheism necessarily leads. And pantheists are far from denying it; for they admit as a principle the *identity of contraries*,* and make this principle the foundation-stone of their logic and of all their science.

The absurdity of regarding the world as a necessary emanation of the divine substance may from this be easily perceived. The Absolute, if Absolute, ought to be most perfect and wholly sufficient for itself. But to assert that the creation of the world is necessary, is to admit that the Absolute has need of the world; and thus the very idea of the world is destroyed.

But the absurdity of pantheism is manifest not only from the falsity of the principles on which it rests, but also from the fatal consequences to which it leads.

* Or, as Kant expressed it, the doctrine of Antinomies (See note, p. 110).

For the God of pantheists is an imperfect God, subject to blind necessity; therefore he is not God, and pantheism is atheism in disguise.

With equal logical consistency is fatalism deduced from pantheism. If man has no substance of his own, he has no liberty, no activity of his own; all his acts are illusory phenomena, which a blind Absolute fatally performs; there is no longer either good or evil, and the whole moral law is destroyed. Likewise, if the principle of the identity of contraries, the foundation of the logic of pantheists, be admitted, there is no longer either true or false, and the most complete scepticism becomes the sole rule of the human mind.*

ART. III.—GOD THE PRESERVER.

36. *The creatures of God stand in need of His continual active preservation.*—Every effect depends on its cause for all that it has from it. Now, the efficient cause either creates, or simply gives a new form to what is already existing. Therefore, if the effect is nothing but a new form informing pre-existing matter, it will be referred to the cause for this form only. But if the effect be the whole existence of a being,

* Pantheism is the real principle of rationalism, which in turn has given birth to positivism and agnosticism. Positivism, inaugurated by Comte, was propagated in the name of reason and science by Littré, Taine, Rénan, Sainte-Beuve in France, by Lewes and Harrison in England, by Emerson in America. Rejecting the supernatural as unknowable, it studies only *positives*, i.e., natural phenomena with their "relations of coexistence and succession." It may be traced to three causes: "metaphysical scepticism, due to the *Critique* of Kant," the "too exclusive use of the experimental method," and the "material tendencies of the age." Littré died in 1881, a convert on his bed of death.

matter and form, it will depend on the cause for its whole existence, for both matter and form. But God is the first cause of all the beings of the universe, since He has given them existence by creating them; therefore they cannot cease to depend on Him for their existence; and they continue to exist only so long as He preserves it to them. For if creatures cannot come into existence of themselves, it is because they are contingent; as they do not cease to be contingent, they require for the continuance of their existence a divine act of the same nature as that which drew them forth from nothing. The necessity of this divine act is such that God Himself could not make creatures capable of preserving themselves by their own nature; because unless God created a contradictory being He could not make a creature not contingent.

37. *God preserves His creatures by a positive act, which does not differ actually from that by which He created them; so that preservation may be called a continued creation.*—The preservation of a being is of two kinds: it is positive and direct, if the being continues in existence by a positive and direct act of God; it is negative and indirect, if the being merely continues to exist, inasmuch as God does not destroy it, and removes the causes that could effect this. Now as to the act by which God preserves creatures, only positive and direct preservation can be meant; and so all the great philosophers have understood it. Evidently it could not be otherwise, for creatures are always contingent, and consequently always in need of that which was needful at the first moment of their existence. God has drawn the world from nothing by an act of His will; He continues to will that the world exist, and so the world continues to exist. Therefore

the act by which God created the world and the act by which He preserves it, are identical ; and in all truth we can say that the divine preservation is a *continual creation*. The difference between the creation and the preservation of creatures consists not in the act but in the term of the act : by creation God draws things out of nothing ; by preservation He keeps from nothingness the things He has made. If one were to accept the opinion of some philosophers, that God preserves creatures by a negative and indirect act, he would be obliged to admit that creatures could not return to nothing except by a positive act of God. But it is impossible for nothing to be the term of any act whatever. Therefore, to admit the indirect preservation of creatures is to deny to God the power of annihilating the things He has made. But in the doctrine of direct preservation the annihilation of creatures is easily explained by the cessation of the act which keeps them in existence.

38. *Although God can annihilate creatures, yet it is certain that He will never annihilate even one of them.*—Since God has created freely, He can also, if He wills it, annihilate His creatures. But this is only a metaphysical possibility which will never be realized ; for the gifts of God are without repentance, and having willed to give being to creatures, God, in a sense, owes it to His wisdom, His immutability, and His glory, to preserve them. The existence of creatures is a proof of the power of Him who made them ; but that a thing after having existed should return into nothing, would be contrary to the manifestation of God's power, which shines forth especially in the preservation of creatures. The world will doubtless undergo transformations and does undergo them every day ; but it will not cease to exist. It is certain also, as we

daily see, that the accidents of things and the very forms of living beings other than man, do cease to exist; but these accidents and these forms are not complete beings, since they are not substances. The name of being is imperfectly applied to them; and yet, such as they are, they are not absolutely annihilated, not that any part of them subsists, but because there is always a potentiality in the subject or in the matter, from which they can be educed.

ART. IV.—THE DIVINE CONCURRENCE WITH THE ACTIONS OF CREATURES.

39. *God concurs directly in all the acts of creatures.*—God not merely exerts an influence on creatures inasmuch as He preserves their being; He also influences their operations. For just as the creature as second being depends on God as first being, so the creature as second cause depends on God as first cause.

40. *There are two principal systems to explain the divine influence on the actions of creatures: the system of physical premotion and the system of simultaneous concurrence.*—*Physical premotion or predetermination*, is an influence by which God applies the cause to action, firstly, actively, and intrinsically. The divine influence on the actions of creatures as explained by physical premotion has been taught by the Scholastic philosophers generally, and particularly by St. Thomas. They regarded God as moving and applying secondary causes, actively and physically, by an internal inclination which determines them definitively to their action, as the heart gives to the other members of the body a predetermining force that stimulates them and makes them thoroughly capable of their functions.

Simultaneous concurrence is the influence by which God helps second causes, producing with them one and the same effect. This system originated with Molina (1535–1600) toward the end of the sixteenth century. He taught that the entire effect is to be ascribed to God and creatures ; but that neither God nor second causes are the total cause of the effect, but each is a partial cause requiring the concurrence of the other—just as a boat rowed by two men receives its entire motion from both together. In this system is also admitted, particularly in the order of grace, that concurrence of God called moral motion, which consists in a moral influence exercised on the will, either external, as by preaching and good example, or internal, as by inspiration and good thoughts. Still, in whatever way the divine influence upon the action of creatures be explained, it by no means destroys free will ; for although God concurs with free acts, He never concurs with what is defective in them. Similarly, although the motion of a lame man's leg must be attributed to the soul, the defect in his walk is due to the defect in his leg.*

ART. V.—OMNIPRESENCE OF GOD.

41. *Omnipresence is an attribute by which God is present in all creatures.*—The attribute of *omnipresence* differs from that of *immensity*, for the latter is that perfection by which God is present by His infinite essence in all things that exist, and can be in all possible worlds ; while the former is merely that perfection by which He is actually present in all places and in all creatures. This is, therefore, a relative attribute ; the other is absolute.

* Cf. Zigliara, *Summa Philosophica*, T., § 30. Digitized by Google

42. *God is in all creatures in three ways: by His power, by His presence, and by His essence.*—God is in all creatures by His *power*, for He acts in them; by his *presence*, for He actually knows them; by His *essence*, for His essence is not distinct from His power and His knowledge.—God is in all beings by His *power*, because He has created them and continues the creative act by preserving them. God is in all creatures by His *presence*, for all that He produces outside Himself He produces freely according to eternal prototypes; therefore, as creative and preserving cause of all things, He must have them ever present to His intelligence. Lastly, God is in all beings by His *essence*. Wherever God's power is exercised, there is His essence whole and entire; but God is in all places by His power; therefore He is also there by His essence.* Our imagination, accustomed as it is to represent to itself material things, cannot represent the divine substance present in all things without picturing it as mingled with their substances; but reason rejects such a representation. The essence of God is no more confounded with the essences of creatures with which He is present than the soul is identified in its substance with that of the body to which it is substantially united.

ART. VI.—PROVIDENCE OF GOD.

43. *The Providence of God is the care that He takes of creatures, especially rational creatures.*—Considered in God, *providence* is the reason of the order by which

* "He is in all things by His power in that all depend upon Him, and by His presence, inasmuch as all things are 'naked and open to His eyes;' He is in all by His essence, because He is with all as the cause of their existence."—*Sum. Th.*, i., q. 8, art. 3.

all things are conducted to their end; and in this sense providence is exercised immediately over all things. Considered in its effects, providence is the execution of the order which God conceived in creating the world, and in virtue of which all things answer their end. In this sense providence is exercised only mediately, for it governs the inferior by the superior, not that it needs an intermediary, but that in the exercise of its goodness it may give the dignity of cause to creatures.

44. *The existence of Providence is proved by an a priori argument drawn from the very idea of God.*—An intelligent and free agent must operate with a view to some end. God must have proposed some end in creating the world, and this can be no other than the manifestation of His goodness. But this end could not have been attained, if at the same time God had not put order into the world when He created it. And since order implies the disposition of beings in view of an end, the order of the world supposes a providential design. Therefore, if the idea of God as cause of the world be once admitted, the attribute of providence cannot be denied him. This attribute may also be deduced from the other divine perfections. For God is essential goodness; but it pertains to the goodness of a being to care for the effects that it has produced. Why, then, should the government of the world be denied to God? Not from want of power; if He could create the world and determine its end, with greater reason can He direct it to its end. Not from want of will; if He willed the end, it is absurd to say that He does not will the means. Not from want of wisdom; for what would then become of the infinite wisdom of God? To deny providence is, therefore, to deny God Himself.

45. *The existence of Providence is also proved by an a posteriori argument drawn from the admirable order that reigns in the universe.*—The universe presents to us a multitude of beings which, though essentially different, are all governed by constant laws. It shows us also the ensemble of the particular ends of these beings conspiring toward a supreme, single, and universal end; so that each being taken separately pursues a particular end, which in turn is subordinate to another end, and so on to the supreme end toward which all others converge. But the admirable constancy of the world's physical laws, the subordination of particular ends to a general end, which gives so perfect a unity to the world, must be the effect of blind necessity, of chance, or of a supreme reason. But necessity cannot govern creatures, since they are evidently contingent; nor can chance direct them, for it cannot make constant and invariable laws. Therefore the order of the world must be the effect of an ordaining reason, and is nothing else than divine Providence. The evidence of this conclusion will be more striking when we bear in mind that many creatures are destitute of reason, others are of opposite natures, and yet all concur to the supreme end assigned to the world. How can beings destitute of intelligence tend to an end, if they are not directed by an intelligent cause? How can those whose particular ends are opposed to each other concur to the general order, if they are not subjected to a supreme Being who disposes all things at will? It is of no avail to object that we know but a small part of the creatures of the world. What we know suffices to demonstrate rigorously the necessity of Providence, and the necessity of Providence once shown, it is easy to infer order even in that portion that is unknown to us.

46. *The existence of Providence is also proved by a moral argument drawn from the unanimous consent of all peoples in all ages.*—The truth of a Providence has, under one form or another, constituted a fundamental dogma in all ages. The greatest geniuses have proclaimed the truth, and not a few have written excellent works describing the admirable care that God takes of His creatures, and especially of man, the lord of creation.

47. *The principal objection against God's providence is drawn from the existence of evil.*—If God is just and good, He cannot but detest evil; if He is infinitely wise, He knows how to prevent evil; if He is almighty, he can actually prevent evil. Believing it impossible to reconcile the existence of God with that of evil, some men have denied the existence of God, and are, therefore, atheists; while others have denied the existence of evil, and are fatalists. Others again have referred the evil to an evil principle distinct from God and independent of Him; of this class are the Manichees. And yet others, seeing that all these systems, far from settling the difficulty, only increased it and added glaring absurdities, believed it the wiser course to doubt the existence both of God and of evil; these are sceptics.—All these errors spring from false notions of the nature and origin of evil, and of the divine plan in permitting it. If evil is not being, but a privation of being, evidently it cannot be found in God, who possesses being in all its plenitude. It has also been proved that there can be no absolute evil, no supreme principle of evil.* It is idle for fatalists and sceptics to deny or doubt the existence of evil in the world; it is, indeed, a

* See p. 156.

fact that we cannot understand, but not all our negations and all our doubts together are able to destroy it.

48. *The objection against Providence drawn from the existence of evil may be refuted indirectly by showing, first, that these two truths must be held as certain, even though they cannot be reconciled with each other; and secondly, that the existence of evil cannot be explained without admitting a divine Providence.*—When reason recognizes two truths as certain we may affirm, on the principle that truth never contradicts itself, that these two truths harmonize. Now, the existence of Providence is a truth demonstrated by reason; the existence of evil is a fact attested by experience. If, then, we are unable to discover their connecting link, we must ascribe it to the imperfection of our minds; for it would be as absurd to deny the one or the other as it would be foolish to deny the existence of a circle or a square, because one could not point out their common measure. Besides, it can be shown that the existence of evil in the world is so far from destroying divine Providence, that it can have no explanation without Providence. What, indeed, is evil? A privation of good, a deviation from order. Therefore evil is not possible unless the existence of good and of order be granted. But good is the effect of a good cause, and order presupposes Providence; therefore evil, far from militating against the goodness and providence of God, rather proves their existence. Therefore, instead of saying: Evil exists in the world, therefore there is no God; we should rather say: Evil exists in the world, therefore there is a God and a Providence.

49. *The objection against Providence drawn from the existence of evil may be refuted indirectly by showing*

that evil only serves to manifest in a more striking way the wisdom and goodness of divine Providence.—There are, according to some, three kinds of evil—metaphysical, physical, and moral. But metaphysical evil cannot be an objection against Providence, for it is nothing but the necessary imperfection of every creature. Therefore, properly speaking, it is not evil at all, and is reduced to the axiom, “The finite is not infinite.” Only pantheists have been able to deny this nominal evil.—Physical evil has been denied by the Stoics. But the physical disorders that do not depend on the liberty of man are either a particular effect of the general laws that give harmony to the world, or they are destined to afford man an occasion of gaining merit, or, lastly, they are a consequence and a punishment of moral evil.—The only difficulty, then, with regard to Providence, must come from moral evil. This evil consists in the inordinate act of a free agent, and is denied particularly by fatalists. The principle of this evil is liberty. But how can we suppose, some will ask, that a good God can have endowed His creatures with a privilege which for a great number results, on the one hand, in a resistance to the divine will, and consequently, in an attack upon the glory and holiness of the infinite Being; and, on the other hand, entails such chastisements that nothingness would be a benefit to the creatures subjected to them? Since God knew those who would break His law, why did He draw them from nothing and grant them a liberty that was to render them so guilty and so unfortunate? *

* This objection really comes from disguised anthropomorphism. It likens God to a bungling artisan, who begins a work but fails to fit it for its destined purpose, and then throws it aside to make another attempt with new material. Whoever says that God should

These difficulties are such as to move the imagination and the sentiment, but they are not founded in reason. For that God has created a world in which free creatures are subjected to trial and personally merit their happiness, is not contrary to God's goodness. If in consequence of this trial evil becomes possible, God first in His goodness places limits to evil, and by His wisdom and His power triumphs over it, and even draws good out of it. If to this be added the teachings of faith on the dogma of original sin and on that of the Incarnation, the moral evil that abounds in the world is easily explained, and the good, in a sense infinite, that results from the permission of evil, is better understood.

create those only whom He knows will be saved, thereby limits His power, His knowledge even, and His wisdom. He supposes that God has decreed to create A, for instance, but foreseeing that his career will end in eternal misery, He changes His decree and determines to create B. If He foresees that B will not prove a failure, He will create B. The objection is then plausible and insidious, but if sharply scrutinized becomes most absurd. When God creates He sees not only the actual career that will be lived by His creature, but likewise all possible contingencies. To suppose that He can fail in His work is to assert that He is not God; to say that He changes His decrees is to deny that He knows from all eternity the whole life of creatures, and to attack both His wisdom and His immutability. God gives to every creature the means to attain its end; more than this it cannot of right demand. The creative act, creatures, and the end of creatures are all good; eternal woe is the legitimate consequence of the creature's perversion of free will. See *A Skeptical Difficulty against Creation*, by R. F. Clarke, S. J., *American Catholic Quarterly Review*, vol. ii., p. 278.

MORAL PHILOSOPHY.

DEFINITION OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.—CHARACTER OF THE SCIENCE.—ITS EXCELLENCE.—ITS METHOD.—ITS DIVISION.

1. *Moral philosophy is a science which treats of the free actions of man, and directs them to his final end.*

2. *Moral philosophy is a practical science, because it serves to direct the will.*—Unlike Logic and Metaphysics, which require only acts of intellect, Moral Philosophy requires, besides, acts of the will. Hence, while they are speculative sciences, it is called a practical science.

3. *The excellence of moral philosophy follows from its very nature, and from its relations with the other sciences, particularly with the practical sciences, which it furnishes with their first principles.*—In itself moral philosophy is conversant about all that regulates and relates to man's will. Now, what is of greater importance to man than the proper direction of his will, since it is by this faculty that he is to attain the end of his existence? As to the relations of moral philosophy with the other sciences, on the one hand, it is manifestly the end of the speculative sciences, since the true should be known only with a view of thereby better practising the good; and, on the other hand, it lays down for the practical sciences, like jurisprudence, political economy, and æsthetics, those fundamental

principles without which they become deceitful and hurtful.

4. *The method of moral philosophy is to seek out the laws of morality by the light of reason guided by faith and history.* — The principles of moral philosophy should be founded on the natural light of reason aided and sustained by the teachings of faith. Revelation, which directs our feeble intelligence in the way of truth, is the more necessary in the study of morals, as the tumult of passions often so disturbs the judgment that the good is not duly esteemed, and the will is weak in putting that good into practice.

Moral science receives great help also from the study of history, which shows that the leading principles of justice and honor, in spite of many errors, have been maintained constant and uniform, throughout all ages and among all people.

There are three principal errors as to the method to be followed in the study of morals. *Rationalism* will have no other basis than independent reason. Such a pretension is opposed to the native imperfection of reason, and even to affirmations of experience. *Traditionalism*, going to the other extreme, holds that reason is unable to discover the moral laws, and knows them only by a primitive revelation from God, which has been handed down by tradition. This attacks the natural powers of reason, and thus does injury to God, from whom both reason and revelation proceed. In the last place, the *historical school* whose principles are illustrated in the writings of Savigny (1779–1861), Niebuhr (1776–1831), Eichhorn (1752–1827), instead of seeking the rule of morality in the nature of things, pretends to find it by induction in the study of history; “and therefore,” says Liberatore, “they hold that the equity of all laws is

to be judged from the times, inclinations, instincts, and different development of powers, and other circumstances that led to their enactment."* By this very fact it gives to morality a basis without consistency, and takes away from justice those characteristics of absolute and eternal which are its distinguishing property.

5. *Moral Philosophy is divided into two parts, Ethics and Natural Law; or, according to some, into General Ethics and Special Ethics.*—A human action may be viewed under two aspects, either abstractly and under the general conditions that constitute its morality, or concretely and in relation to the particular obligations that result from the order established by nature. The study of human actions from the former standpoint belongs to *Morals* or *General Ethics*; from the latter, to *Natural Law* or *Special Ethics*. Although distinct, the two sciences are closely united, standing in the relation of principles to their application.

* *Institutiones Philosophicæ*, vol. iii., p. 17.

ETHICS.

DIVISION.

6. *Ethics examines the moral goodness of human acts, and therefore should study: 1, the external objective cause of human actions, that is, their end; 2, the internal subjective cause, that is, the faculty that elicits them; 3, the constitutive principles of the morality of human actions; 4, the rule of human actions.*

CHAPTER I.

THE END OF HUMAN ACTIONS.

ART. I.—GOOD IN GENERAL AS THE END OF EVERY BEING,
AND THE FIRST PRINCIPLE OF ITS OPERATIONS.

7. *Every being has an end, which is the first principle of its operations.*—Every being has received from God with its existence a power to operate, a tendency to action, in harmony with its nature. This power cannot exist without an end or term; otherwise it would be a tendency tending to nothing. The term of the operations of a being is called its *end*. Such a term, such an end, has necessarily been given to every creature by the Supreme Ruler of the world; for He is infinite wisdom, and, therefore, cannot create any-

thing without fixing its end and giving it the means to attain that end. The end of a being is, therefore, the first principle, the external objective principle, of all its operations.

8. *The end of each being is one, as its nature is one.*—Unity is an essential property of every being. Since the end is proportionate to the nature, every being has, strictly speaking, but one end. When a being is thought to have several ends, then its last end has been confounded with the subordinate ends, which are rather to be called means.

9. *The operative power of a being is in perfect agreement with its nature ; hence, as the nature varies, so will there be a difference in the manner of attaining the end.*—Whatever is destitute of intelligence tends to its end by a blind impulse. Animals tend to it through sensitive perception ; but, being unable to abstract, and consequently to know, the relations of things, they cannot consider the object of their operation as an end ; their appetite is moved, not by a judgment on the fitness of the act, but by mere natural inclination. Man, on the contrary, can know the relations of things, considers the object as the end of his operations, and chooses freely the means of attaining his end.

10 *The good of each being is in its end.*—The operative power of a being is imperfect so long as the end is not attained ; but when that is compassed it is in repose, because it has obtained its natural perfection. The natural perfection of a being is its good ; therefore the good of each being is found in its end. But since the idea of good is intimately connected with that of end, the true good of a being does not consist in this or that subordinate end, but in the one end properly so called ; and this good is but one, as the

end is but one. This, however, is so far as it is objectively considered.*

11. *Good is honorable, pleasurable, or useful.*—The good if considered as end is called *honorable* or *virtuous* if it is sought for its own sake and agrees with right reason ; if considered in respect to the satisfaction which it affords its possessor, it is called *pleasurable* ; if considered as the means of attaining the end, it is called *useful*. Hence the useful is willed as means, the pleasurable as a consequence, but the honorable alone for itself. The same good may under different aspects be at the same time useful, pleasurable, and honorable. A useful good should be sought only as leading to an honorable good ; a pleasurable good, only as resulting from an honorable good.

12. *Order, as being a participation of the divine intelligence and will, is the last reason explaining the good.*—The true good of a being is always the good of order, because it is this good that befits the being according to its nature, that is, according to the place which God has assigned it in the general order of the universe.† Now, the order of the universe which results from the subordination of the special ends of each being to a single end is essentially good because it is the realization of the essentially good idea of the divine intelligence. Thus the last reason for which a being attains good in attaining its end is

* "Good takes the nature of end inasmuch as it objectively moves the will to act. . . . Whence end is only mentally distinguished from good" (Russo, *Prolecciones Philosophicæ*, p. 10, § 13). But good as a *means* is not end ; therefore not every good has the nature of end.

† See *Metaphysics of the School*, vol. i., pp. 500, 501, 506.

found in the intelligence and will of God, the infinite Good.*

ART. II.—THE SUPREME GOOD AS THE LAST END OF MAN.

13. *Rational good is the good proper to man's nature.*—Man is composed of body and soul, and hence there are for him two kinds of good. By his sensitive appetite he is drawn toward sensible good; by his intellectual appetite, toward spiritual good. But as these goods are often opposed, and as everything should conform to the order established by the Author of nature, the sensitive appetite should be subject to the intellectual appetite. Therefore the good proper to man is intellectual good. The sensible good is a true good if it is in conformity with reason; otherwise, although it be a good with regard to the body, it is an evil to the whole man, inasmuch as he is a being disposed with order; and if man tends to good not conformable to right reason, he does evil.

14. *The supreme good is man's last end.*—The last end of a being is but one; therefore the last end of man and the good that constitutes that end are but one. It is easily seen that this good can be nothing else but the supreme good, since it must be proportioned to man's nature. For as the intellect tends not to the particular true, but to the universal true, so the will tends not to the particular good, but to

* The end of a being "depends on the divine wisdom and goodness. For the natures and relations of things are dictated by the divine intellect contemplating the divine essence. Therefore, because the morality of human actions depends immediately on the order of things, it depends mediately on the divine wisdom and goodness" Liberatore, *Institutiones Philosophicæ*, iii., p. 50.

the universal, unlimited good. This tendency is so powerful in the will, that it always subsists, even when the will seems to follow a particular good. Besides, the repose, the happiness, which results from the end obtained, i. e., the good possessed, shows clearly what that good is whose possession procures perfect happiness. Now, perfect happiness should (1) fully satisfy the innate desires of the heart; (2) be immutable; (3) be eternal. But what good is there the possession of which can confer such happiness except the supreme good, the good than which nothing greater can be conceived?

15. *Pleasure cannot be man's supreme good.**—Pleasure is either corporeal or spiritual. Corporeal pleasure is not proportionate to man's intellectual nature. Spiritual pleasure or joy may be either limited and imperfect, or perfect. In the latter case it must result from the possession of the supreme good, but is not the supreme good itself; for pleasure or joy is subjective, the good that causes it objective.

16. *Knowledge and virtue attainable in this life cannot be man's supreme good.*—Knowledge and virtue in this life are great blessings and to be sought with diligence, but, aside from the imperfect way in which they are always possessed, they demand much labor and many sacrifices; hence they cannot be man's supreme good.

17. *Neither can knowledge and virtue together with pleasure be man's supreme good.*—In the first place, experience proves that this union is never complete and permanent in this life. In the second place, a collection of limited goods can never give more than a

* The contrary would be true were there no error in the dictum of Paley, "Pleasures differ in nothing but in continuance and intensity."

limited good, and therefore cannot satisfy the boundless desires of man.

18. *God alone is the supreme good.*—If the supreme good be not an empty abstraction, if man's desire for it be not an illusion of nature, we must admit that the supreme good is God, who alone is infinite, immutable, and eternal, and the knowledge and possession of whom can alone confer upon man supreme and perfect happiness.

19. *The supreme good is possessed radically by an act of the intellect.*—The will enjoys the good because it is present and possessed, but it is not possessed because the will takes complacency in it. It is the intellect that directly apprehends and possesses the object that constitutes the good; the enjoyment is the consequence of possession, not the possession itself.

20. *The human soul desires to enjoy the supreme good in union with the body.*—The human soul is made to be united to a body; hence it has a natural desire of resuming the body after being separated from it. Therefore, when the soul possesses the sovereign good, though it is then fully satisfied as to the object possessed, it is not so as to the manner in which it desires to possess it, which is in union with the body. And as this desire comes from nature, it will be satisfied. This argues for the resurrection of the body.

ART. III.—THE SUPREME GOOD IN RELATION TO MAN'S
LIFE UPON EARTH.

21. *Man cannot possess the supreme good in this life, but he ought to tend to attain it in the life to come.*—The knowledge that man has of God in this life is imperfect; hence his love of God and his happiness are also imperfect. But as his end cannot change its nature, man should so subordinate this life to the future as to attain in the latter the perfect possession of the supreme good.

22. *Man in this life must tend to the supreme good by his will.*—In this life man cannot possess the supreme good; but he should tend to it unceasingly, and in this his real perfection consists. But it is chiefly by the will that actions tend and are directed to an end. Therefore it is especially by the will that man attains his perfection in this world; as it is especially by the intellect that he will possess the supreme good in the other.

23. *The tendency of the will ought to be directed by the moral law.*—God, having created the world, must have proposed to Himself an end. The realization of this end constitutes the order of the world. This order, which is styled physical or moral, according as it refers to irrational or to rational beings, consists in this, that every being should remain in its place, act according to the laws imposed on it by God, and regulate its motions in harmony with those of other beings. Therefore the observance of this order constitutes the natural perfection of each being. As the physical order is fixed, irrational beings cannot disturb it; but the moral order man can depart from by the free election of his will. But because God cannot but will

that the order established by Him be maintained, it follows that if man wishes hereafter to possess God, the supreme good, he ought to direct and regulate his will according to the laws of the moral order.

24. *Conformity to the moral order constitutes for man an imperfect happiness in this life.**—Order for man consists chiefly in knowing and loving God. Now, as he will one day enjoy perfect happiness by the perfect knowledge and love of God, so by the knowledge and love of God which he will acquire in this life will he enjoy a sort of participation of the happiness of the other life, a happiness which hope will enable him to possess by anticipation.

* Yet for the enjoyment of the imperfect happiness attainable in this life man needs also not only a certain perfection of body and external goods as well, but naturally the society of friends. Cf. Zigliara, *Summa Philosophica*, M. 7, v. vi.

CHAPTER II.

SUBJECTIVE PRINCIPLES OF HUMAN ACTIONS.

ART. I.—THE FACULTY BY WHICH HUMAN ACTIONS ARE ELICITED.

25. *A human action is one that proceeds from a deliberate will.*—Intelligence and liberty constitute the specific difference between man and the rest of the visible creation. But since the actions by which a being attains its end are in harmony with the constitutive principles of its nature, human actions are, strictly speaking, those which proceed from a deliberate will, those which are elicited freely and with knowledge of the end. Actions that are not free are called actions of man, not *human actions*.*

26. *Twelve successive steps may be distinguished in human actions: 1, a simple apprehension of the good; 2, a simple volition to acquire it; 3, a judgment that the good is possible; 4, an intention of taking the means to attain it; 5, an examination of these means; 6, consent of the will to these means; 7, discernment of the fittest means; 8, a choice of this means; 9, an indication of what is to be done for the execution of the action; 10, an impulse given to the faculties or powers destined to*

* A *voluntary* action is done with knowledge of the end; a *free* action is done so that the same conditions remaining it need not have been done. A *human* action is therefore both *voluntary* and *free*. Man's desire of happiness is *voluntary*, but not *free*.

execute the action ; 11, the exercise of these faculties or powers ; 12, delectation of the will.—The first principle from which every human action proceeds is a necessary tendency of the will to good in general, just as every demonstrated truth is derived from a first indemonstrable truth. This natural impulse of the will being presupposed, the following order obtains among the successive steps of the intellect and will which constitute a human act : 1. The intellect proposes under the general form of good the end to be attained. 2. The will takes complacency in this good as good, and bids the intellect see whether the good is suitable and possible. 3. The intellect judges of its possibility. 4. The will is borne toward the end to be attained, really desires it, and bids the intellect seek the means. 5. The intellect points out the means. 6. The will approves of them and orders the fittest to be sought. 7. The intellect points it out. 8. The will chooses it and commands the intellect to prepare the means of executing the action. 9. The intellect indicates these means. 10. The will moves the faculties or powers that elicit the action. 11. These faculties or powers execute the command of the will. 12. The will rests in the completion of the action and in the end attained.

Of these subordinate actions the first four refer to the end of the action, considered, first, in a general way, then determinately and particularly ; the next four have as their object the means, which are first examined in general, and then the best is chosen ; the last four have for their object the execution of these means, and the repose and pleasure of the will in the accomplished action. In these subordinate actions, five judgments influence the will, which thereupon applies the intellect to new researches. To the fifth

action of the will the action of the eliciting power responds, and to this, in turn, the repose of the will. In this series of subordinate actions liberty is exercised every time the will acts. The human action subsists in all its essence when the will is making its election, its free determination ; but it subsists in all its integrity only when the action willed is executed. To sum up these results, every human action may be resolved into three principles : (1) An impulse of the will to good in general ; (2) knowledge of a particular good ; (3) liberty in the choice of this good. Without the first condition the will could not act ; without the second, it would have no direction ; without the third, it would not act conformably to its nature.

27. *A voluntary action is perfect or imperfect, direct or indirect, express or tacit, elicited or imperate.*—A voluntary action is *perfect* if it proceeds from an entire inclination of the will ; it is *imperfect* if it is done with a certain repugnance, or without a perfect knowledge of what is done. It is *direct* if it is actually produced by the will ; it is *indirect* if it happens through the omission of an action. It is *formal* or *express* if it proceeds from a proper action of the will ; it is *virtual* or *tacit* if it is willed not in itself but in something else. It is *elicited* if it is the action of the will itself ; it is *imperate* if it is elicited by other faculties at the command of the will.

28. *Violence, when absolute, renders the action involuntary ; when conditional, it makes it less voluntary.*—Since a voluntary action must be produced by an intrinsic principle, it no longer exists when the action proceeds from an extrinsic principle, such as absolute violence. Violence is defined as “an action proceeding from an extrinsic principle and opposed by the

subject.”* If the violence is only conditional or moral, it is absolutely possible not to do what is demanded, and hence the action is *voluntary*, though only partially so. Violence, be it noted, can be exercised only over imperate actions and never over actions elicited by the will.

29. *Fear makes the action less voluntary, but not absolutely involuntary.*—Fear is an impression resulting from a threatening evil difficult to avoid. This evil, it may indeed be said, does us a sort of violence, but the violence is purely conditional; free will is not destroyed, but only lessened.

30. *Ignorance, when invincible and opposed to the action of the will, renders the action involuntary.*—There is no voluntary action without knowledge; an action is, therefore, more or less voluntary according to the less or greater degree of ignorance. Ignorance is of three kinds: *antecedent* if it is in nowise willed and the action would not be done if there were knowledge; *consequent* if it is willed either expressly or implicitly; *concomitant* when knowledge is wanting, yet so that the action would be done if there were knowledge. Antecedent ignorance excludes all exercise of the will, because no knowledge is had of the object; consequent ignorance is willed implicitly, and hence does not entirely exclude knowledge; and the same is to be said of concomitant ignorance. Consequent ignorance is either *affected* if, by a direct act, one chooses to remain in ignorance, or *crass* if the means of acquiring the knowledge necessary to act with propriety are neglected.†

* Liberatore, *Institutiones Philosophicæ*, lib. iii., p. 66.

† Antecedent ignorance is called *invincible*, “because though all the means be employed which can humanly speaking be employed it cannot be dispelled.” Hence consequent ignorance is *vincible*, since

31. *Concupiscence does not make the action involuntary, but rather makes it more voluntary. If it precedes, it diminishes the free will, but not if it follows.*—Concupiscence is a movement of the sensitive appetite toward a pleasurable good; therefore it inclines the will to this good and gives greater intensity to the voluntary action. But when concupiscence precedes the voluntary action, it does a sort of conditional violence to the liberty of the will and consequently diminishes it; when, on the contrary, it follows the voluntary action, liberty remains, since the action has been freely elicited. Concupiscence even augments the moral value of the action if the will calls it expressly and intentionally to its aid.

ART. II.—THE PASSIONS.

32. *Passion is a movement of the sensitive appetite, proceeding from an apprehension of good or evil, and accompanied with some alteration of the body.*—The human soul, being substantially united to a body, possesses, besides the will or intellectual appetite, sensitive appetite or an inclination to sensible goods. The sensitive appetite is the seat of the passions. The cause which actually produces a passion is the good or evil apprehended by imagination. The particular note or character that accompanies it and distinguishes it from a purely voluntary motion is a physical, bodily change, which is due to the fact that the sensitive appetite resides in a corporeal organ.

33. *There are six passions of the concupiscible appe-*

it can be dispelled when those means are employed which can and should be employed. Cf. Zigliara, *Summa Philosophica*, M. 19, vi.

tite: Love and hatred, desire and aversion, joy and sadness. There are five passions of the irascible appetite: Hope and despair, daring and fear, and anger.—The passions are movements of the sensitive appetite, the divisions of which they therefore follow. Now, the sensitive appetite is concupiscible if it has for its object sensible good and evil taken absolutely; and irascible if it seeks good and evil as being arduous and difficult, in the one case to gain, in the other to avoid. The passions of the concupiscible appetite are six in number: Love and hatred, desire and aversion, joy and sadness. For when good is present, we *love* it; love begets *desire* if the good be absent; *joy* is repose in the possession of good. So, in the presence of evil, we first experience *hatred*; hatred engenders *aversion*, if the evil be absent; and when the evil here and now affects us, we feel *sadness*. There are five passions of the irascible appetite: Hope and despair, daring and fear, and anger. *Hope* lifts the mind toward a good that is difficult of attainment; *despair* casts it down at sight of the difficulty; *daring* faces the evil; *fear* shrinks from it; *anger* inflames us against the cause of the evil. All the passions of the irascible appetite proceed from a passion of the concupiscible part, and end in it. These two kinds of passion differ from one another, for those of the concupiscible appetite are all opposed in their object, but not all those of the irascible appetite. Anger has no opposite. All the secondary passions may be reduced to these eleven principal ones.*

* “Modern Psychology is accustomed to treat of several species of Feeling and Feelings in its theory of the third Faculty. We accordingly have discussions regarding the sympathetic, intellectual, æsthetic, moral, and religious emotions; and also of the feeling or sense of right, of the beautiful, of the noble, and of moral good, or

34. *The passions are in themselves morally neither good nor bad ; these qualities depend on their subjection to the empire of reason.*—The passions are movements of the irrational appetite, and hence are without either reason or liberty, the two conditions of all morality. If, however, the passions be considered as subject to

of æsthetic, moral, and religious feeling. If we admit no special Feeling-power, besides the faculties of Cognition and Conation [Appetite], where shall we dispose of these states ? It is not very difficult to find a place for them, if we only get a clear notion of what is meant by these names. The sympathetic emotions are, in general, joy or sorrow over the weal or woe of others. Those feelings are styled 'Æsthetic' which are awakened in the soul in the presence of the æsthetic excellence of the creations of human genius. Under the phrase 'Intellectual Feelings' are signified those agreeable or disagreeable affections, the cause and object of which is an activity of our intelligence in harmony or conflict with that intelligence. Finally, Moral and Religious Feelings are the appetencies of the soul in the presence of ethical good and ill with reference to the supernatural order. . . . The sense of the Beautiful and the Good, or Æsthetic and Moral Sentiment, is not a (special) energy, not a faculty of the soul, but simply the first attribute of every created spirit, *Rationality*. Rationality embraces a two-fold element. Our soul is rational on the one hand because its understanding is necessarily determined by Eternal Wisdom's laws of knowledge ; on the other, because there is impressed upon its appetency a natural bent towards what agrees with these laws of knowledge and with Uncreated Goodness, that is, towards the physically perfect and the ethically good, and therefore towards the Beautiful. This rationality, for reasons assigned elsewhere, does not manifest itself in all men in equal perfection, but in its essence it is present in all. Accordingly, in so far as no other agencies interfere, every man naturally knows and recognizes the Good, the Right, the Noble, the Beautiful, and the Great ; towards these he is impelled, these he embraces, these he loves, these he enjoys. On the other hand, Wickedness, Meanness, Ugliness, are for every man the object of aversion and displeasure." —Jungmann, *Das Gemüth und das Gefühlsvermögen*, cited in *Psychology*, Stonyhurst Series, pp. 417, 418.

the empire of the reason and the will, they share in the morality of voluntary actions.

35. *The passions of man should be controlled by reason.*—Order requires that the sensitive part of man's being should be directed by the intellect, which is superior. Therefore the passions should be subject to reason. Besides, the passions of themselves are blind, and in man, because of the help they receive from intellect and will, have a tendency to possess their object indefinitely in intensity and duration. Therefore reason should control them that it may establish them in order, whether as to their object or as to the manner in which they tend to it. Thus controlled, the passions attain their natural end, which is to facilitate the practice of virtue, and to excite and sustain man in the accomplishment of good.

ART. III.—VIRTUES AND VICES.

36. *Habit is a permanent quality residing in the powers of the soul, and inclining them to certain determinate actions.*—The will is not only roused to action by the apprehension of good and by the passions, it is also powerfully stimulated and aided by habit, i.e., a permanent quality which inclines the powers of the soul to certain determinate actions. Experience shows that habit gives not only perspicacity to the intellect, and promptitude to the memory, but likewise a great facility to the will in eliciting its acts.

37. *Good habits are called virtues ; bad habits, vices.*—As the will is free, it can form habits inclining it either to good or to evil ; in the former case, the habits are said to be good ; in the latter, to be bad. Good habits constitute what are known as virtues ; bad habits are called vices. Therefore virtue is defined

as "a perfection by which the will is constantly inclined to good actions;" and vice as "an imperfection of the will constantly inclining it to bad actions."

38. *Man needs virtue to act perfectly.*—To be disposed with perfect order to the accomplishment of good, man must be able to do it constantly, promptly, and with pleasure. Now, so to act is the property of habit. Therefore virtue, which is merely a good habit, is necessary to man for the accomplishment of good in a perfect manner.

39. *Virtues are naturally acquired only by frequent acts.*—The will is of itself indifferent to this or that particular good. Therefore, to incline it by preference to the moral good, there must be a special inclination added to its nature, forming, as it were, a second nature. This inclination is acquired only by a repetition of acts, as experience proves.

40. *Virtue lies in the mean.*—Virtue is such when it maintains human actions in conformity with right reason; but this conformity lies in the mean between excess and deficiency; therefore every moral virtue lies in a mean.

41. *There are four principal moral virtues: Prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude.*—As in man there are two principles of action, so there are also two generic classes of virtue. Every virtue that perfects the intellect, as "wisdom" and "science," is called an *intellectual* virtue. Every virtue that perfects the appetite, whether rational or sensitive, is a *moral* virtue. There are as many principal moral virtues as there are faculties that concur in the moral action and may be the subject of habit in reference to the action. But these faculties are four in number: reason, will, and sensitive appetite, which latter is divided into the concupiscible and the irascible appetite. Hence there

are four principal virtues: *prudence*, which enlightens the reason as to what should be done; *justice*, which inclines the will to render to everyone his due;—for in what regards himself man does not need this virtue, since he naturally always desires his own good sufficiently; *temperance*, which regulates the concupiscible appetite and checks the inordinate pursuit of sensible goods; *fortitude*, which perfects the irascible part when there is difficulty either in acquiring good or avoiding evil.

CHAPTER III.

MORALITY OF HUMAN ACTIONS.

ART. I.—ON WHAT THE MORALITY OF HUMAN ACTIONS DEPENDS.

42. *The morality of human actions consists in their relation to the end of man.*—Human actions are morally good when they lead man to his end; they are morally bad when they turn him from that end. For it belongs to every moral agent to act according to order, that is, with due subordination of means to its ultimate end.*

43. *The ultimate external criterion of morality is the good of order apprehended by reason.*—Man's perfection consists in attaining his end, and his actions are the means by which he tends to that end. But, since God has given man both his being and his end, and since there is an intimate connection between the end and the means to attain it, it follows that these means are also given to man, and do not, in their relation to his end, depend on his free choice. But this close dependence of the means on the end constitutes the *good of order*, which, however, does not become the term

* Pantheists must logically deny the existence or the possibility of *moral* action, for they assert that God alone acts in creatures. Men, therefore, can be neither responsible nor free. A like conclusion must be drawn from the doctrines of those materialists who teach that morality is but a function of the brain.

of a voluntary action until apprehended by reason. Therefore a human action is morally good when it is conformed to the good of order apprehended by reason, and it is morally bad in the contrary case. What constitutes the morality of an action is, then, something independent of man, and there is an intrinsic and objective difference between good and evil.*

44. *The ultimate criterion of morality is not education, as Montaigne held ; nor the opinion of peoples, as Saint-Lambert pretended ; nor human laws, as Hobbes asserted ; nor the good pleasure of God, as Puffendorf taught.*—The good of order which requires that each being should tend to an end conformable to its nature, is immutable like God himself, who being infinite wisdom cannot create a being destitute of an end, or with an end contrary to its nature. Therefore morality is immutable in its fundamental principles. But education, the opinion of peoples, and human laws are changing and variable ; therefore they cannot be sources of morality. Besides, we judge of opinions, laws, and systems of education as to whether they are good or bad ; therefore opinions, laws, and educational systems imply a higher principle on which they depend. As to the good pleasure of God, it is evident that, whatever Descartes (1596–1650) and Puffendorf (1632–1694) may say, what God could have willed otherwise than He does will, cannot be the source of morality, which is essentially immutable, since God having created man for a determinate end cannot but will honorable actions as leading to that

* This conclusion overthrows the doctrine of Antinomies, set forth by the Transcendental School of Germany, in its application to moral science.

end, and detest sinful actions as averting from that end.*

45. *The judgment of the morality of actions belongs to intellect and reason alone.*—Truth is the proper object of intellect and reason; but, whether truth be speculative or practical, its nature does not change, since the difference is only accidental. Since, then, the judgment of the morality of actions is only a judgment about practical truth, it belongs to intellect and reason. Whatever sceptics may say, reason cannot be deceived as to first practical principles and their immediate consequences, any more than it can be deceived as to first speculative principles and the truths derived from them directly. The greater opposition manifested to first practical principles is explained by their end, which is to control the passions and subject them in all things to right reason.

46. *It is absurd to say, with the Scotch school, that the judgment of the morality of actions belongs to a spiritual sense; still less is it to be admitted, with the materialists, that it belongs to a corporeal sense.*—The spiritual sense, as understood by the Scotch philosophers, Reid (1710–1796), Hutcheson (1694–1747), and Adam Smith (1723–1790), is a blind inclination that makes us judge spontaneously of moral good or evil. But man is intelligent and free, and can by no means be absolutely subject to the impulse of blind instinct. It is evi-

* “No power in heaven above, nor on earth beneath, can dispense from any portion of the Natural Law. For the matter of the negative precepts of that law is . . . something bad in itself and repugnant to human nature, and accordingly forbidden by God; while the matter of the positive precepts is something good and necessary to man, commanded by God.”—*Moral Philosophy*, Stonyhurst Series, p. 149.

dent that the corporeal sense of the Sensists, Locke (1632-1704), Helvetius (1715-1771), Bentham (1748-1832), etc., cannot form moral judgments that are in themselves immutable and universal, for every sensation is essentially variable and particular.

ART. II.—CONSTITUENT PRINCIPLES OF THE MORALITY OF HUMAN ACTIONS.

47. *The object of volition* apprehended by reason is the first principle of the morality of an action.*—The good of order is the foundation of morality. But the object presented to the will by reason, and viewed not simply but as agreeing with right reason, is the term of the action and specifies it. Therefore, according as this object is conformed to good order or not, the action will be good or bad, and the object will be the first constituent principle of the morality of the action, and by it the objective intrinsic difference between a good action and a bad one will be established. Therefore the object may be called the *formal principle* of a moral action, since it is, as it were, its substantial form; the free act or election of the will may be called the *matter* of a moral action.

48. *The circumstances of an action are the constituent principle of its accidental morality.*—The object of the action and the unchangeable relation of the object to absolute order constitute the substance of the morality of an action; the accompanying circumstances are as the accidents of that morality. The perfection of the nature of beings depends not only on their substance, but also on their accidents; so, too, will the

* The object of volition includes both the end willed and the means to the end.

moral action be more or less perfect not only from its substance, but also from the accidents that accompany it, i.e., the circumstances. The principal circumstances are : The *person who acted, what he did, by what means, in what manner, in what place, and at what time.**

49. *The end of the subject operating is causally the constituent principle of the subjective morality of the action.*—Besides the natural end of the action (*finis operis*), there is the end depending on the subject operating (*finis operantis*), which may be identical with the former or different from it. If the object of the action is conformed to order, but the end of the subject is opposed to order, the end vitiates the action by the evil that it contains ; in the contrary case it perfects it. If the object of the action is opposed to order, the end of the subject operating, even if it be conformed to order, will never make good what is intrinsically bad. This end, depending only on the will of the subject operating and distinct from the natural end of the action, determines the *subjective* morality of the action ; the object and the circumstances constitute its *objective* morality.

50. *That an action may be good, it must be without defect in its object, in its circumstances, and in its end.*—The three constituent principles of the morality of an action are the object, end, and circumstances ; hence an action is good when each of these three principles is conformed to order (*Bonum ex integra causa*). If even

* It must be borne in mind that these circumstances are not elements essential to the physical integrity of a human action, for such elements are contained in its *object* ; but they are *accidentally* connected with the causes of the action. The priestly character of a person, for example, may affect the morality of an action. So, too, theft acquires a new species of malice when the object stolen is one consecrated to God.

one of these principles is contrary to order, the action will be bad, at least in part (*Malum ex quocumque defectu*).

51. *Although abstractly there may be indifferent actions, in the concrete there can be none.*—It is the object that specifies the action. Now, as there are objects indifferent in themselves, i.e., presenting neither agreement nor disagreement with order, there are, therefore, actions indifferent in themselves. But in the concrete every action is vested with morality because of its circumstances, or, at least, of its end. For every action elicited with advertence of reason* is either ordained to an end or it is not. If it is so determined, it will necessarily be either good or bad. If it is not determined, it will in so far be bad, because every action ought to be in the order of reason, and reason demands that everything be conducted to its proper end. The external act that follows the action of the will, though in itself not free, and therefore not possessing a morality of its own, may yet accidentally affect the morality of the action of the will, since it gives to it greater intensity, implies a greater affection for it, and a fuller advertence to it.

ART. III.—IMPUTABILITY.

52. *Imputability is that quality in virtue of which every free action is attributed to some one as its author, just as an effect is referred to its cause.*—The man who acts freely is the true cause of the action; it is, therefore, with reason that every free action is attributed

* The discussion turns solely upon human actions, and therefore actions that are indeliberate, or necessary, or supernatural are excluded.

to him who does it. This attribution is called *imputability*, and although always joined to morality is yet distinct from it, since it does not constitute the morality of an action, but is rather a consequence of it.

53. *From the imputability of human actions arises the reason of praise or blame.*—When a moral action is imputed to a man, he is considered as the author of the resultant good or evil, and is therefore judged worthy of esteem or contempt, of praise or blame. To praise or blame anyone is nothing but to impute to him the goodness or malice of his action.

ART. IV.—MERIT AND DEMERIT.

54. *Merit is that by which an action deserves recompense ; demerit is that by which it deserves punishment.*—Conscience testifies to us that according as an action is good or bad it deserves to be rewarded or punished. Merit and demerit are, therefore, qualities that flow from an action as a consequence of its morality. The good merited is called a reward if preceded by no compact, otherwise it is pay. The evil merited is punishment, which, however, not all men may inflict upon those who injure them, for in most cases recourse should be had to the tribunals lawfully established for that purpose.*

55. *Man by his actions may merit or demerit from his*

* Merit is *condign* (*de condigno*) if it is founded in the very work that is freely done, or in some compact. It is *congruous* if founded in the benevolence or liberality of him who bestows the reward.

The conditions requisite for acquiring merit or demerit are: 1° That the action be free ; 2° that it benefit or injure some other person than the agent ; 3° that it be not obligatory from some previous contract.

fellow-man.—Man may do a good action that profits his fellow-man, or an evil action that injures him. Order requires that in the former case he receive a recompense in return ; and, in the latter case, a punishment, that there may be a proportion between what he gives and what he receives.

56. *Man by his actions may merit or demerit from society.*—Every man is a member of society. Therefore whoever does good or evil to his neighbor should receive a reward or a punishment not only from him, but from society, because to benefit or injure a member is to benefit or injure the whole body. If one does good or evil directly to society, he should first be rewarded or punished by it, and afterward by its members. If one even does good or harm to himself, he should likewise receive recompense or incur penalty from society, because he is a member.

57. *Man may by his actions acquire merit or demerit before God.*—It is a duty for man to tend to God. Therefore if by his actions he departs from God, he deprives God of the glory due Him as the supreme good, and consequently he should be punished. Again, God is the sovereign legislator of the universe. Therefore an action merits or demerits before Him in proportion to its conformity or non-conformity to the universal order.

CHAPTER IV.

LAW, THE RULE OF HUMAN ACTIONS.

ART. I.—MORAL DUTY.

58. *Moral duty is the moral obligation resulting from the connection of the last end with the means necessary to attain it.*—Man is obliged to tend to his last end. But as it is necessary to take means to reach this end, it follows that these means are imposed on him as well as the end. The obligation of employing these means constitutes moral duty. If the means are conformed to the end, but not necessarily bound up in it, they are not imposed by an obligation in the strict sense of the word; if a man uses them he does a moral action, but he does not perform a duty, properly so called. Therefore a moral action is *honorable* when it is not commanded; it is *just* when it is obligatory. If the action be indifferent to the attainment of the end, it is then called *lawful*.

59. *Moral duty is primitive or derivative, negative or positive.*—*Primitive* duty is that which is founded in man's necessary and essential relations to his end; such is the obligation "to love God." *Derivative* duty is that which arises from a primitive duty in consequence of some fact dependent on our liberty; as the duty "to fulfil an engagement one has made." *Negative* duty is that which forbids something; thus are we bound "not to lie." *Positive* duty is that

which commands something; as the duty of "loving our parents." When a duty answers to some one's right, it is called *juridical*; such is the duty of "paying our debts."

60. *The obligation of duty harmonizes with free will, because it is moral and not physical.*—A being is not free when subjected to physical violence; but when man apprehends by reason the necessary connection between means and end, he preserves in his will the power to employ these means or not. Therefore he remains free, and is under a moral obligation only.

61. *Duty is absolute, immutable, and universal.*—Duty is *absolute* like man's end, since it is the necessary means of attaining the end. But though absolute as to the obligation that it imposes, it has degrees relatively to the greater or less moral perfection which it imparts to man. Thus duties to God are more perfect than any others; and duties to ourselves take precedence of those that we owe our neighbor. By the very fact that duty is absolute, it is clear that it must be *universal* and *immutable*; for all men have the same nature, which can no more change in its end than in its essence.

62. *When several duties conflict, the most perfect is binding.*—Thus if, in a given case, a duty to God and a duty to ourselves cannot be accomplished without the sacrifice of one of them, it is patent that the second should be sacrificed. So, too, if a duty to ourselves conflicts with a duty to our neighbor, the latter should be sacrificed; for the bond of identity with ourselves is more intimate than that of likeness with our neighbor, which is the basis of our duties to him. Hence, in general, the perfection of a duty is determined from the dignity of the power that imposes it, or

from the gravity of its matter, or the strength of its motive.*

63. *In certain cases, necessity excuses from duty.*—The necessity is extreme, grave, or common, according as a man cannot fulfil the duty without exposing himself to an extreme evil, as death, or a grave evil, as loss of health, or an ordinary evil, as a slight loss of fortune. This last necessity never excuses from duty. The other two necessities do not excuse from a primitive and negative duty, because the natural law forbids what is essentially evil; and as no circumstance can change the nature of the evil, so is it equally incapable of rendering it lawful.† But if a duty is positive, an extreme or grave necessity may entirely exempt from it if the transgression of a negative duty is not thereby involved,‡ or allow one to put off fulfilling it to a more suitable time, because a positive duty does not always oblige us to perform the action commanded, but only in a fitting time and occasion. When the duty is derivative, excepting a few cases that are easily recognized,§ necessity ex-

* Cf. Russo, *De Philosophia Morali Prælectiones*, p. 106, § 145.

† “Therefore negative precepts oblige *always and at all times* (*semper et ad semper*), as the Schoolmen expressed it, that is, in every place, at all times, and in every circumstance; . . . positive precepts oblige *always* . . . but not *at all times*, so as thereby to oblige a man, for instance, at all times, in all places and circumstances to perform a prescribed act of virtue.”—Zigliara, *Sum. Phil.*, M. 30, v.

‡ For valid exemption, however, the necessity must be “a) independent of our will, . . . b) extreme or at least grave, . . . such as a notable loss of reputation, health, or material goods.”—Russo, *De Phil. Mor. Præ.*, p. 107, § 147.

§ As included in these few cases Liberatore mentions neglect of duty when the public welfare or the security of the state would be menaced or impaired thereby; or the breaking of a contract the ob-

cuses from fulfilling it, because then the matter is indifferent in itself, and is binding only by reason of a circumstance freely posited by man.

ART. II.—RIGHT.

64. *The obligation of duty implies an inviolable moral power in respect to the actions and things necessary to fulfil the duty. This moral power is a right.*—If the obligation of attaining his end imposes a duty on man, it thereby grants him a *right*, that is, a moral power in respect to the necessary actions or things to fulfil the duty. This power is called *moral*, because it is found in moral beings only, and also to distinguish it from physical force. It is called *inviolable*, because as it rests upon order, no one can prevent its exercise. Lastly, this power is said to be exercised *upon actions or things* to indicate what the right is applied to, viz., action or the matter of action. Four things enter into the consideration of every right: a “*subject* in which that power is moral and inviolable; a *term* in respect to which that power is inviolable and which is bound not to injure it; a *title* which both produces that power in a subject and manifests it to others, by whom it is to be respected.” *

65. *Absolutely, right precedes duty; relatively, duty precedes right.*—Considered in itself right precedes duty, for it is from God’s sovereign right over us that every duty flows. But if right and duty are considered relatively, i.e., as both are found in man, then we must say that duty precedes right, because

servance of which would involve some danger, provided this difficulty had been supposed as reasonably included in the contract.

* Russo, *De Philosophia Morali Prælectiones*, p. 99, § 134.

man enjoys rights only in so far as he is bound to attain an end, for the gaining of which he must have the power to exercise his activity and to make use of many things.* When a duty is obligatory only because a right is actually exercised, then actual right precedes actual duty.

66. *Right is necessary or arbitrary, connatural or acquired, negative or positive, rigorous or not rigorous, personal or delegated or real.*—Right is *necessary* or *inalienable* when it is the sole indispensable means of fulfilling a duty; such is the “right of a father to the respect of his son,” corresponding to the father’s duty of educating his son. Right is *arbitrary* or *alienable* when one may or may not exercise it without violating duty; as the “right of a creditor to be paid by his debtor.” Right is *connatural* when it is founded in the very nature of man; as the “right to defend one’s life.”—Connatural rights, says Russo (p. 102, § 139), are chiefly four: Man’s right of tending to his ultimate end, arising from his personal dignity; the right to preserve his life unharmed; the right to independence in the lawful exercise of his faculties; the right to his own perfection. Right is *acquired* when it is founded on a fact freely caused either by one’s own action, as the “right of dominion arising from occupation,” or by the action of another person, as the “right of a child or minor,” or from both together, as a “master’s right to be served by his domestics.”—*Negative* right is that which imposes on others no obligation but that of not violating it, as the “right

* This statement allows some exceptions. “A man may have a right conjoined with a duty not of justice, of course, but of some other virtue—not to use that right. Such are sundry rights of the rich trenching on the poor.”—*Moral Philosophy*, Stonyhurst Series, p. 248.

of property." *Positive* right is that which imposes an obligation of doing or giving something, as the "right to be paid by one's debtor."—*Rigorous* or *perfect* right is that which rests on an evident title and has determinate matter; such is the "right to be paid a definite sum acknowledged by the debtor." If the matter be not determinate, the right is *imperfect*, as the "right to pity or friendship." A right is more or less *rigorous* according to the greater or less determination of the title and matter of the right.—Right is *personal* when it is inherent in the person of its possessor. It is *delegated* when it has been communicated to another. It is *real* when it is considered as inherent in some thing which a person possesses.

67. *Every right is essentially coercive.*—If intellect and will can act in virtue of right, they can likewise move the inferior powers to operate. Therefore, if in virtue of some right the will of a person can be morally compelled to some thing, so can the executive powers residing in the organism be compelled to some thing, and this is nothing else than *coaction*. It is to be noted, however, that coaction can be exercised only when the right is perfect; but very often in civil society it cannot be exercised by the possessor of the right, and then recourse should be had to the lawfully appointed guardian of the rights of the citizens.

68. *In a conflict of rights* the less right yields to the*

* Viewed abstractly rights cannot conflict, but in their actual exercise one may impede another. If the conflict has been caused voluntarily, then its author loses his right. If the conflict is involuntary and the rights are equal, then he whose right is oldest prevails; if the rights were acquired at the same time, then might decides the conflict, unless the matter of the rights be divisible. If the rights are unequal, the more perfect should prevail. Cf. Russo, *De Phil. Mor. Præl.*, pp. 104, 105.

greater.—Thus, as divine right excels human, so should it prevail. But when the conflict ceases, the less right regains its power, because the order whence it is derived also exists.

69. *Every right surpassing its natural limits is subversive of order.*—Absolutely, duty is the foundation of human right; if, therefore, a right passes the limits fixed by duty, which is its foundation, it is no longer according to order. Whence it happens that a right may have for its matter, (1) the means without which the end cannot be attained; (2) the means that lead to the end of the law, but not those that avert from the end and are evil; (3) finally, everything that one is bound by another person to preserve.*

ART. III.—LAW IN GENERAL.

70. *To the idea of right and of duty answers the idea of law.*—Where duty is, there also is necessarily a law which imposes it; just as where right is present, there is a moral power over an action or a thing, there also is necessarily a law which gives this right and commands it to be respected by others.

71. *Law in general is a rule by which beings are directed to their proper end.*—In every created being there is a necessary connection between its nature and its end. Therefore, for every creature the directing of itself toward its end constitutes the rule of its perfection or its law.

72. *Moral law is the direction toward its end imparted to a rational creature by his superior.*—The term law is applied to the tendencies flowing from the nature and constitution of irrational creatures and man-

* Cf. Zigliara, *Summa Philosophica*, M. 28, viii.

ifested, except on occasion of divine interference, in an unvariable uniformity of "coexistence and succession, connecting certain effects with certain causes, so that when the conditions are present the effect invariably follows;" this is *physical* law. But the term has an application special to Ethics; for, besides the condition of all law, which is to direct any being whatever to its end, *moral* law implies, first, the idea of obligation, and this idea supposes superiority in him who binds and dependence in him who ought to obey; secondly, moral law implies freedom in the subject, who is bound to obey not by physical necessity but by moral obligation.

73. *Law is divine or human. Divine law is eternal, natural, or positive. Human law is ecclesiastical or civil.*—The *eternal* law is the imprescriptible order of what is to be done, such as it exists from all eternity in the divine mind. *Natural* law is a participation of the eternal law, by which the reason of man is enlightened and can discern good from evil. *Positive* law determines certain things that are according to the natural law indifferent.* It is defined as *A prescription of reason for the common good promulgated by him who has the care of the community.* When positive law is made by man it is called *human*, and is either *ecclesiastical* or *civil* according as it proceeds from the authority of Church or State.

74. *The necessity of law for men arises from two causes: one objective, the creative act; the other subjective, the nature of man.*—Every creature, by the fact that it has received its nature from God, has also received its law from Him. But besides his nature of

* Those actions are said to be indifferent which are "not determined by the natural law, and are in conformity with it." Zigliara.

mere creature, man has a rational principle, by which he perceives the intimate connection existing between his nature and his end, and his obligation of tending to that end by means that really lead thereto.

ART. IV.—THE ETERNAL LAW.

75. *Above all other law is the eternal law ; from it all other laws derive their force.*—Since all law implies direction to an end, and since God is above all other ends, being the supreme end to which all others are subordinate, it follows that there is also a law on which all other laws depend. This is the *eternal* or *divine* law.

76. *The eternal law is the imprescriptible order of what is to be done, as it exists from all eternity in the divine mind.**—Order exists in the world ; but this order supposes the intelligence of God which conceives it, and His will which causes it to persist. The eternal law is only the order so conceived and willed by God from all eternity.

77. *The eternal law is the first fundamental principle of morality.*—The distinction between good and evil is founded on the unchangeable relations of things ; but these relations are only the external realization of order as it exists from all eternity in the divine mind and will.

ART. V.—THE NATURAL LAW OF CONSCIENCE.

78. *The natural law of conscience is a participation of the eternal law in a rational creature, enabling him to discern good from evil.*—Man no sooner perceives or-

* St. Augustine defines it : “ The reason or will of God bidding the natural order to be kept, and forbidding it to be disturbed.”

der than he conceives it to be the expression of a will essentially right and just, and so he rises to a knowledge of God as the supreme legislator of this order. Therefore, as the law of order considered in God is the *eternal* law, so viewed as it is in human reason it is the *natural* law of conscience. These two laws differ as to the intellect that knows them, and as to their object; that of the eternal law being universal, that of the natural law being particular because referred exclusively to man.

79. *The law of conscience has three principal marks: it is necessary, absolute, and universal.*—It is *necessary* because it rests on the necessary relation of nature to end, which has been determined from all eternity by the divine mind. It is *absolute* and immutable, because the ideal relations of things, being founded on the very essences of such things, are absolute and immutable. It is *universal*, because it is imposed upon all intelligent and free creatures, applies to all their free actions, extends to all times and places; for being founded on the very nature of rational beings it must prevail wherever that nature exists.

80. *Conscience and the universal assent of mankind attest the existence of the natural law.*—Every man hears within him a voice telling him that such an action is good or evil; this voice he may disregard, but he can never completely silence. So all peoples in all times have admitted a distinction between justice and injustice, and upon it have based all their legislation.

81. *The existence of the natural law is also proved from the nature of the human will and from our idea of divine wisdom.*—A faculty cannot act unless it be determined to action by its object. But the determining principle of the will must be a law or moral obli-

gation that moves it without doing it violence. But since the will can be determined by law only, this law must necessarily be in reason, the faculty that directs the will. Besides, since God wishes man's good, He must have given him the means of attaining it; but in view of man's free will this means must be the command to do what is right and shun what is wrong.

82. *It is an error to sustain, with rationalists, the autonomy of reason.*—If God exists, we must necessarily depend on Him. But if we are unwilling to admit the existence of God, evidently our reason cannot impose an obligation on us, since it is not above us; for an obligation, says Liberatore, implies an exercise of jurisdiction and power on the part of him who obliges, and therefore supposes a real distinction between superior and subject. Therefore, to admit the autonomy of reason is to destroy all morality.*

83. *The natural law is known naturally by reason and conscience.*—To oblige, a law must be known and promulgated. But the natural law has for its proper object the first principles of morality, and for its secondary object the consequences of these principles. The first principles of morality, like the first principles of thought, are known by the intellectual light of which the human intellect is possessed, and which is a reflection of the intellectual light of God Himself. The application of these first principles to particular actions is made by reason. To aid his reason God has given man an interior voice that approves his conduct

* This theory has been styled Independent Morality, and by Kant, who professes it, the *Categorical Imperative*. Kant's doctrine makes the human intellect absolutely independent of all law, and hence man is no longer a creature, but is identified with God.

when he does good and reproves him when he does evil. This interior voice is called *conscience*.

84. *The natural law is the foundation of the positive law.*—The positive law is of force only when it obliges to the observance of the positive precepts of God or those that proceed from lawful human authority and are not contrary to the commandments of God. Now, it is a principle of the natural law that we must obey God and those to whom He has communicated a share in His authority. Besides, the precepts of the positive law are most frequently only particular applications of some precept of the natural law, or determinations of what is undetermined by the natural law.

ART. VI.—SANCTION OF MORAL LAW.

85. *Sanction of moral law is the reward determined by the lawgiver for those who observe the law, and the punishment decreed for those who transgress it.**

86. *Moral law necessarily has some sanction.*—Justice demands that for the merit inherent in good, and the demerit inherent in evil, there should be a corresponding recompense or penalty. Moreover, the sanctity of God requires that He should practically distinguish good from evil by rewarding the former and punishing the latter. Finally, the wisdom of God demands that He have means for securing the fulfill-

* "It is true that human law specifies no particular reward for obedience to it, because obedience to the law is sufficiently rewarded by the good which it does for the whole community and for every one in the community; nor is it possible for human government otherwise to reward obedience to its laws. It is, perhaps, from this circumstance that some authors are led to conceive that the whole sanction of law consists in punishment."—Hill, *Moral Philosophy*, pp. 154, 155.

ment of the law ; but this can be effected only by rewards and punishments.

87. *The sanction of the moral law is of three kinds : that of conscience, that of society, and that of God.*—The free actions of man refer to himself, to society, and to God ; therefore sanction must be of three kinds. In the individual order there is remorse or peace of conscience ; in the social order there are rewards and punishments established in society ; and in regard to God there is the reward or punishment that He reserves for those that keep or break His law.

88. *An adequate sanction of the natural law can be found only in the life to come.*—It is evident that neither the testimony of conscience nor the punishments and rewards of this life are a sanction proportionate to moral good and evil. For this good or evil has a direct or indirect reference to the infinite good ; therefore the reward or punishment must be in some way infinite ; but this cannot be here below. Besides, it is often necessary to give up one's life in the practice of good, or to expose one's self to great sufferings ; therefore there must be another life where good receives its recompense. So, too, the commission of evil often brings temporal goods in its train ; therefore it must be punished in a life to come.*

89. *The sanction of the law consists chiefly in the possession or the loss of the sovereign good.*—Good actions are so many steps by which man tends to the sovereign good ; whereas by evil actions he withdraws farther and farther from this good. Therefore it is meet that the just attain the end to which they tend, and

* A perfect sanction should always correspond to the degree of virtue or vice, and should outweigh both the evil incurred in observing the law and the good to be gained in breaking it. Cf. Russo, *De Mor. Phil. Præf.*, p. 87, § 119.

rejoice in its possession, and that the wicked be deprived of that good. Since there are different degrees in the goodness of the former and in the malice of the latter, it is also just that there should be a diversity in their rewards and punishments respectively.

To those who object that everlasting punishment is unjust, the answer may be given that punishment is not merely "*medicinal*," or for the amendment of the culprit, but it is also *deterrent*, an example to the community, and *retributive*, as affording satisfaction to the injured party. Now, eternal punishment is the reparation due to God for a grievous transgression of His law. The justice of punishment is not to be estimated by its duration, but by its proportion to the offence. But the gravity of the offence is determined by its nature and by the dignity of the offended party. Now, God is the greatest of all beings, and sin is the greatest of evils. For, says St. Thomas,* "In the judgment of God the will is taken for the deed; for as men see what is done externally, so God beholds the hearts of men. Now, he who for a temporal good has turned away from his ultimate end, which is possessed forever, has preferred the *temporal* enjoyment of that temporal good to the everlasting enjoyment of his ultimate end. Whence it is evident how much more he would have wished to possess that temporal good *everlastingly*. Therefore in the judgment of God he ought so to be punished as if he had sinned everlastingly. But it is unquestionable that an everlasting sin merits an everlasting punishment. Therefore everlasting punishment is due to him who has turned away from his ultimate end."

* *Contra Gentes*, 1. iii., c. cxliv., n. 4; cf. Russo, *De Mor. Phil. Præf.*, p. 90 et seq.

ART. VII.—THE FIRST PRECEPT OF THE NATURAL LAW.

90. *All the precepts* of the moral law are reduced to one fundamental precept called the Categorical Imperative.*†—All the precepts of the moral law have a common element in which they are identified, and from which they draw all their force. This element, this first principle, must be known to give order and unity to moral science.

91. *The first principle of the moral law must be irreducible; it must be evident and universal.*—The first moral precept must be *irreducible*, otherwise it would be neither the first nor the supreme principle. It must be *evident*, for it is destined to account for all other moral precepts. It must be *universal*, since it must include what all other moral principles implicitly contain, and serve as their foundation.

92. *The first precept of the moral law is, Do good and avoid evil.*—As whatever is apprehended by the intellect has the note of being, so whatever is sought by the will has the nature of good. Every agent acts for an end, and this end is good. Therefore the first principle of practical reason is founded in the good, and is this: "Good is that to which all things tend."

* Law differs from precept in that the former looks to the common good; the latter to some individual benefit. Again, law refers to the end to be attained, whereas a precept refers only to means to that end. Cf. Zigliara, *Sum. Phil.*, M. 22, vi.

† The Categorical Imperative, as here understood, is the fundamental principle of the moral law which obliges all men. Hence it is not exposed to the absurdities of Kant's Categorical Imperative, which, in the words of Joseph Rickaby, S. J., "makes the reason within a man not the promulgator of the law to him, but his own legislator."

The first precept of the law is, therefore, "Do good and avoid evil." This principle cannot be reduced to any other principle, it is evident and universal. From it is derived the norm of moral excellence. Since man is constituted with reason, and order answers to reason, human good lies especially in order. From the first precept of the law is derived the precept of *observing order*.

ART. VIII.—FALSE SYSTEMS OF MORALITY AS DERIVED FROM THEIR FIRST MORAL PRECEPT.

93. *Since the first moral precept is the basis of the whole moral science the various systems of morality may be classified according to their first precept.*—Every system is determined by its principle; therefore an exact division of the systems of morality can be made according to the principle on which each rests. But the first moral precept is to do good; therefore systems of morality vary according to the diverse ways in which they understand the nature of that good to which man should tend. All subjective systems, says Zigliara,* are based on the principle that *man is the measure of morality as he is the measure of the truth of things*.

94. *Utilitarianism, the system of interest, in which the only good is the useful, is false, because it excludes a constituent element of the good, i.e., the absolute.*—In Utilitarianism the only good is the *useful*, whether with respect to the individual or to society. The system of personal interest or individual utilitarianism was taught of old by Aristippus (B.C. 425), and in modern times by La Rochefoucauld (1613–1680) and Bentham

* *Summa Philosophica*, M. 11, i.

(1748-1832).* The system of general interest has had Hume (1711-1776) for its principal master. It is evident that these systems lack the essential marks of moral duty, i.e., universality and immutability, since both public and private interest are relative and variable. In these systems, therefore, there is no duty, no moral law, and it is impossible to account for great deeds of disinterestedness. Egotism and might become the sole rule of human actions, and anarchy or despotism will be the normal state of society. The criterion of Utilitarianism is, therefore, inadequate, vague, and arbitrary.

95. *Hedonism, or the moral system of pleasure, in which the sole good is the pleasurable, is false, because it confounds a consequence of the good with the good itself.*—Materialistic and sensistic schools base morality upon love of pleasure and fear of pain. Epicurus (B.C. 340-270), among the ancients, Hobbes * (1588-

* Other utilitarians of a recent date are the two Mills, father and son, John Austin, and George Grote. Against the principle which they advocated it may be argued : (a) It takes the sign and indication of moral evil for the evil itself. . . . It places the wickedness of an act in the physical misery and suffering that are its consequences. (b) " Mill tells us that ' utilitarian moralists have gone beyond almost all others in affirming that the motive has nothing to do with the morality of the action.' " (c) It does away with the distinction between *harm* and *injury*, "injury being wilful and unjust harm ;" it confounds physical and moral evil, and ignores the meaning of a *human action*. (d) It " sees in virtue a habit of self-sacrifice useful to the community but not naturally pleasant," . . . in fact, " a natural evil, inasmuch as it deprives him of pleasure, which natural evil by habit is gradually converted into a factitious and artificial good."—*Moral Philosophy*, Stonyhurst Series, pp. 177-189.

* " If every thought," as Hobbes holds, " is but a compound of sensations, then good and evil can be only expressions for agreeable or disagreeable sensations; they have no absolute character, but mean simply personal pleasure or pain, and the highest motive of

1679), Helvetius (1715–1771), and Saint-Lambert (1716–1803), among modern moralists, are the most faithful interpreters of this system. To confound duty with pleasure is to reverse the very notion of good, of which pleasure is a consequence, but not the essence. It is to contradict reason and conscience as well as the common sense of mankind. Besides, materialists generally understand by pleasure only what is sensible and material, and despise those higher pleasures that have their source in the culture of the true and the exercise of virtue, and those also which we experience at the sight of good in our fellow-men.

96. *The moral system of sentiment, in which good or evil is that which is perceived as such by a moral sense, is false, because the existence of such a sense as a distinct faculty is a mere hypothesis, and because a sentiment of sympathy for good, far from being a principle of that good, presupposes its idea.*—The Scotch school, designing to combat those who place morality in interest or pleasure, sought the basis of morality in a disinterested principle. This it claimed to have found in a certain instinct or moral sense, which in man would be a special faculty ordained to judge what is good and what is evil, not only in general but also in particular. Shaftesbury (1671–1713), Adam Smith, Hutcheson, and Reid, are the principal upholders of this system. To admit their doctrine is to assert that man is led by instinct, by a blind principle; but this is unworthy of a rational being. Besides, it bases morality on a variable and uncertain principle, takes

life must be to attain the one and avoid the other. Moreover, as man does not determine for himself the law of sensation and the conditions of pleasure and pain, it follows that he is absolutely subject to circumstances, and the creature of necessity." *American Encyclopædia*, sub. Hobbes.

away from good and evil their essential distinction, and eliminates their objective nature. In a word, it confounds effect with cause, since the sentiment experienced in presence of good or evil is only a consequence of our idea of good and evil.

97. *The moral system of rationalists which exaggerates the idea of honorable or virtuous good, and excludes the notion of useful and pleasurable good, is false, because it is exclusive.*—The Stoics of old, Kant* in modern times, and the philosophers of the contemporary French school, in their efforts to frame a purer code, have perverted the nature of morality. Their first moral principles are all subjective, because the speculative principles of which they are the application are subjective. Kant said, "So act that the rule of your actions may be a law for all men." This principle is defective, because it does not apply to good actions that are not obligatory, and because it points out rather what is to be avoided than what is to be done. Moreover, Kant fails to state the principle in virtue of which man should impose a law on his will, and even why man should be guided by law.† Jouffroy (1796–1842) and Damiron (1794–1862) took as their first principle: "Perfect yourself." They forgot that human perfection is an effect of morality, and does not produce it; besides, their principle is too vague, obscure, and comprehensive. Cousin laid down as his primary principle, "Follow the light of your reason." Now, reason is either personal or impersonal. In the former case we are led into the inconsistencies of Kant's system; in the latter case, the principle is an abstraction, a creation of reason, and therefore incapable of imposing an obligation.

* See pp. 81, 82. † Cf. Zigliara, *Summa Philosophica*, M. 12, vi.

Fichte adopted for the basis of his moral system the principle of *absolute independence*, and for the basis of his social system the principle, "Love thyself above all things, and other men for thy own sake."

ART. IX.—CONSCIENCE.

98. *Conscience is a practical judgment of reason, determining in a given case what is good and what is evil.*—It is not sufficient to consider the natural law theoretically, it must be applied practically. To do this is the work of conscience. It is a judgment upon an action to be done or to be avoided. This judgment is the conclusion of a syllogism, of which the law is the major, and the action to be done the minor. For instance, it is a law that "evil should not be done;" if, therefore, this particular action, as *perjury*, be evil, practical reason dictates the judgment, "This action of perjury should not be done." This syllogism is not always *explicitly* made by the intellect, but it is none the less real.

69. *The judgment of conscience, though not an objective norm, is the subjective norm of an agent's moral actions. Therefore it is necessary to conform to the dictates of conscience.*—Conscience is not the moral law, but supposes it, as a consequence supposes its antecedent. To make conscience the sole foundation of the morality of obligations, as do rationalists, is to confound the application of the law with the law itself. It is even to attribute infallibility to conscience, and thus to contradict both faith and reason. It is certain that conscience is a subjective rule to which man is bound to conform, for law would be useless if not applied. But it can be applied by conscience only, and therefore the judgments of conscience should be followed.

100. *Since conscience viewed as a faculty does not really differ from intellect, its various states in respect to its matter will correspond to the various states of the intellect in respect to truth.*—Conscience, says Zigliara,* is *true* when its judgments are true; otherwise it is *false* or *erroneous*. It is *right* when it dictates what reason would prudently judge to be good, though the judgment may be materially false; otherwise it is *not right*. It is *invincibly erroneous* when it judges according to principles which it holds to be true, and which, morally speaking, it could not have known to be false. But if it could have examined the principles more attentively, and ought to have done so, then conscience is *vincibly erroneous* in its judgment. It is *certain* when its judgment is free from doubt or fear of error. It is *probable* when its judgment rests on reasons which, though solid, do not exclude all danger of error. It is *doubtful* if it remains in suspense between two decisions. Conscience is *scrupulous* when it fears for trivial and groundless reasons that an action is wrong. It is *perplexed* when it fears evil whether an action be done or omitted. A *lax* conscience seeks to justify to itself an evil action; a *rigorous* conscience, on the contrary, tries by refined reasoning to persuade itself and others that a good action is evil.

The rules of conscience are: "We are bound to obey a conscience that is true and certain, or even an invincibly erroneous conscience. We are not to act if conscience is doubtful as to the morality of the action viewed concretely. If we are bound to attain a certain end, and doubt as to the means to be taken, we may use those means that most avert the danger of not gaining the end." †

* M. 13, iv. † Russo, *De Morali Philosophia Praelectiones*, § 110.

In the case of vincible error it is forbidden both to follow one's conscience and act against its judgment. We must suspend the action and examine to rectify the error, provided, however, that the thought or suspicion of such an obligation occurs to our mind. But if there be no such thought or suspicion, conscience is actually invincibly erroneous, and therefore must be obeyed.

NATURAL LAW.

1. *Natural Law is the study of the rights and duties that are derived from the law of conscience.*—Law (*jus*) in its widest meaning is in the moral order all that is conformed to law. So considered, it is divided into moral obligation and moral power; because the law in permitting or imposing an action gives the power to take means to do the action. Moral obligation is called *duty*, and moral power *right*. If the term “law” just defined, be taken in its widest meaning, and the term of the definition in its most restricted sense, natural law, the science that considers human actions in the concrete, includes not only the rights but also the duties that are derived from the law of conscience.

2. *Natural Law is divided into Individual Law, Social Law, and the Common Law of Nations.*—The rights and duties of man are derived simply from his nature, or they arise from society, where man is no longer considered alone, but as united with his fellow-men in the pursuit of a common end. Individual Law treats of rights and duties under the first aspect; Social Law and the Common Law of Nations consider them from the second point of view.

PART I.

INDIVIDUAL LAW.

3. *The rights and duties pertaining to individual law refer to God, to our neighbor, and to ourselves.*—Man in his own regard, and apart from society, has moral relations with God, with himself, and even with his fellow-men, inasmuch as they are united to him by a likeness of specific nature. Hence the three kinds of right and duty for man outside his social life.

CHAPTER I.

MAN'S DUTIES TO GOD.

4. *Natural Law obliges man to acknowledge his dependence on God as the Supreme Being, Sovereign Truth and Goodness, and to express by external actions this interior and voluntary acknowledgment of his dependence.*—The sum of the duties by which man acknowledges interiorly his dependence on his Creator and expresses this dependence in external actions is called Religion.

5. *Man depending on God as Necessary Being owes Him adoration.*—Man is a contingent being, and therefore depends by nature on God, who is Necessary Being. And since this dependence is natural, man

should acknowledge it by adoration, which consists in attributing excellence of Being to God.

6. *It is morally evil either to refuse to adore God, or to adore Him in an unfitting manner, or to adore another being.*—To refuse to adore God is impiety ; to adore Him in a manner that expresses false relations between God and man is superstition ; to adore false gods is idolatry. Impiety, superstition, and idolatry are not only moral disorders, but are based on metaphysical absurdities ; for it is intrinsically absurd that there be no Supreme Being, or that the Supreme Being be without the attributes proper to such a being, or that there be more than one Supreme Being.

7. *Man depending on God as absolute Truth, owes Him the homage of faith.*—Man as an intelligent being is bound by his nature to adhere to the known truth and to tend to a fuller possession of that which is but imperfectly known. When, therefore, God, who is truth itself, speaks, man owes Him faith, that is, he should assent to God's word. So, too, if man, though aware that a divine revelation has been made, yet does not know the truths revealed, he is bound to make the necessary efforts to attain this knowledge.

8. *The assertion of some philosophers that revelation is impossible is intrinsically absurd.*—Some philosophers pretend that God cannot speak to us ; others, that so to do would be contrary to His dignity ; some declare that He cannot reveal mysteries to us ; others, that He cannot deny us the right to examine what He reveals ; others, again, that if He makes a revelation He ought to make it in this or that way. All these pretensions are as absurd as they are impious. For why should God, the Almighty, be unable to do what a child can

do, that is, manifest its ideas? How would He debase Himself by enlightening our minds, since He it was who moulded the clay of which our bodies were formed? And since our intellect is so limited that besides the mysteries of nature that meet us at every step, all is mystery in the supernatural order, why cannot God reveal to us these truths called mysteries, which although in themselves incomprehensible to us, yet enrich and elevate our intellect? But to say that if God reveals mysteries, we have the right to examine them by our reason,—is not this admitting the absurdity that truth can be erroneous? Lastly, if God wills to speak to man, is it not unreasonable to assign Him this or that means of revelation, and to pretend, for instance, that He ought to speak to all directly and not to most men indirectly through others? All these pretensions of rationalistic philosophers are manifestly absurd, even from the standpoint of reason.

9. *The assertion of some philosophers that revelation is useless is belied both by experience and by reason.*—Besides the truths which the human intellect can know naturally, there are others to which it cannot of itself attain. Since man has been raised to a supernatural state, it was necessary that God reveal supernatural truths. But it was also fitting that He should reveal even certain natural truths; for otherwise but few men would have become acquainted with them, the greater portion of mankind being prevented by their wants, their occupations, and particularly by their lack of intellectual aptitude. And even the privileged few would attain to a knowledge of these truths only with a great admixture of doubt and error, and after long and difficult studies. Moreover, history shows into what moral and religious darkness

those nations, and even great geniuses, fell who were either deprived of the light of revelation or had rejected it.*

10. *Man, depending on God as absolute Goodness, owes Him love.*—The good is amiable; but God is sovereignly good; therefore He is amiable above all other good. Besides, all other good is referred to God as the supreme good; therefore man should refer to God all other good that he loves. Lastly, man's happiness and perfection proceed from God as the supreme good; but man should seek his own perfection and happiness; therefore man should love God. If he loves God as supremely good in Himself, his love is perfect; but if he loves Him chiefly as the source of his own perfection and happiness, his love is imperfect.† ‡

11. *Man owes God both internal and external worship.*—Man is composed of body and soul; therefore, to the interior homage of his soul he should add the exterior homage of his body. This exterior homage is

* The objection that the revelation of mysteries to be believed impedes the progress of the human intellect must be categorically denied. Since the object of the intellect is truth, the progress of the human intellect must be measured by the fulness and perfection in which it possesses the truth. Though the nature of mysteries is beyond man's comprehension, yet the facts or truths so revealed often throw much light upon truths of the merely natural order.

† Kant affirms that God is *transcendental being*, meaning thereby to insinuate that He is beyond the reach of human reason; whence he infers that man cannot possibly love God. But he fails to distinguish between comprehensive or adequate love and adhesive or inadequate love. Cf. Zigliara, *M.*, 33, viii.

‡ The love that man owes to God does not impose on him an obligation of always actually thinking of Him, but only of acting in virtue of that first intention that has God and eternal happiness in view.

a necessity because of man's twofold nature; hence at all times this external worship has been paid by all people. In the second place, man has received from God his body as well as his soul, therefore he should do homage for both. Lastly, the external actions favor the accomplishment of the internal actions which they intensify; therefore we should perform them as a help and stimulus to internal worship. Some philosophers have said that God being a pure spirit demands the homage of the heart only; but they have not reflected that the necessity of external worship is founded in the inviolable order of nature, the maintenance of which God must necessarily require. In other words, it is a necessity not for God, who is self-existent, but for man, who is essentially dependent.*

12. *Public worship is due to God.*—Society, or the union of men for a common good, must necessarily be directed to the sovereign good. But to labor together for the acquisition of the sovereign good, men must so act that all the members of society seek to possess it. For this end it must be made known to them and revered by them; to make known the supreme good is to praise it; to have it revered is to have all depend on it, subjecting all things to it, and sacrificing to it all sensible good. Therefore a public worship consisting chiefly in praise and sacrifice is due to God from society. Besides, as without external worship internal homage soon fails for want of support, so without public worship religion fast

* The Manichees rejected external worship, on the ground that the human body proceeds from a supreme principle of evil. A like opposition to external worship has been manifested by some members of the Eclectic French school, and is consistent with the principles of German Transcendentalism. Cf. Zigliara, *M.*, 34, iii.

disappears from society and its constituent members. Since, then, society cannot subsist without religion, public worship is a duty no less from the stand-point of social order than from that of our relations with God.

CHAPTER II.

MAN'S DUTIES TO HIMSELF.

ART. I.—THE FOUNDATION OF MAN'S DUTIES TO HIMSELF.

13. *The foundation of man's duties to himself is in the excellence and perfectibility of his nature.*—God has given man a nature of great excellence; therefore man is bound, in order to conform to order, to respect the excellence and dignity of his nature. And since God has made this nature capable of perfection, man is bound to tend to perfection.

14. *The supreme principle of all man's duties to himself is, Love thyself with a well regulated love.*—Man should love himself, but with a love that conforms to order. This precept of well-ordered love of self may be expressed thus : *Man is bound to preserve and perfect himself in order to his last end.*

ART. II.—MAN'S DUTIES TO HIS SOUL.

15. *Man is bound to cultivate his intellect, to apply himself to the study of those truths the knowledge of which is necessary to him for attaining his last end.*—Man is made to know truth; but he cannot attain truth without labor and the cultivation of his intellect; therefore he is bound to this labor and cultivation. There are some truths that every man should know in order to reach his end; there are others

more abstract and more difficult, which are necessary under certain conditions. Every man is bound to the acquisition of the former; the latter must be known so far as is required by one's employment or duties. The obligation of cultivating the intellect also imposes the duty of cultivating the sensitive faculties, the concurrence of which is necessary for the development of the intellect itself. From the obligation of man to cultivate his intellect we conclude that it is false to hold with J. J. Rousseau that the progress of the arts and sciences naturally leads to the depravity of man. But it is equally absurd to look to the progress of the arts and sciences for the remedy of all the evils of humanity. Experience and reason show, on the contrary, the fatal consequences of intellectual development without equal moral development.

16. *To the duty of cultivating the intellect correspond the rights of being instructed and of teaching.*—Intellectual culture is acquired only by instruction, which is gained chiefly from teaching. Therefore the right of teaching is derived from that of being instructed, and this in turn springs from the duty of cultivating the intellect. But these, like all rights, should be kept within the limits of order. If they pass these limits they degenerate into pretended liberties, such as the so-called liberty of thought, liberty of the press, liberty of examination, liberty of conscience, liberty of worship, etc., which, in the sense intended by several modern philosophers, constitute not a right, but a veritable violation of right, and therefore should be punished by civil magistrates as soon as they manifest themselves in any overt act prejudicial to the good of society.*

* Cf. Russo, *De Philosophia Morali Prælectiones*, pp. 272, 273.

17. *Man is bound so to perfect his will as to render it strong and constant in the practice of duty.*—The will should always act conformably to order, whatever it may cost, because order is absolute and immutable. But it is evident that the will can remain inflexible in the practice of duty only in so far as it is endowed with strength and constancy, in a word, as it is perfected by virtue. And since there are four kinds of moral virtue necessary to the perfection of the will, man should strive to acquire them, so that by *prudence* he may judge justly what should be done or avoided, and this is an intellectual operation; by *justice* he may give every one his due; by *fortitude* he may strengthen the sensitive appetite to overcome difficulties; by *temperance* he may hold it in check and regulate its tendencies. The pretension of such modern reformers as Fourier (1772–1837) and Saint-Simon (1760–1825), that man may freely follow all his inclinations, is as immoral as it is contrary to reason.

ART. III.—MAN'S DUTIES TO HIS BODY.

18. *Man is bound to watch over the preservation of his body.*—Man cannot fulfil his destiny in this life without his body; therefore he should watch over its preservation. And since health of body is necessary for the development of the soul's faculties and the fulfilment of many of man's duties, it follows that man should have a prudent care of his health, that he should preserve it by conforming to the rules of temperance and sobriety, and restore it when it has been impaired.

19. *Suicide is a crime against nature, against society, and against God.*—Every creature naturally shrinks

from death. This dread of death is, therefore, a universal instinct. Man consequently violates the laws of nature when he takes his life. At the same time he injures the rights of society, which he deprives of the help afforded by one of its members, and he trespasses on the domain of justice, to which alone the punishment of crime pertains. Lastly, suicide violates the rights of God, who is the sole master of life and has constituted it a means of attaining man's destiny. Therefore the man who destroys his life subverts the designs of God in his regard, and arrogates to himself the supreme dominion of the Master of life.

20. *The arguments in favor of suicide are groundless.*—Some philosophers, and among them J. J. Rousseau (1712–1778) and d'Holbach (1723–1789), have attempted to offer an apology for suicide. They say that at times life is such a misfortune that instinct prompts us to make away with it; that society is not injured when he who takes his life is a useless member; that invariably it loses its right over the wretch who is weary of life; and that God Himself provides a remedy against misfortune in the possibility for each man to take his own life. Passing over the absurdities contained in these assertions, we may refute them by saying: (1) Life is never a misfortune, since even in the greatest adversities man can always tend to the sovereign good and increase the sum of his merits and their corresponding rewards; (2) Conceding to one unfortunate the right to take his life is conceding a like power to all; and thus all order would be destroyed by the natural law itself.

21. *The natural law does not always forbid an action that leads indirectly to death, for in certain cases this is*

*an act of virtue and even of duty.**—The natural law forbids any action that leads indirectly to death, when the action is willed positively as destroying one's life. But when such an action is willed in view of a good superior to life, then one does not so much will to take his life as allow it to be taken, and he does not break the natural law. Moreover, to expose one's self to death is often a duty imposed by justice, or at least an act of heroism inspired by charity, and redounds to the glory of its author.

22. *It is in conformity with the natural law to practise mortification in order to repress the passions and facilitate the control of reason over the senses.*—Some philosophers have stigmatized the austerity of life and the mortification of the saints as contrary to the natural law. But this is false, for experience proves that moderate austerities do not injure health; on the contrary, they help greatly to preserve it. Again, even though austerities should shorten life, they would still be commendable, because they enable man to attain a greater moral perfection, and because life is but a means that should be referred to man's last end.

* In these cases man does not dispose of his life against the will of God, who must approve what is nobler. If one cannot fulfil his duty otherwise than at the sacrifice of his life, then duty must be preferred to life; but if duty requires one to preserve his life, then is it unlawful for him to lay it down.

CHAPTER III.

MAN'S DUTIES TO HIS FELLOW-MEN.

ART. I.—LOVE OF ONE'S NEIGHBOR.

23. *Even apart from civil society men are bound to reciprocal duties in virtue of the likeness of their specific nature and the identity of their end.*—All men have the same specific nature, the same origin, and the same end. This establishes a kind of affinity among them which, apart from civil society, imposes on them reciprocal duties.

24. *The foundation of all duties to one's neighbor is the precept, Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself.*—Love of one's neighbor is not a mere natural inclination resulting from likeness of specific nature, but it is a precept of reason. For order demands that as other men have the same human nature as ourselves, we should wish them the blessings that we desire for ourselves. Yet because the bond of identity or substantial unity is stronger than that of likeness of specific nature, we should indeed love our neighbor as ourselves, but not as much as ourselves.—The precept of loving our neighbor imposes both negative and positive duties. The former are contained in the maxim, "Do not to others what you would not have them do to you;" the latter, in the maxim, "Do to others as you would that they should do to you."

25. *From love of one's neighbor results the duty of*

doing nothing that injures his moral dignity, or impedes or perverts the lawful exercise of his free will.—The moral dignity of one's neighbor is impaired by scandal, which gives him an occasion of falling into evil ; by seduction, which deceives him in order to draw him into evil ; in a word, by whatever turns him from his duty. All these acts are a manifest violation of the love of justice due to our neighbor. But if a man of evil habits have a good name, and thereby take occasion to injure the rights of others, it is lawful to reveal his true character, but so far only as is necessary to protect the innocent. Hence, adds Russo pertinently, we may judge how far are justifiable the revelations made by newspapers, at the time of elections, of a man's public and private character.

26. *From the love of one's neighbor arises the duty of doing no violence to his intellect by deceitfully leading him into error.*—Veracity is indispensable to society. Take away from speech its nature as sign of thought and you destroy all intercourse among men. Besides, even if lying would not harm society, it would still be an evil, for God has given speech to man as a means of expressing his thoughts and communicating with his equals ; therefore, to use it to deceive is to oppose nature. Hence lying is never permitted. But when the matter is such that it is unlawful to reveal it, then is it not only justifiable but obligatory to use equivocal terms, provided the following conditions enumerated by Russo * are present : “(1) that the questioner have no right to know the matter which we conceal ; (2) that equivocal words, whether such in themselves or in their circumstances, are used only when there is a proportionately grave

* *De Phil. Mor. Præl.*, p. 140.

cause for uttering them; (3) that the speaker intend the true sense, though the hearer attach another meaning to them, when he could avoid this error by attending to the existing circumstances." And the author further explains: "When there is a proportionately grave cause for concealing the truth, and a question is proposed concerning it which must be answered, because one's very silence would be a manifestation of the truth; two rights come into conflict: in one person, the right and at times even the duty, of concealing the truth, and in the other the right to keep his intellect free from the infection of error. One of these rights must be suspended; but which? Certainly the right of him who is the cause of the conflict. But the hearer is the one who by unlawful questioning caused the conflict; therefore his right must be suspended." The author further distinguishes between words essentially equivocal and words which though having in themselves but one determinate signification may from certain circumstances acquire another. Of this latter kind of equivocation he cites two instances: if a man be questioned as to something which he knows by incommunicable knowledge (*sub secreto*) and answers, "I do not know," his reply means ignorance simply, but if the circumstances be considered, it means ignorance of incommunicable matter. If a prisoner answers the judge, "Not guilty," though his words taken by themselves signify innocence, yet viewed in connection with the circumstances they signify that he has not committed a crime of which he is bound to make himself his own accuser.*

27. *From love of one's neighbor results the duty of not*

* Cf. Russo, pp. 144, 145.

attempting his life or maltreating his body.—Life is a most precious boon to man, for it enables him to work out his present destiny and to prepare for his future state; hence homicide is one of the greatest crimes that can be committed. The interdict laid upon homicide extends to every action that impairs the integrity of the human organism, such as mutilations, wounds, and blows.

28. *From love of one's neighbor arises the duty not merely of doing him no harm, but even of doing him good.*—We ought to love our neighbor as ourselves; now, we wish not only that others do us no evil, but also that they do us good. Hence besides *negative* or *perfect* duties, we have also *positive* or *imperfect* duties toward our neighbor. We should enlighten his mind, strengthen his will in the practice of good, help him in need, and defend his good name. Positive duties are either *humane* or *beneficent*. They are duties of humanity if they are rendered our neighbor without any personal sacrifice; they are duties of beneficence if they involve some personal inconvenience or loss. They are, therefore, more meritorious than the former class. Yet though both kinds of positive duty are commanded in a general way, they do not constitute a determinate obligation in this or that particular case; their obligation being only moral and not juridical, no one can be forced to fulfil them. They become a strict and imperative duty only in case of our neighbor's extreme need, owing to the presence of imminent and deadly evil to soul or body.

29. *Both negative and positive duties of loving our neighbor oblige us in regard to our enemies.*—The love due to our neighbor is not founded in his personal merit, but in his dignity and specific nature as man.

Hence, although it is permitted to detest the wrong done us by an enemy and to demand satisfaction, it is not lawful to pursue with hate the author of this evil and to neglect in his regard the duties that bind us toward other men as such.*

ART. II.—THE RIGHT OF SELF-DEFENCE, AND DUELLING.

30. *It is lawful to repel force by force, even to the killing of the unjust aggressor, provided the moderation of blameless defence be observed.*—The moderation of blameless defence has five conditions: (1) that there be no other means of defence from the aggression but force; (2) that violence be offered only in the act of aggression; (3) that no more evil be done the aggressor than is here and now necessary to nullify the aggression; (4) that the evil done the aggressor be proportionate to the good that is the object of aggression; (5) that the evil be done in self-defence and not in revenge. When these conditions are present, it is evidently lawful to repel an unjust aggression by force even to the killing of the aggressor. For he who has the right to possess a good has also the right to remove even by force the obstacles to the possession of that good. Undoubtedly, in the case of aggression, the aggressor suffers loss when violently repulsed; but since one of the two adversaries must suffer loss, it is just that he should suffer who exposed himself to this risk and in a measure willed it. Besides, man is not bound to love his neighbor more than

* Although brutes as being irrational creatures have no rights, yet man is forbidden, says St. Thomas, to exercise cruelty upon them, both because such action disposes him to act similarly to his fellow-men, and because it opposes the order and end established by God in creating brutes.

himself ; but this he would do were he to lose his own goods in order to save his neighbor's. Yet though man has the right to repel by force an unjust aggression, he may forego its exercise, and he will then at times perform an act of heroic virtue ; but he is bound to use his right, says *Liberatore*, when he knows that he is himself in mortal sin, or that his own death will imperil the common safety.

31. *Duelling is a violation of the natural law.*—The natural law forbids duels, or single combats in which two persons engage of their own private authority, after previously agreeing upon weapons, judges, and the time and place of combat. For by duelling (1) One exposes himself without lawful motive to give or receive a mortal wound, and is thus guilty of both homicide and suicide ; (2) He commits a crime against society, since he deprives it of one of its members and contemns its laws ; (3) He sins against reason and justice, since there is no proportion between death and the vain motives invoked by adversaries, and no relation between the honor at stake and the skill or chance on which the issue of the duel depends.—It is idle to object that honor should be preferred to life, and that when challenged one should always accept in order not to pass for a coward. For it is evident that while real honor is preferable to life, it cannot be kept by the duel, the issue of which depends not on justice, but on skill or force or chance. He that refuses a duel does not prove himself a coward, for there can be no cowardice in not doing a bad action ; and besides, it is not courage, but skill, force, or chance that decides a duel. Reasonable men find as much courage as good sense in him who rejects a challenge to combat.

ART. III.—RIGHTS AND DUTIES IN RELATION TO SOCIAL GOOD.

32. *Social good is that which a man enjoys as a member of a constituted community.*—Man is composed of soul and body. The social blessings that pertain to the life of his soul are honor and reputation, and consist in the good opinion in which he and his qualities are held ; those that benefit the life of his body are property or wealth.*

33. *Man is bound to guard his honor and reputation.*—Man ordinarily must live in society to attain the end of his existence. But if his reputation be injured, he loses a part of that benefit which he would otherwise derive from society ; therefore he must see to it that he does not compromise his reputation. Yet his care for his good name should have a just limit, and so far is one from being obliged always to make known his good parts, that he often proves his virtue by concealing them.

34. *Man has a natural right to his honor and reputation.*—No man may of right demand to be honored by others with positive marks of consideration unless in virtue of some legitimate dignity added to that of his nature as man ; but every man may demand that no one shall injure his natural dignity.

35. *From love of one's neighbor arises the duty of not injuring his honor.*—Honor or reputation is one of

* Wealth is here taken to include "all useful things that can be appropriated and exchanged." Its sources are God's bounty and man's labor. It is *natural* if it supplies man's natural wants ; as do food, clothing, and lodging. It is *artificial* if it is merely an invention of human skill to facilitate interchange of commodities ; as, for instance, money.

man's most precious possessions ; to injure it without lawful motive is to violate one of his dearest rights. Therefore does the natural law forbid unjust suspicion, rash judgment, contempt, false testimony, detraction, and calumny.

36. *Every man is bound to procure for himself the material goods necessary for life.*—Since man is bound to preserve his life, and cannot live without the material means of food, clothing, and lodging, it is evident that he must provide himself with these means.

37. *Every man is obliged to labor.*—The obligation of procuring the goods necessary for life imposes the law of labor, since it is by labor only that we can procure these goods. Labor is also a duty for this reason, that it is an essential condition of man's moral and intellectual development. Again, labor is obligatory on every man, because in no other way can he render himself useful to society, in which he is called to live.

38. *Man is permitted to acquire riches.*—Riches supply food to man's activity ; therefore their acquisition is a condition favorable to the development of his faculties. They enable him to satisfy his wants more perfectly, and are therefore conformed to order, which requires him to have care of his existence. Riches are also useful to society ; they afford a means of remedying the inevitable inequality of the fortunes of its members ; they are an element of public prosperity, and, by exciting the activity of the intelligence and the labor of individuals, they contribute to order and the general well-being. Yet one should not forget that they are but a means of attaining man's end. When pursued immoderately, and when turned from their true end, they produce idleness, luxury, and all kinds of evil.

39. *To man's duty of preserving his life and promoting his well-being, there is the correspondent right of property, which originates in nature.*—Viewed abstractly, property is exclusive dominion over some corporeal thing ;* viewed concretely it is the object possessed. Its possession supposes that the object can confer some advantages, and the exclusion of every other person from its possession supposes that the benefits to be derived are limited in nature. If the object can serve all equally and without detriment, it cannot become property. Dominion is *perfect* or *imperfect* according as it implies the possession of the object and the enjoyment of its fruits, or the possession of the object without its fruit, or the fruits without the object. Dominion is *transitory* or *permanent*, according as it is temporary or lasting.

Transitory dominion evidently arises from nature. It is man's duty to procure whatever is necessary for his life and well-being ; but these things cannot serve him and others also ; therefore he has the right to their exclusive use. It is also certain that permanent property is of natural right. For by the conditions of his nature man is obliged to provide for the future ; otherwise he would fall a victim to the inevitable vicissitudes of life, such as sickness, old age, and the caprices of fortune, and, moreover, being restrained by his material wants, he could not give himself up to the nobler occupation of intellectual pursuits. Sec-

* Dominion over a person is called *jurisdiction*. Russo (§ 209) distinguishes between the right *to property*, which he defines as “ a general moral power by which man is made capable of acquiring dominion, the matter of it being indeterminate ; ” and the right *of property*, “ the moral power of disposing of any determinate thing to the exclusion of others.” The former right springs from nature ; the latter is founded in some contingent fact.

ondly, man is naturally active and industrious; it would be unjust that the fruits of his labors should fall to others. Thirdly, the family, which is an institution of nature, cannot subsist, if the father or head does not by permanent property provide for the future wants of his children. Fourthly, the social state, or civil society, is morally necessary for human nature; but without respect for property society cannot prosper, cannot even exist. Lastly, stability of property is characteristic of all nations and of all times; so universal a fact must rest upon a law of nature.

40. *The right of permanent property extends not only to the necessities of life, but also to its luxuries.*—All the arguments establishing the right of property show also the legitimacy of man's right to the luxuries of life. Besides, to put limits to the right of property is to destroy it, because, since it is impossible to determine these limits, the denial of the right to the necessities of life becomes a natural consequence. To attack the right of property, whatever its object be, is to attack man's liberty and to arrest all development, all individual and social progress. It is idle to object that all men being equal, all have a right to an equal share of property. Men are indeed equal in their specific nature, but not in their individual natures; and as inequality of possessions arises from the natural inequality of individual men, their equality in specific nature demands not that every man should have equal wealth with his fellows, but that all men's justly acquired possessions should be equally respected.

Man's ownership of objects is always subject to God's supreme dominion, and extends only to their use as means of attaining his destiny both in the natural and in the supernatural order. In this sense

it is true that man has only the usufruct of these objects. It is also true that in the beginning all material things were, *negatively*, in common; that is, the natural law does not determine them to any individual, but leaves them open for his appropriation by impressing his personality upon them and so making them his own. "Private property," says St. Thomas,* "is necessary to human life for three reasons: first, because every one is more solicitous to look after what belongs to himself alone than what is common to all or many; . . . secondly, because human affairs are handled more orderly when on each individual is the care of managing something; . . . thirdly, because thereby a peaceful state of society is secured, while each one is content with his own."

Even landed property does not belong to government, since, as will be shown farther on,† the State naturally originates in the propagation of families from a common stock, and therefore its right, if any, of property must preëxist in the head of the family. But the State has the right of eminent domain, or dominion "over all the property within the State, by which it is entitled by constitutional agency to any part necessary to the public good, compensation being given for what is taken."‡ Since, then, landed property is not apportioned by the natural law, and it does not belong naturally to government, it must be divided by "positive convention." Since, moreover, for men as now constituted, in a fallen state, the division of landed property is morally necessary to enable them to tend to their due perfection as members of society, this apportionment must be made by public authority, to which alone it belongs, to determine the just con-

* *Sum. Th.*, i-ii., q. 66, a. 2. † § 74. ‡ *Century Dictionary*.

ditions that establish a legal title to land, since to civil government pertains the office of securing the temporal good of the community.* Communism, the doctrine that forbids all private property and would vest all dominion in government alone, must be rejected.

An equally pernicious theory is Socialism, "the quintessence of which is the double proposition that inequality of conditions—the distinction of rich and poor, masters and servants—is the principal cause of misery and crime; and secondly, that the maximum of temporal welfare will be gained by the State becoming the owner of all means of production, reducing all industries to branches of the public services, and all workers to be public servants paid by the State."† Such a doctrine fails to consider that civil authority is vested in human beings, who as such are liable to err; that man's highest end is not to produce, but to contemplate the truth. Besides, it means stagnation of art, science, and literature, and precludes the development both of political life and industrial arts."‡

Mr. Henry George also ascribes vice and misery to inequality of conditions, but "attacks only one class of rich people, not all, and would confiscate not every kind of difference, but only one." His scheme is the *nationalization of the land*, the taking by the State of "all difference due to the law of diminishing returns from land." "He assumes, like the Socialists, a wonderful piety and moderation among those who would have the handling of the goods taken from the rich; but he has to extend his piety and moderation to the

* Cf. authorities cited in Hill's *Moral Philosophy*, pp. 239-246.

† Devas, *Political Economy*, p. 478.

‡ Ibid., p. 393.

delicate relations of buyers and sellers, of masters and workmen ; and thus he combines the delusions of those who worship competition and those who execrate it. Finally, his proposal bids us do what is impossible. For we have seen that in all old countries, owing to long continued cultivation and use of land, and to the frequency of the realization of differences, it is practically impossible to ascertain the amount of the difference (or rent, as he calls it), or if the amount could be ascertained, to ascertain who is getting it. Hence this scheme of social reform is a scheme of taking nobody knows how much from nobody knows whom." *

Inequality of condition is a law of nature. Hence every scheme of social reform should aim not at the destruction of either the poor class or the rich, but at the permanent establishment of harmonious relations between them, so that they may, "as it were, fit into one another, so as to maintain the equilibrium of the body politic. Each requires the other ; capital cannot do without labor, nor labor without capital." The most powerful means of securing this happy result is religion. It "teaches the laboring man and the work man to carryout honestly and well all equitable agreements freely made, never to injure capital, nor to outrage the person of an employer ; never to employ violence in representing his own cause, nor to engage in riot and disorder ; and to have nothing to do with men of evil principles, who work upon the people with artful promises, and raise foolish hopes which usually end in disaster and in repentance when too late. Religion teaches the rich man and the employer that their work-people are not their

* Devas, p. 483.

slaves ; that they must respect in every man his dignity as a man and as a Christian ; that labor is nothing to be ashamed of, if we listen to reason and to Christian philosophy, but is an honorable employment, enabling a man to sustain his life in an upright and creditable way ; and that it is shameful and inhuman to treat men like chattels to make money by, or to look upon them merely as so much muscle or physical power." It imposes upon him likewise the duty of seeing that the workman have time for "the duties of piety ; that he be not exposed to corrupting influences and dangerous occasions ; and that he be not led away to neglect his home and family or squander his wages. Then, again, the employer must never tax his work-people beyond their strength, nor employ them in work unsuited to their sex or age. His great and principal obligation is to give to every one that which is just ; . . . to make one's profit out of the need of another is condemned by all laws, human and divine." *

The State is bound to protect the rights of all its citizens ; but because the rich have many means of self-defence, of which the poor are deprived, it is particularly bound to safeguard the rights of the poor, of the workman and laborer. These are in truth the bone and sinew of the nation, and without their coöperation the State cannot prosper. Hence it should see to it that the hours of labor are not too long whether in relation to the workman or the nature of the work or the season of the year ; that the work is not too hard ; and that the wages are sufficient. Now "a man's labor has two notes or characters. First of all, it is *personal* ; for the exertion of indi-

* Encyclical Letter on the *Condition of Labor*. Digitized by Google

vidual power belongs to the individual who puts it forth, employing this power for that personal profit for which it was given. Secondly, man's labor is *necessary*; for without the results of labor a man cannot live." Wages, therefore, should be sufficient for the support of the workman, his wife, and two or three children. "As a rule, workman and employer . . . should freely agree as to wages; nevertheless, there is a dictate of nature more imperious and more ancient than any bargain between man and man, that the remuneration must be enough to support the wage earner in reasonable and frugal comfort."* Whenever these rights of the workman are trespassed on by the employer, the workman has the right to strike, and further, is entitled to the active support of the State, to which it belongs to institute tribunals of arbitration.

41. *It is absurd to hold with Heinicius (1681-1741), Grotius (1583-1645), and Puffendorf (1632-1694), that the right of permanent property arises from compact.*—Some philosophers have maintained that by the divine law all things were at first held in common by men, but that when the human race increased in numbers they were divided by common compact. This assertion is contradicted by history, which has preserved no record of this agreement; it is opposed to reason, since, were it true, the savage state would be more conformed to nature than the civilized state. Finally, this assertion favors communism; for, if all things are held in common by the natural law, the compact of our ancestors cannot be binding on us, and we have the right to return to the primitive state of mankind.

* Encyclical Letter on the *Condition of Labor*.

42. *It is equally absurd to hold, with Hobbes, Bentham, and Montesquieu (1689-1755) that the right of permanent property arises from civil laws.*—Some philosophers derive the right of property from civil laws. This opinion is based on the false hypothesis that the savage state was the primitive state of man; it makes the civil laws on property the rule of justice, and it leads easily to communism, for if civil law has established the right of property, it can also destroy it.

43. *The primitive fact determining the right of property is the exercise of man's activity.*—Man's action is, as it were, a development of his personality, and what results from his action is thus stamped with the seal of his personality. He who first takes possession of a thing that belongs to no one, and declares his intention of keeping it, thereby contracts with it a relation that makes it his. *A fortiori*, should such an object belong to him if, while in possession of it, he improved it by his labor; to deprive him of it would be robbing him of the product of his activity.

44. *A father has the right to will his property to his children.*—The right of property evidently gives the right to use it and dispose of it; therefore a father has the right to transmit his property to his children. Again, a father owns an object, because he has impressed upon it the seal of his personality; but his personality is continued in his children; therefore the right of property is also continued in them. Liberatore adds that a will drawn up to this effect is unnecessary, that children may succeed to their father's possessions; yet Blackstone seems to judge it a civil right.

45. *From love of one's neighbor arises the duty of not injuring his property.*—Theft is an injustice to the individual, whom it deprives of a lawful possession; it

is an attack upon society, of which respect for property is one of the firm foundations, for men are united in society as well for the protection of their property as for the defence of their lives. The natural law in forbidding theft forbids also all that is disguised theft, as fraud and usury. It also forbids one to keep stolen goods, and commands them to be restored.*

ART. IV.—CONTRACTS.

46. *A contract is a "consent of two or more wills to the same object, manifested by some sensible sign and productive of an obligation in at least one of the consenting parties."*†—No man can suffice for himself, hence the necessity of an exchange of goods and services among men, a necessity imposed as well by love of self as by love of one's neighbor. But to effect an exchange among two or more persons, their consent is necessary; this consent is called a *bargain*. When the bargain produces an obligation in at least one of the consenting parties, it is called a *contract*.

47. *The validity of a contract depends on five conditions: (1) knowledge of the object; (2) liberty of the contractants; (3) their mutual consent; (4) the possibility of the object of contract; (5) its moral goodness.*—That

* In extreme need one may take as much of another's goods as is necessary to sustain life; for God, who is the Supreme Lord of the earth and all it contains, has commanded man to preserve his life. But the following conditions should be present: (1) The need should be absolutely or relatively extreme; (2) There should be at hand no other means of satisfying it; (3) Only so much should be taken as is really necessary; (4) He from whom it is taken should not thereby be placed in the same need. Cf. Liberatore, *Institutiones Philosophicæ*, vol. iii., p. 179.

† Zigliara.

a contract be valid, its object must be known, because an action done in ignorance is not voluntary; hence deceit and fraud render a contract null. Secondly, it must be free, otherwise it can be considered an effect of the will; hence drunkenness, insanity, childhood, and violence, nullify a contract. Thirdly, there must be mutual consent, and this is of the very essence of contract; hence he who promises is legally bound only when his promise is accepted. Fourthly, the object of contract should be possible, for no one is bound to the impossible. Lastly, the object should be lawful, for no contract can ever remove man's obligation of shunning moral evil.

48. *Contracts are unilateral or synallagmatic, commutative or aleatory, gratuitous or onerous, consensual or real, principal or accessory, solemn or not solemn, explicit or implicit.*—A *unilateral* or *unequal* contract is one in which only one of the contractants assumes an obligation. A “loan of money” and a “promissory note” are instances. A *synallagmatic*, *bilateral*, or *equal* contract is one in which both the parties are bound to fulfil some obligation toward each other, as in “purchase and sale,” “rent and hire.” A contract is *commutative* when each of the contractants makes an engagement which is considered an equivalent for what he receives, as in “purchase and sale;” it is *aleatory* when the equivalent consists in the mutual chance of gain or loss owing to some uncertain event; of this the “lottery” is an instance. A contract is *gratuitous* when one of the parties confers some advantage on another without requiring a corresponding recompense, as a “simple promise;” it is *onerous* when each of the contractants assumes an obligation.

A *consensual* contract is one that is perfected by the mere consent of the parties; a *real* contract requires

in addition the delivering over of something, as a "deposit." A *principal* contract is one that exists independently of any prior contract; an *accessory* contract is one made to assure the fulfilment of a prior contract, without which it could not have been made, as a "mortgage."

A contract is *solemn* or *not solemn* according as it is or is not subject to certain particular forms. An *explicit* or *formal* contract is one wherein the parties state their obligations in precise terms; an *implicit* or *virtual* contract is one in which from a purely voluntary action of one party there results an obligation to a third party, and sometimes a reciprocal obligation of the first and second parties; when, for instance, one person receives the money or goods of another he is virtually bound to deliver them to the owner.

49. *The obligation arising from a contract ceases :* (1) *When the engagement made has been fulfilled ;* (2) *When he, in whose favor the contract was made consents, if the contract be unilateral, or if the contract is bilateral, when both parties consent ;* (3) *When the object of contract becomes impossible ;* (4) *When one of the contractants does not fulfil the stipulated conditions.*—The obligation of a bilateral contract ceases on the consent thereto of the parties, unless the contract be indissoluble either in itself or by the law. If the impossibility that nullifies a contract originates in the will of one of the contractants, he is bound to make a proportionate compensation to the other party.

A *loan* is "an onerous contract whereby one party so transfers something of his to another, that it immediately becomes the receiver's with the obligation of afterwards giving back the same, not numerically, but in kind and quality" (Zigliara). It immediately

becomes the borrower's, because it is consumed in its use, and it must be returned in kind, because otherwise the contract would be, for example, "purchase and sale."

The grounds on which the demanding of *interest* is lawful are four : the loss of the lender in loaning the money ; the profit that he might make by retaining the money, and which he foregoes by making a loan ; the risk to which he exposes himself of not having the sum repaid ; and the benefits thereby accruing to commerce and to society in general ; hence the State should fix a legal rate of interest. Yet it is unlawful not only to demand a rate of interest higher than that fixed by civil law, but even to demand any interest at all *in virtue only of the money loaned*. For as the use of the thing is here not really distinct from the thing itself, were the lender of the money to require in addition to the repayment of the principal the payment of a sum for its mere use, he would virtually sell the same thing twice.

"Usury is properly interpreted to be the attempt to draw profit and increment without labor, without cost, and without risk, out of the use of a thing that does not fructify" (Leo X., in Fifth Council of Vatican, 1515).

PART II.

SOCIAL LAW.

50. *Human society is a union of minds, wills, and powers for a common good.* — Human society should contain all that is proper to man in his specific nature and in his relations with his fellow-men. But man is essentially a being having mind and will conjoined in unity of person with a material organism. On the other hand, minds do not unite without a common truth, which being proposed to their wills, impels them with common accord to the same good. For the acquisition of this good men are morally united only when they join their moral forces by the help of material means, as language, cohabitation, etc. Therefore human society unites minds and wills which concur to the common good by the help of material means.

51. *The essential elements of society are multitude, unity, end, and means.* — Multitude constitutes the quasi-material part of society; unity, which is effected by authority, is the formal part. Society is the more perfect, the more numerous the elements that are united, the more complete their union, the more universal the good sought after, and the more efficacious the means of attaining it.

52. *The foundation of all society lies in the good which its members should wish one another.* — The obligations upon men which result from association, are

only the confirmation, the determination of these general obligations which result from their likeness in nature. But the foundation of the latter consists in this, that each is bound to love the others and to wish them whatever good he wishes for himself. Such, then, must also be the foundation of society. Hence society should never depart from the moral order, for the good that we should wish for ourselves or others should be no other than the honorable good.

53. *Perfect society is divided into domestic, civil, and religious society.*—Society is either perfect or imperfect. It is *perfect* when it has for its end the general good of its members and all that can procure their perfection. Society is *imperfect* if it pursues a particular good; as literary and industrial societies, etc. Perfect society is of three kinds: *domestic, civil, and religious*, according as it seeks the perfection and propagation of individuals, or has for special end the good proper to this life, or the life to come.

CHAPTER I.

DOMESTIC SOCIETY.

ART. I.—NATURE OF MARRIAGE.

54. *Marriage* is the society of man and woman united in a community of existence and life.*—Marriage is a natural contract by which the spouses engage to give themselves to each other. The society which results

* The one marriage may, according to the different aspects in which it is viewed, be called a *natural* contract, a *social* or *civil* contract, a *religious* contract, and a *sacrament*.

therefrom is not transitory, but it is a stable union, which has for its end: (1) the propagation and education of the human species; (2) the mutual happiness of the married couple. Before Christianity marriage was only a natural association, though of divine institution; in the Church of Christ it is a sacrament.

55. *Marriage is one of the most important acts of man's life.*—In ordinary engagements man stipulates for his private interests, as arbiter of his fortune; in marriage he stipulates not for himself only, but for others. He engages to become, as it were, a second providence for the new family to which he will give existence; he stipulates for the State and for humanity. Hence the multiplicity of protective forms surrounding it in both the civil and the religious order; hence likewise the religious law consecrating among almost all peoples the nuptial tie.

56. *Marriage derives from civil authority only its purely civil effects; for the rest it is indebted to religion.*—Civil society supposes domestic society, whose rights it does not create, but recognizes and safeguards. Hence what regards the constitution of the family does not depend on the State. Such is the case with marriage, which is the foundation of the family. Secondly, civil society supposes religion, which is essential to man as man; now marriage is matter of religion, for it is consecrated by its end, which is to give existence to a being made in the likeness of God and destined to glorify Him. Therefore, among all peoples, even among barbarians, marriage has always been attended with sacred rites. Besides, marriage has been raised by Jesus Christ to the dignity of a sacrament; and since the sacraments come from ecclesiastical authority, it follows that marriage

can depend on the State for none but its purely civil effects.*

57. *Celibacy kept from love of virtue is a more elevated state than marriage.*—By celibacy kept from love of virtue, man attains a very great intellectual and moral perfection, and puts himself in a condition to reach his last end more surely and more perfectly. The nobility of virtuous celibacy is also manifest from the admiration felt by the people and sages of all times.†

ART. II.—UNITY AND INDISSOLUBILITY OF MARRIAGE.

58. *Nature wills that marriage should be a union between one man and one woman.*‡—It is manifest that unity of marriage is demanded by the good of the married couple and by that of society; therefore it is consonant with nature. Besides, it is rigorously demanded in the law of Christ, where marriage has been brought back to its primitive perfection.§

* “The dependence [of marriage on the State] is entirely extrinsic and presupposes a marriage already contracted and a family, or domestic society, already constituted; for if there were no marriage, it could have no relations to civil society” (Zigliara, *Summa Philosophica*, M. 44, iv.); but “the marriage tie is in no way subject to civil power.” (vii.)

† Marriage is of precept for mankind in general, but not for the individual unless the human race be in imminent danger of becoming extinct. It is beyond question that Christian celibacy gives the individual greater liberty for the contemplation and pursuit of truth and the practice of virtue, and thereby confers untold blessings upon society. (Zigliara § M. 42, viii.)

‡ Polyandry opposes the principal end of marriage; polygamy breeds jealousy, strife, and dissension. Cf. Zigliara, M. 42, x., xi.

§ The polygamy of the patriarchs of the old law is an apparent exception; but two explanations may be given in harmony with the natural law from which God cannot dispense without contradicting

59. *Divorce is absolutely contrary to the perfection of marriage.*—The indissolubility of the marriage tie despoils, so to say, those who are united, of the glorious titles of husband and wife, father and mother. It is opposed to the children's interest and to the well-being of the State. In the evangelical law marriage having been raised to the dignity of a sacrament and signifying the indissoluble union of Christ and His Church, has been re-invested with a stability such as nothing can destroy.

ART. III.—RECIPROCAL DUTIES OF HUSBAND AND WIFE.

60. *The authority in domestic society resides in the husband.*—Marriage is a society in which an authority is necessary. But to whom can it belong but to him on whom the Author of nature has bestowed the double authority of physical strength and of reason? Civil legislations have acknowledged this superiority

Himself. One explanation "would suppose that mankind beginning in monogamy, from passion and ignorance leaped quickly into polygamy; that the patriarchs in good faith conformed to the practice of their time; and that God, in their case as with the rest of mankind, awaited His own destined hour for the light of better knowledge to break upon the earth. Whether, meanwhile, by some darkly intelligible stretch of His power He legitimized their unions, who can tell?" Or again, "God by His supreme dominion can dissolve any marriage. By the same dominative power He can infringe and partially make void any marriage contract without entirely undoing it. The marriage contract, existing in its fulness and integrity, is a bar to any second similar contract. But what, on this theory, the Lord God did with the marriages of the patriarchs was this: He partially unravelled and undid the contract, so as to leave room for a second contract, and a third, each having the bare essentials of a marriage, but none of them the full integrity."—*Moral Philosophy*, Stonyhurst Series, p. 273.

by imposing upon the wife the duty of listening to her husband and following him ; and in this they are in accord with the Sacred Scriptures.

61. *In domestic society the wife is not the slave, but the aid and associate of her husband.*—Woman has a natural dignity equal to that of man, and although she is subject to him, she yet retains all her natural rights. She is the indispensable aid of man, and shares with him the family cares and duties. She is his associate, because she is one of the contracting parties, and by the matrimonial contract she has been provided with a husband and protector, not a despot.

ART. IV.—DUTIES OF PARENTS AND CHILDREN.

62. *Education is the principal duty that results from paternity ; this duty is common to father and mother.*—Education, in its most extended meaning, comprises all the cares whether corporal or spiritual, by which the child is developed, physically, intellectually, and morally. Thus understood, it is certainly a duty imposed on parents by nature, by society, by God Himself ; by nature which, making the child incapable of preserving and perfecting itself, charges with this care those who have given it existence ; by society, which can be preserved and can prosper only on condition that its members have received a suitable physical and moral development ; by God, who by giving children to parents evidently charges them with the duty of making them useful members of civil society and of the Church. The duty of education is common to father and mother, because both concur in giving existence to the child, and because this is required by the very end of education, the harmonious development of body, mind, and heart.

The duties of parents to their children also oblige masters, who are the representatives of parental authority. As to moral education, it is essential that parents and those who in any way represent them, offer in their own person models worthy of imitation, for children follow more readily what they see than what they hear.

63. *From the duty of educating follows the right of parents to direct this education personally.*—The right of parents to direct the education of their children is founded in the natural law and is therefore inviolable. Hence it is without reason that some moralists confine to the State the right of education. It is indeed true, that as the children of the family are one day to be members of society, the State has in self-defence and pursuance of its end, which is the temporal good of the community, the right to demand that they be suitably trained to fulfil their future duties as citizens. But this by no means implies that education, or even secular instruction, belongs to the State exclusively. The right of the State in this regard is limited to affording parents ample facilities for the proper training of their children; its interference can be justified only in individual cases of manifest neglect. For the rest, the natural love of parents for their offspring will more effectually provide for their education than State control, which in itself is purely temporal, and often with no higher end in view than utility.

64. *The child owes its parents obedience, respect, love, and assistance.*—The voice of nature, of religion, and of gratitude, unite in bidding man honor those who, after God, are the authors of his life. Children owe obedience, respect, and love to those also who in their regard represent their parents.

65. *The authority of parents over their children is limited in the extent and duration of its exercise.*—Education is the end for which nature gives parents authority over their children. What is required by this education should therefore regulate the exercise of this authority, which, in consequence, will be less exercised as the child advances in years. The child may even withdraw entirely from it when he becomes of age, yet ever fulfilling toward his parents the duties of love, respect, and gratitude. He may also be released from obedience to them in the choice of a state of life; for in this matter his parents may direct and counsel him, but not oppose or constrain him.

66. *The children of a family owe one another affection and assistance.*—Consanguinity and community of education and life produce among brothers and sisters those sweet and lasting bonds which cannot be broken without violating the law of nature.

ART. V.—DUTIES OF MASTERS AND SERVANTS.

67. *The society of masters and servants is lawful.**—This society is founded in the inequality of the conditions of life and the reciprocity of social needs. It is indeed constituted by the free consent of man; but though not directly derived from nature, it is nevertheless in perfect conformity with the natural law.

68. *The society of masters and servants is an extension of the family, and thus, in a measure, gives rise to the same series of duties.*—Servants owe their masters re-

* A servant "is one bound by an onerous contract to do work useful to another and determined by his will; a master is one who has a personal right of exacting from another work useful to himself and determined according to his own will, with the obligation of paying him in return the wages agreed upon."—Russo, § 816.

spect, obedience, service, and fidelity ; masters, in turn owe their servants affection, care for their spiritual and temporal interests, and fidelity to their contracts. The extent of these reciprocal duties is determined by the nature of the engagements.

69. *Slavery is not absolutely in contradiction to nature.*—The state of domestic service is free ; slavery, on the other hand, is a state of perpetual subjection in which a man in exchange for the necessaries of life is bound to give all the profit of his labor to him who supports him. Such a state, though less suited to man's dignity, is not, strictly speaking, contradictory to his nature ; for man has the right to serve his fellow-man under the reserve of his essential rights. But if slavery be understood to deprive a man of all his rights, to degrade him to the level of the brute, and to give to his master the power of life and death over the slave, then is it absolutely opposed to the natural law, since it is essentially destructive of the slave's inalienable rights.

CHAPTER II.

CIVIL SOCIETY.

ART. I.—NATURE OF CIVIL SOCIETY.

70. *Civil society is the permanent union of independent families associated to enjoy in common the same rights and privileges.*—Man does not find in the family complete satisfaction of his wants. He needs a more extended society comprising the family itself, in which he may find the necessary assistance to enable him to attain the perfection proper to his nature. This union of families is called *civil society*, or if viewed in relation to the ruling power, *political society*.

ART. II.—THE SOCIAL STATE IN RELATION TO MAN.

71. *The social state is natural to man.*—1. This truth is proved by history, which teaches that in all times and in all places men have lived in society ; now, so universal a fact must be due to a law of nature. 2. Unlike the brute, man is not equipped by nature with all that is necessary for the preservation and development of his being ; it is only society that can satisfy his physical, intellectual, and moral needs. 3. Man is naturally endowed with the faculty of language, but this faculty would be useless were men not called to live in society. 4. Man is naturally inclined to communicate with his kind, to share their sentiments

and to help them in need. 5. Man is naturally perfectible; now, it is manifest that without society he cannot attain the perfection of which he is capable, particularly in the intellectual and the moral order. 6. Reason bids man realize, as far as in him lies, the good of order; now order, both in the culture of science and the practice of virtue, is most resplendent in society.

72. *It is absurd to say with Hobbes that the natural state of man is perpetual war, and that men united in society only to free themselves from this state.*—The social system of Hobbes is a consequence of his materialistic principles touching the nature of man. Were his system true, we must necessarily grant that man is inferior to brutes, which are never seen in strife with those of the same species. But experience proves that man is inclined to show benevolence to his neighbor, unless his passions have perverted his instincts; again, reason bids us keep order. Order is manifestly peace and not war. The falsity of Hobbes's system is also proved by its fatal moral and social consequences; for it legalizes all crime and despotism.

73. *The opinion of Rousseau, that man is anti-social, and that by force of circumstances he passes from the savage to the social state, is false.*—This theory is based on an absurd hypothesis. (1) Nowhere has man lived in the solitary and savage state. (2) Rousseau affirms that man is born good, that he is endowed by nature with sensitive faculties and with liberty,* and that society depraves him by giving him the use of reason and the development of intelligence; but these are

* Liberty, however, as *Liberatore* observes, cannot even be conceived without reason.

absurdities so manifest that it is needless to refute them. (3) The hypothesis of the compact makes society impossible; for how could men in the savage state have the notions necessary to comprehend the nature of the social state and realize it by the help of a contract? (4) This contract would be without force; whence it follows that men would be free to break it when it seemed good to them.

ART. III.—THE PRIMITIVE FACT THAT REDUCES TO ACT
THE NATURAL SOCIABILITY OF MAN.

.4. *By the very fact of his existence man is constituted in society.*—Since men have the same end, the same law, they form a universal society under the authority of God. Yet this society is too general, too abstract; individuals need for the satisfaction of their wants a less extensive society, having a visible sanction and a positive form. This society is civil society.

75. *The natural and primitive fact that gives rise to civil society is the multiplication of families coming from the same stock.*—The causes which actually produce a political association vary according to time, place, and person. In one place it may be a contract between several families of different origin; again, it may result from the domination of some powerful man. But these are fortuitous and variable events. The fact which naturally gives rise to civil society is the multiplication of families coming from a common source. For as families are multiplied, their homes must also be multiplied; as new relations are established, the city is formed, and with it civil society is constituted, at least in its essentials.

ART. IV.—END OF CIVIL SOCIETY.

76. *The end of civil society is the common external good, regulated so as to procure the individual internal good of all the members, and subordinated to their last end.*—Nature always furnishes the means to fulfil the duties which she imposes ; but she does not give society the means to know and to act directly upon the interior ; therefore society can procure only the common external good of its members. But this is a good only so far as it is a means of arriving at their internal good and future good. Therefore society ought to procure their external good so as to facilitate the acquisition of their internal and future good. When it is said that society should pursue a common good, such a good must be understood as may be shared by all the members of the society. Social justice would be violated if even one member were excluded from participating in the common good.*

77. *It is an error to hold with Kant that the end of political society is the reciprocal limitation and harmony of the liberty of its members.*—This principle, which is only a consequence of the theories of rationalism on the native independence of man, is false, because it gives society rather a negative than a positive end, and leads directly to egotism and despotism. 1. For if society is limited to preventing any one from using his liberty to the detriment of that enjoyed by others,

* Russo (§ 320) places the end of civil society in the easier and fuller attainment of the security, well-being, and perfection of the citizens. By *security* he means immunity from the evils proceeding from physical and moral causes ; by *well-being*, an abundance of material goods ; by *perfection*, the development of the intellectual and moral faculties of the citizens.

it will not unite individual forces for the pursuit of a common good, and each one will act in isolation from the others ; or if it unites its forces for the pursuit of a determinate good, it can do so only by the help of a despotic power. 2. The principle of Kant, besides, results in the ruin of public morality and in indifferentism of the State in religious matters ; for many crimes, such as blasphemy, suicide, etc., etc., do not encroach upon the liberty of others, and to prescribe a public profession of faith would be to restrain the liberty of each one more than is demanded by respect for the liberty of others. Besides, though liberty in the abstract is not limited, yet in the concrete it is limited both by its object, whose order and end it may not change, and by the duties of the person who is to exercise liberty.*

ART. V.—ELEMENTS OF CIVIL SOCIETY.

78. *The essential elements of society are multitude and authority, i.e., subjects and superiors.*—Society forms a moral body ; but in every body there must be the members that compose it and the principle that unites them. In the social body, the members are the persons that enter into it ; they are called the *multitude* ; the principle which produces unity and order among these members is *authority*.† Multitude and authority considered in the concrete are the subjects and superiors.

* See *Liberatore*, p. 235.

† “Civil authority consists in the right of establishing order in a multitude with a view to attain the end of the state ; civil subjection lies in obedience and in the duty of following the direction given by authority for the attainment of the end. Hence it follows that authority differs widely from dominion, and civil subjection from

79. *The social multitude results proximately from the family, not from the individual.*—Rousseau, basing his statement on the hypothesis of the state of nature and on the social contract, conceived society to be a union of individuals, and not of families. This assertion is contrary to the progress of nature, which passing from the imperfect to the perfect, first gives birth to domestic society and then produces civil society. Domestic rights are anterior to civil rights; they are more restricted, more indissoluble. Civil society is bound to protect them, but it cannot modify them. Since, then, individuals belong to the family before they become members of civil society, they form civil society only inasmuch as they are already constituted in the family. Besides, the laws are here in accord with reason, since they admit the child to the full enjoyment of his civil rights only when he has attained his majority and has thus passed from domestic to civil society.

80. *The natural constitution of society should be organic and not mechanical.*—Society is a whole whose

servitude. For dominion . . . consists in the power of disposing at will of something for one's own use. Now dominion is concerned with things, not persons; its use proceeds from liberty, not duty; its end is the utility not of others, but of the owner. Authority, on the contrary, is directly concerned with persons; its exercise is prescribed by reason; it regards not the profit of the superior, but the good or the whole community. Now the slave as such is compared to things; he depends absolutely on the will of his master; in his actions he intends not his own profit, but that of his master. But nothing of this is found in the subject, who even as such retains his personal dignity and right is directed not by the caprice of another but by law, . . . and acts not for the private good of the ruler, but for the common good of the whole social body of which he is a part."—Liberatore, *Institutiones Ethicæ et Juris Naturalis*, p. 241.

parts are not inert beings having only the artificial movements imparted to the whole, but intelligent and free beings, each with his own activity and end. And not only of individuals severally is it true that they have their own life and activity, but also of particular associations entering into civil society, such as industrial or scientific unions, and especially those which originate in the family. Therefore the constitution of society should be *organic*. Hence it is easily seen how contrary to the order of nature is that exaggerated centralism which robs individuals and societies of all spontaneity, and makes all social activity proceed from a single principle.

ART. VI.—NATURE OF CIVIL AUTHORITY.

81. *Civil authority is the moral power, one and independent, to direct the actions of the citizens to the common good.*—1. The civil authority is called *moral* to distinguish it from purely physical force, and also to mark the fact that it is founded in the rational order of things. 2. This authority should be *one*, otherwise it would not establish unity and order in the social body. Nevertheless, this unity of authority does not exclude a multiplicity of instruments by which the authority functions; thus, under the supreme head, there are ministers, magistrates, officers, etc. 3. The civil authority should be *independent*; if it were dependent on those whom it governs, it could not direct them toward the common end. But this independence of authority does not imply that it be unlimited; it is necessarily subjected to the moral order and circumscribed in its sphere of action by its proper object. 4. The authority should *direct the actions of the subjects* toward the common good. Yet, as

in the man clothed with public authority we must distinguish the individual from the authority with which he is vested, it is certain that this individual as such can also seek his particular good.

ART. VII.—ORIGIN OF CIVIL AUTHORITY.

82. *Civil authority in itself proceeds directly from God.*—Civil society is natural to man, and authority is an essential element of this society. Therefore supreme power is a right proceeding from nature itself. But what proceeds from nature has God for its immediate author; therefore supreme power in society proceeds immediately from God. Besides, in virtue of the natural law, God wills the maintenance and observance of order. But order is maintained in society only by authority. Therefore authority is willed by God and proceeds directly from Him.

83. *The cause that primarily determines the subject of supreme power is accidentally the consent of the members of society; but, naturally, it is found in the pre-existent authority of domestic society.*—In certain cases, the consent of society determines the man who is to possess civil authority, a power that in itself has proceeded directly from God. This happens when, for example, a society is suddenly formed by the union of several independent families,* or when, a dynasty becoming extinct, society is for the time without a ruler. But these cases are purely accidental; according to the order of nature the supreme power is of itself constituted in civil society by the very principle of the society. For civil society cannot be conceived without the authority that directs it; therefore the

* As in some of the early settlements in America.

principle of this authority is identical with the principle of civil society. But civil society is, so to say, only a development of domestic society ; for the state supposes towns or villages, which in their turn have originated in the septs or clans that are the development of the family ; therefore civil authority itself is, as it were, a kind of development of domestic authority.

84. *It is an error to say, with Hobbes, that war being the natural condition of mankind, they have established among them to stop it a supreme power, invested with all their rights and with unlimited jurisdiction.*—According to Hobbes, civil power is of purely human institution, like society ; the latter, inasmuch as it is a moral person, is absorbed, and ceases to be anything, while the monarch is all. This theory sanctions the most degrading despotism.*

85. *It is an error to say, with Rousseau, that the civil authority, de jure and de facto, has its origin in social compact.*—This theory is false in its principle that human liberty is inalienable, i.e., incompatible with civil subjection, and it makes society radically impossible. For, on the one hand, since all men enjoy the same rights, the collective will which establishes public authority should be unanimous ; but this unanimity is absolutely impossible of realization. On the other hand, even if unanimity of particular wills were possible, it would never be other than momentary and transitory, because fathers cannot contract for their children, and also because the right

* From the principle of Hobbes enunciated in §95 (*Moral Philosophy*), p. 412, it follows that—"Nature dictates to every man the right to seek his own happiness, the highest end of his being, at whatever expense to his fellow-men. The state of nature, therefore, is a state of warfare among men."—*New American Cyclopædia*.

of the multitude being inalienable, according to Rousseau's teaching, it can break the contract when such action seems good to it. Therefore, the theory of Rousseau, as experience has indeed proved, is productive of only anarchy and disorder.

It is replete with absurdities. It puts forth as a means of preserving liberty intact the spoliation of all individual and personal rights. It destroys morality, since it recognizes no law superior to the multitude, and it leads to socialism and communism.

ART. VIII.—DIVERSE POLITIES.*

86. *The three forms of government to which all others may be reduced are monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy.*—Supreme power is essential to society; but the subject of this power varies with the times, the places, and the persons. But the subject of supreme power is either a physical person, i.e., an individual; or a moral person, i.e., a union of several individuals for a common end. In the former case, it is a *monarchy*; in the latter it is an *aristocracy* if those banded together to govern are the most notable individuals of the society; or it is a *democracy* † if the people govern themselves by representatives whom they name. To these three forms of government all others may be reduced.

87. *Every polity that rests upon a just title is in itself legitimate and capable of procuring the happiness of the people.*—The civil power, although primarily

* "The distribution of power in the state, and especially of the sovereign power, is called the *polity*." (Aristotle.)

† This is *representative* democracy as opposed to *pure* democracy. The latter is rarely workable, for it implies that all the members of the community share directly in the government.

derived from domestic power, is yet susceptible of several modifications. Reason demands a polity for every society, but not this or that particular polity. Therefore, if the power resides justly in one or in many, it is legitimate. It is also suited to procure the happiness of the people, because to this end three things suffice: light of intellect, rectitude of will, and strength of execution; but these three things may be present, whether the power resides in a single individual or in many persons.

88. *With respect to a particular people, the polity which suits it best is that which corresponds most perfectly to its manners, its character, and its degree of civilization.*—It is with the happiness of society as with that of individuals; the same kind of rule does not suit all. The best for each is that which is most adapted to his age, his temperament, and his situation.

89. *The polity that best suits a people is the most legitimate for it.*—The happiness of a people lies chiefly in order and peace. But that there may be order, everyone must know with certainty who has the right to govern. Nothing will better produce this certitude than evidence of legitimate title in him who governs. In general, says Zigliara, “that polity is best which best secures the end of society and is shown by history to be most firm and lasting.”

90. *The goodness of a polity depends not so much upon the form of government, as upon the probity of those who govern.*—The form of government is like an instrument which by force or skill may be used for good or evil. This is proved by experience; and hence the great political problem should be to seek out the moral means to hold those who govern to integrity of conduct, rather than the material force

that is to keep them to duty. Such a means is religion.

91. *Absolutely speaking, simple monarchy is the most perfect polity ; yet in view of human weakness, monarchy with aristocracy, or monarchy with democracy, is more advantageous.*—It is evident that the more a government is one, the more perfect it is, because greater order reigns in the State. But no unity can be more perfect than that of an absolute monarchy. But, on the other hand, the most advantageous polity is that which pleases the people most, and which offers the most safeguards against abuse. But, in view of human weakness, such a polity is monarchy when tempered with aristocracy or democracy ; for, on the one hand, all have the pleasure of sharing more or less in the power, and on the other hand, the ruler is less exposed to act unjustly, being limited in his authority and aided by many counsellors.

ART. IX.—MANNER OF TRANSMITTING SUPREME POWER.

92. *The supreme power is possessed by right of heredity, by right of election, or by right of victory.*—1. Transmission by right of *heredity* is well adapted to procure the good of the people. It admits modifications according to the usages of the country, which should be respected ; thus, in certain lands, women are entitled to succeed to power, and in itself this is not contrary to the natural law. 2. When the power is communicated by *election*, the election should be made by those only whose knowledge and prudence fit them to make a good choice. 3. Lastly, the acquisition of power by right of *victory*, is legitimate only when it is the result of a just war, and when the good either of the conquered or of the other nations demands a change

of government, or a forfeiture of their independence by the conquered people. In all other cases, he who would take possession of the power, would be a usurper.

93. *A usurper cannot acquire by force either legitimate possession or political authority; but he ought to be obeyed in the exercise of his civil authority. It may even happen that a kind of prescription in the usurpation renders the expulsion of the usurper illegitimate.*—It is evident that a usurper cannot by force render the possession of power legitimate, for “usurper” means one who unjustly has possession. Neither has he right to distribute political powers among different social bodies, for, not possessing the rights, how can he dispose of them? But although a usurper possesses civil authority illegitimately, the authority is just in itself, since society cannot exist without it; therefore society should obey this authority, which, in the case of usurpation, can have no other organ than the usurper. And if it should happen that with time he would so strengthen himself that his expulsion would involve the subversion of social order, it would then be unlawful to attempt to drive him out. This the good of society demands; and in such a case, the legitimate head ought to forego his rights, or at least to suspend their exercise, because evidently he ought not to sacrifice the general good to his private interest.

ART. X.—EXERCISE OF SUPREME POWER.

94. *Supreme power includes three powers which are essential to it: legislative power, executive power, and judiciary power.*—*Legislative power is the right to impose on subjects rules of conduct to instruct them in what*

they ought to do and what not to do in the interest of social order. *Executive* power is the power to oblige the members of society to observe the laws imposed on them. *Judiciary* power is the right to judge what is in conformity with justice and what is not, and to apply the law to particular cases. These three powers are essential to supreme power; without the first it cannot give direction to the social body; without the second this direction would be deprived of all efficacy; without the third it would remain abstract and without application. Although both executive and judiciary power are subordinate to legislative power, yet each of these three powers is absolute in its sphere.

95. *The legislative power cannot touch the constitution of the State; it can be exercised over all those external acts which may be necessary or useful to the public good.*— Since the legislative power can be exercised only in virtue of the rights which it holds from the constitution of the society, evidently it cannot touch the constitution itself. *Existence*, says the axiom, *precedes action*. Constitutive right belongs both to the people and to the supreme power; therefore every change in the constitution must be made by the whole social body and not by the power alone. Outside of what effects the constitution of the State, the legislative power extends to everything that can procure the good of the society. But it is clear that it can be exercised directly upon external acts only, for purely internal acts do not come under human authority; nor can it, as civil authority, interfere in what concerns religious authority, except to give concurrence and support.

96. *The laws enacted by the legislative power should be honorable, useful, universal, and suitable. For this*

end the legislative power should know the wants of the people and choose wise and prudent men to judge of the fitness and goodness of the laws.—The laws enacted by the legislative power should be *honorable*, otherwise they would deviate from the universal end of man, which is the moral good. They should be *useful*, for they would not otherwise refer to the particular end of society, which is the external good of its members. They should be *universal*, i.e., they should embrace all the individuals, not excepting the law-giver himself in his capacity of private person. They should be *suitable*, i.e., they should be adapted to the customs of the people for whom they are made. Hence he who exercises legislative power, must have the means of knowing the wants of the people and must be surrounded by men whose wisdom and probity will be a help to him in judging of the fitness and morality of the laws.

97. *The executive power should be faithful, strong, and prudent.*—(1) The executive power should be *faithful*, i.e., subject to the laws.* If it were used arbitrarily and against the law, it would be despotism. (2) It should be *strong*, otherwise it would be without efficacy. The force with which it should be endowed, requires, first, that there be a perfect subordination in all those who concur in the administration of the State, so that the movement proceeding from the supreme power may be communicated promptly and faithfully even to the last instruments of power. On the other hand, the executive power should be able to exercise sufficient coercive power to repress or prevent the resistance offered to the law. (3) The execu-

* But this fidelity is perfectly consistent with reprieve or even pardon in individual cases, if such exception tend to the common good.

tive power should be *prudent*, lest it become odious. Since the subjects enjoy liberty, they should be directed not by violence, but with such wisdom that they will voluntarily obey the law.

98. *The judiciary power is divided into civil and criminal. The former should be easy of access and such that the judgment may be given surely, promptly, and with the least possible expense to the parties. The latter should punish evil in such a way that the penalty be as expiatory, medicinal, exemplary, and moderate as possible.*—The judiciary power, which, rigorously, may be regarded as part of the executive power, is divided into *civil* and *criminal*. The civil judiciary power judges the collisions of rights which arise among the members of society. That it may answer the needs of society, it is evident (1) that it should be of easy access, particularly to those of the lowest ranks in society. (2) There should be certainty in the judgment, and for this purpose there must be several judges, who should be capable and honest; within certain limits, appeal to higher tribunals should be possible. (3) It is necessary that justice be administered promptly and with the least possible expense to the litigants, because order demands that a violated right should be restored as soon as possible, and that the reparation should not be too onerous to the litigants.

The criminal judiciary power punishes crime as being a disturbance of the social order. The punishments which it inflicts should be necessary and sufficient: *necessary*, otherwise they would not safeguard the rights of all nor even those of the guilty; *sufficient*, otherwise they would not establish society in security. They will be such if they are reparatory of the troubled order, medicinal for the guilty, or at least exemplary for others, and lastly, as moderate as

possible. But this moderation does not furnish an argument against capital punishment. For whatever several modern philosophers, as Beccaria (1738–1794), Bentham, and Ahrens (1808–1874) say against this punishment which has been inflicted at all times and among all peoples, it is not only just, but very often necessary ; because certain crimes are of such a nature that the punishment of death is just and proportioned to their enormity, and this punishment is demanded by the public security to impress a salutary fear upon the wicked. On the other hand, if authority has the right to punish, even with the penalty of death, it has also the power to grant pardon. This power is limited only by the rights of the injured persons or those of social order.

99. *The three functions of supreme authority considered in their exercise demand different subjects ; considered in their source and principle, they require but one subject.*—The three principal functions of supreme authority are operations of different nature and demand diverse qualities, which can with difficulty be found in the one individual. Besides, in view of human weakness, the union of these functions in a single person would easily occasion great abuses. It is, therefore, necessary that they be exercised by different persons. But it is with these functions as with the operations of the soul, which, although necessarily performed by different faculties, are, nevertheless, one in their principle, which is the soul. In like manner, the functions of the supreme power must be one in the principle from which they emanate, otherwise there would be disorder in society. Those who, following Montesquieu, have boasted so much of the division of powers, have paid too much attention to possible abuses and not sufficient to society's absolute need of order and peace.

ART. XI.—DUTIES OF THE RULER AND HIS SUBJECTS.

100. *The ruler ought :* 1. *To know the art of governing ;* 2. *To practise the art with an upright will ;* 3. *To choose for office instructed and prudent men ;* 4. *To protect the rights of the citizens, especially of the weak and poor ;* 5. *To increase daily the public prosperity ;* 6. *To assure intellectual and, above all, moral and religious progress ;* 7. *To remove the causes of material calamity and, in particular, those that favor the propagation of error, vice, or irreligion.*—These duties are derived from the very nature of supreme authority. Since public authority exists in society only to maintain it in order, and to enable it to attain all the perfection of which it is capable, it is evident that the ruler, both in himself and through those whom he has associated with himself in the exercise of his power, should do all that is possible to procure the threefold perfection, physical, intellectual, and moral, of his subjects both as individuals and as a social body. To this end he will establish an efficient system of police for the prevention of crime ; he will enact salutary laws prohibiting the spread of doctrines opposed to the primary truths of religion, and the publication of aught that offends good morals. He will protect the national industries, and try to secure to all a moderate competence, always tempering the rigor of the law with the clemency befitting his dignity and the occasion.

101. *The duties of subjects are :* 1. *Respect for their ruler ;* 2. *Obedience to the laws and to the magistrates charged with their execution ;* 3. *Love of country.*—The authority of the ruler is a participation of God's authority ; therefore it must be honored and respected. Authority is always sacred and inviolable ; the

qualities of the person who is its depository may dim or enhance its lustre, but they do not change its nature. Secondly, subjects should obey the laws and the magistrates charged with their execution. Power holds from God the right to command and to make laws ; therefore, not to obey the laws is to resist God. But when the laws are evidently opposed to the divine will, the right to command ceases, and obedience, far from being obligatory, would be sinful. In the doubt the presumption is in favor of the power.* The third duty of subjects is love of country. The social body to live and prosper demands the services of those who compose it. Therefore the State has the right to demand these services in order to attain its end ; but love of country is a duty common to all, without being the same for all. In the love of country a twofold error is to be avoided : the one is seen in those who not limiting themselves to finding their country dearer to their heart than any other, exalt it beyond measure and believe that they should attribute to it all kinds of perfection. The second is the error of pagans, who make their country a kind of divinity to which they must sacrifice everything, even the personality of the individual, all duty and justice.

* On resistance to *de facto* government, Balmez (*History of European Civilization*, chap. 54), writes : 1. " We cannot, under any circumstances, obey the civil power when its commands are opposed to the divine law. 2. When laws are unjust, they are not binding in conscience. 3. It may become necessary to obey these laws from motives of prudence ; that is, in order to avoid scandal and commotions. 4. Laws are unjust from some one of the following causes : When they are opposed to the common weal—when the legislator outsteps the limits of his faculties—when, although in other respects tending to the good of the common weal, and proceeding from competent authority, they do not observe suitable equity ; for instance, when they divide unequally the public imposts." See also Zigliara, M. 55, xvii.

PART III.

THE COMMON LAW OF NATIONS.

102. *Nations attain the perfection proper to them only when they constitute a universal society.*—Man tends naturally at all times to enlarge the circle of his social relations; the ultimate term of this tendency is the universal association of people. The collection of rights and duties resulting from this universal association constitutes the common law of nations, which, like individual and social law, has its foundation in nature itself.

CHAPTER I.

NATURAL RELATIONS EXISTING BETWEEN DIFFERENT NATIONS.

103. *Among independent societies, considered abstractly, there exists a perfect equality of rights and duties; inequality can arise only from concrete facts.*—Independent societies, considered abstractly, are only the social nature reproduced many times; but reproduction is not change; therefore they are perfectly equal. But three kinds of concrete fact, viz., origin, consent, and right, may produce inequality among the societies. Thus, colonies depend on the mother country by origin; the weak consent from need to submit to

the powerful; those who have acted unjustly are punished in virtue of violated right.*

104. *International love is the basis of all the duties of nations to one another.*—If nature imposes on individuals the duty of loving one another, with much greater reason does it impose this duty on nations, who represent man in a state of greater perfection. But while the love that we owe others must be reconciled with that which we owe ourselves, the love which one nation owes another must be in harmony not only with that which it owes itself, but also with that which is due to its citizens.

105. *The mutual relations between nations bind their rulers directly, and all the individuals mediately.*—This results from the fact that rulers represent the societies which they govern.

* “The common law of nations, or the *jus gentium* of the old schools, comprised certain principles or rules of justice, which were recognized as laws in all or nearly all nations; not, however, by any compact either expressed or implied which they entered into. These laws were common to nations . . . not by convention but by coincidence of judgment. To this kind of law was referred the division of property; also, the introduction of slavery; the transferring of supreme authority from the multitude, to which it is primitively and naturally given, to a ruler, who, for the ends of government, impersonates the multitude; the punishment of certain enormous crimes with death, etc. This common right of nations was understood to include not only general laws regulating internal order among the citizens of each nation; but other laws also which governed the intercourse of nations with each other. . . . International law as a special and complex department of jurisprudence, is of more recent origin.”—Hill, *Moral Philosophy*, pp. 327, 328.

CHAPTER II.

PEACEFUL RELATIONS BETWEEN DIFFERENT NATIONS.

ART. I.—THE DUTIES PRESCRIBED BY THE LOVE OF ONE NATION FOR ANOTHER.

106. *Nations are bound in justice to respect the independence and the territory of other nations, and to put no obstacle to their perfection.*—A nation as such lives in virtue of its own independence; to deprive it of this is to cause its death politically. So, to violate its territory is to violate its right of property, a right more sacred in a nation than in an individual. Lastly, to foment discord in the bosom of another people and to propagate vice or error in it, is also opposed to the law of nations.

107. *Nations ought in benevolence to aid one another, but only in so far, however, as will not injure themselves.*—The duties of benevolence bind nations no less than individuals. Therefore they ought to aid one another to acquire intellectual and moral perfection, and to offer resistance in civil troubles and public calamities.

ART. II.—COMMERCE.

108. *Commerce is necessary to procure the good which nations ought to wish one another.*—Nature produces different products in each country; therefore, that every country may have all that is necessary or useful to it, the different nations should exchange their

products with one another. This exchange not only develops the material prosperity of nations, but also, as experience shows, singularly favors their progress in civilization.*

109. *Every nation has the right to establish commerce with those nations who may wish to exchange their products with it ; it has also the right to prohibit the exportation of its own merchandise or the importation of foreign merchandise and to subject the latter to imposts.*—It would consequently be contrary to international law if one nation should arrogate to itself the right to establish commerce to the exclusion of other nations. It would also be contrary to international law if one nation should be denied its right of prohibiting the importation or the exportation of merchandise and of subjecting them to various taxes. This right has its foundation in the independence of the nation and in its duty of warding off whatever may injure its material or moral well-being.

ART. III.—TREATIES AND THE RIGHT OF EMBASSY.

110. *Treaties are contracts between nations, and are subject to the same laws as contracts between individuals.*—

* Commerce “develops intelligence by the number and variety of the objects which it examines, the sight of distant places to which, thanks to interchange of commodities, it conducts man by land and sea, by its constant incentive to the intellect to contrive new ways of extending trade, by the mutual communication of minds which it brings about, by contact with diverse manners, whence arise mutual moderation and greater development of resources.” Yet care should be taken that the liberty given to commerce have just limits ; that the rich and powerful do not oppress the weak and indigent ; that occasion be not taken to introduce evil morals and overstock the market with useless articles ; that exportation be not excessive. Cf. *Liberatore*, vol. iii., p. 344.

Treaties are valid only in so far as their object and end are conformed to justice and good order ; they are dissolved by the same causes that remove the obligation of contracts between individuals. Treaties are *equal* or *unequal* according as the terms are equivalent or not. They are *personal* or *real* according as they directly and primarily regard the ruler himself or the State.

111. *The right of embassy is necessary to preserve the relations that should exist among nations.*—Peoples and their rulers cannot preserve the relations which they should have with one another without the aid of persons to represent them ; therefore the right of embassy is founded in nature, as are also the relations which the nations should preserve with one another.

112. *The principal duty of ambassadors is loyalty ; their principal prerogative is inviolability.*—Since the mission of the ambassador is to maintain the peaceful relations existing between two nations, he can do nothing that would be a subject of legitimate complaint, and should strive unceasingly to strengthen the bonds that unite them. On the other hand, the nature of his office claims the privilege of inviolability and the liberty of communicating at will with the government that he represents. Hence he is not subject to the nation to which he is sent.

CHAPTER III.

WAR.

ART. I.—NATURE AND JUSTICE OF WAR.

113. *War is a state of two or more nations contending by violence to maintain their right.*—Nations have rights as well as individuals ; therefore, as individuals may maintain their rights by force, so also may nations ; yet with this difference, that individuals may through virtue sacrifice their right, while nations in most cases cannot do so without failing in their duty to the citizens. War is said to be a *state*, because it includes the whole period of hostile feeling and action between the two nations. It is called a *conflict of nations*, for they are the subject and term of war. The definition adds *by violence*, to distinguish war from peaceful contention ; and *to maintain their right*, to mark the end of just war.

114. *War is either offensive or defensive.*—It is *offensive* when it attacks an enemy in peace ; it is *defensive* when it repels the invasion of an enemy that has first attacked.

115. *That a war be just, it is necessary : 1. that the cause be just ; 2. that the war be truly inevitable ; 3. that it be made by public authority ; 4. that it be made with the purpose of procuring an honorable peace ; 5. that it be publicly proclaimed ; 6. that it be lawful in the means which it employs.*—1. The motive of war should be the repairing of an important right vio-

lated in a determinate manner, and not a motive of glory or utility. 2. It should be inevitable: the evils brought on by war are so great that to make it legitimate all means ought to have been employed previously to settle the dispute peacefully. 3. Since war is a social act, it should be made by the authority of him who represents the society. 4. It should be made only in view of peace, since it is itself a state contrary to nature, and hence lawful only as a necessary means of restoring harmony between nations. 5. It should be preceded by a public proclamation, at least on the part of the aggressor, otherwise he would act as a pirate and not as a civilized man. 6. War should employ none but legitimate means.*

ART. II.—DUTIES DURING AND AFTER WAR.

116. *During the war no more damage should be done than is necessary to repulse the enemy and oblige him to repair the violated right; the laws of justice and humanity should be observed not only with neutral peoples, but also with the enemy.*—1. No violence should be used upon neutral States, unless they are bound by some preceding treaty. 2. The license of soldiers should be held in check, so that they may cause no harm to inoffensive individuals, nor give themselves up to pillage and conflagration, nor outrage morality or religion.† 3. Faith should be kept in conventions, armistices, etc. 4. Peace should always be proposed as

* War begun to spread religion is unjust, but not war undertaken to defend it against evil aggressors.

† Hence it is forbidden to use means not necessary to repel the enemy and affecting those also who offer no violence; as the poisoning of water and food supplies, and the causing of pestilence.

end, and should not be rejected when it can be granted on just conditions.

117. *After the war, the conqueror should demand nothing more than is necessary to assure an honorable peace and to compensate for the damage caused by the war.*—The conqueror should be guided by the rules of justice and equity, and should not forget the ties of mutual love that still bind nations, even when one of them has been unfaithful to its duty.* Yet if the peace of his own nation or of other states require it, he may, if the war has been just, deprive the conquered nation of its independence.

* Killing in war is always indirect, as in cases of self-defence. Consequently, a similar train of reasoning is to be applied. In capital punishment only is the killing direct.

CHAPTER IV.

THE SOCIETY OF NATIONS.

118. *The nations are destined by nature to unite under a new and more extended form of society.*—The nations, finding themselves in contact with one another, are obliged to aspire to a common good, which consists in order ; it is, therefore, the design of nature that they form a universal society. The same conclusion is drawn from the need which nations experience of associating for their material, intellectual, and moral development.

119. *The universal society of nations, far from injuring their independence, is its surest guarantee.*—As civil society is the most powerful protection of the domestic order, so the universal society of nations is destined to assure the national independence and upright government of each of the associated peoples.

120. *The authority destined to rule this universal society is naturally polyarchical, but it may also be monarchical.*—Nations are in themselves equal, therefore they all naturally share the authority in the person of their representatives who are united in a general assembly. Yet it depends on their will to delegate the whole power to one, as happened in the empire of the middle ages.

121. *The associated nations should apply themselves to the gradual formation of a government endowed in the highest degree with unity and efficacy ; and this govern-*

ment should have threefold power, legislative, executive, and judiciary. — The government of this universal society should possess the conditions of all government. The more it is one and efficacious, the more will harmony reign among the nations. If all international controversies and all the abuses of power by those who govern could legitimately be summoned to its tribunal, there would soon be an end of all international or civil war.

APPENDIX ON RELIGIOUS SOCIETY.

ART. I.—NATURE AND ORGANIZATION OF THE CHURCH.

122. *Besides domestic and civil society man also needs religious society.*—Just as man is impelled by the instinct of his nature and by his reason to form domestic and civil society, so also is he solicited to place himself in religious society. For there lies upon all men a necessity to meet together to manifest the inmost sentiment of their hearts, namely, the religious sentiment, and to help one another both in the belief and the practice of religion. To this natural inclination there is added the precept of reason, which prescribes to man to pay worship to the divinity in his totality as an individual and as a social being. If from the natural order one rises to the supernatural, then the necessity of religious society appears even more evident. For man cannot attain his supernatural end if he is not a member of that visible society, the Church, which Christ established to unite within its pale all the peoples of the earth.

123. *Religious society has for end to render God the worship due to Him and to enable men to arrive at eternal happiness.*—Religious society has no other end than that of religion itself, i.e., divine worship and the happiness of man in the other life. This end, which belongs necessarily even to natural religion, is, in the Church of God, of a more elevated order, the order of grace. But religion enables us to attain not only the

happiness of the other life, but, as appears from both reason and experience, it is the most certain means of assuring in the present life the happiness of the individual and of society.

124. *Since the end of religious society depends neither on persons nor on places, but solely on the immutable and universal relation of men with God, it is in its nature one and universal.*—This unity and universality, though resulting from the very essence of religion, yet, in view of the diversity of the character and manners of nations, would be impossible to the unaided powers of nature. But God by His grace has remedied the defect of nature, and has established unity and universality in His Church.

125. *The form of government in the Church of God is a simple monarchy, tempered in the exercise of its power with aristocracy and democracy.*—The form of government in the Church is a simple monarchy, since the supreme power resides in a single person, who is the Sovereign Pontiff. It is tempered in the exercise of its power by a kind of aristocracy; for, in the councils, the bishops, in union with the Pope, exercise supreme jurisdiction, and in their own dioceses they are true spiritual princes, making laws and exercising all the other functions of power. But, besides this, there is in the Church an element of democracy, in this sense that no one is excluded from even the highest ecclesiastical functions. Thus, even from a rational point of view, the Church may be styled the most perfect of governments: it has the unity of monarchy, the expansive action of democracy, and with all this the temperament of a strong aristocracy.

126. *The Church is a true spiritual kingdom, established by God among men, entirely distinct from the civil power, and of a much nobler order.*—The Church is distinct from

the civil power. For its members are spread over the whole world, its end is supernatural, the form of its government proceeds directly from God, it exercises a direct influence on the moral order; while civil society is restricted to a particular country, its end is temporal and natural, its actual polity depends on the liberty of men, its influence is exercised directly only upon the external order of things. Hence it is evident that the Church is of a more elevated order than civil society.

ART. II.—RIGHTS OF THE CHURCH.

127. *The Church has the right to spread through the whole world and does not need the consent of the civil power.*—This right evidently arises from the duty which Christ has imposed upon the Church of preaching the Gospel in the whole world.

128. *The Church has the right to constitute itself wherever there are faithful, and to establish ministers as the organs of its spiritual authority.*—The faithful are the subjects of the Church, whom it should direct and govern wherever they are to be found. It can accomplish this duty in so far only as it has the right to constitute itself according to the order of its divine hierarchy in every place where the faithful are.

129. *The power of the Church is threefold—legislative, executive, and judiciary.*—Since this triple power appertains necessarily to every society, it should belong also to the Church. But because this power in the Church is of divine institution, it possesses this triple power without division, and nothing can prevent its exercise.

130. *The Church has the right to use coercive power, and even material force.*—If the Church had not

this right, its authority would be vain. Recourse to material force is often necessary to the Church to repress culpable external acts of men. Moreover, because the swerving of the will takes its rise in the senses, it is necessary to act upon the senses to restore the equilibrium of man's moral nature.

131. *The Church has the right of permanent property and can possess temporal goods.*—This right belongs naturally to every society; therefore it belongs to the Church. Without permanent property, it could not provide for its subsistence and would lack the necessary means to attain its end.* Hence in the designs of Providence the Temporal Power acquired by the Popes was a means to secure “the free and undisturbed development of their sublime prerogative.”† Ever since they were despoiled of their possessions in 1870, they have not ceased to claim “that freedom be again restored to the Holy See by the recovery of the temporal power.”‡

132. *The Church has the right to institute religious orders or associations, in which the faithful profess a more perfect life with determinate rules, under the government of a special authority which is dependent on the Church.*—This right is only a consequence of that in virtue of which the Church develops freely within the limits of its proper activity and its proper end. This belongs to the Church, just as to the State appertains the right to establish particular associations, such as armies, academies, etc., which serve to defend it and make it prosperous. To impair this right of the

* See Propositions xxvi., xxvii., of the *Syllabus*.

† *American Catholics and the Temporal Power of the Pope*, by Joseph F. Schroeder, D.D., *American Catholic Quarterly Review*, vol. xvii., p. 72.

‡ *Encycloical Inscrutabili*, April 21, 1878.

Church is to impair the rights of the citizens, whom no human authority can prevent from taking the means to attain their end with the greatest security.

ART. III.—MUTUAL RELATIONS OF CHURCH AND STATE.

133. *The Church is entirely independent of the State.*—The Church has for its object the supernatural and divine order, while the State has for its object the natural and human order. Therefore, unless it be granted that the divine order is subordinate to the human, the Church cannot be subordinate to the State. Secondly, the Church is immutable; therefore it cannot be subject to the State, which by its nature is various and changeable.

134. *In the present condition of society the temporal power is necessary to the independence of the Church.*—To protect the independence of the Church, it is indispensable that the Pope reside in a place where no other power reigns; otherwise he could be harassed in the exercise of his ministry, or at least doubts could be raised as to the full liberty of his acts. And since there is no middle term between prince and subject, it follows that the Pope can be independent in that place only in which he is also temporal prince.

135. *The State cannot be separated from the Church.*—The end of the State cannot be separated from the end of the Church, since the former is a means to attain the latter. Secondly, were the State to separate from the Church, there would be great embarrassment for the conscience of subjects if the State should impose laws contrary to those of the Church, which would not fail to happen frequently. Hence as the Church comes to the aid of the State in maintaining the citizens in the love of duty and in obedience to

legitimate authority, so the State should lend support to the Church in defending its rights, in facilitating the exercise of its ministry, and in repressing those who might wish to impede its action.

136. *Although the State is independent in the exercise of the power proper to its institution and end, yet absolutely it is subordinate to the Church.*—Just as the Church should be supreme in the order of religion, so the State should be supreme in the civil order, because it also constitutes a perfect society, distinct in its origin, end, and means. Men should, therefore, obey the State in temporal matters, but the Church in spiritual matters. But because the end of the Church is much more elevated than that of the State, the State, absolutely, should be subordinate to the Church. If there be a collision of rights, that of the Church should prevail.

ART. IV.—RELATIONS BETWEEN THE CHURCH AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY.

137. *The Church naturally gives rise to a universal society among nations.*—Without religious association the universal society of nations is impossible, because union cannot exist among men differing in belief and customs. Besides, owing to the passions of men, union cannot long subsist where the powerful restraint of religion is wanting to keep them in bounds. Religious association, on the contrary, leads naturally to temporal association. Thus, from the religious communion which the Church establishes among the nations subject to her, there naturally follows a union of even temporal interests. But the universal society which the Church naturally establishes, although essentially united to the Church and subsisting in the

Church, is, nevertheless, a society distinct from the Church in nature, formation, end, and means.

138. *Although the authority in this universal society is naturally polyarchic, yet from its nature it is fitting that it should be vested in the person of the Sovereign Pontiff.*—The temporal rights of nations remain completely independent of the Church; therefore each has a right to share in the authority which is to govern the universal society. But this authority naturally tends to revert to him who is the best fitted to secure the social good; therefore it will be found especially in the person of the Sovereign Pontiff, who on account of the influence of his religious authority and the moral power inherent in his office, is the most proper person to secure order, peace, and mutual assistance among the nations.

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.

The history of philosophy goes back to the very origin of the human race. In all times man has sought to know the cause of the phenomena of which he was witness. Nevertheless, if we except the monuments of Oriental philosophy, to which it is difficult to assign a precise date, authentic works are not older than the sixth century before the Christian era. It is only from this date that we can follow without interruption, the progress and succession of philosophical works down the ages. The long intervening period may be divided into three general epochs: the *first* epoch, that of ancient philosophy, begins with Thales (B.C. 600) and ends with the death of Proclus (A.D. 485). Oriental philosophy, though anterior by some centuries, is included in this epoch; the *second*, that of the middle age, extends from Boëthius (A.D. 500) to Gerson (1395); the *third*, that of modern philosophy, begins with the movement of the Renaissance in the fifteenth century.

ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.

ORIENTAL PHILOSOPHY.

Oriental Philosophy comprises all that is known of the speculations of the human mind in the Orient, and principally in India, China, and Persia. The oldest writings in which we can trace the primitive philosophy of India are the sacred books known as the *Vêdas*, the compilation of which is attributed to Vyasa about the twelfth century before Christ.

Pantheism is the basis of the religious system contained in these books, yet it is especially in the *Vedanta*, a philosophical work also attributed to Vyasa, that it is presented in its greatest metaphysical precision and accepted with its most exaggerated consequences. Ancient India has likewise produced a great number of philosophical works in which the most contradictory systems are in turn exposed. The strangest theories of our days—materialism, idealism, scepticism, and others—have their counterpart in the Hindoo philosophy. The rules of reasoning, those of the syllogism in particular, are presented with such precision and detail that we know not whether it is to Greece or to India that the priority of the science of logic belongs. Yet, in spite of this variety of philosophical systems, it is pantheism that predominates in the Hindoo religion and literature, and from it several sects have deduced not only ideal but even moral and practical consequences.

It is likewise in the *Kings*, the sacred books of China, that we must seek the first traces of its philosophy. The *Kings* date back to the remotest antiquity; they contain principles that deviate little from the true primitive traditions, and embody remarkable ideas of God, of man, and of the relations existing between Creator and creature. About the sixth century before the Christian era these books gave rise to two schools of philosophy, which at the same time constitute two religious sects. One is metaphysical, that of Lao-Tseu: his doctrines greatly resemble those of Pythagoras and Plato. The other school, founded by Confucius, is chiefly moral. It is the peculiar character of his doctrine that it reduces all the virtues to filial piety, from which, again, it derives all duties, whether toward family, country, or God Himself. This doctrine, apparently so beautiful, has exerted a fatal influence upon China. By confounding family and country, Confucius has made the Chinese nation a race of children, blindly subject to their sovereign. About the thirteenth century of the Christian era a new school was formed in China, and by this materialistic pantheism was propagated.

The doctrines of ancient Persia are contained in the writings known as the *Zend-Avesta* and attributed to Zoroaster. The dominant idea of the *Zend-Avesta* is dualism; it bases everything in the universe on the antagonism between Ormuzd, the principle of good, and Ahriman, the principle of evil; men are good or bad according as they follow the one or the other of these principles.

ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY.

FIRST PERIOD (B.C. 600–400).

Greek Philosophy may be divided into three periods. The first (B.C. 600–400) extends from Thales to Socrates. It comprises five distinct schools: the Ionic, the Italic, the two Eleatic schools, and the school of Sophists. All the philosophers of these different schools proposed to themselves above all else to solve the problem of the origin of things.

The Ionic school, of which Thales of Miletus (B.C. 587) is the founder, studied the universe from a physical stand-point and began with the observation of phenomena. Thales said that water was the origin of things, that God was the intelligence who together with water forms beings; Anaximander (B.C. 560) derived all things from the slime of the earth; Anaximanes (B.C. 530) assigned the air as their principle; whereas Heraclitus (B.C. 500) asserted that it was fire. According to Anaxagoras (B.C. 475) the primitive elements of bodies are of several different species, but attract one another in proportion as they are like in nature. He returned to the idea of God, which Thales had taught, but his successors had cast into oblivion.—Empedocles (B.C. 450) combined all these systems; he admitted four elements, water, earth, air, and fire, and a motive principle to unite and divide them.

The Italic school was founded by Pythagoras (B.C. 540). He taught that numbers were the principle of all things, and as all numbers begin from unity, he concluded that absolute unity is the first principle. In his doctrine, he did not, like the Ionic school, confine himself to the physical order, but included the moral order and established the subordination of matter to spirit.—The principal disciples of Pythagoras were Timæus of Locris, Ocellus of Lucania, and Archytas of Tarentum.

The two schools of Elea followed the steps of the Ionic and the Italic school. One of these, the atomistic, had for its leaders Leucippus and Democritus (B.C. 590), who explained everything by eternal atoms infinite in number. The other, the metaphysical school, had three chief representatives: Xenophanes (B.C. 536), Parmenides (B.C. 465), and Zeno of Elea (B.C. 450), who denied finite realities and professed the most formal pantheism.

The last school is that of the Sophists, the most celebrated of whom are Gorgias (B.C. 430), and Protagoras (B.C. 422). These sceptics, in presence of the contradictions of the philosophers who had preceded them, concluded that there was no absolute truth and that man could not arrive at any certain knowledge.

SECOND PERIOD (B.C. 400–200).

In the fourth century before Christ, Socrates (B.C. 399) opened a new era of philosophy. Rejecting the speculations and systems of preceding schools, he aimed to give philosophy a practical end, and applied himself to the study of man and of the moral world. He taught that the soul contains the germs of truth, but so choked up by the vain opinions to

which the passions give birth, that for their development it is necessary to begin by freeing it from these false notions. And such was the method adopted by Socrates in teaching, and since called *Socratic induction*.

Immediately after Socrates come four schools of little importance : 1° The Cynical school, founded by Antisthenes (B.C. 380), which placed virtue in a haughty independence of external things.—Diogenes (B.C. 324) was the most complete representative of this school ; 2° The Cyrenaic school, founded by Aristippus (B.C. 380), which taught that the end of life consists in the pleasures of sense ; 3° The Sceptical school, founded by Pyrrho (B.C. 288), who referred all philosophy to virtue, inferred the inutility of science, and sought to prove its impossibility ; 4° The Megaric school, founded by Euclid (B.C. 400), whose philosophy was the doctrine of Xenophanes modified by Socratic influence.

These schools had little power ; but not so the four great schools that produced the philosophic development promoted by Socrates : 1° The school of Plato, or the Academy ; 2° The school of Aristotle, or the Lyceum ; 3° The school of Epicurus ; 4° The school of Zeno, or the Portico.

Plato (B.C. 388) is one of the greatest geniuses of antiquity. In his numerous works he has developed great and sublime truths whenever he takes the traditional beliefs for his basis, but he falls into error when he accepts no other guide than his own reason. Thus he has erred upon most of the great questions of philosophy : on the origin of ideas, on the criteria of certitude, on the nature of the union between soul and body, on the unity of the soul, its origin and destiny. The principal writings of Plato are ; *Crito*, on the duty

of the citizen ; *Phædo*, on immortality ; the *First Alcibiades*, on the nature of man ; the *Second Alcibiades*, on prayer ; *Gorgias*, on the end of rhetoric and of justice ; *Protagoras*, on sophists ; the *Republic*, on the plan of an ideal city ; and the *Laws*. As to form, the works of Plato display an admirable perfection ; it is through this especially that the philosopher has exercised so profound and extensive an influence both in ancient and in modern times.

Aristotle of Stagyra (B.C. 331), a disciple of Plato, surpassed his master in the depth and extent of his knowledge. Metaphysics and natural history, logic and physics, and poetry, he has embraced all. The theory of the syllogism comes from him, and has received from him a complete exposition. His works on physics and natural history were for centuries a recognized authority. On the nature of bodies, on the soul and its faculties, on ideas, he has taught doctrines that are full of deep truths and were the basis of the great labors of the Scholastic philosophers. Nevertheless, he has fallen into very grave errors, especially in morals and politics, for he was buried in the darkness of paganism.—Of the Peripatetics, or disciples of Aristotle, the chief are Theophrastus (B.C. 322) and Straton (B.C. 289).

Epicurus (B.C. 309) professed the atomistic doctrine of Democritus. Egoism and skilfully calculated pleasures — such is the summary of his morality, which all ages have justly branded with disgrace. When introduced into the Roman empire, Epicureanism found an eloquent interpreter in the poet Lucretius (B.C. 50), who contributed not a little to propagate its tenets.

Zeno (B.C. 300), the founder of Stoicism, taught a doctrine which, in its physical theories, touched on

Epicureanism, and, in its morals, on Platonism. In his opinion there is nothing but body; everything is subject to the laws of fatality; all cognition is derived from sensation. As to ethics, justice should be the sole motive of man's actions; to be truly wise, one must repress all the emotions of the soul; justice is the only good, injustice is the only evil; sickness and death are neither good nor evil. From this it is evident that Stoicism is contradictory in its principles and in its morality.—The principal Stoics were Chrysippus (B.C. 230); and later Seneca (B.C. 30), Epictetus (B.C. 50), and the emperor Marcus Aurelius (A.D. 161).

The school founded by Plato had been styled the Academy. By the name of the Old Academy that epoch has been designated during which Plato's disciples respected his doctrines; by that of the Second or Middle Academy, the epoch that witnessed the first reform of Plato's teaching; and by that of the New Academy, the epoch in which a second reform was attempted.—Arcesilas (B.C. 260) was the founder of the Middle Academy: he reduced all human certitude to probability under the name of *acatalepsy*.—Carneades (B.C. 180) founded the New Academy. According to him, objective truth exists, but man is incapable of attaining anything beyond a more or less probable conjecture. The principles of the New Academy were spread in the Roman world, and found their most illustrious exponent in Cicero (B.C. 43), who formulated no system of his own, but faithfully reproduced the doctrines of the Greek philosophy. In his philosophical writings he has treated all the great questions, sometimes with positiveness, and again with doubt.

About this same epoch there was a *quasi*-resurrection of the old school of Pyrrho; doubt was again

systematized and presented as the necessary term of all philosophic labors.—Ænesidemus (B.C. 20) professed a positive and rigorously formulated scepticism. But it was Sextus Empiricus (A.D. 180) who, of the ancients, exposed scepticism with most science and extensiveness; he attacked all the doctrines of his predecessors and strove to convict them of uncertainty.

THIRD PERIOD (A.D. 200–500).

The third period of ancient philosophy begins with Christianity and ends with the invasion of the barbarians. It may be divided into three distinct schools: 1° The Gnostic school; 2° The Neoplatonic school; and 3° The Christian school.

Gnosticism is a mixture of Oriental doctrines and Christian dogmas; it gave birth to divers systems, all of which, however, may be reduced to two, pantheism and dualism. Pantheism is seen in the systems of Apelles (150), Valentinus (160), and Carpocrates (170). The speculations of Saturninus (120), of Bardesanes (160), and of Basilides (130), spring from the principle of dualism. The Gnostic ideas developed by these systems concurred to produce the doctrine of Manes (274) or Manicheism, a combination of Persian dualism and Hindoo pantheism with the dogmas of Christianity: this doctrine exercised a powerful influence for several centuries. Eventually the Gnostic systems were transformed, and their principles became the basis of various heresies, such as Arianism, Nestorianism, and Eutychianism.

The Neoplatonic school, called also the school of Alexandria, from the name of the city which was its chief asylum, had for its leading professors: Ammo-

nius Saccas (200), Plotinus (245), Porphyry (290), Jamblicus (300), Hierocles (400), and Proclus (450). These philosophers undertook to unite Oriental and Greek philosophy. A like attempt had been made in the first century by Jewish philosophers, among others by Philo (40); but, properly speaking, the head of the Neoplatonic school was Plotinus. These Alexandrians devoted themselves for the most part to occult practices of theurgy; they were the sworn enemies of Christianity, from which, however, they borrowed not a little.

The principle Christian philosophers of the first centuries are: St. Denis the Areopagite (95), St. Justin (160), St. Irenæus (200), Athenagoras (200), Tertullian (240), Clement of Alexandria (210), Origen (250), Lactantius (320), and St. Augustine (430). These writers, grounding their teachings on the dogmas of religion, attained to the highest and best founded speculations. Their ideas, even in purely philosophical matters, far excel all the conceptions of their predecessors among the philosophers. Moreover, they gave a practical end to their vast labors, for, on the one hand, they combated the false doctrines of the pagan and heretical philosophers; and on the other, they always contemplated science in its relation to virtue. Most of them had been disciples of the Greek philosophy; they borrowed thence whatever was true, and strove to apply it to the truths of religion. Their writings have served as a preparation and groundwork for the labors of Christian philosophy.

MEDIÆVAL PHILOSOPHY.

FIRST PERIOD (6TH TO 9TH CENTURY).

The disordered state of society which followed the invasions of the barbarians interrupted the great philosophic movement of the first ages of Christianity. From the sixth to the ninth century there were few philosophers: in the West, Boëthius (525), Cassiodorus (575), Claudian Mamertus (474), Isidore of Seville (636), and Bede (735); in the East, John Philoponus (650), and especially St. John Damascene (754). Boëthius forms the link between ancient and mediæval philosophy. He sought to reconcile whatever was true in the Greek philosophers with the dogmas of Christianity. He became a high authority for the following centuries; his writings, and among others his book *On the Consolation of Philosophy*, were for a long period used in the school-room. St. John Damascene, like Boëthius, united the study of philosophy to that of theology; at a later date his works also had great credit in the schools of the East.

SECOND PERIOD (9TH TO 13TH CENTURY).

ARABIAN PHILOSOPHY.

Under the reign of the caliphs Haroun-al-Raschid and Al-Mamoun, the Arabs began to cultivate the science of philosophy. The principal masterpieces of

Greece were translated into their tongue ; the books of Aristotle in particular were much studied.—The most ancient of the Arabian philosophers is Alkendi (800), who merely commented upon Aristotle. Al-Farabi, who lived about a century later, made logic the principal object of his labors.—In the tenth century appeared Avicenna, who was long counted in the first rank of the masters of medicine, and is still regarded by the Orientals as one of their chief philosophers. He commented on the logic and metaphysics of Aristotle, but considerably modified several of the Stagyrice's important theories.—Al-Gazel, who lived in the eleventh century, employed his entire resources in dialectics to destroy all systems of philosophy ; he held that one could escape doubt only by having recourse to the revelation of the Koran. In the East the attempt of Al-Gazel inflicted a blow on philosophy from which it could not recover. But this was the very time when it was cultivated with more eagerness than ever in the Academies which the caliphs had founded in most of the cities subject to the Saracens. Far different from Al-Gazel was Avempace (1138), a native of Saragossa, who taught that philosophic speculation was the sole means by which man could know himself ; his doctrine tended to exclude the supernatural. Avempace had among his disciples Thofail (1185), whose system is pantheism.—But of all the philosophers that Islamism has given to Spain, the most celebrated is unquestionably Averrhoës (1168). He made extensive commentaries on all the works of Aristotle. He composed, besides, several original treatises, of which the substance is Peripateticism, but carried to consequences which Aristotle would have disclaimed. In the opinion of Averrhoës, there is none but a universal intelligence, in which all

intelligent beings share without having an intelligence of their own. By this and other doctrines he opened the way to pantheism, so that even the Muslims condemned his works. Some of his Peripatetic ideas were developed by a disciple of his, Moses Maimonides (1209), a Jewish philosopher and the greatest light of the Hebrew people since the preaching of the Gospel. A century previous, another Jew, Avicbron, also gained great renown as a philosopher; he taught doctrines whose consequences were pantheistic.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE SCHOOLS BEFORE ST. THOMAS.

With Charlemagne the culture of the sciences and literature was begun anew with ardor in the West. Alcuin (804) was the principal instrument in the hands of the emperor to create new schools and make them prosper. Under Charles the Bald, Scotus Erigena (886) became famous; he was of Irish birth, but passed the greater part of his life in France. His doctrines are pantheistic, and he labored in vain to reconcile them with the Christian dogmas. About the middle of the eleventh century great philosophic works began to be published. St. Anselm (1033–1109) wrote his two treatises, the *Monologium* and the *Prosologium*, in which, with no aid but reason, he rose to the highest conceptions of the divine essence.

It was at this epoch that philosophy was brought back to a problem with which it had formerly been engaged, the problem of *universals*, of genera and species. Plato had thought that universals had an existence in themselves apart from particular individuals; Aristotle had regarded them as concepts of the intellect corresponding to the essences contained

in the existing entities ; however, he did not present his opinion with sufficient clearness, and it may receive different interpretations. Toward the end of the eleventh century, Roscelin, a canon of Compiègne, revived the question. He maintained that the universals contained in generic and specific ideas were mere words and consisted in names only : hence the designation of *nominalism* given to his theory. St. Anselm was one of his most ardent adversaries, and victoriously combated the heterodox consequences which Roscelin drew from his system. William of Champeaux (1121) considered the universals as essences common to several individuals, which were, therefore, distinguished from one another by merely accidental differences. This doctrine, which gave an objective reality to universals as such, was called *ultra-realism*. Abelard (1142) attacked the theory of his former teacher, William of Champeaux, and invented a third system, *conceptualism*, which regarded universals as mere concepts of the mind, and was, after all, only disguised nominalism. Nominalism and conceptualism tended to serious errors, even to atheism and materialism ; hence they were generally rejected by the Catholic schools. As to realism, it is of two kinds : one considers the essence as having an individual subsistence apart from the mind and receiving its universality in the intellect ; the other regards the essence as possessing an abstracted and universal reality apart from any mental operation. The former is *moderate realism*, and was accepted and defended by St. Anselm and the other great philosophers of the schools ; the latter is *ultra-realism*, which was sustained by several, among others by Gilbert of Porrée (1154), bishop of Poitiers, and has been solemnly condemned by the Church.

One of those who shone with greatest lustre in these philosophic disputations was Peter Lombard (1159). His chief work is the book entitled *The Master of the Sentences*, in which he has collected the sentiments of the Fathers on the principal points of theology and philosophy. This book exerted a powerful influence; it was for a long period a text-book which the professors explained in their schools.

At this epoch the dissemination of the complete works of Aristotle within the universities, which till then had known them only in part, and the appearance of the Arabian philosophy, gave a new impulse to philosophic studies. Unfortunately the ardor which then carried minds away, and the enthusiasm for Aristotle and his Arabian commentators which then fired them, weakened religious faith and submission to the authority of the Church. Amaury of Chartres (1209) and David of Dinant (1220) taught, the one, idealistic pantheism, the other, materialistic pantheism, and thus drew upon themselves the anathemas of the Church. But while the works of Aristotle and the Arabian philosophers brought trouble into the schools, two religious orders sprang up destined to furnish illustrious defenders of the truth. The Franciscan Alexander of Hales (1245) and the Dominican Albert the Great (1280) became celebrated as much by the depth and extent of their learning as by the orthodoxy of their teaching. Their works, together with those of William of Auvergne (1248), bishop of Paris, were a preparation for the immortal masterpieces to be produced by Bonaventure and Thomas of Aquin.

APOGEE OF THE SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY (13TH CENTURY).

Around William of Auvergne, Alexander of Hales, and Albert the Great was grouped a great number of illustrious philosophers and theologians, as Vincent of Beauvais (1264), whose *Speculum Majus* (General Mirror) was a kind of encyclopædia of all the sciences; Henry of Ghent (1295), surnamed the "Solemn Doctor," from the authority of his doctrines; and Roger Bacon (1294), whose vast intellect foresaw some of the most important discoveries of modern science. But among all these, two men became especially famous in the thirteenth century; they soared by their genius above all their contemporaries; they are St. Bonaventure and St. Thomas of Aquin.

St. Bonaventure was born in Tuscany in 1221. He entered the order of Franciscans and studied at Paris under Alexander of Hales; by his sanctity, as well as by his science, he merited to become the general of his order. He was made bishop and cardinal by Gregory X., and assisted at the second council of Lyons, where he died in 1274. St. Bonaventure's principal philosophic work is his commentary on *The Master of the Sentences*. He teaches that all science comes from God and should lead to God; therefore he makes all the cognitions of reason concur to the service of the divine science, and in all things he seeks the hidden element by which they are referred to God; hence the elevation and sublimity to be remarked in his writings, and that have won for him the surname of "Seraphic Doctor."

His rival in learning was St. Thomas of Aquin, surnamed the "Angel of the Schools." He was born

in the kingdom of Naples in 1227, and embraced the religious life in the order of St. Dominic. After studying philosophy and theology at Bologna under Albert the Great, he followed him to Paris, where he subsequently taught with great distinction. He died in a monastery of Italy in 1274. His philosophic ideas are embodied chiefly in the *Theological Sum*, the *Sum against the Gentiles*, the *Commentaries* on all the parts of Aristotle's philosophy, and several special treatises on questions of metaphysics and morals. Pope John XXII. declared that St. Thomas of Aquin diffused more light in the Church than all the other doctors together. In fact, in his numerous works are to be found arguments to defend all truths and to combat all errors. Hence they have at all times possessed the greatest authority in the schools and among the learned, and the *Theological Sum* merited a place on the same table with the *Bible* at the Council of Trent. By his vigorous attacks on the Arabian philosophy, St. Thomas destroyed its credit and reduced it to complete impotence. He took from Aristotle whatever was true, refuted his errors, rectified what was defective and incomplete; by thus enlisting the philosophy of the Stagyrte in the defence of the truth, he put an end to the pernicious influence which it had long exercised in the schools. By a luminous distinction he cleared up the difficult problem of universals. He showed that the essence has a different manner of being according to whether it is considered as having a real existence or as having an ideal existence, and thus he avoided the error of both nominalists and realists. He threw light upon the most difficult questions of metaphysics; and his doctrines on God, the nature of spirits, the composition of bodies, the origin of

ideas, the rights and duties of man, have even to this day lost none of their authority. Moreover, it is from St. Thomas of Aquin that philosophers as well as theologians most frequently borrow their arguments for the defence of truth.

THIRD PERIOD (14TH AND 15TH CENTURIES).

DECLINE OF SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY.

The teaching of St. Thomas was continued by his disciples, among others by Egidio Colonna (1316). But in the face of this body of doctrine, which had its principal defenders in the Dominican order, there arose another in the Franciscan order whose solutions differed on several points. Its founder was Duns Scotus (1308), called the "Subtle Doctor," whose numerous works give proof of his remarkable power and his great subtility in dialectics. But this subtility was nowhere carried further than in the *Combinatory Art* of Raymond Lully (1315), who pretended that by logical procedures a mechanical means is given to the intellect for the solution of all questions.

While Durand de Saint-Pourçain (1334) appeared in the order of St. Dominic as the adversary of St. Thomas, William Ockham (1347) among the Franciscans opposed both St. Thomas and Duns Scotus, and revived the nominalism of Roscelin, in which action he was followed by John Buridan (1360) and Peter d'Ailly (1420). Thus it happened that lively discussions were raised in the universities, and they led to such errors that many a time the Holy See was obliged to interfere,

On the decline of scholasticism several philosophers made a name for themselves by remarkable works; among them should be noted the chancellor Gerson (1429), who in some of his writings restored intuitive and mystic philosophy.

MODERN PHILOSOPHY.

1. FIRST PERIOD (END OF 15TH, AND 16TH CENTURY).

EPOCH OF TRANSITION.

At the end of the fifteenth century, and during the sixteenth, many writings were published relating to philosophy without strictly constituting a system. The Greeks, Theodore of Gaza (1478), George of Trebizonde (1486), and Cardinal Bessarion (1472), published commentaries on the books of the ancient philosophers; Angelo Poliziano (1474) in Italy, Ulric von Hutten (1523) and Erasmus (1536) in Germany, attacked the Scholastic philosophy; Marsilio Ficino (1499), the Florentine, became the panegyrist of Plato; Pico della Mirandola (1494) in Italy, and Reuchlin (1522) in Germany, taught doctrines that were a mixture of theology and cabalistic ideas.

Yet some philosophers gave a systematic form to their conceptions. Cardinal Nicholas de Cusa (1464) distinguished himself by his depth and originality. He restored certain Pythagorean ideas to honor and anticipated the exposition of the Copernican system of the earth's motion. Paracelsus (1541) taught a kind of illuminism which was subsequently professed by Van Helmont (1664) and Boehme (1625). All three derived the science of the physical world from theosophy. Telesio (1588), on the contrary, excluded God from his theory of the world. Thomas Campanella

(1639) was one of Bacon's precursors, and explained the whole man by the faculty of sensation. Pomponazzi, or Pomponatus (1526), taught among other errors that the soul is mortal and destitute of all liberty. Jerome Cardano (1576) became noted by his most extravagant doctrines. Giordano Bruno (1600) professed a pantheistic system and prepared the way for Spinoza; he regarded the world as an infinite organism, of which God was the soul. Vanini (1619) was burned at Toulouse as an atheist. Peter Ramus (1572) undertook a reform of logic, and combated to the last extremity the philosophy of Aristotle. Montaigne (1592) regarded the reason of man as naturally incapable of arriving at certitude; in this he was in part followed by his disciple Charron (1603).

2. SECOND PERIOD.

PHILOSOPHY OF BACON, DESCARTES, AND LEIBNITZ.

Francis Bacon, Lord Verulam, was born at London in 1561. He played an important part in the affairs of his country and was made baron of Verulam by James I. He died in 1626. His principal work is *Novum Organum Scientiarum*. In this work he assails the philosophy of Aristotle, and seeks to replace it by a new system. After a criticism of the syllogism, he gives a classification of the sources of errors, dividing them into four categories, which in his own quaint language he designates as *idols of the tribe*, the prejudices common to all men; *idols of the den*, individual prejudices; *idols of the market-place*, prejudices due to language and the commerce of men; and *idols of the theatre*, prejudices due to the authority

of masters. Bacon then assigns a practical end to science ; he lays down the laws of experimentation, and gives the method of observation and induction as the means of progress in the sciences. The soul of Bacon's philosophy is the principle that sensations are the only constituent in the formation of human cognitions. This principle, developed by his disciples, was destined gradually to insure the triumph of materialistic doctrines.

Descartes was born in 1596 at La Haye, in Touraine. He at first embraced the military state ; then, after travelling in several countries of Europe, he withdrew to Holland, where he devoted himself exclusively to works, the plan of which he had already conceived. He made important discoveries in physics and mathematics. In philosophy he desired to effect a reform, and he made a vigorous attack on the theories of Aristotle. Having drawn persecution upon himself by his doctrines, he sought refuge with Queen Christina, at Stockholm, where he died in 1650. His principal philosophical work is the *Discourse on Method*. It contains six parts. The first comprises his criticism of the science handed down by the schools. In the second, after proclaiming the insufficiency of the syllogism, he formulates his method, which he reduces to the famous four rules : 1° Accept as true only what is evidently such ; 2° Divide every question into as many parts as possible ; 3° Proceed from the easy to the difficult, from the simple to the composite ; 4° In enumerations take care to omit nothing. These rules have been much praised for depth and originality, but they are pointed out by nature, and were known and put in practice long before Descartes published his *Discourse*. In the third part, while awaiting the solutions which his

reason was to furnish him, he makes provisional rules of thought and conduct. In the fourth part, he rejects by the methodical doubt all his previous opinions, and formulates the celebrated enthymeme: *I think, therefore I am*, on which he pretends to raise the structure of science. In the fifth part, he describes the leading ideas in his system of cosmology; and in the sixth, he indicates by what means the sciences may effect new progress. In this discourse, the value of which has been greatly exaggerated, and also in his other works of philosophy, Descartes teaches many errors, which have been made the foundation of most of the modern false systems. And so, while aiming to create a new philosophy, he has fallen into error on the great questions of certitude, of substance, of the union between soul and body, and others of equal importance. It is to be remarked, however, that Descartes did not shape his conduct by these systems, for he showed himself a good Christian, though his doctrines have been the occasion of bitter attacks upon the Church.

Leibnitz was born at Leipsic in 1648. His vast intellect embraced all the sciences. In mathematics he established the basis of infinitesimal calculus, and he wrote extensively on history, constitutional law, philosophy, and theology. He died in 1716. His principal philosophical works are his *Essays on Theodicy* and his *New Essays on the Human Understanding*. Leibnitz holds that all substances, even material, are forces; that matter has its principle in simple and irreducible forces, perfectly analogous to the simple and irreducible forces that constitute spirits: these forces he calls *monads*. The monads cannot act upon one another; however, they correspond exactly in their evolutions in virtue of a *harmony pre-established*

by God. In theodicy, he professes *optimism*, and believes that this world is the best possible.

3. THE SCHOOLS OF BACON, DESCARTES, AND LEIBNITZ.

The principal disciples of Bacon's school are: Hobbes, Gassendi, Locke, Condillac, Helvetius, d'Holbach, and Hume. Hobbes (1679) in his works, and more particularly in the *Leviathan*, denies the existence of spirits, reduces the end of man to pleasure, and in politics acknowledges no rights but those of power and force. Gassendi (1655) is celebrated on account of the apology which he makes in various works for the philosophy of Epicurus.—Locke (1704), in his *Essay on the Human Understanding*, recognizes two sources of ideas: sensation, which furnishes all the elements, and reflection, which forms from them various composites; he asserts that it is impossible to demonstrate the spirituality of the soul, and that perhaps matter is capable of thought.—Condillac (1780) develops the theories of Locke in his *Essay on the Origin of Human Knowledge* and in his *Treatise on Sensation*. He takes away reflection as a source of ideas and admits only sensation. He explains all the operations of the soul by *transformed sensations*. From his doctrines it is easy to deduce the negation of liberty, of the soul, and of the existence of God—in a word, scepticism.—Helvetius (1771) applied the principles of sensism to morals, and reduced virtue to self-interest. D'Holbach (1789) in his *System of Nature* supported the opinion that only material beings exist.—Hume (1776) drew from sensism a complete system of scepticism.

The principal philosophers of Descartes' school are: Malebranche, Arnauld, Bossuet, Fénelon, Pascal,

Berkeley, and Spinoza. The most noted works of Malebranche (1715) are the *Search for Truth*, the *Christian and Metaphysical Meditations*, and the *Conversations on Metaphysics*. In these he proves himself a superior writer and at times a profound philosopher, but at the same time he teaches erroneous systems which have justly discredited his works. For instance, it is his theory that we see all in God, even the material world; that the soul is only the *occasional* cause of the movements of the body. His philosophy tends to idealism and contains the germs of pantheism.—Antoine Arnauld (1694) made a great name by his *Art of Thinking*, commonly known as the *Port-Royal Logic*, which he wrote in a week with Nicole (1695), each writing half.—Bossuet (1704) has left but one work that treats specially of philosophy, the *Treatise on the Knowledge of God and Oneself*, in which he summarizes what is most useful in the science of God and of the soul.—Fénelon (1715) wrote the *Demonstration of the Existence of God*, in which he displays his great depth and originality: in the first part, he proves the existence of God by final causes; in the second, he deduces it from the idea of the infinite.—Pascal (1662), in his *Thoughts*, aims alternately to exalt and to humble man at the sight of his greatness and his miseries.—Berkeley (1753), in the attempt to destroy materialism, falls into an opposite excess; he denies the existence of the material world and sinks into complete idealism.—Spinoza (1677), in his *Ethics*, revives materialistic pantheism. He gives an exposition of his system according to the geometrical method, and forms his theories into a closely linked chain of reasoning, but he begins with an unsound principle. It is the false definition of substance given by Descartes, "Substance is that which exists by it-

self (*par soi*).” In his work, Spinoza (1677) sets himself to demonstrate: 1° That there is but one substance, the Infinite Being; 2° That all finite beings are only modes or attributes of this Infinite Substance. The famous sceptic Bayle (1706) may also be placed in the school of Descartes; in his *Critical Dictionary* he impugns the certainty of all human knowledge.

The influence of the philosophy of Leibnitz was felt by nearly all the German schools of his epoch, and inclined them to idealism. Thomasius and Wolf are its leading exponents. The doctrine of Thomasius (1655) presents a singular combination of sensism and mysticism. Wolf (1764) was the continuator of Leibnitz, whose doctrines he coördinated into one great system of philosophy.

4. THE SCOTCH SCHOOL AND THE GERMAN SCHOOL.

Even in England the doctrines of Hobbes and Locke had encountered marked opposition. Hutcheson (1747) strove to banish sensism from the domain of morality, though he allowed it to remain as the basis of psychology. But Reid (1710–1796) attacked it as a false theory not only of morality, but likewise of the human mind. He taught for a long period in the University of Glasgow, in Scotland, and he is regarded as the founder of the *Scotch school*. His chief work is the *Essay on the Intellectual Powers of Man*. He there demonstrates with much justice and sagacity the insufficiency of sensation to explain all psychological phenomena, but he also inculcates some errors on method, certitude, the faculties of the soul, etc. One of the special characteristics of his philosophy is his doctrine of instinctive judg-

ments, the truth of which, though not intellectually perceived is necessarily to be admitted under pain of drifting into scepticism. Dugald Stewart (1828), a pupil of Reid's, continued in his teaching and his works to apply the method of his master. He distinguished himself by his spirit of observation in the study of the phenomena of the human mind.

Emmanuel Kant (1724-1804) was the founder of the *German school*. He taught for many years at Koenigsberg. The most celebrated of his works is the *Critique of Pure Reason*, wherein he establishes the principles of the philosophical reform which he had begun. Although he proposed to combat scepticism, yet in his works he lays the foundations of a complete scepticism and of the most monstrous errors; but he is inconsistent with his system and admits the great truths of the existence of God, the liberty and immortality of the soul.* The chief philosophers connected with his school are Fichte (1814), Schelling (1854), and Hegel (1831); all three, pushing the ideas of their master to their utmost limit, drew the logical consequence of an idealistic pantheism which numbers many adherents in Germany to-day.†

* That is, as *postulates of practical reason* and because of practical necessity; but he affirms that they are unattainable by theoretical or speculative reason.

† From the denial of philosophic certitude, Strauss went a step farther and denied the historic certitude of the books of the Bible. In his *Life of Jesus* (1835) he asserts that Christ is but a myth, his Gospel but a bundle of myths, embellished by poetic imaginations called miracles. It is from him that Rénan has borrowed most of his blasphemies

5. PRESENT SCHOOLS IN FRANCE.

Besides the German school, strictly so called, there are many schools at present: 1° The eclectic rationalistic; 2° The progressive; 3° The positivistic and materialistic; 4° The ontologistic; 5° The traditionalistic; 6° The Thomistic. The founder of eclecticism is Victor Cousin (1866). Among those who prepared the way for him are Laromiguière (1837), Maine de Biran (1824), and Royer Collard (1825). His principal disciples are Jouffroy (1842) and Damiron (1864). The eclectics adopt in general spiritualistic doctrines, but they reject the supernatural and recognize no authority but that of reason.—The progressive school is so called because it professes to believe in indefinite progress. Its leaders are La Mennais (1854) and Pierre Leroux (1871), whose tenets lead to pantheism. To this school may be referred the humanitarian and socialist systems of Fourier (1837), Saint-Simon (1825), and others, whose utopian schemes have excited the contempt of all sensible persons. The positivistic and materialistic school is chiefly represented by Auguste Comte (1857), Littré (1881), and Taine (b. 1828), who have striven, but in vain, to make the progress of modern science subservient to the defence of the degrading doctrines of materialism.—The ontologistic school, renewing the error of Malebranche, has overlooked the distance that separates man from God, and teaches that all our ideas are but partial intuitions of God. This error, which logically ends in pantheism, has been specially inculcated by Gioberti (1852) and Rosmini (1855).—The traditionalistic school exaggerates the feebleness of human reason, in the belief that the authority of tradition and reve-

lation is strengthened thereby; it has exposed itself to the attacks of incredulity and atheism, which it aimed to combat. Its leaders were De Bonald (1840), La Mennais (before his fall), and Ventura (1861).

6. PHILOSOPHY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA.

The great impetus given to the study of the natural sciences in this century has led many philosophers, so called, to give undue importance to the methods of observation and experiment, and even to apply them to the solution of some of the gravest questions in philosophy. Thus, "Mill and his followers drag down all *a priori* laws to the level of the *a posteriori*, or rather deny the existence of the *a priori* laws at all."* The manifold errors of English philosophy to-day may be traced more or less directly to this deplorable confusion of principles. In the domain of logic, the conceptualism of Sir W. Hamilton and the nominalism of John Stuart Mill are the result of a failure to discriminate between the intellectual idea and the sensible image in the imagination. Both men have attacked the fundamental principles of knowledge: Hamilton asserts that not the principle of contradiction, but the principle of identity, which he formulates as *A is A*, is the first of all; Mill declares that the principle of contradiction is "one of our first and most familiar generalizations from experience," and reduces the principle of causation to "invariable and unconditioned antecedence." In psychology empiricism prevails and is supported by Mill, Lewes, Spencer, and Bain, in England; by Draper and Fiske, in America. Now it takes the form of positivism, and,

* *Logic*, Stonylhurst Series, p. 387.

as its name indicates, accepts as positive only what is attested by scientific observation and experiment. Of this school George H. Lewes is the exponent in England. Again, it becomes evolutionism and teaches that "all material and spiritual substances are but force, or a collection of correlated forces." Herbert Spencer is the father of this system ; with him Darwin and Huxley may be associated. In ethics and politics the same spirit is at work, as may be seen in the utilitarianism of Mill, the moral system of Herbert Spencer, and the religion of humanity inculcated by the school of Comte. As for general metaphysics, it is all but absolutely rejected as being a series of unintelligible, unprofitable, and often unmeaning speculations. Agnosticism is but the negative side of positivism, for it defines that "the ultimate cause and the essential nature of things are unknowable, or at least unknown"—a sad commentary on the enlightenment of a Huxley and a Romanes, who profess such ignorance of what it most intimately concerns man to know. The German transcendental school has also a following in England and America.

Since the condemnation of ontologism and traditionalism by the Church, the Thomistic school alone remains among Catholic philosophers. This school, which has never wanted illustrious representatives in Catholic universities, counts among its prominent supporters, Sanseverino (1873), Kleutgen (1883), Liberatore (1893), Gonzalez, and Cardinal Zigliara (1893). By their learned works, these philosophers and their disciples have repulsed the attacks of error and restored to honor the grand Scholastic philosophy, justly styled Christian or Catholic, because as a course it has been praised, encouraged, and, it may be said, sanctioned by the Church herself, the infallible guardian of truth.

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ERRATA.

p. 402, § 72, l. 2, for *his* read *its*.

p. 403, l. 2, for *unvariable* read *invariable*.

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